The Rational State

A feminist look, supported by Althusser's Marxist theory, at how Mr. Scogan views and interacts with the women in Aldous Huxley's *Crome Yellow*

Andrew Modig

Vt- 2012

Uppsats, kanditatnivå, 15 hp
Engelska
Engelska 6190

Handledare: Marko Modiano
Examinator: Iulian Cananau
ABSTRACT
This paper analyses Mr. Scogan and his treatment of women with the use of Althusser’s Marxist theory which (supposedly and in this case successfully) reveals the ideology which infuses every State and every larger social group. Feminist theory is then used to analyse his philosophy which influences both his utopia, “the Rational State”, as well as his treatment of women – the conclusion drawn after analysing several events or discussions in *Crome Yellow*, such as on the Home Farm, the Rational State and the Charity Fair was that Mr. Scogan is perhaps not representative of all men and certainly not of men (and men’s notions) at the time of *Crome Yellow*’s publication, but he is representative of a stereotypical man who oppress women based on their femininity. The worst case scenario drawn was that Mr. Scogan could be a rapist of young virgins.

Keywords: Huxley, Althusser, ideology, fascism, rationality, feminism, patriarchy, essentialism, Enlightenment
INTRODUCTION

In this paper Mr. Scogan and his philosophy will be investigated through his words and actions in interacting with the women at Crome, with the primary aim of analysing what views he has of women (and to some extent why he has those views) in the early 1920’s. This is particularly interesting since women gained the right to vote in 1918 as a direct result of the suffragette movement’s century-long work and an indirect result of the First World War and women’s war effort (taking on the jobs that the men left vacated when going to war, as well as new jobs pertaining to the war situation required) and “in the British war economy 1914–1918 [which] secured a degree of emancipation which years of campaigning had not achieved” (Evans 12). Inquiring whether the women are representative of this revolutionary time as well (or not) is of lesser import; the purpose is to analyse Mr. Scogan, not the women. Despite this, the women and their situation, and to some extent their personalities, will provide the background for understanding Mr. Scogan’s (inter)actions with said women – since people interact differently due to circumstances of varying kinds. The descriptions of Mr. Scogan will either be from the women’s or the narrator’s perspective, and citations of conversations will also leave out the other men to as large an extent as possible.

The theoretical perspective will be based in feminist theory and criticism and remains as such in general; however, when analysing Mr. Scogan’s interactions with the “girl dressed in white muslin” (Huxley, CY 152, hereinafter, when in the form of parenthetical reference, Crome Yellow will be abbreviated CY; “the girl dressed in white muslin” will hereinafter be referred to as the “muslin girl” as well) at the charity fair it was necessary to use Marxist theory and an aspect of Freud’s psychoanalysis to be able to understand the encounter (and only in that encounter).

The secondary aim is to analyse Mr. Scogan’s utopia, “the Rational State” (Huxley, CY 128; henceforth this concept will be taken from the same source and page when referred to), through Marxist theory – specifically in the form of Althusser’s Marxist theory – which attempts to reveal Mr. Scogan’s fascist ideas; ideas whose familiarity (to the reader) and later analysis thereof serves to provide the basis for the feminist theory’s criticisms. In the end (that is, after preceding attempts of analysing Mr. Scogan) Althusser’s theory and terms proved to provide the best basis for describing (the underlying structures of) Mr. Scogan’s philosophy, a philosophy which in turn makes him treat women in a certain way; that philosophy and its results are what will be exposed and criticised through utilising feminist theory. Thus, Althusser’s Marxist theory is used to expose Mr. Scogan’s philosophy, which then is criticised through feminist theory. Taken to its extreme, the analysis makes it plausible that
the Rational State could become the civilisation in Huxley’s best known novel, *Brave New World*. To understand the full extent of Mr. Scogan’s utopia, and thus his philosophy, it is necessary to draw comparison between *Crome Yellow* and *Brave New World*.

Everything considered, it would be wrong to assume that feminist theory must therefore be explained in more depth – it is assumed the reader holds a necessary understanding for the oppression of women, and furthermore the feminist approach is *essentialist* in that it assumes women rather than individuals are oppressed (more on essentialism in the section “Feminist theory”). Althusser’s Marxist theory, however, needs further explanation and afterwards serves as basis for understanding Mr. Scogan’s philosophy as well as view of women.

**THEORY, HYPOTHESIS AND DEFINITIONS**

This paper, in the analysis but also through explaining concepts in the theory section, starts by shortly answering the question: Who is Mr. Scogan, and how is he viewed by those around him, including the author, Aldous Huxley? This first, short section describes Mr. Scogan and his philosophy, and will function as a backdrop for the more important second question: How does he view his contemporary world (particularly women), and why does he treat women the way he does? In this second section Althusser’s Marxist theory and feminist theory will be applied in order to understand Mr. Scogan’s nature, specifically in regards to his utopia, as well as his relation to others. The term *philosophy* and its plural form is used, throughout this paper, in the definition of a “system of values by which one lives” ([http://www.thefreedictionary.com](http://www.thefreedictionary.com)) or, as in Mr. Scogan’s case concerning his utopia, *should* live by.

There are three aspects worth noting when analysing Mr. Scogan’s person and reasoning, for instance regarding his fascist ideas – why and how Mr. Scogan is a fascist explains his philosophy in relation to class diversion and the oppression of women as well. The first is the benevolence he sees in his philosophy, such as his belief that “the Herd” (Huxley, *CY* 128; all further references to this concept are taken from the same source and page) will “go through life in a rosy state of intoxication [and be] marvellously happy, happier than any race of men has ever been” (Huxley, *CY* 129). This first aspect of what he regards as benevolence will fit into the more important aspects that follow, namely the actual theories used to understand and criticise his reasoning. The aspect of benevolence comes into play in the form of Mr. Scogan’s misplaced kindness towards others; as a man of reason he seeks an end injustices and social disorder – the core of fascism, i.e. essentially early fascism. However, his end justifies his means (as he sees it, although he sees the whole process as good and rational) and
it will be the whole ideology of his utopia, and specifically the place of women in that utopia, that will be criticised using the above mentioned theories.

The second aspect is Marxist theory and criticism, which in turn serves in helping to understand the third aspect; the dominating (for this paper) feminist theory and criticism. To put it simply and in correlation with each other: Marxist theory concerns “class struggle [and] exploitation of one class by another” (Barry 151), here applied onto Mr. Scogan’s “three main species” (Huxley, CY 128) which in turn aids in understanding feminist theory concerning “unequal treatment of women” (Barry 116). Feminist theory as used in this paper is based on the second and third of the following three definitions, “‘feminist’, ‘female’ and ‘feminine’” (Barry 117) as developed by Toril Moi, where the second is “‘a matter of biology’, and the third ‘a set of culturally defined characteristics’”. The first definition, feminist, is irrelevant in regards to this paper, seeing as this paper seeks to discover if, and (if so) how, and why Mr. Scogan treats women on the basis that women as individuals and as a gender are inferior to men, based on their sex (i.e. their biological differences) – in other words, does he define their characteristics based on their sex? The second definition, female, denotes the biological female sex, while the third definition, feminine, is used as meaning socio-historically patriarchal prescribed attributes which overlook women’s personalities in ‘favour’ of general descriptions; Oxford Dictionaries describes feminine as: “having qualities or an appearance traditionally associated with women, especially delicacy and prettiness” (http://oxforddictionaries.com).

One key concept in this text is the word patriarchy, which is an ideology which sees men as rightfully and naturally better (in most aspects) than women. The word paternal is closely related as well, meaning “showing a kindness and care associated with a father” (http://oxforddictionaries.com). For further discussion and analysis of these words and this ideology, see below (both the sections on Althusser and feminism, as well as the analysis bring up this issue).

THE RATIONAL STATE

At least basic understanding of what Mr. Scogan’s Rational State incorporates is needed to follow the discussions in this paper; to that purpose a summary of what his utopia is described will firstly be provided the reader.

According to Mr. Scogan (all citations in this paragraph taken from Huxley, CY pp: 127-130), the Rational State is based on the idea that “sane men will have the power yet”; “Sanity, for example, informs us that the only way in which we can preserve civilisation is by
behaving decently and intelligently”. However, he admits that “sanity unassisted is useless”, but fortunately enough “[w]e men of intelligence will learn to harness the insanities to the service of reason”. Note should be taken that Mr. Scogan, with perhaps a degree of hubris, unquestioningly assumes himself qualifying as one of the ”men of intelligence”. Mr. Scogan’s utopia nevertheless contains “three main species into which the subjects of the Rational State will be divided”, namely ”the Directing Intelligences, the Men of Faith, and the Herd”. The “Intelligences” consists of “all those capable of thought” who “have to be marvellously clear and merciless and penetrating”, such as Mr. Scogan (according to himself), while ”the Men of Faith … and Desire … might drive men … on to cutting one another’s throats” but after the “men of intelligence” has successfully seized power the “Men of Faith” (as well as the Herd) “will be, all unawares, the tool of some superior intelligence”, and as such the ”Man of Faith will be expending his passion, his desire, and his enthusiasm in the propagation of some reasonable idea”, the reasonable ideas formed by the Intelligences. As Mr. Scogan directly puts it: ”The principal function of the Men of Faith will be to move and direct the Multitude, that third great species consisting of those countless millions who lack intelligence and are without valuable enthusiasm” (my italics). Mr. Scogan explicitly refers to these “countless millions” as “the lower species” as well, thus assuming natural correlation between their “lack [of] intelligence” and their natural and biological inferiority. As Mr. Scogan puts it, one is not born into a “species”, effectively meaning social class, but rather born with an individual set of qualities which provides the basis for the allocation into one of three “species” or classes, with the above mentioned possession (or lack) of qualities. The manner in which the selection is performed he describes thusly: ”human beings will be separated out into distinct species, not according to the colour of their eyes or the shape of their skulls, but according to the qualities of their mind and temperament”.

FREUD

Some aspects of Freud’s psychoanalysis theory will be used when analysing his interaction with the muslin girl, section “Mr. Scogan and the muslin girl”, but the whole of his theory will not be discussed in the theory section. It suffices to discuss the terms used (such as ‘penis envy’) in correlation with the actual analysis. This psychoanalytical perspective is used only to understand why the muslin girl possibly could agree to amorous activities with the old Mr. Scogan – psychoanalysis is not needed in order to explain why Mr. Scogan would take the opportunity to amuse himself.
FASCISM

FASCISM – EARLY AND LATE

When the reader approaches this section regarding fascism the reader should know that instead of simply stating what is ‘early fascism’ (the core of fascism) this section takes it start in ‘late fascism’ and works its way backwards towards the chronologically earlier fascism. The reason lies in our contemporary notion of what fascism implies, which is radically different to how it was perceived in the early 1900’s. To avoid confusion, the reader must not assume that a chronologically ‘devolving’ description will be provided; instead descriptions which come closer to the core of fascism (i.e. early fascism) will be provided. Using a metaphor: the start and goal are set, but the road from one to the other is unclear, but important nevertheless.

Going by the many discussions and proclamations he produces, Mr. Scogan is a wholehearted fascist, and as such it is important to understand what the word fascism denotes: fascism is “(in general use) extreme right-wing, authoritarian, or intolerant views or practices [towards others and] was first used of the totalitarian right-wing nationalist regime of Mussolini in Italy (1922–43)”, (http://oxforddictionaries.com) which incidentally coincides with Aldous Huxley’s stay in Italy (Izzo, Aldous Huxley 3). Furthermore “the regimes of the Nazis in Germany and Franco in Spain were also Fascist” and the word fascism “tends to include a belief in the supremacy of one national or ethnic group, a contempt for democracy, an insistence on obedience to a powerful leader” (http://oxforddictionaries.com), and leadership through a dictator more specifically. This is our contemporary definition of fascism.

The above definitions have been proven right during the twentieth century, however, there was a time when fascism did not carry with it the same connotations as described above. It is crucial to understand how fascism was depicted and understood in its infancy, the late 1910’s and the early 1920’s – the time of and preceding Crome Yellow, and in effect the time of Mr. Scogan’s (inter)actions in said novel. Working our way backwards from what is closest to the above mentioned definition (late fascism) and towards the earliest definition of the word (early fascism) it will be clear how it applies to Mr. Scogan’s contemporary time (that of early fascism). Before defining fascism the history behind this totalitarian philosophy will benefit the understanding of the word and its origin, i.e. the social background which inaugurated it.

Another definition, closer to the heart of fascism (applying to both early and late fascism) describes it as “a nationalistic and anti-Communist system of government … where all aspects of society are controlled by the state and all criticism or opposition is suppressed” (http://www.thefreedictionary.com). It is very fitting to approach fascism through Marxist theory...
seeing how they are truly ideologically opposed, although at the same time, in the realisation of the fascist and Communist regimes and dictatorships, they are yet so similar. As we shall see, pertaining to one particular aspect of fascism (found below in the description of early fascism) Mr. Scogan similarly dreams of a utopia so close to, and yet so different from the fascist ideal state.

FASCISM – EARLY

In all the following paragraphs (all that describe fascism – ending with the new section on Althusser) any long citations, and any shorter citations in correlation to them, are all taken from the same, following source, unless otherwise specifically quoted otherwise:


Before we delve into the definitions of fascism, let us consider the contemporary setting which provided the reactions that led to fascism. The coming of fascism is a direct counteraction against the expansion of Communism (in both Communist states and the rapid increase of Communists of various origin): “fascism introduced no systematic exposition of its ideology or purpose other than a negative reaction against socialist and democratic egalitarianism”, particularly in the late 1910’s which saw the Russian Revolution (1917), “the collapse of the Central Powers in 1918” and various other disorders “caused by Communist[s]”. Conservatives were terrified of the “growth of democratic ideology” and thus “fascism grew out of the attempt to counter it by forming mass parties based largely on the middle classes … exploiting their fear of political domination by the lower classes”.

There are several points where fascism and Communism differ; firstly, as mentioned above, in the fact that fascism is pro-middle class, whereas Communism is chiefly pro-lower class, but essentially pro-classless (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/). When it comes to the classes, fascism “unlike Communism … abhors the idea of a classless society and sees desirable order only in a state in which each class has its distinct place and function”. These points considered, it is clear that fascism owes, to a degree, its existence to socialism (and thus to an extent to Communism) despite their considerable differences.

Continuing with the definitions of fascism in order to come closer to the initial ‘core’ of the term we find that fascism “is obliged to be antitheoretical and frankly opportunistic in order to appeal to many diverse groups” but some concepts are basic to fascism. One is that the state is glorified and the individual must submit in order for order to be ensure and “for their own and the state’s benefit”. The second is that this totalitarian state “is absolute in its methods and unlimited by law in its control and direction of its citizens”.
The state must be “absolute in its methods and unlimited by law” in order to assert “control and direction of its citizens”, but as the definition states it is necessary because “individuals must be absorbed for their own and the state's benefit”. How they – the citizens and the state – benefit will become clear as we come closer to the core of fascism. In order to maintain control over state and citizens, to defend them from both foreign forces and criminals within the nation, a strong police force is also necessary – which citizens clearly benefit from as long as the police force is not abusing their power – as well as a strong army (albeit to a lesser extent unless during war). Thus, to ensure the need of a strong army, fascist states often involve themselves in war or similar military endeavours. The presence of the army is justified by this second purpose, to preserve the nation from outside threats:

A second ruling concept of fascism is embodied in the theory of social Darwinism. The doctrine of survival of the fittest and the necessity of struggle for life is applied by fascists to the life of a nation-state. Peaceful, complacent nations are seen as doomed to fall before more dynamic ones, making struggle and aggressive militarism a leading characteristic of the fascist state.

Drawing from fascism’s “negative reaction against socialist and democratic egalitarianism” it is apparent that

Another element of fascism is its elitism. Salvation from rule by the mob and the destruction of the existing social order can be effected only by an authoritarian leader who embodies the highest ideals of the nation. This concept of the leader as hero or superman … is closely linked with fascism’s rejection of reason and intelligence and its emphasis on vision, creativeness, and “the will.”

There are two important aspects of the above quote that are discernible: firstly, that of “salvation from rule by the mob” and the anarchic result of the lack of “social order”; secondly, “fascism’s rejection of reason and intelligence”. The former aspect defines the ‘core’ of fascism, i.e. the fear of anarchy, which is essential to fascism, while the latter aspect is of particular interest in regards to Mr. Scogan’s pseudo-intellectual reasoning. Approaching them one at a time will serve to provide the definition needed to understand how Mr. Scogan
is a fascist, or perhaps why he is not (see the analysis section concerning this discussion). The above citations is thus the definition for early, ‘core’ fascism.

**FASCISM – EARLY AND ANTI-INTELLECTUAL**

How this relates to Mr. Scogan will be discussed in the section “Mr. Scogan at the Home Farm”, but first we must discuss the second aspect, that of fascism’s “rejection of reason”, is described. The fascist “attitude [is] markedly anti-intellectualistic” (freely translated from Swedish, Norborg para 9) whereas “[m]artial virtues are celebrated, while liberal and democratic values are disparaged”. All things considered, “[t]he myth, not the party program, was what should incite action, and the myth need not be true in order to fulfill its purpose” (freely translated from Swedish, Norborg para 9) a notion that corresponds exceptionally well with fascism’s idea of “unquestioning obedience to its leader”. Any concrete consequence or critical reaction to this anti-intellectual side of fascism has been hard to find, however we can put one and two together and see that “unquestioning obedience” to either leader or party program essentially means that criticism of the fascist state, its leader, philosophy or ideology and any other aspects thereof, was discouraged – and in order to make sure no future criticism arises fascism needs to abolish intellectualism and reason, which sooner or later results in criticism.

There is also a slight difference in the meaning of the word *fascism* depending on context; as for Huxley’s relation to the word and its real world practises it remains true to the above definition and (can) entail the danger of its later definition (that is, chronologically later, i.e. the definition we are familiar with nowadays), but when considering fascism as Mr. Scogan represents it, through his ideas, it is of course similar to its early definition but also represents his “upper-class arrogance” and thoughts on “class divisions” (Izzo, p. 8) – specifically in his fascist utopia the Rational State where the men of intellect and or breeding, “the Directing Intelligences”, govern the inferior human beings Mr. Scogan calls the Herd (Huxley, CY 128). What perhaps separates Mr. Scogan from the stereotypical fascist is that he does not make a difference between groups of either “national or ethnic” character; he says that “Among the Intelligences will be found *all* those capable of thought” (my italics, Huxley, CY 128) which could indicate that whomever, of whichever background, could *possibly* be part of the ruling class (although when coupled with his thoughts of the lower classes it seems unlikely; for further arguments in regards to class-thinking and –differentiation, see below). Henceforth, further reference to the concepts the Intelligences are taken from the same source and page (page 128 CY).
In conclusion, *late fascism* equals the negative notions we have of fascism today, whereas *early fascism* equals the positive notions that people had of fascism in the early twentieth century. Secondly, Mr. Scogan is a fascist in the early definition of fascism, but he differs on the point of reason.

**ALTHUSSER**

**ALTHUSSER – HIS MARXIST THEORY**

Before Marxist theory is used herein it needs to be defined. In this paper Marxist theory is used in the sense of the French Marxist Louis Althusser’s (1918-1990 (Therborn para 1) perspective owing to his

useful distinction between what we might call state power and state control [which] is closely related to the notion of *hegemony* [since, as Barry states, it] is like an internalised form of social control which makes certain views seem ‘natural’ or invisible so that they hardly seem like views at all, just ‘the way things are’. The trick whereby we are made to feel that we are choosing when really we have no choice is called by Althusser *interpellation*. (author’s italics, Barry 158)

Althusser tries to see the whole picture of society and manages to draw broad conclusions as well as assign society (i.e. the State in its many forms and its subjects) and its cornerstones into a few categories describing their purposes within the State, as well as discussing whether those purposes are explicitly stated or implicit (i.e. largely hidden, unbeknownst to even those carrying out said ‘purpose’). Althusser’s perspective (his Marxist theory) is clear and to the point and even backed up by distinct examples of how to apply his theory (see Louis Althusser, *On Ideology*, 1971, for said examples; they are superfluous in this essay, unfortunately), and when analysing Mr. Scogan and his ideas, his philosophy, it fits perfectly for describing the manner in which Mr. Scogan imagines his “Rational State”; specifically because Althusser exposes “social control” (Barry 158) and how institutions manage and controls citizens and thus exposes “the social structures in which they exist” (Barry 159).

Barry is somewhat unclear when he mentions Althusser’s “useful distinction between what we might call state power and state control” (all quotes in this paragraph from the same source and page, Barry 158) because he only describes state power, as “maintained by … repressive structures, which are institutions like the … prisons, the police force, and the
army” (author’s italics), after which he says: “But the power of the state is also maintained more subtly, by seeming to secure internal consent of its citizens, using … ideological structures or state ideological apparatuses … such [as] political parties, schools, the media … which foster an ideology … which is sympathetic to the aims of the state” (author’s italics). Confusion occurs to one unfamiliar with Althusser – what is, then, state control? Barry seems to explain what state power and state control means, but when describing the latter he confuses the reader when mentioning “the power of the state” which comes too close to “state power”. Secondly, Barry misnames the term which Althusser argue maintains state power; Althusser does not call them repressive structures, he calls them (Repressive) State Apparatuses (Althusser 17), which, granted, function as repressive structures.

A few definitions are needed to understand Althusser and his terms and how they are used in this paper, for instance the term ideology:

*Ideology* is a key term for Althusser, as for all Marxists. It is a broad concept variously defined within Marxism. Althusser’s definition (quoted by Goldstein) is as follows: ‘Ideology is a system (possessing its logic and proper rigour) of representations (images, myths, ideas or concepts according to the case) endowed with an existence and an historical role at the heart of a given society. (Philip Goldstein, *The Politics of Literary Theory: An Introduction to Marxist Criticism*, Florida State University Press, 1990, p. 23). (author’s italics, Barry 157)

In effect, Mr. Scogan’s utopia, as we shall see, is built upon an ideology, “a system”, with its inherent logic (ironically Mr. Scogan’s logic is based upon the idea of logic; “intelligence” and “reason”, and in his own words, “men of intelligence will learn to harness the insanities to the service of reason” (Barry 127)) and with its own representations, such as the idea or concept of intelligence being greater than physical strength – the Intelligences ruling over the Herd. For further information on the ideology of reason, see the feminist section where the Enlightenment is addressed.

ALTHUSSER – SA(S) AND ISA(S)

Two terms essential to reading Althusser are “the State apparatus” (Althusser 11), hereinafter abbreviated SA(s), and “Ideological State Apparatuses” (Althusser 15),
hereinafter abbreviated ISA(s), both of “which [are] clearly on the side of the (repressive) State apparatus” (Althusser 16). He best explain these himself, starting with the former:

The Marxist tradition is strict, here: in the Communist Manifesto … the state is explicitly conceived as a repressive apparatus. The State ‘machine’ of repression, which enables the ruling classes … to ensure their domination over the working class …

The State is thus first of all what the Marxist classics have called the State apparatus. This term means: not only the specialized apparatus … whose existence and necessity I have recognized in relation to the requirements of legal practise, i.e. the police, the courts, the prisons; but also the army, which … intervenes directly as a supplementary repressive force in the last instance, when the police and its specialized auxiliary corps are ‘outrun by events’; and above this ensemble, the head of State, the government and the administration.

… The State apparatus, which defines the State as a force of repressive execution and intervention ‘in the interests of the ruling classes’ in the class struggle conducted by the bourgeoisie and its allies against the proletariat, is quite certainly the State, and quite certainly defines its basic ‘function’.

(Althusser 11)

This, the SA, is defined as in Marxist tradition and “has no meaning except as a function of state power” (author’s italics, Althusser 14), a term which explains the manner in which the SA controls the state and its citizens. Althusser also calls the SA for a “Repressive State Apparatus [which] suggests that the State Apparatus in question ‘functions’ by ‘violence’ – at least ultimately” (Althusser 17). There is a distinction between the State and the SA(s), namely that while the State might fall – and, if so, it will effectively fall under the rule of a different ideology thus reinstating a new State – the SA(s) will more than likely still remain; that is because the SA(s) are one large or several (smaller) institutions necessary for maintaining the State (whether current or new), even if changes in the details are made. To Althusser such details are irrelevant other than being the natural cause of ideology; that is to say, the SA still performs the same task of upholding state power in whatever form it takes. Consequently, when state power cannot be upheld the State looses its power and risks a collapse, leaving it vulnerable for new possession: “Even after a social revolution like that of
1917, a large part of the State apparatus survived after the seizure of State power by the alliance of the proletariat and the small peasantry” (Althusser 15).

However the latter term, the ISA, is Althusser’s own ‘invention’, which he describes as “a certain number of realities … of distinct and specialized institutions” (Althusser 17) after which he lists the most distinct ones, such as “the system of different Churches”, “the system of different public and private ‘Schools’”, the family (which he acknowledges carries more “functions” than only that of an ISA), “press, radio and television” and others (Althusser 17). Althusser says that: “What distinguishes the ISAs from the (Repressive) State Apparatus is the following basic difference: the Repressive State Apparatus functions ‘by violence’, whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses *function ‘by ideology’*” (author’s italics, Althusser 19). He admits that they both to a small degree function by both repression and ideology, but they chiefly follow their own prime directive: “There is no such thing as a purely ideological apparatus” (Althusser 19). How then do ISAs function by ideology?

If the ISAs ‘function’ massively and predominantly by ideology, what unifies their ideology by which they function is always in fact unified, despite its diversity and its contradictions, *beneath the ruling ideology*, which is the ideology of ‘the ruling class’. (author’s italics, Althusser 20)

The importance of the ISAs lays in the “knowledge [that] *no class can hold State power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses*” (author’s italics, Althusser 20). As stated above, hegemony means the “internalised form of social control which makes certain views seem ‘natural’ or invisible” (Barry 158) and it is here the ISAs perform their role. As Alison Assiter says in *Althusser and Feminism*: “Indeed the nature of each part of the whole is determined by its role in the totality” (Assiter 7), meaning that the ideology decides the “nature of each part”, i.e. the ISAs. Through the ISAs, e.g. religious or educational institutions, the people are exposed to the ideology, the “views”, which teach them what is “natural”. This ‘knowledge’ taught by the ISAs is over time “internalised” and through these (in a sense) brainwashed subjects the State has produced citizens who in turn will help with their “social control” through transferring this ‘knowledge’ to others. Ideology, when successful and backed by ISAs, spreads like a virus to more and more individuals – thus rebellious individuals need not only confront the State and the SAs (the police or army or others), but also other subjects of the state who defend the ideology in which they have learned to exist; declaring ‘war’ on the government is
arguably easier than declaring ‘war’ on both the government and one’s friends and family (who support the government). This is not strange since all institutions and governments function through the actions of individuals, the government is in reality the sum of all those individuals and their actions; without them the ‘government’ would merely be an empty building.

To summarise, SAs are institutions that explicitly are concerned with governing and keeping the order of the State and its citizens (police, army etc.), whereas the ISAs are institutions which instead subtly indoctrinate the citizens to follow the creed (schools, religions etc.) set by the ruling classes so as not to cause disorder and upset the order of the State.

ALTHUSSER – HIS ROLE IN FEMINISM

We can put this in relation to the cause of feminism as well: firstly, regarding the ISAs, if we take the example of schools one can criticise the idea that schools indoctrinate children into a specific ideology, because, as of today, schools have the explicit purpose to educate children and train them to become critical thinkers – however this is a very superficial argument, since the truth is that the idea of having critical thinkers is a result of our contemporary ideology (in the Western world) of individualism (http://www.thefreedictionary.com). Thus we must agree with Assiter when she agrees with Althusser that one cannot “’read off’ an understanding of the essence of some phenomenon by looking at its appearance” (Assiter 7). Secondly, regarding the government in relation to the suffragette movement, the government of the UK did not let women be elected into the Parliament until the time they got the right to vote, in 1918 – thus they were not and could not be part of the deciding part of the government. Had they on the contrary been part of the government the suffragette movement would have reached its goal(s) much sooner, or perhaps there had been no need for it, because women had been (more) equal to men thus negating a need for equality, or at least resulting in other demands. The conclusion we must draw is that the women who fought for women’s rights were fighting against a male government – as opposed to the supposedly ‘neutral government’ that it (or they) wish to be portrayed as, in order to avoid exactly this kind of resistance. The (desired) appearance of the government is to govern society with justice and in a fair way – the government in a democracy exists in order to serve its citizens – but the government before 1918 was (largely) under the ideology of males (that is to say, the idea of men being superior to women), and governed by men who were voted in by other men and obviously wanted to keep their power and thus naturally
opposed the women who fought to upturn the social order those men wished to maintain. Assiter says that the “nature of the part” (9), e.g. one fighting against the government, the other fighting to keep social order, “is determined by its role in the whole system” (9), the role being for instance male or female and the system being the country with its patriarchal government and social order (this is however an essentialist view, the reality is of course that not all women agreed with or were active in the fight for women’s rights, nor were all men against them; still, the struggle between the sexes is certainly essentialist since it does not describe a struggle between personalities).

Evans mention in her introduction to *Feminism* that

modern Europe (the society that emerges throughout Europe from the seventeenth century onwards) … introduces a gradual, but systematic, codification of sexual difference. The law and public institutions between the public and the private, make what had been cultural distinctions between women and men socially enforced distinctions. Parallel to this shift came the growth of institutional structures which organised individual access to power, reward and privilege. (1)

In this short description we can, through Althusser’s theory, identify the different parts thusly: the “gradual, but systematic codefication of sexual difference” being the ideology called patriarchy (and male superiority, hence its naming after “the ruling father” ([http://oxforddictionaries.com](http://oxforddictionaries.com))); the law and “public institutions”, both “public and private”, are obviously the SA(s) and ISA(s) upholding the ideology; and once this process was begun, another process which shifted around “power, reward and privilege” was set in motion, backed by other “institutional structures”.

State power has thus exerted state control.

**ALTHUSSER – CRITICISM**

How the (function of the) SAs and the ISAs relate to Mr. Scogan’s views (as unearthed through analysis of his Rational State) will be discussed in the analysis further below, but first let us address the criticism, and defence, of Althusser, after which shall follow feminist theory. The most brazen critic of Althusser is Kolakowski, who in *Main Currents of Marxism* devote only four pages to Althusser (in a work containing over a thousand pages) in which he, all in all, concludes that Althusser “does not explain” (1175) a number of terms and claims, for instance he “does not define ‘ideology’ and ‘science’” and that he provides “merely
repetition” of for example observations of the early Marx (1175) and “a repetition of Engel’s remarks about the ‘relative independence of the superstructure’ … but he does not add anything to make Engel’s vague statement more precise” (1176). Kolakowski is ‘the most brazen critic’ because he presents only Althusser’s weaknesses and the only point of importance he approves of is that Althusser “opposed the tendency among Marxists to make advances to existentialists, phenomenologists, or Christians, thus diluting their own philosophy and depriving it of its uniqueness” (1176). Apart from this his summary of Althusser’s impact reads:

His work is merely an attempt to revert to ideological austerity and doctrinal exclusivism, a belief that Marxism can be preserved from the contamination of other ways of thought. From this point of view it is a return to old-fashioned Communist bigotry, but at the same time it bears witness to the directly opposite process which set in as a result of the post-Stalinist ‘thaw’.”

