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Auditor objectivity as a function of auditor negotiation self-efficacy beliefs
University of Gävle, Faculty of Education and Business Studies, Department of Business and Economic Studies, Business administration.
Mid Sweden University, Department of Business, Economics and Law, Centre for Research on Economic Relations, Sundsvall, Sweden.
West Virginia University, Department of Accounting, Morgantown, United States.
2019 (English)In: Advances in Accounting, ISSN 0882-6110, Vol. 44, p. 121-131Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This study empirically examines whether an auditor's perceived ability to negotiate discretionary accounting issues with clients (auditor negotiation self-efficacy) is related to auditor objectivity, and whether an auditor's negotiation self-efficacy has a greater impact on her objectivity when the auditor's accuracy motive (professional identity) is strong rather than weak. We tested the hypotheses using a cross-sectional survey design and obtained 146 responses from among 800 surveyed experienced Swedish auditors. The findings indicate that auditors with higher negotiation self-efficacy were more likely to make decisions on a material and discretionary accounting issue contrary to their clients’ desires compared to auditors with lower self-efficacy. The relationship between negotiation self-efficacy and auditor objectivity was not moderated by professional-identity strength. These research findings suggest that recruiting and training auditors to increase their negotiation self-efficacy may be an effective method to enhance auditor objectivity without the problems inherent in other methods, such as auditor rotation. Our sample was obtained in Sweden, which allows long auditor tenures. We caution that, although our analysis controlled for auditor tenure, the effect of auditor negotiation self-efficacy may not be generalizable to countries that limit tenure through regulation.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2019. Vol. 44, p. 121-131
Keywords [en]
Auditor objectivity, Client identification, Negotiation self-efficacy, Professional identification, Short-tenure threats
National Category
Economics and Business
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:hig:diva-28647DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2018.10.001ISI: 000465351800012Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85054447607OAI: oai:DiVA.org:hig-28647DiVA, id: diva2:1265761
Note

Funding: Handelsbankens forskningsstiftelser

Available from: 2018-11-26 Created: 2018-11-26 Last updated: 2019-08-27Bibliographically approved

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Svanberg, Jan

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CiteExportLink to record
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Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard-cite-them-right
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • sv-SE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • de-DE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf