In this paper, we investigate the direct and indirect effects of the EU-wide mandatory CSR reporting reform (2014/95/EU). We argue and find that, in addition to direct effects, coercive pressure also has spillover effects. An example of such a spillover effect of coercive pressure due to the reform is the change in reporting behavior of firms not subject to the reform, i.e., not directly coerced by the regulation. We exploit the Swedish implementation of the reform as a natural experiment to test our hypotheses and find that firms coerced by the reform increase their CSR reporting by 3.5 issues on average. However, firms not coerced by the regulation but close to being regulated increase their CSR reporting by 5.2 issues. As such, firms close to being regulated change their behavior more at the time of the reform than do those that are actually regulated. We also find that the spillover effects are significantly higher for low than high prereform reporters. On the other hand, the direct effects on low prereform reporters are insignificant. Together, the results refine our understanding of the institutionalization process of CSR reporting in a mandatory setting. The results are robust for various model specifications and provide useful insights for regulators and managers.