(Kolakowski 1176-1177)

Kolakowski is right in that Althusser does not explicitly explain what ‘ideology’ is, but in defence of Althusser Kolakowski seems to be the one who does not understand what it means. Althusser need not explain what ideology means because it means so many things and varies depending on context because an ideology is “a system of ideas and ideals, especially one which forms the basis of economic or political theory and policy [and/or] the set of beliefs characteristic of a social group or individual” (http://oxforddictionaries.com). Althusser simply cannot explain the specific characteristics of these ideas and ideals just as he cannot explain how a person or personality is; it is wholly dependant on the context. What we can conclude from Althusser’s approach to ideology (and this he could surely have explained) is that ideology for him is all-pervasive and inevitable, like the unconscious; we all carry notions and beliefs, and when many individuals share the same notions (which are “the set of beliefs … of a social group”) we call it an ideology. Furthermore, due to the nature of Althusser’s terms, the ideology need not be specified in order to understand how to use the tools he provides (State, SA and ISA) in order to analyse any ideology in any time and place. Given these tools one could even analyse a State without knowing its ideology since by identifying the “system of ideas and ideals” of the SA and the ISAs one can identify the ideology of the State.

Another critic of Althusser is E. P. Thompson “in his anti-Althusserian tract The Poverty of Theory” (Smith 19), whose Althusser-criticism Steven B. Smith writes about in Reading
Althusser. Peter Barry also notes Thompson’s attacks on Althusser (Barry  159). Thompson criticise Althusser on a number of points, several of which Smith counter-argues on, for instance Thompson’s belief that Althusser seeks to strip us from our ‘free will’.

Althusser has been classified as a structuralist (despite his insistence against it) and the definition of structuralism works favourably in regard of this essay since structuralism is defined as “a method of interpretation and analysis of aspects of human cognition, behaviour, culture, and experience, which focuses on relationships of contrast between elements in a conceptual system” (http://oxforddictionaries.com). The ISAs function is to transmit and indoctrinate ideologies (other than maintaining them) thus changing “human cognition, behaviour” and, ultimately, culture, but of course the ISAs are only one of the “elements in a conceptual system”. Mr. Scogan’s Rational State is nothing but conceptual. How this ties in with Thompson will be apparent in the next two paragraphs.

Althusser is also an anti-humanist, through his “implicit moral teaching … in the form of a ‘theoretical anti-humanism’” (Smith, p. 23). And since he denies “concepts like will, volition, agency” (Smith, p. 23) through his “attempt to focus attention on the underlying structures of production relations at the expense of concrete individuals who inhabit those structures” (Smith 23), Thompson concludes, as Smith understands it, from Althusser’s anti-humanism that

what is ultimately at stake is the replacement of the doctrine of free action by a type of class determinism which Thompson exhorts us to resist at all costs.

“Whatever we conclude in the endlessly receding argument of predetermination and free will,” he [Thompson] writes, it remains profoundly important that “we should think ourselves to be ‘free’ (which Althusser will not allow us to think).” (Smith 23)

Thompson is right in that there is a threat of individuals giving up their independence if they are presented with Althusser’s notion that they have been influenced by their State and indoctrinated through ISAs – but he presents Althusser’s anti-humanism in its extreme; Althusser’s theory of how ideologies work shows how either Thompson has fallen pray to an ideology, or that Thompson is part of the system which tries to submit people to its ideology, which would mean that he is lying. Using Althusser’s understanding of interpellation we can see the validity of this: the purpose of a interpellation is to internalise the State’s ideology so as to have “social control” (Barry 158) and still making “certain views seem ‘natural’ [so that]
we are made to feel that we are choosing when really we have no choice” (Barry 158). To choose between several choices is what freedom means – thus, when one can choose without ‘really’ having a choice, that freedom is only an illusion.

If Thompson wants us to “think ourselves to be ‘free’” he provides no criteria of how to verify whether we are truly free or if it is just an illusion; thus he argues that we should not analyse our freedom but rather take it for granted, but the truth is that freedom never is granted if someone gains from it being taken away from us. In doing so he performs the same task as, for instance, an ISA in the form of a school which teaches us to view ourselves as ‘free’ instead of firstly analysing how state power affects us and controls us. Althusser does not wish the State to control us in this way, and this is what Thompson is wrong about. Furthermore, if an individual was to give up the struggle to stay independent – thus surrendering to the State – that person would effectively go against the State, because that person would give up the interpellation that determines the choices that person would otherwise have made. To state one’s freedom and analyse the context in which one lives, and to criticise it, is the first step towards changing the State, and perhaps to truly find freedom – under a new ideology which cares about everyone rather than categorise everyone, an ideology which presumably also will indoctrinate its citizens into being kind towards all. There is no escaping ideologies unless we escape our prejudices and perhaps even our minds. Contrarily to Thompson’s belief, Althusser’s theory reveals the ideology rather than leave us prey for the immense indoctrination we find ourselves being under the influence of.

Going back to Kolakowski’s criticism, – in relation to how Althusser’s methods relate to the analysis of Mr. Scogan’s Rational State – Kolakowski sees similarities between Louis Althusser and Lévi-Strauss, another French structuralist, who “was the first French advocate of a structural, non-historical approach to humanistic studies, paying little attention to the individual but concentrating on the analysis of a system” (1174). Kolakowski is neutral in this description, but in analysing the Rational State it is a very useful and thus a positive approach, seeing as Mr. Scogan presents no individuals in this utopia, instead he focuses on the “system”, which we shall analyse (further below in the relevant section). Kolakowski goes on to say: “The subject of observation, then, is ‘structure’ (a term used incessantly in these books, but nowhere explained) and not its individual human elements” (1175). Kolakowski is not wrong here, but neither is he right; the meaning of ‘structure’ is apparent when considering the apparatuses of the State (SA and ISA) which are two “realit[jes]” (Althusser 16) of the ‘structure’. Althusser takes this term from the Marxist terms “infrastructure” [and] superstructure” (author’s italics, Althusser 8), which an author on such a comprehensive work
on Marxism as the *Main Currents of Marxism* should be well aware of. In the manner in which Althusser’s theory will be used in the analysis, Kolakowski is partially right, it is indeed the structure that is “the subject of observation”. The structure is the State, and it is upheld through the SAs and ISAs and the three categories of people populating it. But in the Rational State this structure is in direct correlation with the characteristics of its “human elements”, although not its “individual human elements” – how could we analyse individuals which Mr. Scogan has not mentioned; individuals which would only be a figment of imagination? We must be satisfied with analysing how the natures of the humans in Mr. Scogan’s utopia are essential to its structure, and vice versa, how the structure is essential to the role of the humans upholding it.

Following the criticism of Althusser, lets round off with Smith and Barry. In Smith’s conclusion he mentions several instances where Althusser’s thoughts are questioned, but despite this Smith forgives Althusser his human errors and sees beyond them: “If I may borrow a phrase from Toqueville, in reading Althusser I saw much more than Althusser. I saw the future of the social sciences” (Smith 28). Barry is more reserved but also sees Althusser as “a particularly dogmatic [thinker, however,] he did provide terms and formulae when they were needed, in the liberating 1960s” (Smith 159) and, expanding on Kolakowski’s lukewarm recognition, states that “[w]ithout these ‘loosening’ moves Marxism might have been widely rejected as just one more form of rigid traditional thinking which the ‘counterculture’ of that time needed to reject” (Smith 159). Barry notes the importance of Althusser’s “terms and formulae”, exactly those as used in this paper; Althusser’s faults matter not in the use of his theory in this paper.

**FEMINIST THEORY**

In this last section, before the analysis of Mr. Scogan and his philosophy, feminist theory will be explained and defined as it relates to this paper. Incidentally there is a whole book on the subject of Althusser’s Marxism as well as how it relates to feminism, *Althusser and Feminism*; in the book Assiter says that: “Overall, then, as far as the ‘structuralism’ of Louis Althusser is concerned, I argue that it has little to offer us as Marxists, but much to give us feminists” (Assiter ix). What then, does Althusser offer feminists, when he tries to explain capitalism (in the tradition of Marxism) but extends it to a theory of identifying (underlying) ideologies in the State system? The answer is in the question. He provides tools for identifying ideologies (in the form of SAs and ISAs), and patriarchy is certainly an ideology. As explicitly defined here, patriarchy is “a system of society or government in which men
hold the power and women are largely excluded from it: [e.g.] the dominant ideology of patriarchy” (http://oxforddictionaries.com).

Assiter gives three conditions for understanding why women are oppressed in a patriarchal society based on their biological differences:

First, there is the biological data. Secondly, there is the use of these biological facts in particular social set-ups and including class societies. And thirdly, there is the way this biological data is viewed in class societies – the ‘ideological’ factor. In a sense, then, it is true to say that in class societies women are oppressed \textit{qua} women, and not merely as working class women, etc. But it is the class society which provides part of the explanation for this being true. …

Nurturing the young is something that other animals do as well as human beings. Producing to satisfy their needs [(as opposed to hunting or gathering)], on the other hand, is an activity which is distinctly human. It involves people in taking roles which are unique to the human race. The males of the species – or anyway, a majority of them – have, on the whole, historically performed the tasks for which the human race is labelled rational. A natural link is likely to have grown up, therefore, between the possession of reasoning capacities – a distinctly human trait – and being male. The males of the species humanity by proxy represent humanity, and the women, through effectively being denied membership of that species are refused the attribute rationality. (author’s italics, Assiter 80)

FEMINIST THEORY – (ANTI-)ESSENTIALISM

When considering how feminist theory will be used in this essay, terms need to be explained. One term that is essential to define is \textit{essentialism} (pun intended). It is described in the following manner in Trina Grillo’s article, found in the anthology \textit{Theorizing Feminisms}:

\begin{quote}
Essentialism is the notion that there is a single woman's, or Black person's, or any other group's, experience that can be described independently from other aspects of the person – that there is an 'essence' to that experience. An essentialist outlook assumes that the experience of being a member of the group under discussion is a stable one, with a clear meaning, a meaning
\end{quote}
constant through time, space, and different historical, social, political, and personal contexts.

[Furthermore, essentialism] assumes that the strands of identity are separable, that the experience of a white woman dealing with a white man, or raising a white child, is the same experience that a Black woman has dealing with a Black man, or raising a Black child. But as the intersectionality critique has taught us, they are different and not just additively. (Grillo 32)

Drawing on this knowledge it is safe to assume that the women at Crome each represent different types of women, albeit all being women nonetheless, but since they are all from a higher social class one must also assume they represent a different type of women compared to the “girl dressed in white muslin” (Huxley, CY 152), although in more aspects than simply socio-economic; specifically, in regards to education.

Mary Evans writes in (Vol. 1 of) the four volume-anthology Feminism that “[a]ll societies acknowledge and in various ways elaborate differences of biological identity” (1) which provides the background to sex oppression (the oppression of differences based on biological gender). However, anti-essentialism shows us that we cannot simply talk about men as ‘men’ and women as ‘women’, because there are an infinite amount of individuals that biologically falls into either of the two categories, but no two men or women are the same. Grillo describes intersectionality in this manner:

The basis of intersectionality and anti-essentialism is this:
Each of us in the world sits at the intersection of many categories: She is Latina, woman, short, mother, lesbian, daughter, brown-eyed, long-haired, quick-witted, short-tempered, worker, stubborn. (30)

However, the danger of the anti-essentialism and intersectionality critiques is that if carried to their fullest conclusions, they make it impossible to talk of any oppression. If each woman, if each Black, has a different experience, how can one say that women as women, or Blacks as Blacks, are oppressed? [W]e’re all in this together, [but] by putting forth your separate identity you’re making it hard for us to fight the patriarchy. (Grillo 33)
This is a troublesome issue, because at the end of the day we must decide whether any “category” is oppressed or not, and considering the purpose of this paper it is evident that the patriarchal oppression of women must be considered true – otherwise we must consider no sort of ‘people’ oppressed by no other sort of ‘people’, only individuals oppressing individuals. True, this paper considers Mr. Scogan’s oppression of others, but those others are (in his eyes and as they are considered in this paper) representatives of (subcategories of) women. The way in which the women at Crome are oppressed is another matter entirely, which is what provides the basis for an interesting analysis. Even so, this paper is primarily interested in how Mr. Scogan views and interacts with women, and why.

FEMINIST THEORY – FEMINISM AND MARXISM

Marxism and feminism shares one common understanding, that of oppression of one category by another category. The ideology which leads to the respective oppressions is for Marxists called capitalism, for feminists called patriarchy. But whereas we (‘we’ in the Occident; its States and to a great extent its citizens) believe in the free market and the possibility for everyone to earn money and rise in status, – which according to individualism represents “a culture that celebrates individualism and wealth [and] freedom of action” (http://oxforddictionaries.com) – in contrast, the notion of patriarchy has, as a result of the belief in human rights and equality (between everyone regardless of ‘categorisation’), been increasingly criticised.

As to why there even exists a sex oppression at all, some (like Assiter says Barrett does) put

emphasis on the role of ‘ideology’ in reproduction of gender inequalities. However she does not really tell us how gendered subjectivity – ‘ideology’ – comes into being. An answer to this question is surely essential if we are to say why women are oppressed. (Assiter 76)

We must thus assume that the essential understanding of the (male) oppression of women is true, unless we want to go into an extensive debate regarding all the subtle details of different experiences of women belonging to a multitude of categories. The allure of anti-essentialism is that a truly anti-essential world, or ideology, would mean that every person would be viewed as the sum of their characteristics and personality, thus eliminating the inequality between genders (and other characteristics). Unfortunately, such an endeavour
must take a long time, and necessitates support from more individuals and institutions (to an increasing extent the State too) than mere activists, since anti-essentialism seeks to change the very fundamental manner in which we view and understand the world around us.

FEMINIST THEORY – THE ENLIGHTENMENT

There is one detail – of particular interests concerning an analysis of Mr. Scogan – that must be developed before we end the feminist section however, namely the important aspect of ‘reason’ (and what was perceived as women’s lack of it), which was redefined in regards to gender as a result of the Enlightenment, “a European intellectual movement of the late 17th and 18th centuries emphasizing reason and individualism rather than tradition” (http://oxforddictionaries.com). This is of particular interest because, as we saw in the description of fascism, Mr. Scogan is a self-proclaimed man of reason (being his contradictory trait in regards to that ideology) and thus values this characteristic in people (including himself). Evans describes the issue of the Enlightenment’s reason to be a result of “the idea that belief in God had to be a matter of reasoned argument rather than the acceptance of the beliefs of those in authority” (2) Later, the issue of reason becomes, therefore, central to the history of Europe in the seventeenth century and with it, and by implication, the question of who can reason. It is thus that gender and reason begin their difficult – and often stormy – relationship, a relationship which has become no less complex or contentious in the twenty-first century than in the seventeenth or eighteenth. As the ability to reason increasingly became the mark of the citizen of the Enlightenment, so the ability to acquire that capacity involved institutional and structural intervention. (Evans 2-3)

Naturally, men assumed superiority through their “ability to reason” since they, for instance, had the education that women were forbidden to achieve through schools, thus “women per se, and the perceived characteristics of womanhood, were increasingly marginalised” (Evans 3). She says that the eighteenth century is characterised by “a growing validation of science and rational enquiry which specifically excluded the intuitive and that cluster of ideas, emotions and inclinations which became known as the irrational and associated with the ‘feminine’” (Evans 2-3). Evans goes on to discussing the fact that the feminist critical tradition within
feminism has observed the transparently gendered nature of science and the scientific community and assumed that from this literally male domination we can equate scientific (and to a certain extent academic) knowledge with the male knowledge. Once this equation is made, it is then a fairly short step towards the claim that the scientific mode is in some sense ‘naturally’ the way in which men think, whilst women are the sex of a form of thought which is directed towards continuity and conciliation rather than problem solving, confrontation and paradigm shifts. This distinction between male and female thinking has been resisted for centuries by women, whilst at the same time it has also been taken as a given by generations of women and men. (3-4)

This is a patriarchal notion of male superiority which is founded on the previous patriarchal male superiority which led to women being denied education and normally restricted to the domestic sphere. It can be argued that Mr. Scogan does represent those who have taken “this distinction” as given, and thus men of patriarchal notions. But it is evident that Mr. Scogan’s cold rationality is flawed; the realisation of his ideas, his Rational State would bring suffering (or repression, oppression and injustices) to the majority of its participants (the Herd foremost). Mr. Scogan seem to be of a contradicting opinion, however, pertaining to his perceived benevolence, as we shall see (further below in the analysis, section “Mr. Scogan – his benevolence”).

