

The Stockholm Gang Model

PANTHER

Stockholm Gang Intervention & Prevention Project, 2009–2012

Leinfelt & Rostami (Eds.)



The Stockholm Gang Model: PANTHER

Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project, 2009-2012

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“ *“First, we must address the personal, family, and community factors that cause young people to choose gangs over more productive alternatives. The more success we have in prevention, the fewer people we’ll have to prosecute for violent activity down the road.”*

U.S. Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales,
2006 Contents

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PROJECT PARTNERS



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The Norwegian Police Service, Oslo Police District

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Södertörn District Attorney

The Financial Intelligence Unit, Swedish National Bureau
of Investigation

The Swedish Tax Agency, Tax Fraud Unit

The Swedish National Economic Crimes Bureau

The Police Education and Training Program, Växjö University

The Swedish Social Insurance Agency, Control Unit

The Swedish Prison and Probation Service, Intelligence unit

The Municipality of Huddinge Social Service Administration

The Municipality of Haninge Social Service Administration

The Municipality of Botkyrka Social Service Administration

The Swedish Enforcement Authority

In 2009, the Stockholm County Police and the Section against Gang Crime (SGI) was awarded a substantial three-year EU grant (1,1 million Euro) to study and develop new methods in the fight against gangs and gang crime. This grant resulted in the creation of the Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project (SGIP), a project that would bridge science with pragmatism and advance the current knowledge on Swedish street gangs. Specifically, SGIP would develop and introduce a new philosophy, concept, or framework on how law enforcement and social agencies *can* work against gangs; a philosophy based on “holistic-oriented policing” – a concept that fully incorporate the fundamentals of problem-oriented policing and applied theory.

Consequently, this book is the written product of the Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project – a collection of theory and practice. This book is intended primarily for researchers and scholars interested in gang research, although it may have some appeal to police administrators interested in implementing a holistic program of gang intervention and prevention. This book will introduce the foundation for a new philosophy, a model we named after the acronym PANTHER. However, we also wanted to offer the reader a contemporary and international view on gangs and gang enforcement. As a result, this book will also include some international perspectives on gangs, contributed by our project partners in the United Kingdom and Wales (The Metropolitan Police / New Scotland Yard, London), Norway (Oslo Police), and the Danish National Police. In addition, we have invited several distinguished scholars and practitioners from around the world as contributing authors on various topics in an attempt to capture the international nature and scope of the problem.

An independent and unbiased evaluation (process evaluation) of the project is currently underway by Dr. Stefan Holgersson at the Linnaeus University in Växjö, Sweden.

Stockholm, January 2012

Fredrik Leinfelt

Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project



Our world is changing and society is becoming more complex. Socially and financially disadvantaged residential areas result in a tough upbringing where gang crime attracts vulnerable youths. A street gang can be seen as an opportunity to belong to a fellowship, provide structure, as well as means of an income, even as an opportunity to become visible and gain power. Older gang members are viewed as role models due to their status and lifestyle. Even if it ends badly for many, there is still a strong appeal factor involved. Indeed, Al Pacino's *Scarface* is still an icon.

We must not underestimate the need for social support for people who fall outside the traditional and safe communities. If we are successful in helping people to resist destructive environments, then we are one step closer a positive change for the individual, but also for the relatives who ultimately get a better quality of life.

We must adopt a new approach to gangs and organized crime. The fight must be incorporated at a local level. Combating gang crime must take place close to the citizens and their everyday lives. We need to understand that gangs are a problem for the whole society. The police have an important responsibility, but collaboration between law enforcement, research, municipalities, associations, and citizens is a must. Furthermore, legal security and confidence in the justice system are also very important.

Gang crime becomes impossible to combat if people do not dare to talk. Threatened and scared citizens should always be supported and protected by the community. Failure to provide this type of support will result in a non-functional legal system. It is therefore important to develop strong collaborations with external agencies to build structures that are designed to take care of victims and witnesses.

