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  • 1.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    A reply to Søvik2019Ingår i: Theofilos, ISSN 1893-7969, Vol. 11, nr 1, s. 49-53Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    Recently, in this journal, Atle Ottesen Søvik has argued that there is a critique of Skeptical Theism that I hardly discuss in my book The God who Seeks but Seems to Hide. According to him, this critique is “devastating” to the whole project of Skeptical Theism. Here I present his critique and show that he is incorrect

  • 2.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    A Very Friendly Atheism Indeed2013Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
  • 3.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet, Centrum för mångvetenskaplig forskning om rasism (CFR).
    Agnosticism och lidandets problem2022Ingår i: Vidgade perspektiv på lidandets problem / [ed] Francis Jonbäck, Lina Langby, Oliver Li, Dialogos Förlag , 2022, 1Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
  • 4.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    An Evaluation of Skeptical Theism2012Ingår i: Svensk teologisk kvartalskrift, ISSN 0039-6761, Vol. 88, nr 1, s. 29-34Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    One of the most influential and frequently addressed responses to the evidential argument from Evil and divine hiddenness is advocated by so called skeptical theists, who claim that we are cognitively ill-equipped to know Gods reasons for permitting suffering or for hiding from us. In this article I evaluate Skeptical theism with regard to two common arguments, namely the argument that Skeptical theism entails skepticism concerning our moral decision making and that it entails skepticism concerning most if not all theistic beliefs. It is concluded that Skeptical theism isn’t in any serious trouble with regard to these arguments.

  • 5.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    Default Agnosticism2021Ingår i: Religions, ISSN 2077-1444, E-ISSN 2077-1444, Vol. 12, nr 1, artikel-id 54Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Agnosticism has always had its fair amount of criticism. Religious believers often described the first agnostics as infidels and it is not uncommon to see them described as somewhat dull fence-sitters. Moreover, the undecided agnostic stance on belief in gods is often compared with being unsure about such obviously false statements as the existence of orbiting teapots, invisible dragons or even Santa Claus. In this paper, I maintain that agnosticism can properly be endorsed as a default stance. More precisely, I use a strategy presented by Alvin Plantinga and argue that it is rationally acceptable to be agnostic about the existence of God. I also anticipate and answer a number of objections. Finally, I offer my conclusion.

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  • 6.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    En agnostikers bekännelse2021Manuskript (preprint) (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 7.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    Generic Theistic Reliabilism2013Ingår i: European Journal of Philosophy of Religion, ISSN 1689-8311, Vol. 5, nr 3, s. 139-148Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, I present the recently much discussed Value Challenge for Theories of Knowledge and formulate Generic Theistic Reliabilism as a theory, which can answer this challenge, with respect to Theism and the proposition ‘God exists’.

  • 8.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    Hopeism2022Ingår i: Studia Theologica, ISSN 0039-338X, E-ISSN 1502-7791, Vol. 76, nr 2, s. 172-192Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Philosophers of religion have traditionally focused their attention on belief in God and assessed such belief in terms of it having some epistemic status like“rationality” or “probability”, or indeed by determining whether or not it constitutes knowledge. In this paper, I focus my attention on the non-doxastic attitude of hope and formulate reasons for whether or not we should hope for God. In light of these reasons, I formulate hopeism as a research programme according to which we should develop concepts of God by starting with the question of what type of being would be worthy of our utmost hope. I compare this view with belief-based concepts of God, such as perfect being theism and what I call worship-worthiness theism. Arguably, the greatest benefit of choosing hopeism is that it is inclusive. Most atheists as well as agnostics and theists can endorse the view. I also suggest a number of directions in which hopeism can be developed.

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  • 9.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    How to be a friendly skeptical theist2013Ingår i: Forum Philosophicum, ISSN 1426-1898, Vol. 17, nr 2, s. 197-210Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper Skeptical Theism is described, applied and defended. Furthermore, William Rowe’s position of Friendly Atheism is described and a version of Friendly Theism suggested. It is shown that Skeptical Theism can be defended against two common arguments and that skeptical theists might be able to adopt the position of Friendly Theism.

