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Resilience to Intentional Electromagnetic Interference Is Required for Connected Autonomous Vehicles
University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Electronics, Mathematics and Natural Sciences, Electronics. Department of Electromagnetic Engineering, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-5562-3182
Department of Real Estate and Construction Management, Building, and Real Estate Economics, Center for Safety Research, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-7606-8771
KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-9507-9185
2018 (English)In: IEEE transactions on electromagnetic compatibility (Print), ISSN 0018-9375, E-ISSN 1558-187XArticle in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

The connected autonomous vehicle (CAV) will never be completely autonomous; on the contrary, it will be heavily dependent on so-called vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) for its function. To deserve the trust of the general public, the vehicles as well as the intelligent transport system (ITS) infrastructure must be able to handle not only natural disturbances but also attacks of malicious nature. In this paper, we discuss the effects of antagonistic attacks using intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) and how the antagonistic nature of the threat renders probabilistic risk analysis inadequate for the defense of the vehicles and the infrastructure. Instead, we propose a shift toward resilience engineering and vulnerability analysis to manage antagonistic threats. Finally, we also give two examples of possible scenarios to illustrate the type of situations a CAV must be able to handle.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2018.
Keywords [en]
Autonomous vehicles, Electromagnetic interference, Resilience, Vehicular ad hoc networks, Risk analysis, Safety, Sensors, Connected autonomous vehicle (CAV), infrastructure to vehicle (I2V), intelligent transport system (ITS), intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI), risk, shared autonomous vehicle (SAV), vehicle to infrastructure (V2I), vehicle to vehicle (V2V), vehicular ad hoc network (VANET), vulnerability
National Category
Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:hig:diva-27872DOI: 10.1109/TEMC.2018.2866178Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85052897433OAI: oai:DiVA.org:hig-27872DiVA, id: diva2:1246142
Available from: 2018-09-06 Created: 2018-09-06 Last updated: 2018-09-24Bibliographically approved

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Ängskog, Per

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