"Go for the money" is also a key development area. Eliminating profit from crimes contributes to the removal of a strong incentive. We also remove temptations for youths. It should be difficult to make money from crime and also from gang membership fees and fines.

The police should be open for discussions about their operations. It is also important to spread knowledge about gangs and organized crime. All collaborating actors must receive information from each other. Investing in the correct resources and taking the correct measures necessitates the exchange of experience and knowledge between research and law enforcement.

Furthermore, objective reporting in the media is important. Gang problems must

be highlighted and discussed. However, we should also be aware that gangs are strengthened when they are visible in the media. Several gang leaders have gained “celebrity-like” status through the media and have been able to advertise their brand. The good forces have to meet this challenge of balance.

In conclusion, I’ll put the focus on the human rights. They are important in the fight against gangs and organized crime. Human rights should be the fundamental value of any society, both in terms of gang members and victims of crime. As such, the fight against gang crime must be conducted with the highest ethical standards, equality in the law, and by way of a fair trial.

With great appreciation to our project partners,

Stockholm, December 2011

Detective Superintendent Fredrik Gårdare

Chairman Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project



The spread of gangs and proliferation of gang membership has become a national concern in Sweden in recent past. Recent data suggest that roughly 5,000 youth under the age of 21 make up an active recruiting base for criminal gangs in Sweden, of which Stockholm account for approximately 1,200 youth (Lindström, 2010; SOU 2010:15).

Moreover, three out of four sentenced juveniles released from institutional care recidivate within three years, and recidivism data show that 85 percent of convicted gang members released from prison fall back into a life of crime (SOU 2010:15). Results from Denmark suggest that street gang members are more enthusiastic and keen on joining established organized criminal gangs compared to criminal youth not affiliated with street gangs (Libak Pedersen, 2011; Libak Pedersen & Lindstad, 2011). We have seen a similar development in Sweden, a development where street gangs make up a recruiting pool for organized crime groups. This concern has created the need to look for alternative, holistic solutions in dealing with the street gang problem. In looking at how other countries have dealt with the “gang problem”, politicians and practitioners have come to realize that aggressive, suppressive methods do not work in the long run.

As a result, in 2009, the Stockholm County Police and the Section against Gang Crime initiated an unprecedented three-year, 1,1 million Euro (approximately 12 million SEK) project funded by an action grant from the European Commission. The mission: creating a holistic model, a philosophy, or a concept, in how law enforcement agencies can tackle the street gang problem.

This book will address the focal points of the project, how it is designed, the theory behind it, and introduce the PANTHER concept of holistic gang enforcement. Moreover, this text will present some of the research conducted within the project (for example, testing a U.S.-based multi-factor structural typology in Sweden, and implementing findings from gang leadership research in an operative setting). We will also suggest some new venues for future research.

Some highlights:

- **There is little consensus among scientists as to the meaning of the term “gang.”** The debate is widespread and there may be as many definitions as there are debaters. At the core of this debate, however, is the ever-changing nature of gangs, including the tendency to politicize the debate. Undoubtedly,

the gang definition is malleable over time depending on current economic and social situations. As such, we have come across a wide disparity in definitions and have devoted one chapter in this book to the definitional debate.