Contemporary patriarchal notions have remnants of Mr. Scogan’s patriarchal notions, but are to much less strict and are at worst notions and slowly being abolished through the new laws which gives women more and better rights. Crome Yellow’s contemporary patriarchal notions is somewhere in between the eighteenth or nineteenth century’s notions and the notions of our twenty-first century – knowing that all is still not well and equal between the genders. As stated in the introduction, this is evident due to the emancipation of women following the First World War.

Thus ends the feminist section and the theory section as a whole, but for a table offering the basic “difference between men and women” (Braidotti 411) the curious reader may find said table in the appendix (“Table 1 Sexual Differences …”). Nevertheless, the author presenting this table makes it clear that it “is not to be taken as a categorical distinction but as an exercise in naming different facets of a single complex phenomenon” (Braidotti 411).
ANALYSIS – THE TERTIARY MR. SCOGAN

Before the analysis of Mr. Scogan begins in this section, he should be (swiftly) described for those unacquainted with the man. The narrator in *Crome Yellow* gives a compact and detailed description of Mr. Scogan the very first time he is introduced:

Next to Mary a small gaunt man was sitting, rigid and erect in his chair. In appearance Mr. Scogan was like one of those extinct bird-lizards of the Tertiary. His nose was beaked, his dark eye had the shining quickness of a robin’s. But there was nothing soft or gracious or feathery about him. The skin of his wrinkled brown face had a dry and scaly look; his hands were the hands of a crocodile. His movements were marked by the lizard’s disconcertingly abrupt clockwork speed; his speech was thin, fluty, and dry (Huxley, *CY* 16).

To summarise, it is an understatement to say Mr. Scogan is unattractive, even given his age, the same as his school-fellow, Henry Wimbush, to whom, in comparison, “Mr. Scogan looked far older and, at the same time, far more youthfully alive” (Huxley, *CY* 16).

Mr. Scogan has further contrasting traits besides his ambiguous appearance, for instance the fact that such an old man so vigorously talks almost constantly, as seen on page 29, “Mr. Scogan’s fluty voice had pronounced the opening phrases of a discourse. There was no hope of getting so much as a word in edgeways”. More importantly Mr. Scogan is described as intelligent, for instance, in Mary and Anne’s matchmaking conversation (Huxley, *CY* pp: 40-43) he is mentioned as one of “three unattached and intelligent men in the house … There’s Mr. Scogan, to begin with; but perhaps he’s rather too much of a genuine antique. In his own words, Mr. Scogan says that “while I may have a certain amount of intelligence, I have no aesthetic sense” (Huxley, *CY* 144) but his self-deprecating is mainly pleasantry or, perhaps more likely, regret, owing to his view that “In a sane world I should be a great man” (Huxley, *CY* 126), which he believes he would have been had he been born under better circumstances: “I was born and brought up in a country rectory; I passed my youth doing a great deal of utterly senseless hard work for a very little money. The result is that now, in middle age, I am the poor thing that I am” (Huxley, *CY* 90) but “as things are, in this curious establishment, I am nothing at all; to all intents and purposes I don’t exist. I am just Vox et praeterea nihil” [I am just a voice and nothing more] (Huxley, *CY* 126). His resentment for his standing, for his reality, he sums up thusly: “How often have I tried to take holidays, to get away from myself, my own boring nature, my insufferable mental surroundings!” (Huxley, *CY* 144).
Even so, he talks to no end as if he truly was a learned man, perhaps because he is one of Crome’s “diverse carnival of pretentious upper-class characters” the majority of whom, just as he, “hide their insecurities behind masks of pseudo-intellectuality”, as David Garrett Izzo describes the Crome fellowship (on page 6). Despite being brought up in a devoutly Christian home with a priest as a father (the term “country rectory” could also mean the home of a minister, but it is unlikely that such a position would have a young Mr. Scogan perform “utterly senseless hard work” in such an environment) Mr. Scogan is still permeated with the same careless negligence due to “class pretension and snobbishness” (Izzo 4) that Crome’s casual residents exhibit, which he shows several times. One of these occasions is when giving voice to his vision of the future Rational State, and asked by Denis what place he (Denis) would hold in such a world; in response Mr. Scogan replies unabashed, as the “superficial pessimist” (Izzo 8) that he is: “No, I can see no place for you; only the lethal chamber” (Huxley, CY 130). To openly state that a person is useless, regardless of circumstance, is certainly cold and unsympathetic.

MR. SCOGAN AND THE CREATOR

Mr. Scogan’s thoughts of class, class differences and dominance and submissions – essentially people’s place in the world, in other words – is proclaimed loud and proud a number of times in the novel, and ultimately he is what Izzo calls “the cold rationalist who is the forecaster of a Brave New World” (Izzo 8), the memorable novel in which Mr. Scogan’s fascist visions are (in part) realised; although Brave New World is much rounder and detailed than the mere outline Mr. Scogan gives (see further below). Furthermore, Mr. Scogan argues that the “men of intelligence must combine, must conspire, and seize power from the imbeciles and maniacs who now direct us” (Huxley, CY 128); in Izzo’s words, “[t]hrough Scogan, Huxley hints at the coming of fascism” (Izzo 8). There is no disagreeing with Mr. Izzo here, seeing as there are at least three distinct examples of fascist leaders who came into power following Crome Yellow’s publication in 1921; Spain’s Francisco de Franco (reigned 1939-75), Nazi-Germany’s Adolf Hitler (reigned 1934-45) and the fascist founder himself, Benito Mussolini (reigned 1922-43), the last whom Aldous Huxley experienced himself while living in Italy during the larger part of the 1920’s (Murray 126-135). Pritchard also states that Huxley’s essays “show him becoming, as the 1920’ wore on, more critical of rationalism in various forms” (337). Izzo also quotes Lidan Lin who writes: “Huxley shared [D. H.] Lawrence’s rejection … of being subservient to the order of mind and his espousal of the Dionysian mode of being that responds to the spontaneous impulses of the blood and the
flesh. Both men agreed that things were going wrong, and neither Christianity nor a philosophy that was to replace it could offer solutions” (17).

As stated in the relevant (theory) section Mr. Scogan is, in effect, a fascist, although in an early definition foremost – though he is not the only fascist Huxley writes about. According to Izzo and others, Huxley moved with his family to Florence, Italy, after the success of *Crome Yellow* to stretch his three-year contract advance (Izzo 3), but it was there he “saw the emergence of Mussolini’s fascists and the tools of media propaganda” (Izzo 3). Such propaganda is “used to promote a political cause or point of view” (http://oxforddictionaries.com) through an institutional State Apparatus (abbreviated SA herein) in order to promote the ruling ideology, in this case fascism. His best-seller *Point Counter Point*, 1928, once again features a fascist, “the British fascist Sir Oswald Mosley … portrayed [as the character] Sir Everard Webley” (Izzo 12), although Izzo could be in the wrong here, seeing as Sir Oswald Mosley was “one of the leading figures in the [Labour] [P]arty”, and would remain so until 1931 (http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/PRmosley.htm) and did not become a member of the British Union of Fascists until after he took part in its founding, in 1932 (Skidelsky para 1). This is strange considering the fact that *Point Counter Point* was published as early as 1928. In *Time Must Have a Stop*, 1944, the protagonist’s uncle, Uncle Bruno, according to Izzo, “inadvertently makes himself an enemy of the Italian Fascisti [and] [t]he Fascist police imprison and mistreat him” (Izzo 24).

However, one could argue that Huxley was aware of Sir Mosley’s fascist opinions (or tendencies) even so (thus prophesying Mosley’s coming fascist interests). For whom it may interest, Sir Oswald Mosley’s son, Nicholas Mosley, “discusses the connection in a new introduction to the novel” in the 1966 reprint of Huxley’s *Point Counter Point* (http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/5135.Point_Counter_Point).

Mr. Scogan might be a thinker and a dreamer who must understand that he will never play any great part in reforming society, or the world, so as a fascist Mr. Scogan is positively benign; especially when compared to the time of World War II with its major names, such as Mussolini and Hitler. After their rise, “Huxley understood that dictators would use any means to subjugate a populace” (Izzo 22). Aldous Huxley was an outspoken pacifist and “an active member of the Peace Pledge Union” and stayed true to his beliefs even when it cost him, such as after World War II when Huxley applied for United States citizenship:

The McCarran Act of 1952 had denied citizenship to any person who refused to bear arms for other than religious reasons. Aldous was a pacifist, and said so
at the interview. Was he a religious man? asked the interviewing judge.

“Aldous said that he was indeed a religious man; his opposition to war, however, was an entirely philosophical one.” This particular metaphysical circle was never squared to the satisfaction of the immigration authorities; though he lived in the United States for the last twenty-six years of his life, Huxley never did get citizenship, and died a subject of the Crown. (Derbyshire para 34)

This clearly means he valued his pacifist beliefs higher than giving them up for a citizenship which would have him risk his life for or against the fascists he literary and otherwise fought against in a way contradicting his morals; as Izzo says, Huxley “depicted the worst [(such as fascists and their realised utopia in Brave New World)] so that one could try to imagine something better to take its place” (Izzo 6). Thus, Mr. Scogan is one of the “worst”, and the readers can hopefully “try to imagine something better” than a person such as him. A point of exceptional note is however Huxley’s last novel before his demise; Island, 1962, which is set on a paradise island named Pala. Despite its inherent charm and unspoiled beauty, this paradise is in the end destroyed when “the military dictator of Rendang … invades Pala to take its oil” (Izzo 33). Notice should be taken that the paradise is destroyed by a “military dictator”, a probable analogy for fascism.

In conclusion, Aldous Huxley does not seek to present Mr. Scogan in a positive way due to their opposing philosophies; Mr. Scogan is brought to the reader’s attention as a negative example of a man with all the wrong notions. These ‘wrong notions’ will be further investigated as we continue. It seems Huxley was able to see past the benevolent pretence of fascism (i.e. creating order) and perhaps included Mr. Scogan’s fascist ideals partly to pique his contemporary readers at a time when fascism was in fashion.

As it is described, fascism at its core provides its believers with a solution to “chaos, anarchy, and general insecurity”, and here it is understandable how the philosophy appeals to the middle class, who are afraid of losing their wealth and security. However, that is not the whole truth. The philosophy, at its core, benefits people of all classes, perhaps because of its “essentially vague and emotional nature” which left room (past time tense due to the people of the time being unaware of what was to come, whereas we are not now in hindsight of the fascist era’s end) for some independent interpretation (as to the effects of implemented fascism, that is). Fascism was “[a]ppealing to the masses and especially to the lower middle class through demagogic promises of order and social justice” and the fascists “portrayed
themselves as champions of law, order, Christian morality, and the sanctity of private property”. It is not hard to see what is positive when fascism is defined in this way – who wouldn’t prefer “order” instead of “anarchy”; who wouldn’t prefer the state to take action and defend the sanctity of private property instead of allowing “the rule of the mob” and petty criminals running wild? This was at a time when people had begun feeling insecure and felt the need to lock their doors so that no criminal could simply walk into their home and take whatever they wanted. The reason for this increase in criminal activity, going by Victor Bailey’s look at “the alarming rise in British crime[,] [was due to] the growing opportunity for larceny in a more affluent society” (Bailey para 1). He says: “From 1900 to 1914, the crime level remained constant. Recorded crime increased by 5 per cent a year between 1915 and 1930” (Bailey para 1).

MR. SCOGAN – EARLY FASCISM’S ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM

Finally then, how does this core of (early) fascism relate to Mr. Scogan? Following the above two aspects, “order” and “anti-intellectualism”, it is evident that Mr. Scogan shares fascism’s idea of “social order” and “social Darwinism”, the survival of the fittest. This can be seen when he defends Mr. Wimbush’s handling of the animals at the “Home Farm” (Huxley, CY pp: 27-30, further reference to this concept are all taken from the same source and page), which also function as a metaphor for the class struggle of the exploited and the exploiters; another example of the survival of the fittest is seen when Mr. Scogan deems Denis unfit, being “too independent [and having] none of the characteristics required” (Huxley, CY 130), to take part in Mr. Scogan’s Rational State neither as one of the ruling classes, nor as one of the ruled class. Mr. Scogan is firmly anti-artistic as well, which could influence why he deem Denis unfit, but whatever is the reason he does deem Denis unfit.

The issue, when it comes to Mr. Scogan, is that he does not follow the ‘strict’ early definition of fascism when it comes to anti-intellectualism, because he is a “pseudo-intellectual” (Izzo 6) and values rationality. Arguably this poses no exclusion from describing him as a fascist, since it is only an essential description, whereas the reality is more complex. Not all fascists are cloned versions of one stereotypical (early) fascist; rather, they are all individuals with their own personalities and backgrounds, and as such they are all free to agree with fascism even if strict fascists would not agree with them in return. This is a fact that needs to be read in between the lines, seeing how fascism was “essentially vague” and “[a]ppealing to the masses” – it left room for interpretation which in turn meant that more than the stereotypical fascist could agree with the goals of fascism; e.g. just as politicians of
today more often than not leave room for interpretation (interpretation that appeals to the hearer), so to the fascists (in political parties firstly but not exclusively so) can be described to be ‘flexible’ in order to gain votes.

Perhaps it is the case that Mr. Scogan excels (or is seeking to excel) fascism through his utopia, but that will be discussed in the relevant section in the analysis further below in conjunction to the Rational State. Nevertheless, the early definition of fascism is the context in which Mr. Scogan’s version of fascism should be understood, but Mr. Scogan’s fascism is not entirely alike the early fascism, it incorporates some notions of the late definition of fascism as well, which we clearly can see in his Rational State. Through creating order, Mr. Scogan necessitates class order, thus promoting authoritarian and totalitarian systems of “government and social organization” in the spirit of fascism (http://oxforddictionaries.com/).

During Mr. Scogan’s time such a definition did not carry with it the negative connotations it does today, because when ‘everyone’ knows their place and feels safe due to the order of things, they will naturally be distraught when, for instance, criminals and rebels (such as Communist working towards revolution) upset the order of things and create chaos. Similarly, Mr. Scogan does not seek to oppress anyone, he seeks merely to establish order (although some need to be oppressed or otherwise managed to keep the order, as with the “Men of Faith”, as we shall see – this perspective is part of Mr. Scogan’s perceived benevolence).

MR. SCOGAN AT THE HOME FARM

Analysing Mr. Scogan’s fascist views containing class dominance and oppression will serve to show how he otherwise also (perhaps unknowingly) dominates and oppresses in general – it reveals his philosophy; firstly as what he appreciates and secondly as what he wishes to submit others to. Mary and the muslin girl are the two prime examples. The Home Farm is an obvious metaphor for the patriarchal and capitalistic society in which people in the Occident live, and the fact that Mr. Scogan is very enthusiastic in defending the manner in which the Home Farm is run by Mr. Wimbush (Huxley, CY 27) says a lot of Mr. Scogan’s notion of both patriarchy and the value of individuals and their lives (once again, his cold comment about Denis being sent into the “lethal chamber” confirms this last point).

