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  • 1.
    Ahonen-Jonnarth, Ulla
    et al.
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    Andersson, Hanna
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    Bökman, Fredrik
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    How do people aggregate value? An experiment with relative importance of criteria and relative goodness of alternatives as inputs2022In: Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, ISSN 1057-9214, E-ISSN 1099-1360, Vol. 29, no 3-4, p. 259-273Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The concept of importance of criteria is used as a central element in several decision making contexts, specifically in value aggregation, e.g. as an input to decision support tools. For example, in the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) decision makers are asked to estimate how much more important one criterion is than another. However, it is not clear how people understand aggregation models based on importance of criteria in decision making situations. The purpose of this descriptive study is to investigate if people find an aggregation model in simple value aggregation tasks which remind of the way AHP elicits the input. Further, the purpose is to investigate if people's tendency to find a model depends on their cognitive abilities. In an exploratory laboratory experiment, participants assessed which of two alternatives is the best, based on information about the importance of two criteria and how good the two alternatives are compared to each other with respect to these criteria. The results confirm that people are willing to use importance of criteria and goodness of alternatives as input in value aggregations and show three main models for aggregation. More participants with higher numeracy applied a clear model compared to those with lower numeracy. None of the identified models was one of AHP's models but one of them reminded of one of the ways input can be aggregated in the AHP. The three models identified in the experiment are based on lexicographic order, multiplication and a combination of multiplication and addition. How the results could be used in a prescriptive context is discussed in the paper.

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  • 2.
    Andersson, Hanna
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    Tradeoffs between self and environment in environmental judgment and decision making2021Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    One of the greatest challenges of today is to change our behavior to act more pro-environmentally to reduce global warming. We need to make sacrifices for the environment, e.g., use a means of transportation that take a longer time but causes less CO2 emission. The present thesis aims to study different factors (intrinsic, extrinsic motivational, and extrinsic motivational-neutral information) that influence us when making tradeoffs between self and environment. Paper I examined how an anchor (a reference price) and an ecolabel influence price judgments. It was found that both a judgment of an objective fact (product price) and a subjective preference (willingness to pay for the product) were affected by an anchor. An eco-label resulted in higher judgments of objective facts. People with higher environmental concern were more affected by an anchor when stating their willingness to pay than their low concern counterparts. In Paper II and Paper III, an interaction between a high anchor and a normative message that put the emissions into context was found when making a tradeoff between CO2 emissions and travel time for a flight (Paper II) or a car journey (Paper III). People with higher concern for the environment gave a longer travel time when they received a high anchor (Paper II and Paper III) or no anchor (Paper III). Paper IV investigated how a survey measuring environmental concern can be divided to different indices and how they predict answers in a tradeoff task. The result suggests that a two-factor structure divided into ecocentric and anthropocentric concern is a possible alternative and that people scoring higher on any of the environmental concern indices were willing to travel for a longer time. Taken together, the results show that normative messages, anchors, and concern for the environment are factors that can influence and interact when people make tradeoffs between self and environment in environmental judgment and decision making.

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  • 3.
    Andersson, Hanna
    et al.
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    Ahonen-Jonnarth, Ulla
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    Holmgren, Mattias
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Building Engineering, Energy Systems and Sustainability Science, Environmental Science.
    Marsh, John E.
    University of Central Lancashire, UK; Luleå University of Technology.
    Wallhagen, Marita
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Building Engineering, Energy Systems and Sustainability Science, Environmental Science.
    Bökman, Fredrik
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    What influences people’s tradeoff decisions between CO2 emissions and travel time? An experiment with anchors and normative messages2021In: Frontiers in Psychology, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 12, article id 702398Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    One of the today’s greatest challenges is to adjust our behavior so that we can avoid a major climate disaster. To do so, we must make sacrifices for the sake of the environment. The study reported here investigates how anchors (extrinsic motivational-free information) and normative messages (extrinsic motivational information) influence people’s tradeoffs between travel time and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the context of car travel and whether any interactions with environmental concern (an intrinsic motivational factor) can be observed. In this study, people received either a CO2, health or no normative message together with either a high anchor, a low anchor, or no anchor. People that received both a high anchor and a CO2 emission normative message were willing to travel for a longer time than those that only received a high anchor. If a low anchor was presented, no differences in willingness to travel for a longer time were found between the three different conditions of normative message groups, i.e., CO2 normative message, health normative message, or no normative message. People with higher concern for the environment were found to be willing to travel for a longer time than those with lower concern for the environment. Further, this effect was strongest when a high anchor was presented. These results suggest that anchors and normative messages are among the many factors that can influence people’s tradeoffs between CO2 emission and travel time, and that various factors may have to be combined to increase their influence over pro-environmental behavior and decisions.

