Since management and ownership separated, the objective of accounting was management control. In the wake of Enron, WorldCom and Vivendi voices, inspired by agency theory, were raised for further control. But an important motive was the interests of the global auditing firms.

If general management is corrupt recruitment procedures should change. Are people bad – theory Y?  Then replace management with machines.

Most managers wouldn’t manipulate if they could steer; they’d get rewarded accordingly. But they can’t. Most corporations are not steerable – no viable steering instruments, nor manageable entities.

Increased control is problematic; presuming the reason for failure is dishonest executives; not their lack of control! If they can’t control increased control of them might lead to implosion.

This paper shows that (1) it is possible to increase the quality of accounting information, but also that (2) this is insufficient. This should have (3) consequences for regulation of shareholder capitalism.