Mr. Wimbush is a pragmatic man and in dealing with the animals of the “Home Farm” he is no different than any other contemporary farmer or breeder. He treats the animals well as long as they fulfill their duties of reproduction, but when they fail in doing so they “have to go” (Huxley, CY 27). Mary, a young woman of “nearly twenty-three, but one wouldn’t have
guessed it”, serves to represent the counterpart to Mr. Wimbush with her overflowing and hardly restrained emotions and empathy. With her “serious, moonlike innocence of [her] face [which] shone pink and childish [and her] ingenuous and often puzzled earnestness” (Huxley, CY 16) she is a caricature of innocence and femininity, traits that are benevolent, but ironically it also has the tragic effect that she is not being treated seriously by the others at Crome (more on why Mary is treated as she is will be found below, in the feminist criticism section.

When Mr. Wimbush states his verdict over the sow’s and the boar’s future (the former will get “another chance”; the latter will ”have to go”) Mary exclaims ”How cruel!” (Huxley, CY 27) and is backed up by the equally “liberated” (Izzo 7-8) Anne who says “Farming seems to be mostly indecency and cruelty” (Huxley, CY 27) and goes on to say that she feels “so sorry for the poor things” (Huxley, CY 28), even suggesting that Mr. Wimbush should ”give the animals a little holiday from producing children” (Huxley, CY 29). Interestingly, the ”’liberated’ but cynical femme fatale” (Izzo 7), Anne, shows more pity for the animals than she does human beings. The term liberated as used by Izzo should be understood as it is defined in TheFreeDictionary: “(Sociology) (esp in feminist theory) not bound by traditional sexual and social roles” (http://www.thefreedictionary.com).

Anne’s suggestion to “give the animals a little holiday from producing children” is a clever statement on Huxley’s behalf in line with the contemporary debate regarding contraception and women’s rights, a debate that is still very much alive in our day. Mary, “a convinced birth-controller” (Huxley, CY 29) would surely agree with the argument(s) for women’s rights that state: “a woman has the right to decide what she can and can't do with her body [and she could possibly agree with the conclusion that] therefore a pregnant woman has the right to abort”, although Mary’s (highly probable) use of contraceptives are taken as a precaution so as not to wind up in a situation that necessitates she chose whether or not to abort (http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/abortion/mother/for_1.shtml#h3). Furthermore, it would be to fall for the current critique of contraception that is debated in the US, as of June 2012, to argue that (perhaps) Mary is on the pill in order to be able to have sex with whomever, whenever. Such a standpoint only seeks to disgrace women’s use of contraception and (therefore) also their right to their own bodies. For further analysis of Mary’s view on relationships and sex, see the section ‘Mr. Scogan – his views of the women at Crome’ at the end of this paper.

At the time of Crome Yellow’s publication the women’s movement had won much ground, e.g. finally achieving the right to vote, and it continuously grew in strength of support at the time of Huxley’s writing of the novel:
The National Birth Control League was formed in 1921 with the mission of providing education about preventing pregnancy in fertile women. Under the operation of the League, lectures on the subject of birth control were given and as a result many influential people were convinced and won to the cause. (Mauck para 1)

And on 17th of March that year (1921) “Dr Marie Stopes opens Britain's 1st birth control clinic (London)” (http://www.historyorb.com/events/date/1921).

The timing of Huxley’s novel and the discussion at the “Home Farm” can be nothing but intentional, just as Mr. Scogan’s other views and ideas seem to have been intentionally assigned to him, e.g. Mr. Scogan’s nonchalance regarding contraception and the reasons for taking contraceptives, and his fascist ideals. The following discussion (below) discuss reproduction, and Mr. Scogan’s hope is for a world where children grow “in vast incubators” (Huxley, CY 30) and mankind will be free to “flit like a gay butterfly from flower to flower” (Huxley, CY 30), i.e. having sex with whomever they want. Contraception is indeed useful in order to have sex in abundance. Huxley has Mr. Scogan and his ideas represent the (possible) future, dangerous consequences of fascism. Mr. Scogan effectively takes the role of the scapegoat, that is, the person who represents the faults Huxley sees in society; Mr. Scogan “is blamed for the wrongdoings, mistakes, or faults of others, especially for reasons of expediency” (http://oxforddictionaries.com). Crome Yellow revolves, however, around other characters who, just as Mr. Scogan, “are a bit sick under their superficial surface sheen” (Izzo 7) and Huxley “depicts men who indulge in exercises of intellectual futility” (Izzo 7), but due to Huxley’s pacifist philosophy, and due to the novel being set just after the emancipation of women, it sets Mr. Scogan’s chauvinism in a very aggravating light under the circumstances.

From discussing animal reproduction the people of Crome turn to the similar subject of human reproduction:

“Lots of life: that’s what we want. I like pollulation; everything ought to increase and multiply as hard as it can.” Gombauld grew lyrical. Everybody ought to have children – Anne ought to have them, Mary ought to have them – dozens and dozens. … Mr. Scogan ought to pass on his intelligence to little Scogans, and Denis to little Denises … Sterility was odious, unnatural, a sin against life. (Huxley, CY 29)
It is evident that Gombauld shares the view of those opposed to the use of contraception; in his mind women give birth to children and “ought to increase and multiply as hard as [they] can” (Huxley, CY 29), and the fact that he only mentions Mary and Anne as child-producers but Mr. Scogan and Denis as passing on their characteristics to their children is very provoking and very sexist, even at that time. Gombauld sees sterility as “a sin”, and thus contraceptives, essentially being chosen but only temporary sterility, must be a kin to sin as well. Interestingly enough, Mr. Scogan offers a third view on the issue of child birth, one that is neither against contraceptives nor against the plurality of children; one that is the very foundation that the ‘civilisation’ in Brave New World is built upon:

An impersonal generation will take the place of Nature’s hideous system. In vast state incubators, rows upon rows of gravid bottles will supply the world with the population it requires [while people will] flit like a gay butterfly from flower to flower in a sunlit world. (Huxley, CY 30)

The women respond differently towards this new idea; Anne (without the narrator’s indication of irony) simply says that “It sounds lovely”, whereas Mary – with eyes “more serious and more astonished than ever” (Huxley, CY 30) – cannot come to grips with the notion. One could argue that Mr. Scogan through this notion is in support of women and their right to their own body and thus their right to avoid pregnancy and all the responsibilities that childbearing carries with it. But would Mr. Scogan agree with Pat Armstrong and Hugh Armstrong’s argument in their “interesting attempt to integrate ‘Marxism’ and ‘feminism’” (Assiter, p. 76)? Assiter summarises their “attempt” and concludes that, indeed, “Sex is a Marxist issue” (76):

free-wage labour is a defining characteristic of capitalism, one that entails the reproduction of these labourers, to a degree, outside the sphere of the production process. Given this separation, and also the fact that women are the ones to undergo pregnancy and childbirth, women as mothers are less able to participate fully in the labour force. Because of their responsibility for domestic work, a responsibility which is, in turn, explained by their role in childbearing, women move in and out of the labour market. When women go from domestic labour to work in the factories, schools etc., the value of labour
power, overall, is lowered. Women, therefore, form a reserve army of labour for this market. It is the separation between home and workplace that provides the basis for women’s ‘oppression’ in capitalism; but it is the biological fact of responsibility for childbearing which underlines this. (Assiter 76)

If presented with their argument above he must surely agree with its reasoning. In fact, if women were substituted with the sows at the “Home Farm” he must, beyond doubt, agree that women’s capacity of and role in childbearing is why they belong to the domestic sphere – whether in the kitchen or the bed. The reason is that Mr. Scogan appreciates what is “practical [and] realistic” (Huxley, CY 27), as seen when Mary raises complaints about the system in which the animals live, reproduce and are slaughtered:

“But how practical, how eminently realistic!” said Mr. Scogan. “In this farm we have a model of sound paternal government. Make them breed, make them work, and when they’re past working or breeding or begetting, slaughter them.” (Huxley, CY 27)

He is very convinced that pigs should either breed or work, and when they cannot their purpose in this world is at best to be eaten. Such treatment does not seem very kind, thus Mr. Scogan’s view is certainly biased, seeing as paternal indicates fatherly kindness and care (see its definition in the section ‘Theory, hypothesis and definitions’ at the beginning of this paper). Knowing that male pigs only breed a few times a year and never take part in the upbringing of their offspring, he must surely be of the opinion that the sows’ purpose in life is to rear a new litter of piglets every so often. The issue with pigs lay in the nature and domestication of said species, specifically that pigs do not work. In regards of animals who work, an example of some other species of animal would be better suited, but thankfully Mr. Scogan is forthright (but perhaps unclear) in his notion and specifies that the division (of purposes) of the sexes is “a model of sound paternal government”, thus separating the sexes in two categories: those who work, males, and those who breed, females. If this division between the sexes remain true in regards to all males and females, Mr. Scogan would agree with P. Armstrong and H. Armstrong that the natural differences of the biological sexes result (or even should result) in a division of purposes, namely one reproducing (and caring for the family) and the other working (to earn the means to provide for the family). Of course, Mr. Scogan would never argue for eating the carcasses of human beings (even he is not that
horrible), which results in bewilderment unless he is understood as meaning that a being without purpose, or the means to execute that purpose, should just as well be done away with.

It would be to simplify Mr. Scogan’s stance too much to argue that he (with his suggestion of “gravid bottles” and “state incubators”) is for contraception and women’s right to their own bodies, but neither is he against it. If anything, going by the society in *Brave New World* of which he prophesises, Mr. Scogan is definitely on the women’s side – but under the circumstances of an institution which takes the responsibility of childbearing away from women and turns it into an industry. In effect, his two opinions contradict each other if applied to his time, but they do not when realised in *Brave New World*. What one can do, however, is to put them in the contexts of contemporary reality: the “sound paternal government” in the example of the pigs’ situation is perhaps a bit extreme, but still closer than the futuristic idea of mass-produced children in incubators (which, to this day in 2012, is still not a reality, although we have the technology; the first “test tube baby” is born as late as 1978 (http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/worlds-first-test-tube-baby-born)). If we assume that Mr. Scogan is a realist, a rational man (as the descriptions of him indicate), then he can very well dream of the future, but until such a day that said future comes true he must relate to the world he lives in. If we decide to assume so, then we can also assume that Mr. Scogan’s views of women is closer to that of the “sound paternal government” and, in effect, his view of women comes closer to that of Gombauld’s as well.

Another point of note is his promiscuous notion (again, of the butterfly flitting from flower to flower) which does not conform to his contemporary times (prescribed) notion of monogamy, but rather resembles the animal world where most species live on their own and are promiscuous. It is certainly interesting to see such a self-proclaimed intellectual succumb to the desires of his old flesh, and Huxley must surely have intended these conflicting traits.

Furthermore, Mary and Anne (in the discussion at the “Home Farm” regarding the animals) function as early promoters of “animal welfarism”, a term which should not be taken to mean the same as promoters of animal rights; animal welfarism “is the belief that humans have the right to use animals as we see fit as long as they are treated humanely” (http://animalrights.about.com/od/animalrights101/g/What-Is-Welfarism.htm). However, these thoughts, represented and expressed by Mary and Anne, (could) function as a metaphor for humanitarian beliefs, which is clear when we contrast them to Mr. Scogan’s thoughts. Mr. Scogan deems Mr. Wimbush’s methods “practical [and] eminently realistic!” and describes them as “a model of sound paternal government. Make them breed, make them work, and when they’re past working … slaughter them” (Huxley, CY 27). Mr. Scogan may be referring
to animals, but when he talks of his utopia the Rational State it is easy to see how his utilitarian views regarding the “Home Farm” remains true even there. Seeing as his fascist ideology is central to understanding Mr. Scogan, a description of what Mr. Scogan’s utopia is like is necessary.

**MR. SCOGAN’S RATIONAL STATE – DISSECTED THROUGH ALTHUSSER’S MARXIST THEORY**

Mr. Scogan’s utopia, the Rational State, is ripe with opportunities for both Marxist and feminist criticism, but Althusser’s Marxist theory will also serve to explain how Mr. Scogan’s utopia oppresses women through the State institutions – thus feminist theory will need to wait in order to let Althusser’s theory prepare the Rational State for further criticism.

Mr. Scogan is very open with the system and values, the very ideology, that his Rational State is built upon, namely the opposite of “fascism’s rejection of reason and intelligence” ([http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/](http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/)). It is also built on the Enlightenment’s idea that reason, “the ability to think and argue” (Evans 3), is a quality that signifies power – or more precisely, the quality which indicates the right characteristic in the leaders, the ruling class: the “men of intelligence”. In contrast to the ideology of the Enlightenment in which “the ability to reason increasingly became the mark of the citizen” (Evans 3), in the Rational State this ability instead marks the ruling class. It could be that Mr. Scogan converts the fascist notion of negating criticism of the system, sprung from “reason and intelligence”, by effectively stripping the Herd of any intelligent individuals and instead assigning them a place among the Intelligences – unfortunately we cannot verify this going by his superficial description of the Rational State, and neither does Mr. Scogan mention fascism at all himself. If, however, he means to stript the Herd from their intelligence, then he probably would achieve the social order fascism seeks, since the Herd would have to rely on strength through arms rather than intellect – and strength do not guard one from indoctrination. Furthermore, Mr. Scogan assigns the “Men of Faith” (Huxley, *CY* 128; further references to this concept are taken from the same source and page) as part of the Ideological State Apparatus to spread the Rational State ideology to the Herd:

> the Men of Faith will have had their special education under the eye of the Intelligences. Moulded by a long process of suggestion, they will go out into the world, preaching and practising with a generous mania the coldly reasonable projects of the Directors from above. When these projects are
accomplished, or when the ideas that were useful a decade ago have ceased to be useful, the Intelligences will inspire a new generation of madmen with a new eternal truth. … When any particular effort is required of the Herd, when it is thought necessary, for the sake of solidarity, that humanity shall be kindled and united by some single enthusiastic desire or idea, the Men of Faith, primed with some simple and satisfying creed, will be sent out on a mission of evangelisation. At ordinary times, when the high spiritual temperature of a Crusade would be unhealthy, the Men of Faith will be quietly and earnestly busy with the great work of education. (Huxley, CY 129)

The Men of Faith effectively become a middleman between the Intelligences who want the Herd to do something “for the sake of solidarity” (this solidarity we must assume never goes in the opposite direction since that would upset the social order). Taking this into consideration we can see how the Intelligences never act (openly) politically; instead they are ‘puppet masters’ working from behind, guiding and ruling the Men of Faith who are given the task of ‘ruling’ (i.e. carrying out the agenda they are given) the public sphere and governing the Herd. The Men of Faith persuade and inspire the Herd through their “preaching and practising with a generous mania” and must on that account be considered one of the ruling classes; however, the Men of Faith are also subject to “special education” and are constantly “under the eye of the Intelligences” and (true to the metaphor of class struggle) take their orders “from above”. Thus we can conclude that the Men of Faith form a lower upper class, somewhere in between the (true) ruling class and the working class.

Mr. Scogan’s utopia is supposedly a world in which all forms of ideology, their apparatuses and their ‘victims’ are safely under the control of ‘reason’; but this vision, in its turn, expresses a fascist ideology of meritocracy – Mr. Scogan has failed to realise the very truth Althusser sought to expose, i.e. the fact that ideology, or any ideological idea, is (seemingly) inevitable. Huxley would later, in his Point Counter Point, return to this idea – but then in the form of “the surrogate of Mark Rampion, [a man in which] Huxley portrays [his close friend] D. H. Lawrence's personality and his ideas in this novel of ideas” (Izzo 16). Izzo says these are ideas of “balanced reason and intuition” (16) and are conveyed through ”Rampion who is also the spokesperson for ending class divisions so that a meritocracy would be favored over an aristocracy” (16).