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  • 4.
    Andersson, Hanna
    et al.
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    Bökman, Fredrik
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    Environmental concern: Structure and use for prediction of a tradeoff between CO2 emissions and travel timeManuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
  • 5.
    Andersson, Hanna
    et al.
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    Bökman, Fredrik
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    Wallhagen, Marita
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Building Engineering, Energy Systems and Sustainability Science, Environmental Science.
    Holmgren, Mattias
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Building Engineering, Energy Systems and Sustainability Science, Environmental Science.
    Sörqvist, Patrik
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Education and Business Studies, Department of Business and Economic Studies.
    Ahonen-Jonnarth, Ulla
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    Anchoring effect in judgments of objective fact and subjective preference2021In: Food Quality and Preference, ISSN 0950-3293, E-ISSN 1873-6343, Vol. 88, article id 104102Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The way by which various sources of external information interact in their effects on judgment is rarely investigated. Here, we report two experiments that examine how two sources of external information—an anchor (a reference price) and an eco-label—influence judgments of an objective fact (product price) and a subjective preference (willingness-to-pay for the product). Participants’ price judgments were drawn in the direction of the anchor point, whereas the eco-label resulted in higher judgments of objective fact (Experiment 1) but did not influence subjective preference (Experiment 2). Interestingly, the eco-label seemed to strengthen the effect of the high anchor in judgments of objective fact. Further, participants with higher environmental concern answered a higher price on the subjective preference questions when they received a high anchor, as well as a lower price when they received a low anchor in comparison to the low environmental concern group. This study demonstrates that various external information sources can strengthen each other’s effects on consumer belief about products, while the effects are weaker for consumers’ preferences. The implications of the results for decision making are discussed.

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  • 6.
    Andersson, Hanna
    et al.
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    Holmgren, Mattias
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Building Engineering, Energy Systems and Sustainability Science, Environmental Science.
    Sörqvist, Patrik
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Building Engineering, Energy Systems and Sustainability Science, Environmental Science. Luleå Tekniska Universitet.
    Threadgold, Emma
    University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK.
    Beaman, Philip
    University of Reading, Reading, UK.
    Ball, Linden
    University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK.
    Marsh, John E.
    University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK, Luleå Tekniska Universitet.
    The negative footprint illusion is exacerbated by the numerosity of environment-friendly additions: unveiling the underpinning mechanisms2024In: Journal of Cognitive Psychology, ISSN 2044-5911, E-ISSN 2044-592X, Vol. 36, no 2, p. 295-307Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The addition of environmentally friendly items to conventional items sometimes leads people to believe that the carbon footprint of the entire set decreases rather than increases. This negative footprint illusion is supposedly underpinned by an averaging bias: people base environmental impact estimates not on the total impact of items but on their average. Here, we found that the illusion’s magnitude increased with the addition of a greater number of “green” items when the number of conventional items remained constant (Studies 1 and 2), supporting the averaging-bias account. We challenged this account by testing what happens when the number of items in the conventional and “green” categories vary while holding the ratio between the two categories constant (Study 3). At odds with the averaging-bias account, the magnitude of the illusion increased as the category size increased, revealing a category-size bias, and raising questions about the interplay between these biases in the illusion.