  • 10.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    How to be a very friendly atheist indeed2015Ingår i: Forum Philosophicum, ISSN 1426-1898, Vol. 20, nr 1, s. 65-72Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Friendly atheists hold atheism to be true, and believe that theists may be rational when holding theism to be true. Theists may be rational, they claim, either because they lack the evidence for atheism, or because they are mistaken regarding the evidential force of the arguments for theism. Both these reasons can be interpreted as suggesting that theists are making a mistake, and perhaps even that they are blameworthy for having made that mistake. In this paper, I argue that friendly atheists might even say that the most intellectually oriented theists are rational and blameless for holding theism to be true. I give two reasons for this. The first reason is based on the denial of doxastic voluntarism regarding at least some of our beliefs. Theists might not have voluntary control with respect to their belief that God exists. The second reason is based on a meta-epistemological consideration. Often, we choose our epistemology by looking at paradigm examples of knowledge. Growing up in a theistic context might lead one to regard the belief that God exists as a paradigm example of knowledge, and a theist could be considered perfectly rational and blameless for doing so, even though they may be aware of reasonable arguments for atheism. With these odifications, I suggest that Friendly Atheism is very friendly indeed.

  • 11.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    In Defense of Skeptical Theism2013Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
  • 12. Jonbäck, Francis
    Lidandets problem och livets mening2021Ingår i: Förnuft och religion: Filosofiska undersökningar / [ed] Mikael Stenmark, Karin Johannesson, Ulf Zackariasson, Artos & Norma bokförlag , 2021Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
  • 13.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    Lidandets problem: Ska man vidga gudsbilden eller (kanske) klandra Gud?2015Ingår i: Att undervisa om människosyn och gudsuppfattningar inom och mellan religioner: Med utgångspunkt i kurs- och ämnesplanerna för religionskunskap i Lgr11 och Gy11, Liber , 2015Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 14.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet.
    Local religious exclusivism and truth2013Ingår i: Journal of Ecumenical Studies, ISSN 0022-0558, E-ISSN 2162-3937, Vol. 48, nr 1, s. 121-124Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 15.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    Logical Religous Exclusivism and Truth2013Ingår i: Journal of Ecumenical Studies, ISSN 0022-0558, E-ISSN 2162-3937, Vol. 48, nr 1, s. 121-124Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 16.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet.
    Meningsfullt liv2020Bok (Refereegranskat)
  • 17.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet.
    Meningslöst lidande2018Bok (Refereegranskat)
  • 18. Jonbäck, Francis
    Sant och sannolikt i religionsfilosofin2018Ingår i: Filosofiska metoder i praktiken / [ed] Mikael Stenmark, Karin Johannesson, Francis Jonbäck, Ulf Zackariasson, Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis , 2018Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
  • 19.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet, Centrum för forskning om religion och samhälle (CRS).
    Sceptical Agnosticism2023Ingår i: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, ISSN 2210-5697, E-ISSN 2210-5700, Vol. 13, nr 1, s. 31-43Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Agnostics as well as theists should answer evidential arguments from evil, at least when confronted with them. In this paper, I answer such an argument by appealing to sceptical agnosticism. A sceptical agnostic is not only undecided about the existence of a perfectly good and omnipotent God, but also believes that we cannot make any judgement about whether or not seemingly gratuitous evil probably is gratuitous. I argue that such agnosticism has several advantages compared with sceptical theism.

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  • 20.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    The God who Seeks but Seems to Hide2016Doktorsavhandling, monografi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this study is to reconstruct and evaluate two types of responses to an evidential argument from divine hiding, namely the ‘value agnostic’ response and the ‘theodicy’ response. In the study, the term ‘divine hiding’ refers to the experience of all those who find themselves having inconclusive evidence for the existence of God.

    According to the argument in focus, the fact that there is divine hiding that does not seem to be necessary for any particular greater good, or to avoid a worse evil, makes it improbable that God exists.

    In accordance with the value agnostic response, it is argued that it would not be surprising if divine hiding were necessary to realise greater goods or to avoid worse evils that are beyond our ken. In which case the goods or avoidance of evils in question could figure in a reason God might have for hiding. It is concluded that the value agnostic response is successful.

    The theodicy response states that divine hiding is probably necessary to realise greater goods or to avoid worse evils that are within our ken. It is argued that it would not be surprising if the realisation of the goods or avoidance of evils in question would in turn be sufficient for the realisation of worse evils that are beyond our ken. In which case the goods and avoidance of evils referred to in the theodicy response could not figure in a reason God might have for hiding. It is concluded that the theodicy response is a failure

    Finally, some further problems and prospects on which the study sheds light are discussed. In particular, it is argued that – although believers do not seem to have an evidential problem with believing in a God who seems to hide there might be an existential or practical problem, in particular for non-believers, when seeking a God who seems to hide.