If we apply Althusser’s theory and his terms – the State ideology, the SA and the ISA – we can see that the Intelligences create an ideology of reason and passion through their way of
using the Men of Faith as a medium of governing the Rational State. Rationality and emotion finally come together in this utopia, but with reason as the primary quality. This ideology, and/or its “eternal truth[s]” are infused within the system that the Intelligences creates (and governs). Mr. Scogan is not specific of the way in which, or through which institutions, this ruling class govern the State, but if we look at the institutions in *Brave New World* (as well as what Mr. Scogan mentions) we find that there could be jobs such as these:

(1) Jobs in the “state incubator” (Huxley, *CY* 30) in which the populations new inhabitants are under the care of “the examining psychologists [who assign] them their place” (Huxley, *CY* 129), the “place” being their position in the system, i.e. in one of “the three main species” (Huxley, *CY* 128); (2) jobs with the infants who, after being assigned their appropriate class, are “[m]oulded by a long process of suggestion”, which in *Brave New World* constitutes of brainwashing; thirdly, working in positions as “Directors” and “governors” (Huxley, *CY* 128); and (3) lastly jobs with the “lethal chamber” (Huxley, *CY* 130). It would however be most practical to put the lethal chamber next to the state incubators since any undesirable characteristics (as those of Denis’ (Huxley, *CY* 130)) detected (assuming they can be detected so early) would render the infant unsuitable to the needs of the State.

Mr. Scogan explicitly says that the Intelligences take positions as “Directors” and “governors”, but if they work with the state incubators or with “suggestion” and as “examining psychologists” is left unstated, although it takes a calm, intelligent person (as opposed to the passionate Men of Faith) in order to work as a psychologist, and perhaps it is the same with those who work with the state incubators or with “suggestion”. Nonetheless, the Intelligences, in all probability, make up the majority of positions within the State Apparatus(es).

Seeing as this utopia is built upon the ideology of oppressing “desires” (Huxley, *CY* 128) (or at the very least mitigation thereof), “mischief” (Huxley, *CY* 128) “tears and repentance” (Huxley, *CY* 129) as well as hindering people from “cutting one another’s throats” (Huxley, *CY* 129) it is ironical (to Mr. Scogan’s amusement, no doubt) that the very individuals who often caused these feelings and actions (in response to something, of course), the Men of Faith, are in the Rational State turned into

a new sort of madman, still externally the same, still bubbling with a seemingly spontaneous enthusiasm, but, ah, how very different from the madman of the past! For the new Man of Faith will be expending his passion,
his desire, and his enthusiasm in the propagation of some reasonable idea. He will be, all unawares, the tool of some superior intelligence. (Huxley, CY 129)

If there was a religion (though Mr. Scogan says nothing of the sort, perhaps indicating his resentment of the upbringing he had in the “country rectory” (Huxley, CY 89) in his youth) the Men of Faith – certainly named after their almost religious qualities – would be the obvious priests of it, due to their “preaching” (Huxley, CY 129) and their duty of ‘shepherding’ the Herd – again a religious reference. As Mr. Scogan mentions, the Men of Faith will “at ordinary times” (Huxley, CY 129) be “quietly and earnestly busy with the great work of education”. In Althusser’s definition of which the various institutions the Ideological State Apparatuses constitutes, it is precisely these two above mentioned institutions that Althusser puts at the top of the list, literally, although he says that “the order in which I have listed them has no particular significance” (Althusser 19): “the religious ISA (the system of the different Churches), the educational ISA (the system of the different public and private ‘Schools’)” (Althusser 19). We see thus that (only) the Men of Faith work in the ISAs, presumably also in “the Communications ISA (press, radio and television, etc.)” (Althusser 17) and if so logically as conveyers of propaganda in the interest of the (Rational) State. Mr. Scogan’s explicit descriptions of the nature of the work the Men of Faith do is in agreement with Althusser’s definitions of what an ISA is and to what purpose it exists, namely to spread and transmit the State’s ideology.

MR. SCOGAN’S RATIONAL STATE – SEEING WHAT IS NOT THERE

Althusser’s theory does not simply explain what is there for us to see (in reading Mr. Scogan’s description of his utopia) but it is so ingenious that it lets us tell what we cannot see, more precisely it lets us see why what is not there is, in fact, not there. First we must, however, refer to Althusser’s list of “institutions as Ideological State Apparatuses” (Althusser 17):

the family ISA, the legal ISA, the political ISA (the political system, including the different Parties), the trade-union ISA, the cultural ISA (Literature, the Arts, sports, etc.). (Althusser 17)

Working our way through (part of) this list will show the way that Mr. Scogan’s utopia has been cleverly thought through (a praise that goes to the novel’s author, Huxley, of course).
Huxley did not need to change much in the concept of the Rational State to turn it into the society in which *Brave New World* is set, perhaps most important in said novel was the abolishing of “the family ISA”, through the use of contraceptives and the substitution of mothers in the form of state incubators – the civilisation in *Brave New World* can be seen as the realisation of the Rational State. In *Brave New World* it is even punishable by law to be pregnant and bear a child, and the words ‘mother’ and ‘father’ are considered taboo. In abolishing motherhood the Rational State takes over the responsibility of not only reproduction but more importantly that of fostering the children. The State will “predestine and condition” (Huxley, *BRW* 12, hereinafter, when in the form of parenthetical reference, *Brave New World* will be abbreviated *BRW*) the children “from earliest infancy” (Huxley, *CY* 129), which in this State is done through “a long process of suggestion” (Huxley, *CY* 129), which quite possibly could take the form of the brainwashing seen in *Brave New World*. This “suggestion” or brainwashing is designed to create citizens all but engineered to become one of the “three main species” (Huxley, *CY* 128), and if something goes wrong they can always be reconditioned again (“*Brave New World*”). Perhaps Mr. Scogan, given the opportunity to elaborate on his utopia, would answer any critic of this ‘familyless’ (here the importance of the family in our society is clearly evident, it has left us wanting for a term meaning the absence or abolishment of the family; the closest we come is the phrase ‘absence of family’, but it is still merely a conjunction of words and not a term standing on its own) society something along the words used in *Brave New World*: before the incubators “the children belonged to them [families; mothers and fathers], like objects” (“*Brave New World*”), they were “her children” (Huxley, *BRW* 36). These terms of normal, familial (and loving) belonging has in *Brave New World* been reinterpreted as terms of possessiveness and something akin to slavery. In this new society “every one belongs to every one else” (Huxley, *BRW* 39), as in some form of a huge collective in which everyone (presumably) is interested in everyone else’s well-being.

Moving onto the most important ISA in supporting the Rational State, “the political ISA (the political system, including the different Parties)”, we find that it follows the same reasoning as in fascism, e.g. the elimination (or determined oppression) of opponents, such as political adversaries. The political system in the Rational State is totalitarian, meaning “centralized and dictatorial and requires complete subservience to the state” ([http://oxforddictionaries.com](http://oxforddictionaries.com)) thus negating the need for “different Parties”, unless they would wish to allow the citizens the right to vote for Parties constituted of members of the Intelligences. Such an endeavour carries with it political dangers, however, such as the chance
that the masses (on the losing Parties’ side) would get upset and ultimately result in a revolution stirring up in the working class. The lack of need for a political party is also described in, and explained by the existence of the ideology of the State. If someone would voice too loudly new ideas and ideals not following the set ideas and ideals by the State, then that someone would upset the order of things; that someone would risk another ideology than the one that society rests upon. Several “different Parties” does also suggest democracy, a term which must be shunned by the ruling class(es) seeing as, if democracy was allowed, the majority would set the ideology; and the majority is “those countless millions” Mr. Scogan calls the Herd. Once more, to Mr. Scogan’s great disappointment, would the world “allow dangerous maniacs like Luther, mad about dogma, like Napoleon, mad about himself, to go on casually appearing and turning everything upside down” (Huxley, _CY_ 127).

It is not difficult to analyse the other ISAs either, and the curious reader is encouraged to analyse the other ISAs listed above on their own; however, in this paper there is only room for a short analysis of (and all but a comment on) the remaining ISAs. Regarding “the political ISA (the political system, including the Different Parties)”, its absence in the Rational State is explained by the lack of need for a political party due to the totalitarian ideology of the State. Several “different Parties” does also suggest democracy, a term which must be shunned by the ruling class(es) seeing as, if democracy was allowed, the majority would set the ideology; and the majority is “those countless millions” Mr. Scogan calls the Herd. Once more, to Mr. Scogan’s great disappointment, would the world “allow dangerous maniacs like Luther, mad about dogma, like Napoleon, mad about himself, to go on casually appearing and turning everything upside down” (Huxley, _CY_ 127).

As with “the Communications ISA”, the “cultural ISA” could very well exist in the Rational State since it (cultural) relates to “the ideas, customs, and social behaviour of a society” (http://oxforddictionaries.com). If so they would of course be restricted and pervaded with propaganda, just as with “the Communications ISA”.

It seems like Mr. Scogan (i.e. Aldous Huxley) is aware of the Marxist notion of the base and the superstructure, seeing how the Intelligences and the Men of Faith together fill the positions within and functions of the SAs and ISAs, two levels of the superstructure: “the Rational State is built upon ‘the infrastructure … and the superstructure, which itself contains two ‘levels’ or ‘instances’: the politico-legal (law and the State) and ideology (the different ideologies, religious, ethical, legal, political, etc)” (Althusser 9). The infrastructure, the base, is of course the social order and its class divisions on top of which rests the superstructure with the Intelligences situated in its “politico-legal”, and the Men of Faith indoctrinating the
State’s “ideology” – thus asserting and sustaining the protraction of the (Rational) State. But the metaphor of the base and superstructure also signifies “that the upper floors could not ‘stay up’ (in the air) alone, if they did not rest precisely on their base” (Althusser 8-9). Without these rigid social class divisions the State would collapse and fall into anarchy, and the world would, as Mr. Scogan would say, go back to the irrational state it was.

MR. SCOGAN’S RATIONAL STATE – GENDER INEQUALITIES

The SAs and ISAs forming the government in this State’s system has thus been identified, and focus can be shifted to the effects of gender inequalities in (firstly) the Rational State before considering the Mr. Scogan sees in his utopia and how they apply to the oppression of women. One should start with the most obvious and work down towards the more obscure details, and therefore the issue of Mr. Scogan’s silence regarding women in the Rational State will be given voice first. When Mr. Scogan describes his utopia, he never once mentions the words ‘woman’, ‘girl’ or even ‘female’. He does on the other hand often mention “madmen” (all quotes taken from these pages and this source: Huxley, CY pp: 126-128, unless stated otherwise) and different kinds of ‘men’, e.g. “Men such as I”, “men of reason”, “sane men will have the power yet”, “We men of intelligence”, Men of Faith and “wild men”. To say that Mr. Scogan is entirely positive towards men would be wrong, however, he seems to be oblivious to the absence of women in this utopia. Is the reason because the state incubators effectively results in the superfluous nature of women, a nature that is taken over by machines, thus resulting in the extinction of women? Or is the reason due to his time’s oblivious use of the term ‘him’, ‘his’ and ‘man’ which functioned as a pronoun representing both sexes? If so, then why does he insists on specifically using the terms “men of intelligence” and Men of Faith?

It may simply be that Mr. Scogan talks and thinks according to his time, as ‘man’ was used to refer to ‘a human being’; “the use is now often regarded as sexist or at best old-fashioned” (http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/man?q=men+of+letters#man__51) in our time, but in Mr. Scogan’s time it was common usage. It may also be the case that Mr. Scogan thinks in accordance with the (even in his time all but outdated) Enlightenment’s notion of “knowledge [that] specifically excluded women” (Evans 3) but contrarily to contemporary growing recognition of women’s “contributions to intellectual and social life”. If that is the reason, Mr. Scogan is showing a side of chauvinism that describes his “belief in the superiority of one's own gender, group, or kind” (http://www.thefreedictionary.com). The other definition of chauvinism fits him worse, but would fit a ‘strict’ fascist better due to chavinism’s “[m]ilitant
devotion to and glorification of one's country”, nevertheless such chauvinism could be
encouraged within the Rational State in order to ensure its citizens’ patriotism.

Furthermore, are the women truly extinct, and if so is it due to their irrationality? As
previously noted, Mr. Scogan seems to believe that intelligence equals rationality and
objectivity, thus passion equals irrationality and subjectivity. If we take a look at Table 1 in
the appendix we find that, in a patriarchy, men are perceived as “self-regulating”, “rational
…”, “entitled to rationality”, “capable of transcendence” and deny “corporeal origins
objectifying the body” – whereas women are perceived as “uncontrolled”, “irrational”, “in
excess of rationality”, “confined to immanence” and are “[i]dentified with the body –
corporeality that is both exploited and reduced to silence” (all preceding citations taken from
Braidotti 412). Mr. Scogan talks about men all the time, but if the Men of Faith who “believe
in things unreasonably, with passion” (Huxley, CY 128) are the opposite of the rational
Intelligences, then they must also, conversely, be irrational. They were also “uncontrolled”
before the Intelligences managed to “conspire, and seize power from the imbeciles and
maniacs” (Huxley, CY 128). The Men of Faith fall under all the descriptions of characteristics
of women above, apart from being “[i]dentified with the body …” (since they are not female),
and still they are given a place above the Herd. But why cannot all women who (according to
the ideology of patriarchy) possess these characteristics take the place of, or with, the Men of
Faith? Is the distinction due to the Men of Faith being irrational because they are “imbeciles
and maniacs” with the power to wreak destruction (or inspire others to wreak it), whereas
women are simply irrational but not dangerous? In a patriarchy this view would be logical
seeing as women’s nature (in a patriarchy) “is directed towards continuity and conciliation”
(Evans 4) because of the ideology’s “reproduction of gender inequalities” (Assiter 76). One of
these notions of (ideologically justified) gender inequalities which Mr. Scogan shares is
nevertheless the idea that women have no place in the public sphere and instead belong to the
private, domestic sphere. Mr. Scogan nowhere explicitly mentions anything thereof, but a
man of his age must be coloured by the notions of the society he grew up in – this assumption
is also further strengthened through additional analysis of and findings of Mr. Scogan’s
patriarchal notions (see the section below: Mr. Scogan – his views of the women at Crome).

Mr. Scogan leaves no actual clues for us to answer the question why women have no
important place in the Rational State, but it can perhaps be answered through addressing
another, yet similar, question: what, then, is the women’s place in this State? Their
importance as mothers and child producers, and fosterers of children, has been effectively
‘relieved’ by the state incubators, and still they are not put in positions of power, those of the
ruling classes – what use remains of women (from a patriarchal perspective) when their other characteristics are taken away from them? One answer is: there are no other use of women, therefore the society is entirely populated by males. Another answer is found in *Brave New World*, with the exception that women in fact do work in high positions in that society. In *Brave New World* pregnancy and “monogamy and romance“ (Huxley, *BRW* 38) and ultimately the notion of a family is strictly forbidden; polygamy is encouraged and children are encouraged to “join in the ordinary erotic play” (Huxley, *BRW* 30) which is a “rudimentary sexual game” (Huxley, *BRW* 30) in which children finds another partner “to play with” (Huxley, *BRW* 31), whether of the opposite sex or not. Mr. Scogan says of children that once they are “labelled and docketed, the child will be given the education suitable to members of its species, and will be set, in adult life, to perform those functions which human beings of his variety are capable of performing” (Huxley, *CY* 128). In the Rational State it would seem like the main function of women are that of sex partners, particularly seeing how he mentions the state incubators closely followed by the butterfly which flits “from flower to flower” (Huxley, *CY* 30) which is an obvious metaphor for promiscuity. Women are permitted to be part of the Herd to provide sexual relief – if true to the society of *Brave New World* they would also do it as often as possible, of course for themselves, but (more importantly in order to maintain social order:) also for others (specifically men). Thus, if women do exist in the Rational State, they are, from an essential and heterosexual standpoint, essentially sex objects.