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  • 7.
    Bökman, Fredrik
    et al.
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    Andersson, Hanna
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    Sörqvist, Patrik
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Education and Business Studies, Department of Business and Economic Studies.
    Ahonen-Jonnarth, Ulla
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    The psychology of balancing gains and losses for self and the environment: Evidence from a carbon emission versus travel time tradeoff task2021In: Journal of Environmental Psychology, ISSN 0272-4944, E-ISSN 1522-9610, Vol. 74, article id 101574Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    If human behavior is to become more sustainable, people will have to be willing to sacrifice personal gains and benefits for the sake of sustainability. Decisions will have to involve making tradeoffs between what is good for the self and what is good for sustainability. In the present paper, we studied the psychology of such tradeoffs in the context of a carbon dioxide (CO2) emission versus travel time tradeoff task. The experiment investigated how intrinsic motivational factors (environmental concern), extrinsic motivational information (a normative message) and extrinsic motivation-neutral information (anchors) influence these tradeoffs. The results revealed that extrinsic factors interact in their effects on tradeoffs such that participants were willing to travel for a longer time for the benefit of less CO2 emissions when they were externally motivated by a normative message, but only when this motivational emphasis was combined with a high anchor. Furthermore, this interaction was particularly strong in participants with high environmental concern. We conclude that extrinsic and intrinsic motivational factors interact in their effect on making people willing to accept personal losses in exchange for sustainability gains and that these motivational factors may have to be combined with further extrinsic information to influence decisions.

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  • 8.
    Holmgren, Mattias
    et al.
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Building Engineering, Energy Systems and Sustainability Science, Environmental Science.
    Andersson, Hanna
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    Ball, Linden J.
    University of Central Lancashire, United Kingdom.
    Marsh, John E.
    University of Central Lancashire, Preston, United Kingdom; Luleå University of Technology.
    Can the negative footprint illusion be eliminated by summative priming?2021In: Journal of Cognitive Psychology, ISSN 2044-5911, E-ISSN 2044-592X, Vol. 33, no 3, p. 337-356Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    People’s belief that one or more environmentally friendly items that are added to a set of conventional items can reduce the total environmental impact of these items (the negative footprint illusion) could lead to unwanted environmental consequences. An averaging bias seems to underpin this illusion: people make their estimates based on the average of the environmental impact produced by the items rather than the accumulated sum. We report four studies that used various priming manipulations to explore whether people’s preoccupation to think in terms of an average can be eliminated by fostering a summative mindset. The results demonstrate that participants avoid succumbing to the negative footprint illusion when the critical judgment task is preceded by tasks that engender a summation judgment. Our evidence indicates that the negative footprint illusion can be tempered when a primed concept (summation) is used adaptively on subsequent judgments, thereby correcting for bias in environmental judgments.

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  • 9.
    Holmgren, Mattias
    et al.
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Building Engineering, Energy Systems and Sustainability Science, Environmental Science.
    Andersson, Hanna
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    Marsh, John E.
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Building Engineering, Energy Systems and Sustainability Science, Environmental Science.
    Bell, Linden J.
    Eliminating the Negative Footprint Illusion by Fostering a Summative Mindset using a Transfer ParadigmManuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    People’s belief that an environmentally friendly item that is added to a set of conventional items has the ability to reduce the total environmental impact of these items could lead to unwanted environmental consequences. An averaging bias seems to underpin this negative footprint illusion: people make their estimates based on the average of the environmental impact produced by the items rather than their accumulative sum. We report a study using a problem-solving transfer paradigm to explore if this preoccupation to think in terms of an average can be eliminated by fostering a summative mindset. The results demonstrate that, participants can correctly estimate that environmental impact will increase when a “green” car is added to a set of petrol cars, but only when this task is preceded by a task that engenders a summation judgment. Our evidence indicates that the negative footprint illusion can be tempered by problem-solving transfer whereby a primed concept (summation) is used adaptively on subsequent judgments, thereby correcting for bias in environmental judgments.    