- **Gangs have a long history and are not a new phenomenon.** Some reports gang activity as far back as the 14th and 15th Centuries, although “modern” gang studies emerged out of the Chicago School and the social ecology perspectives, in addition to various structural theories emphasizing structural inequalities and social class.
- **What makes Sweden an interesting place for this particular theoretical perspective is the notion of the Welfare State.** In Sweden, living in the city center is attractive, whereas living in the suburbs is typically regarded as less appealing. This is in stark contrast to the concentric zone model and the structural arguments set forth by Shaw and McKay and Park and Burgess. Nevertheless, Sweden has a gang problem.
- **Although Swedish gang figures are significantly less than in the United States, we find that the Swedish gang development is similar to that of American gangs.** Though we do not (yet) have the “entrenched” multi-generational gangs like the Crips and the Bloods, we predict an alarming development among the emerging Swedish street gangs. Street gangs are establishing themselves in smaller cities and towns and in rural areas, and they are becoming increasingly more organized and sophisticated.
- **Applying a structural gang typology (Klein & Maxson, 2006) to a Swedish gang dataset confirms what recent European research has found.** Gang structures are fairly similar between U.S. and European gangs, although European gangs are fewer and not as violent in comparison. Results from our own research shows that the “compressed” and “neo-traditional” gangs were the most common types of gangs in our dataset of seven major street gangs.
- **Gang interventions have historically been divided into two classes: human/social intervention strategies and law enforcement strategies.** Included in the human/social strategies are prevention efforts such as community intervention programs and school-based programs. The law enforcement strategies are primarily centered on aggressive gang suppression techniques. We intro-

“ Although Swedish gang figures are significantly less than in the United States, we find that the Swedish gang development is similar to that of American gangs.”

duce the concept, or framework, of “holistic-oriented policing” that incorporate traditional law enforcement techniques with intervention and prevention into one model.

- **Research has shown that intervention programs (community based) are more effective in areas and communities suffering from an emerging gang problem** (e.g., Spergel & Grossman, 1997). PANTHER is designed to operate at the local community level, with active collaboration with external partners and stakeholders. The basic idea is to bring everyone to the table by way of *Social Intervention Teams (SIT)* and *Social Coordination Groups (SCG)* at an early stage to facilitate a prophylactic approach to gangs and gang joining, as opposed to a less effective reactive approach. This is based on the research suggesting that **early prevention efforts have shown the most promise in terms of diverting youth from joining gangs** (e.g., Howell, 1998).



A promising realm of effectiveness in terms of what is known about the effectiveness of police practices is the intersection of focused and highly proactive dimensions that build on specific multi-agency collaboration”


- **A promising realm of effectiveness in terms of what is known about the effectiveness of police practices is the intersection of focused and highly proactive dimensions that build on specific multi-agency collaboration** (Lum et al., 2011). Drawing on the Evidence-Based Policing Matrix (see <http://policingmatrix.org>) we see that there is a body of literature that suggest that proactive and specific approaches to gangs can be effective.
- **As such, PANTHER is a holistic model that incorporates traditional suppression techniques with intervention and prevention solutions.** The model should be seen as a problem-solving philosophy that is malleable and flexible in its design, allowing for a potential utility beyond street gangs.
- **Previous research suggests that police agencies rarely engage in formal problem solving and that officers are untrained in using problem-solving methods such as SARA** (Katz & Webb, 2006). PANTHER is based on traditional problem-oriented policing with an applied version of SARA. Tactical officers apply problem solving during operations and results are continuously evaluated as a part of PANTHER.
- **Previous research suggests that police do not regard addressing underlying issues to gangs as a priority** (Katz & Webb, 2006). Traditionally, police en-


ter the gang arena when “it’s too late to do something.” Our challenge is to think holistically and to involve external partners and stakeholders early and to conduct *thorough analysis* of current situations before launching costly gang operations.