If we accept a correlation between Mr. Scogan’s personal philosophy (his views) and the ideology of the Rational State – which seems obvious unless he would propose someone else’s idea, which would seem unlikely considering the many references he has to other persons of note – we can conclude that Mr. Scogan represents the patriarchal outlook of his time on the world (that of the decades before 1920 primarily, due to his age and the notions forming him before the First World War and women’s emancipation). He is representative in particular regarding his view of women, and he argues that rationality can achieve the same social order as fascism (initially) said it could achieve – but not in regards of the notion of monogamy, as will be further discussed in the section “Mr. Scogan and sex”. To Mr. Scogan, injustices (and chaos) are born from irrationality and insanity, traits he ascribes the Men of Faith who, until the Rational State is instated, govern (most of) society (Huxley, *CY* 126 and onwards). So far in this analysis the paper’s initial questions of (1) who Mr. Scogan is and how he is viewed, and (2) how he views his contemporary world has been answered (through his fascist and intellectual ideals), and to a minor extent also (3) why he treats women the way he does (which is because he is a fascist, an intellectual, and foremost a man in and certainly
of a patriarchal time). We need also look at his perceived ‘benevolence’ as well as how he interacts with the women at Crome.

**MR. SCOGAN – HIS BENEVOLENCE**

Mr. Scogan believes that his Rational State could solve all injustices that subjectivity and irrationality evokes, specifically because the world is ruled by madmen and those who lack reason and intellect – clearly he has not taken women into account in this endeavour, however. This benevolence he sees is crystal clear when he describes the Herd:

> Systematically, from earliest infancy, its members will be assured that there is no happiness to be found except in work and obedience; they will be made to believe that they are happy, that they are tremendously important beings, and that everything they do is noble and significant. For the lower species the earth will be restored to the centre of the universe and man to pre-eminence on the earth. Oh, I envy the lot of the commonality in the Rational State! Working their eight hours a day, obeying their betters, convinced of their own grandeur and significance and immortality, they will be marvellously happy, happier than any race of men has ever been. (Huxley, *CY* 129)

Just like early fascists, Mr. Scogan does not seek to oppress anyone (unless one argues that he wishes the Intelligences to, for once, rule through oppression; however, instead he puts emphasis on the liberation from the “madmen” (Huxley *CY* 126)), he seeks merely to establish order. Nevertheless, some need to be oppressed or otherwise managed to keep the order – the Men of Faith are both oppressors and oppressed, as has been discussed, and the reason for why they are given a position under the ruling class but over the working class is by all probability because they would otherwise feel oppressed and react against it; “the new Man of Faith will be expending his passion” so that his passion is not directed against the social order. The reason for the Rational State in the first place, Mr. Scogan argues, is that “people want power to persecute other human beings”, something which his utopia will not tolerate. In the realisation of the State, all categories of humans are abolished except that of the three classes. These classes are needed, because Mr. Scogan knows that order must be maintained; someone must make sure that social order is not disrupted. In this sense the Rational State is nothing if not conservative (“tending to oppose change” ([http://www.thefreedictionary.com](http://www.thefreedictionary.com))). In some aspects his utopia follows the idea that fascism
Modig 48

corporates: the Rational State and fascist governments, like that of Italy under Mussolini, is a system “where all aspects of society are controlled by the state and all criticism or opposition is suppressed” (http://www.thefreedictionary.com), and fascism (also) “abhors the idea of a classless society and sees desirable order only in a state in which each class has its distinct place and function” (http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com).

MR. SCOGAN – HIS VIEWS OF THE WOMEN AT CROME

That concludes the analysis of the Rational State, and allow us to focus entirely on Crome’s women (specifically Mary and Anne). When considering Mr. Scogan’s treatment of them one must keep in mind that they are all of the same social class, thus what separates them is their gender – as well as their personalities; but as stated in the beginning of this paper focus will be kept on their gender foremost, following the essentialist perspective. However Mary’s and Anne’s personalities must be considered in regards of how Mr. Scogan expect women to behave, how else could we see whether he treats women the same or differently according to their personalities. There is no contradiction here, the reader must keep in mind that even if Mary and Anne are two individuals with different personalities they are still both women, and if Anne does not present Mr. Scogan with an opportunity to be belittled or spurned she is simply ‘the exception that proves the rule’, especially since (as we shall see) she possesses masculine traits which Mr. Scogan (seemingly but never explicitly) appreciates. The reason lies in the nature of the difference between sex (female) and gender (feminine). Mary and the muslin girl are better examples of how Mr. Scogan treats women, since he truly sees them as women (e.g. identifying them with their bodies (Braidotti 412) thus perceiving them as both female and feminine).

Mary and Anne is seen conversing on their own in chapter VII (Huxley, CY pp: 39-43, all citations herein this paragraph taken from said source and pages) regarding Mary’s issue of choosing a (potential) male partner. Mary says that she is “afraid of repressions” and says that repressing the “natural instincts of sex” leads to one becoming “nymphomaniac of (sic) one’s not careful”. Mary and Anne then starts to discuss the potential mates’ qualities, going about it in a very rational manner, both agreeing “that knowledge is desirable and that ignorance is undesirable”. The point of this conversation, which Huxley intentionally wants to point out, is that the women discuss a very ‘female’ subject – that of choosing a mate in a monogamous fashion; as opposed to men presumably sleeping with anyone they can – but through a distinctly rational, emotionless approach. Whether Huxley is merely being provocative, due to his “then unprecedented discussion of previously unmentioned topics … especially sex” (Izzo
8), or if he wants to say something in regards to the women’s personalities, we may never know. But if the latter is true, Huxley is either saying something about them as women (that is, women not always behaving in a ‘womanly’ fashion) or about them as upper class (women).

When trying to find the most logical answer we can consider two points. Firstly, it is certainly a fact that throughout the course of civilised society the choice of mate has been very important: this idea is in line with social Darwinism in terms of best (gifted) biological partner; it is also in line with the “monogamian marriage” (Assiter 68) in relation to individual men’s “acquisition of surplus wealth” (Assiter 69); the father is hard to identify in a promiscuous society, thus the “monogamous family is born, with the purpose of guaranteeing the undisputed paternity of the child” (Assiter 69). Following this line of reasoning Mary cannot simply chose a mate at random (a subject to patriarchal notions of marriage as she is), and certainly not be promiscuous and be unsure of the father to her unwanted child, at worst. Secondly, in a patriarchal monogamous society the women are subject to the notion of the dichotomy of the Madonna/Whore complex, thus they do not wish to be seen as sexually frivolous.

Anne, on the other hand, is merely amused by Mary’s relationship trouble. Anne, “the ‘liberated’ but cynical femme fatale” (Izzo 7), is much more certain of herself but seem oblivious to how her flirtatious manner attracts (after which she puts down) the men around her. These two women are (some of) what Izzo calls the “women who are Freudian moderns or Victorian predators or both” (Izzo 7). Annes philosophy is: “One enjoys the pleasant things, avoids the nasty ones. There’s nothing more to be said” (Huxley, CY 24), of which Izzo says “there is much more to be said, but being rich and spoiled simplifies Anne’s view of reality” (Izzo 7-8). Both Mary’s concern of a mate and Anne’s carefree attitude towards men through her being “rich and spoiled” is still very much a consequence of their respective (and same) social standing; thus Huxley is nevertheless saying something about them being upper class.

MR. SCOGAN AND SEX

And how does Mr. Scogan treat them? Mr. Scogan never treats Mary as an equal in the context of (intellectual) discussion, despite her being “a reader of Freud and Havelock Ellis, the then-shocking sex researcher” (Izzo 8). This fact Mr. Scogan demonstrates at several times, and it is surely in line with his old-fashioned notion (due to his age and his upbringing where literacy was limited for women “until the end of the nineteenth century”) of women’s
limited participation in intellectual debates (Evans 6). On this very subject (of sex) Mary and Mr. Scogan hold opposing views:

“I entirely disagree with you,” said Mary. “Sex isn’t a laughing matter; it’s serious.”

“Perhaps,” answered Mr. Scogan, “perhaps I’m an obscene old man. For I must confess that I cannot always regard it as wholly serious.”

“But I tell you...” began Mary furiously. Her face had flushed with excitement. Her cheeks were the cheeks of a great ripe peach.

“Indeed,” Mr. Scogan continued, “it seems to me one of few permanently and everlastingly amusing subjects that exist. Amour is the one human activity of any importance in which laughter and pleasure preponderate, if ever so slightly, over misery and pain.”

“I entirely disagree,” said Mary. There was a silence. (Huxley, CY 85)

This could also be taken as evidence for women’s roles as ‘sex objects’ in the Rational State in order to “preponderate … over misery and pain”. This discussion regarding sex is interesting: partly because it will show, in analysing it, how Mr. Scogan is pro-promiscuity, and thus shows another contradicting side to himself due to the contemporary patriarchal notion of monogamy; and partly because it also contradicts Mary’s monogamous beliefs. Firstly, Mr. Scogan is amused over the story he tells of the court at “the time of the amiable Brantome” (Huxley, CY 85) where female debutantes would drink from a cup with special engravements of amorous scenes on the inside, hidden under the wine. As they drank the engravings would be revealed: “If the debutante blushed, they laughed at her for her innocence; if she did not, she was laughed at for being too knowing” (Huxley, CY 85). This story is amusing to Mr. Scogan because it shows how the patriarchal ideology makes little distinction between the Madonna and the Whore dichotomy – they will laugh at women no matter what category they fall under. In fact, it may well symbolise men’s amusement over women’s folly – if women buy into this dichotomy they have effectively put themselves under the oppression of patriarchy.

Mr. Scogan is met with objection from Mary, who is unknowingly symbolising women’s objection to being referred to as fools. It is hard to understand her defence of Havelock Ellis when compared to her obvious patriarchal notions of monogamy (fully indoctrinated or not, they have a hold on her); Havelock Ellis studied human sexuality and had a troublesome love
life and marriage and his wife, a lesbian, “could not stand the intimacy of a married relationship” (Brink 60), so Ellis was forced to live under an ‘open marriage’. If this lead to or was a direct result of “his objections to restrictive Victorian sexual mores” (Brink 60) Brink leaves unanswered, but it is nevertheless true that he had “many love affairs” (Brink 63). It is ironic that Mr. Scogan deems his anecdote, describing old customs, “so genially frank” (Huxley, CY 85), when Havelock Ellis himself was just as frank seeing how he “went public in the scientist’s guise” (Brink 64) and discussed “anomalous sexuality” (Brink 64), specifically regarding his own personal weakness for women’s urination, a weakness he termed ‘uroagnia’ (Brink 61-62). Mr. Scogan’s contempt for Ellis could be due to the fact of Ellis’ personal ‘flaws’ (in Mr. Scogan’s eyes), particularly if we consider Mr. Scogan’s patriarchal notions otherwise: if we assume he sees women (those below his social class at any rate, perhaps those of low intellect, even) as sex objects – which he certainly must seeing as he is delighted to hear Ivor say that women are “always wonderfully the same” (Huxley, CY 87) in regards to their sex appeal – then we must naturally conclude that men are supposed to be the ones ‘fulfilling’ the women’s purposes, i.e. having intercourse with them. It is then logical to conclude that men are supposed to be heterosexual, and this fact is perhaps the very point in Mr. Scogan’s contempt for Ellis, since he was, in Brink’s words, “crypto-homosexual … almost asexual” (60). In fact, Mr. Scogan mentions his disappointment of professors who write books “in which sex [is] sterilised and dissected” (Huxley, CY 86) which clearly applies to Ellis. It is much harder to specify why Mary likes Ellis; but perhaps it is the case that he, in the case of Mary and others, was “mistaken by his superficial readers as a prophet of free love” (Brink 63), thus indicating Mary’s evident struggle between the Madonna/Whore ideal(s) and monogamy and promiscuity. Of note is also the fact that Ellis was part of those who (perhaps not his intent, but nevertheless) encouraged sexuality and “the erotic partnerings of the Bloomsbury” (Brink 63), and since Huxley was part of the Bloomsbury group as well he must have known much regarding Ellis.

Once more Mr. Scogan treats Mary as a child: “‘But I disagree with you about reading,’ said Mary. ‘About serious reading, I mean.’ ‘Quite right, Mary, quite right,’ Mr. Scogan answered. ‘I had forgotten there were any serious people in the room’” (Huxley, CY 82). But the most important instance where Mr. Scogan (unbeknownst to her) humiliates Mary is seen on page 18-19, and calls her “an exception [and] a femme superieure”. Mr. Scogan clearly says this of her as a jest; Mary takes it literally as a compliment, but Jenny, when asked by Denis if she considered herself a femme superieure, answers “‘No’ … rather indignantly, when
at last she heard what Denis was saying. ‘Certainly not. Has anyone been suggesting that I am?’” (Huxley, *CY* 22). Evidently Jenny knows better than Mary, she understands that it is meant as a cleverly concealed insult.

Since we approach Mr. Scogan’s treatment of the women from an essentialist perspective we can disregard any flaw in Mary’s personality (in the eyes of Mr. Scogan that is) and instead question why he does not treat Anne in this way. Anne may be carefree but when she can make a provocative comment she will; when Mr. Scogan orates about eccentricism, “the justification of all aristocracies” (Huxley, *CY* pp: 62-63, all citations taken from said source and pages) of which they belong, and the consequence of it being unaccepted after “the social revolution”, she provokes Mr. Scogan and is met by a serious answer between (intellectual) equals:

“What then? Will they suffer you to go on writing villanelles, my good Denis? Will you, unhappy Henry, be allowed to live in this house of the splendid privies, to continue your quiet delving in the mines of futile knowledge? Will Anne...”

“And you,” said Anne, interrupting him, “will you be allowed to go on talking?”

“You may rest assured,” Mr. Scogan replied, “that I shall not. I shall have some Honest Work to do.”

Anne obviously seeks to escape being exposed or made fun of, but what is interesting is that Mr. Scogan (1) allows her to interrupt, (2) forget to describe Anne and (2) answers her question, all without any sign of resistance or indignation.

Anne definitely complicates the analysis if it is supposed to be in accordance of essentialism; the only possibly interpretation that does not take into regard her personality in relation to Mr. Scogan is the manner in which she provoked him; she did not, as Mary, disagree and tried to give her own perspective, she did in fact comply with Mr. Scogan’s subject and redirected focus from herself to him instead – or perhaps she simply hurried his oration so that he skipped Anne (and others) to finally arrive at his designation; himself. I believe that this is the interpretation one must choose in the context of this analysis and the frame I have set it in; that said I do encourage further analysis on the subject.

Another difference between Mary and Anne, one that is important in the light of Mr. Scogan’s treatment of them, is the fact that Anne is not as well-read or educated as Mary,
albeit having better general knowledge of the world than Mary. This can be gathered from small details, such as Anne, in the context of education, being “ashamed of [her] lack of it” (Huxley, CY 23). Mary also complains about Anne’s taste in “second-rate” books, since she “was accustomed in London to associate only with first-rate people who liked first-rate things” (Huxley, CY 40). This is important precisely because it concerns literature and education, things that (presumably) lead to intelligence and rationality. Mr. Scogan should, given the fact of Anne’s lesser knowledge compared to Mary, treat Mary better and Anne worse, but obviously he does not.