  • 10.
    Holmgren, Mattias
    et al.
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Building, Energy and Environmental Engineering, Environmental psychology.
    Andersson, Hanna
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Industrial Development, IT and Land Management, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    Sörqvist, Patrik
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Building, Energy and Environmental Engineering, Environmental psychology.
    Averaging bias in environmental impact estimates: Evidence from the negative footprint illusion2018In: Journal of Environmental Psychology, ISSN 0272-4944, E-ISSN 1522-9610, Vol. 55, p. 48-52Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we argue that unsustainable behaviors often stem from a common averaging bias when people estimate the environmental impact of a set of environmentally friendly and less friendly objects or actions. In Experiment 1, we show that people believe that the total carbon footprint of a category of items (a community of buildings in this case) is lower, rather than higher, when environmentally friendly (“green” buildings) items are added to the category, a negative footprint illusion. Experiment 2 showed  that the carbon footprint estimate assigned to a category with a mix of environmentally friendly and less friendly objects (“green” and conventional  buildings) is the average of its subsets (the “green” buildings and the  conventional buildings, respectively), an averaging bias. A similar averaging  process may underpin estimates of the environmental impact of people's own actions, explaining why people believe that environmentally friendly actions can compensate for less friendly actions.

  • 11.
    Threadgold, Emma
    et al.
    University of Central Lancashire, Preston, United Kingdom.
    Marsh, John E.
    University of Central Lancashire, Preston, United Kingdom; Luleå University of Technology.
    Holmgren, Mattias
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Building Engineering, Energy Systems and Sustainability Science, Environmental Science.
    Andersson, Hanna
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    Nelson, Megan
    Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom.
    Ball, Linden J.
    Biased Estimates of Environmental Impact in the Negative Footprint Illusion: The Nature of Individual Variation2022In: Frontiers in Psychology, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 12, article id 648328Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    People consistently act in ways that harm the environment, even when believing their actions are environmentally friendly. A case in point is a biased judgment termed the negative footprint illusion, which arises when people believe that the addition of “eco-friendly” items (e.g., environmentally certified houses) to conventional items (e.g., standard houses), reduces the total carbon footprint of the whole item-set, whereas the carbon footprint is, in fact, increased because eco-friendly items still contribute to the overall carbon footprint. Previous research suggests this illusion is the manifestation of an “averaging-bias.” We present two studies that explore whether people’s susceptibility to the negative footprint illusion is associated with individual differences in: (i) environment-specific reasoning dispositions measured in terms of compensatory green beliefs and environmental concerns; or (ii) general analytic reasoning dispositions measured in terms of actively open-minded thinking, avoidance of impulsivity and reflective reasoning (indexed using the Cognitive Reflection Test; CRT). A negative footprint illusion was demonstrated when participants rated the carbon footprint of conventional buildings combined with eco-friendly buildings (Study 1 and 2) and conventional cars combined with eco-friendly cars (Study 2). However, the illusion was not identified in participants’ ratings of the carbon footprint of apples (Study 1 and 2). In Studies 1 and 2, environment-specific dispositions were found to be unrelated to the negative footprint illusion. Regarding reflective thinking dispositions, reduced susceptibility to the negative footprint illusion was only associated with actively open-minded thinking measured on a 7-item scale (Study 1) and 17-item scale (Study 2). Our findings provide partial support for the existence of a negative footprint illusion and reveal a role of individual variation in reflective reasoning dispositions in accounting for a limited element of differential susceptibility to this illusion.

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  • 12.
    Wallhagen, Marita
    et al.
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Building Engineering, Energy Systems and Sustainability Science, Environmental Science.
    Sörqvist, Patrik
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Building Engineering, Energy Systems and Sustainability Science, Environmental Science.
    Holmgren, Mattias
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Building Engineering, Energy Systems and Sustainability Science, Environmental Science.
    Andersson, Hanna
    University of Gävle, Faculty of Engineering and Sustainable Development, Department of Computer and Geospatial Sciences, Decision, Risk and Policy Analysis.
    Brister i vårt logiska tänkande ett hinder för klimatkloka beslut2019In: Husbyggaren, ISSN 0018-7968, no 1, p. 23-25Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
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