  • 21.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet.
    The God who Seeks but Seems to Hide2017Bok (Övrig (populärvetenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 22.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    The Sceptical Response to the Existential Problem of Systemic Suffering2021Ingår i: Open Theology, E-ISSN 2300-6579, Vol. 7, nr 1, s. 102-110Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Recently, Yujin Nagasawa has argued that “systemic suffering” – suffering inherent in the evolutionary process – poses a problem for existentially optimistic theists and atheists who think that the world is overall good and therefore are happy and thankful to be alive in it. In short, he shows that it is difficult to consistently believe that the world is overall good when also recognising the existence of systemic suffering. In this article, I evaluate a sceptical response to the problem. The idea behind the response is a sort of scepticism according to which we do not know whether our knowledge about the realm of values is representative. I argue that the response fails, but that theism in conjunction with such scepticism succeeds. Atheism in conjunction with such scepticism, on the other hand, does not. I also argue that atheists can at least consistently hope that the world is overall good, despite systemic suffering. Finally, I answer objections and conclude.

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  • 23.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    Viktigt och oviktigt med skeptisk teism2011Konferensbidrag (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 24. Jonbäck, Francis
    Why skeptical theists are not in a scenario of Olly-style deception: A new response to the global skepticism objection2018Ingår i: Forum Philosophicum, ISSN 1426-1898, Vol. 23, nr 1, s. 59-67Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    According to Michael Bergmann, Skeptical Theism consists of two components: firstly, the belief that there is an all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good immaterial person who created the world, and secondly, the skeptical claim that we have no reason to believe that the possible goods and evils we know of are representative of the goods and evils that exist. According to the Global Skepticism Objection, Skeptical Theism entails that we should not be surprised if we are radically deceived by God: there just might be a greater good that can figure in a reason God has for deceiving us about reality. In support of this objection, Stephen Law presents an amusing analogy involving Olly and his reality-projector. In this paper, I outline the Global Skepticism Objection and Law’s case in support of it. I then respond by arguing that the scope of Skeptical Theism should be restricted, and seek to justify this through a narrower construal of Theism and an appeal to common sense.

  • 25.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet.
    Bråkenhielm, Carl Reinhold
    Problemet med lidande och Guds fördoldhet2022Ingår i: Vidgade perspektiv på lidandets problem / [ed] Francis Jonbäck, Lina Langby, Oliver Li, Dialogos Förlag , 2022, 1Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
  • 26.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    Bråkenhielm, Carl ReinholdUppsala universitet, Systematisk teologi med livsåskådningsforskning.Knutsson Bråkenhielm, LottaUppsala universitet, Tros- och livsåskådningsvetenskap.Lundmark, EvelinaUppsala universitet, Centrum för forskning om religion och samhälle (CRS).
    Religions: Special Issue "Agnosticism"2021Samlingsverk (redaktörskap) (Refereegranskat)
  • 27.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Centrum för forskning om religion och samhälle (CRS).
    Ekstrand, Thomas
    Uppsala universitet, Teologiska institutionen.
    Existential Suffering and Hopeful Theodicy in Esaias Tegnér’s Spleen2023Ingår i: Studia Theologica, ISSN 0039-338X, E-ISSN 1502-7791, Vol. 77, nr 1, s. 62-76Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Poetry can contribute to theological and philosophical reflection. In this paper, we concentrate our attention on Esaias Tegnér’s poignant depiction of melancholy, or what we call ‘existential suffering’ in his poem Spleen. We argue the poem can be interpreted as showing that the distinction between theoretical and existential problems of suffering is less clear-cut than often presupposed and that theorizing about the meaning of suffering can have a role to play even when people are experiencing great existential suffering and despair. Based on the speaker’s existential struggles in Spleen we also formulate the novel concept of a ‘hopeful theodicy’, a concept we think can be of use more broadly in future research on problems of suffering and theodicy