One reason could be that Anne is more confident and reserved and having “self-control” (Braidotti 412), which are perceived masculine traits, whereas Mary is the spitting image of a young girl more concerned with her appearance than anything else and constantly airing her comments and feelings because she lacks this self-control (Braidotti 412), which are perceived feminine traits – that is not all she is, but Mary is definitely, by others, identified “with the body” she possesses and thus ‘should’ be “reduced to silence” (Braidotti 412). For further fe/male traits, see Table 1 in the appendix. Assiter says, as “Freud suggested” (137), that “girls, just as much as boys, have ‘masculine’ aims; they wish to be rational and independant. This description is certainly true of Anne, and we can make the conclusion that Mr. Scogan respects rational (and ‘masculine’) individuals regardless of sex – in effect, he oppresses women based on their femininity firstly.

Another reason for treating Mary in this manner lies in her defiance of his views, she is constantly in conflict with Mr. Scogan, partly since she, of course, is of another notion, but the fact that she gives voice to her contradicting notions is because she lacks the virtue of silence – she raises her voice to confront her ‘betters’ (men), but seeing as Mr. Scogan never lets her develop her arguments, she is never allowed to prove herself (and her rationality). Granted, Mary is not a role model of feminism, and Mr. Scogan might be right in thinking her not too clever (which can be clearly seen from his insults of her), but that is still no excuse to suppress her opinion and (cleverly) insult her – everyone has a right to express themselves. The etiquette of their contemporary time might have said otherwise (Evans 6) but then patriarchal notions were also more respected at that time; what we are doing in this paper is however analysing an ideology based on what we now know of both our own and their contemporary time.

This is a virtue in the context of an oppressing patriarchy; during Christianity’s long and strong hold over England women have also been oppressed through religion. In the first epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, he says that “women should remain silent in the churches.
They are not allowed to speak, but must be in submission, as the Law says” ([http://bible.cc/1_corinthians/14-34.htm](http://bible.cc/1_corinthians/14-34.htm)). Evans also describes the intellectual climate during the late nineteenth century (which Mr. Scogan’s views come closer, in regards of gender inequality but not sexuality, to than that of the early twentieth century): “In a society (or in the case of Europe, societies) in which literacy was limited until the end of the nineteenth century, the part played by most women in intellectual or social debates was limited” (6). Mary thus breaks the convention that says women should keep away from “intellectual or social debates”, and she provokes Mr. Scogan who is certainly a patriarchal man due to his “male arrogance and [his] impulse to dominate” (Evans 4).

**MR. SCOGAN AND THE MUSLIN GIRL**

Lastly, Mr. Scogan seemingly breaks from his character when it is time for “Crome’s yearly Charity Fair” (Huxley, *CY* 141). It is incredibly strange that Priscilla – with her fascination for the stars and “in casting the horoscopes of horses” (Huxley, *CY* 11) and football players – is not cast in the role of the fortune teller. That is however a simplistic understanding; neither Priscilla nor her husband Henry take part in essentially serving the common folk at the Charity Fair; the hosts of both Crome and the fair might “tolerate the fair” (Huxley, *CY* 141) and take charge of administering it, but that is where they draw the line. They are conscious of their higher social standing, both in regards of the commoners but also in regards of their guests at Crome, since all their guests are “expected to help in the Fair” (Huxley, *CY* 141). Henry and Priscilla will not suffer the indignity to indulge the commoners (any further). Instead it is Mr. Scogan that volunteers:

> “May I be allowed to tell fortunes?” he asked at last. “I think I should be good at telling fortunes.”

> “But you can’t tell fortunes in that costume!”

> “Can’t I?” Mr. Scogan surveyed himself.

> “You’ll have to be dressed up. Do you still persist?”

> “I’m ready to suffer all indignities.” (Huxley, *CY* 142)

It could be that Mr. Scogan has ulterior motives for suffering these “indignities”, and indeed he does take action which is entirely selfish (all citations in this discussion of the fair taken from the same source and pages; Huxley, *CY* pp: 152-153). When a “young and pleasing” girl “dressed in white muslin” comes up to Mr. Scogan – who is “[d]ressed in a
black skirt and red bodice, with a yellow-and-red bandana handkerchief tied round his black wig” – the first words he says to her are “You are still virtuous”, whereupon she “giggle[s] and exclaim[s], ‘Oh, lor!’” after which he replies, showing us his true intentions: “But you will not remain so for long”. His fortune telling proceeds to foretell “this one crucial incident”, obviously with himself as the man:

Next Sunday afternoon at six o’clock you will be sitting on the second stile on the footpath that leads from the church to the lower road. At that moment a man will appear walking along the footpath … a small man with a sharp nose, not exactly good looking nor precisely young, but fascinating. He will ask you, 'Can you tell me the way to Paradise?' and you will answer, 'Yes, I’ll show you,' and walk with him down towards the little hazel copse. I cannot read what will happen after that.

The “white muslin” girl giggles and leans “eagerly forward” while he foretells her ‘fortune’, but Mr. Scogan warns her that “if anything untoward happens you must blame your own curiosity”. He effectively creates an expectation in the poor young girl and creates a scenario which he can make come true (truly, if he had described the man as handsome and young he would effectively have put himself out of the picture even if he asked her the right question), but he also foretells an excuse that lays the blame on her “own curiosity”, if he would end up distressing or hurting her. Taken to its extreme, Mr. Scogan is in fact describing and setting up a rape, something that the still virtuous girl have no clue of whatsoever. He is quite clearly seeing her as a mere sex object, someone he can be not so wholly serious with. This would then effectively mean that Mr. Scogan does not share Mary’s views on monogamy; for Mr. Scogan sex is not a serious business, and one need not worry over who one does it with. This shows his promiscuous notions being contrary to contemporary patriarchal notions of monogamy but nevertheless in line with male superiority considering that Mr. Scogan presumable sees men to be conquerors whereas women stay true to their (future or present) husbands – it would be possible for the majority of women to remain true to the Madonna ideal (or monogamous ideal) as long as brothels allow men to have several sexual partners.

Nevertheless, could she really be convinced to follow him into “the little hazel copse” if she saw him, “sharp-nosed, brown, and wrinkled”, even if she did not recognise him as the fortune teller? Mr. Scogan seems to think she would. Despite being a man of reason, the
intelligent person he sees himself as, Mr. Scogan is inclined to divulge in amorous activity with a girl not equal to him in neither intellectual sense nor in social standing. This point may however be the reason why she would go through with it; Mr. Scogan could be seen as “fascinating”, perhaps more so to a lowly educated “young lady”, and he is definitely of a higher standing than her, thus being in a position of power over her, perhaps more so due to him being older than her.

Freud (1856-1939) founded what we know as the discipline of psychoanalysis, and his theory of sexuality (Johanson) can perhaps explain the reason to why the “muslin girl” would agree to have sex with Mr. Scogan, if the patriarchal notion that women will submit to dominant men (as Mr. Scogan seems to hope, or assume) does not suffice. Freud calls “the person from whom sexual attraction proceeds the sexual object [(the girl)] and the act toward the instinct tends the sexual aim” (author’s italics, Freud 135), the last of which means the result of “an irresistible attraction exercised by one sex upon the other” (Freud 135), which is whatever happens in “the little hazel copse”. Freud describes the “popular view of the sexual instinct [as] beautifully reflected in the poetic fable which tells how the original human beings were cut up into two halves—man and woman—and how these are always striving to unite again in love” (Freud 135-136). This is a heterosexual view, the conventional view encouraged in the patriarchal ideology (and thus shared by Mr. Scogan, in most regards), which Freud affirms when he later discusses variants of it (homo- and bisexuality, etc.) and names them “deviations [and] inversions” (Freud 136), but it suffices considering Mr. Scogan being male and the “muslin girl” being female.

Freud argue that women have “penis envy” (Freud 195) and says that “when they see that boys' genitals are formed differently from their own [t]hey are ready to recognize them immediately and are over-come by envy for the penis—an envy culminating in the wish, which is so important in its consequences, to be boys themselves” or at best to ‘own’ it through other means, such as through sex. Freud argues that penis envy (which must be a patriarchal notion since a matriarchal ideology would inverse the dominance of the male sex and thus result in ‘vaginal envy’) also leads to patriarchal notions of male superiority – thus, as Althusser says, the ideology both produces and reproduces the ideology’s notions. Freud agrees when he says: “The conviction which is finally reached by males that women have no penis often leads them to an enduringly low opinion of the other sex” (Freud 195). Barry summarises feminist criticism of Freud’s penis envy and says that it “need not be taken as simply concerning the male physical organ itself …, but as concerning that organ as an emblem of social power and the advantages which go with it” (Barry 125); penis envy thus
“signifies “women’s lack of social power” (Barry 125). Lastly, Freud notes what he sees as a fact, pertaining to “intellectual strain”, which may be the underlying reason for why Mr. Scogan feels the need to indulge in amorous activities:

Finally, it is an unmistakable fact that concentration of the attention upon an intellectual task and intellectual strain in general produce a concomitant sexual excitation in many young people as well as adults. This is no doubt the only justifiable basis for what is in other respects the questionable practice of ascribing nervous disorders to intellectual ‘overwork’. (Freud 204)

Barry offers criticism to Freud’s psychoanalysis however: “Marxist criticism has … traditionally been opposed to psychoanalytic explanations of conduct, on the grounds that psychoanalysis falsely isolates individuals from the social structures in which they exist” (159). Despite this, we have approached the matter of the “muslin girl” without isolating her from “the social structures” in which she exist; we have considered her working-class background in relation to Mr. Scogan’s upper-class background.

CONCLUSION

In the end it does not matter whether the “muslin girl” does as Mr. Scogan hopes, the important thing is that he – through his patriarchal notions of heterosexuality and his superiority over her due to him being a man – hold these patriarchal notions of women’s lesser worth and their place in society, regardless of whether they come true or not. Mary certainly defies his view of women, even if she confirms Ivor’s lady-killer charm through being seduced by him – Mary, intentionally on Huxley’s part or not, might be unsure whether she is “coming or going” (Izzo 8), but that is exactly how she reveals the oppressive dichotomy every woman (essentially, yes, but not the whole truth) must choose between in order to fit into the men’s world.

In this paper we have seen Mr. Scogan for what he truly is beneath his intellectual appearance. Mr. Scogan shares notions of fascism and is very class conscious, in his Rational State he seeks to upheave the current social order which he deems ‘insane’, and instead instate a State where reason reigns supreme and unconditional through its SAs and ISAs. The analysis of the latter institutions and the theory presented by Althusser also revealed the underlying ideology of the Rational State as well as Mr. Scogan’s philosophy. What we found is a man confident in himself as an intellectual and as a man – a man who deem those not
meeting those criteria unworthy of being his equal. Furthermore he is a promiscuous man who would steep so low as to trick a young virgin into laying with him for his own pleasure. While Mr. Scogan is not wholly in contempt of women, considering how he all but treats Anne as an equal due to her masculine traits, he seems to look down on femininity, even if he would deign to seek sexual pleasure with a feminine female. Even though Mr. Scogan talks of reason he is very unreasonable in his treatment of Mary, due to her femininity, and never allow her to prove herself (and as stated, whether she may or may not have something clever to come with is unimportant).

Mr. Scogan is a remnant of the pre-war time of the Enlightenment with all the consequences it has for the feminine women who he encounters, and those feminine women belong in the kitchen and the bed as far as he is concerned. Mr. Scogan’s philosophy; his Rational State (to some extent); the very ideology he is influenced by and seeks to promote and influence others with; the world he represents and hope for – they are all aptly described in the Swedish punk song “Patriarkatet”, which aptly says in the first verse:

The Patriarchy is a hereditary tradition
In which gentlemen rule and write constitution
Each boy is a gift but each girl just a weight
A human which class is worth less in the state. (my translation, Asta Kask)

We should not consider this entirely tragic, instead we should heed the words of Huxley himself: “Our mood when we have read a Wholly Truthful [text] is never one of heroic exultation; it is one of resignation, of acceptance. (Acceptance can also be heroic.)” (Izzo 9). Huxley calls this an experience of catharsis, and borrowing the meaning of that word from psychology this paper can hopefully bring something to the reader’s consciousness, particularly regarding the issue of ideologies and their indoctrination through ISAs, and to those in the Occident and those living under other patriarchies this theory of Althusser’s coupled with feminism may help in the struggle for women’s emancipation and rights.

In regards of his chauvinistic view of women and especially his treatment of the muslin girl, it is only fitting that Mr. Scogan gets the last word. Being proud of being a man he ironically draws a parallel between men and pigs: "What wisdom, what judgment, what a sense of values! 'Rightly are they called swine.' Yes. And I wish I could, with as much justice, say, 'Rightly are we called men'" (Huxley, CY 28). After analysing Mr. Scogan – and concluding what his notion of what a man is if he is considered one – we can “with as much
justice” give him the right to say of himself and the men he compares himself to: “Rightly are we called men”, and “Rightly are they called swine".
APPENDIX

TABLE 1
Sexual Difference Level 1: Difference Between Men and Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECTIVITY AS</th>
<th>VERSUS</th>
<th>WOMAN AS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phallogocentric</td>
<td>the lack of/excess/&quot;other-than”/subject</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>universal notion of the subject</td>
<td>devalorized difference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coinciding with consciousness</td>
<td>non consciousness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-regulating</td>
<td>uncontrolled</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rational agency</td>
<td>irrational</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entitled to rationality</td>
<td>in excess of rationality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capable of transcendence</td>
<td>confined to immanence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>denying corporal origins</td>
<td>Identified (sic) with the body – corporeality that is both exploited and reduced to silence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>objectifying the body</td>
<td>(Braidotti 412)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WORKS CITED

Literature


Evans, Mary, *Feminism I – Critical concepts in literary and cultural studies*, Routledge, 2001


---

*Video*

*Brave New World*, Writing credits to author Aldous Huxley and teleplay by Dan Mazur & David Tausik, Dir. Leslie Libman & Larry Williams, Perf. Peter Gallagher, Leonard Nimoy, 1998, National Broadcasting Company (NBC) and Universal TV, [TV].
Internet sources
Bailey, Viktor, “Crime in 20th Century Britain”, History Today Volume: 38 Issue: 5,
Derbyshire, John, "What Happened to Aldous Huxley?" New Criterion, n. pag., 21 June 2003,
Freud, Sigmund, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 1905,
   http://www.sfu.ca/cmns/faculty/mcallister_k/486-857/Freud-
   Three%20Essays%20on%20the%20Theory%20of%20Sexuality.pdf.
Mauck, Allyson C., “Margaret Sanger founds the National Birth Control League – 1921”,
   April 28, 1997, (revised as of August 1999),
West, Mia, “30 Days of Being Branded a Slut”, Women’s Reproductive Rights Advocacy
   Group, My Body My Business, West Public Relations LLC, San Diego, California, May
R. Skidelsky, *Oswald Mosley*, English publication 1975, the article has no author (i.e. Swedish translator) per se, only literary reference given, [http://www.ne.se/oswald-mosley](http://www.ne.se/oswald-mosley).


[http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/abortion/mother/for_1.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/abortion/mother/for_1.shtml)

[http://bible.cc/1_corinthians/14-34.htm](http://bible.cc/1_corinthians/14-34.htm)

[http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/fascism](http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/fascism) (no given author; belonging to the same website as *TheFreeDictionary*).


[http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/worlds-first-test-tube-baby-born](http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/worlds-first-test-tube-baby-born)

[http://www.historyorb.com/events/date/1921](http://www.historyorb.com/events/date/1921)

**Dictionaries**


[http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/culture](http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/culture)


[http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ideology?q=ideology](http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ideology?q=ideology)

[http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/individualism?q=individualism](http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/individualism?q=individualism)

[http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/law?q=law](http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/law?q=law)


[http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/man?q=men+of+letters#man__51](http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/man?q=men+of+letters#man__51)

[http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/propaganda?q=propaganda](http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/propaganda?q=propaganda)