  • 28.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Etik och religionsfilosofi.
    Ekstrand, Thomas
    Uppsala universitet, Teologiska institutionen.
    Existentiella problem med lidande2022Ingår i: Vidgade perspektiv på lidandets problem / [ed] Francis Jonbäck, Lina Langby, Oliver Li, Dialogos Förlag , 2022, 1Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
  • 29.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Etik och religionsfilosofi.
    Langby, Lina
    Li, Oliver
    Traditionella och vidgade perspektiv på lidandets problem2022Ingår i: Vidgade perspektiv på lidandets problem / [ed] Francis Jonbäck, Lina Langby, Oliver Li, Stockholm: Dialogos Förlag , 2022Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
  • 30.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Etik och religionsfilosofi.
    Langby, LinaUppsala universitet, Etik och religionsfilosofi.Li, OliverUppsala universitet, Etik och religionsfilosofi.
    Vidgade perspektiv på lidandets problem2022Samlingsverk (redaktörskap) (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [sv]

    Lidande och ondska utgör realiteter i vår värld som vi människor, oavsett gudstro och livsåskådning, på något sätt måste förhålla oss till.

    Samtidigt är det ett anmärkningsvärt faktum att så mycket av den religionsfilosofiska litteraturen fokuserat på frågan om hur en allgod och allsmäktig Gud kan tillåta lidande.

    I denna antologi angriper ett antal välinsatta forskare ämnet med syftet att vidga perspektiven. Hur ska man se på lidande utifrån ett feministiskt perspektiv? Utgör lidande ett problem för en ateist eller en agnostiker? Hur kan en person som tror på karma och återfödelse hantera problem med lidande och ondska? Detta är bara några av de frågor som diskuteras kring detta tidlösa ämne.

  • 31.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    Li, Oliver
    Åhlfeldt, Lina
    Vidgade perspektiv på lindandets problem2022Manuskript (preprint) (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 32.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    et al.
    Högskolan i Gävle, Akademin för utbildning och ekonomi, Avdelningen för humaniora, Religionsvetenskap.
    Palmqvist, Carl-Johan
    Between belief and disbelief, between religion and secularity: introducing non-doxasticism and semi-secularity in worldview education2024Ingår i: British Journal of Religious Education, ISSN 0141-6200, E-ISSN 1740-7931, Vol. 46, nr 2, s. 109-121Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    In order to include all outlooks and perspectives on the world prevalent in contemporary society, countries like Sweden have replaced traditional religious education with worldview education. However, current worldview theory fails to make justice to two important facts concerning the contemporary religious landscape. Firstly, a great many people are semi-secular rather than traditional believers or atheists. Secondly, many have non-doxastic attitudes such as hope or acceptance instead of belief. We therefore suggest that worldview education needs to include semi-secularity, and that it needs to clearly separate the content of a worldview from the variety of epistemic attitudes a person might have towards that content.

    Ladda ner fulltext (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 33.
    Palmqvist, Carl-Johan
    et al.
    Lunds universitet.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet, Centrum för forskning om religion och samhälle (CRS).
    On the rationality of semi-secular simultaneity: A non-doxastic interpretation of the seemingly inconsistent worldviews of some Swedish 'nones'2023Ingår i: Religious studies, ISSN 0034-4125, E-ISSN 1469-901X, Vol. 59, nr 4, s. 589-602Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Proponents of religious non-doxasticism standardly aim to show how a commitment to traditional religion can be rational in the absence of religious belief. We demonstrate how the non-doxastic framework can be given a much wider application. In a study on Swedish semi-secularity, sociologist Ann af Burén has discovered a pattern where subjects simultaneously entertain naturalistic and supernatural explanations of extraordinary events. We reject Burén's interpretation of these people as irrational and compartmentalized and offer a contrasting non-doxastic reading in which the subjects involved are fully rational in their belief-less engagement with significant supernatural possibilities.

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  • 34.
    Stenmark, Mikael
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    Johannesson, KarinUppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.Jonbäck, FrancisUppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.Zackariasson, UlfUppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi.
    Filosofiska metoder i praktiken2018Samlingsverk (redaktörskap) (Refereegranskat)
    Ladda ner fulltext (pdf)
    FULLTEXT01
  • 35.
    Søvik, Atle
    et al.
    Norwegian School of Theology, Religion and Society.
    Jonbäck, Francis
    Uppsala universitet.
    Agreeing to Disagree2019Ingår i: Theofilos, ISSN 1893-7969, Vol. 11, nr 2, s. 194-195Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
1 - 35 av 35
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