- **Paramount to PANTHER is early and an accurate identification of the gang problem in a particular area (analysis and intelligence).** For example, Katz and Webb (2006) suggested that gang units should collect and analyze available data about a particular problem before initiating responses. Other gang experts are in agreement that understanding the problem is extremely important in devising an effective enforcement response (The Home Office, 2011).
- A football coach would not play an opponent without watching hours of scouting film and examining the weaknesses of the other team. Our question is then, should a professional police force operate differently in response to gangs? **You need to know what you are facing before devising an intelligent response if you goal is to achieve an enduring effect.**
- Research on Swedish gang leaders have provided a useful application in how the police chose appropriate methods in targeting gangs. **We recognize that gangs are complex and that they vary. To some extent, this variation is dependent upon the leadership characteristic of the gang.** By using a “gang leader profile” police can target gangs more effectively by going for apparent weaknesses. If the police use a linear approach – an approach that is uniform – the police will be ineffective on most cases (e.g., just using aggressive suppression). Instead, honing in on individual weaknesses will provide for a much more powerful response.
- **PANTHER allows for various, tailor-made, enforcement responses to gangs**, such as traditional suppression, aggressive investigation methods and going for the money and using tax injunctions, incarceration of certain gang members, constructive dialogue and motivational parleys with gang members to encourage them to quit and to change lifestyle.
- **If incarceration is worth one point in a statistical worksheet, then encouraging someone to quit the gang is worth two points.**

PART I

BACKGROUND





Foreword

Gangs and Gang Members: *Some Definitional Issues*

By: Finn-Aage Esbensen, Ph.D., Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice,
University of Missouri-St. Louis

Much has been written in the past twenty years regarding definitional issues associated with the word “gang.” Nonetheless, it will be instructive to review some of the issues associated with the following terms: gang, gang member, and gang crime. Some of you reading this paragraph might be thinking “who cares?” but how these terms are defined can have serious consequences. Given the international audience reading this text, it is relevant to start the chapter by highlighting translation issues.

The “g” word does not have the same meaning when translated from English into other languages, whether it be “bande”, “bende”, or “banda.” The word “gang” conjures up a specific image in those who hear the word. According to media accounts, gang members are viewed as violent, young, urban males, a member of a racial or ethnic minority, with tattoos and other visible symbols – basically someone to be feared. This image suggests that there is something unique about the word

gang that may or may not be captured when conversing in a language other than English, so much so that it is no longer uncommon to hear the word gang used by non-English speakers when referring to troublesome youth groups. Gangs are more than groups of youth that hang around together; they are groups that are readily identifiable and evoke reactions from the public and/or social control agents. To facilitate discourse about gangs and gang crime, it is necessary to establish some common understanding. Here I provide a brief overview of definitional issues.

Since the early research by Thrasher (1927/1963) it has become commonplace to include the following criteria as core characteristics of gangs: the groups must have 1) a sense of organization and solidarity that sets it apart from a mob, 2) a tendency to respond to outside threats, 3) the creation of a shared esprit de corps, and 4) identification of some geographic area or territory, which it will defend through force if necessary. Missing from Thrasher's definition, but increasingly accepted as an essential defining element of gangs, is involvement in delinquent or law-violating behavior; this, after all, is what makes gangs of particular interest to law enforcement and other agents of social control. Klein has been one of the more forceful and consistent advocates for including criminal activity as an essential criterion for classification of a group as a gang. In his 1971 book, he proposed the following definition that has since received considerable support: a gang is:

any denotable adolescent group of youngsters who (a) are generally perceived as a distinct aggregation by others in their neighborhood, (b) recognize themselves as a denotable group (almost invariably with a group name), and (c) have been involved in a sufficient number of delinquent incidents to call forth a consistent negative response from neighborhood residents and/or law enforcement agencies (Klein 1971, 13).

Involvement in illegal activity and the negative response it elicits is the element that distinguishes gangs from other social groups, including football teams, college sororities and fraternities, and the scouts. These latter groups clearly meet the definitional standards proposed by Thrasher as well as the first two criteria of Klein's definition; however, these groups generally do not meet Klein's third criterion. Some commentators maintain that by including delinquent involvement as part of the definition introduces a tautology with regard to the criminality attributed to gangs; that is, gang members are delinquent because it is a defining element of gangs.

Over the years there has been a gradual merger of Thrasher's and Klein's elements and by the 1990s it was not uncommon to see gangs defined by the following criteria; they are 1) a social group that 2) uses symbols and engages in verbal and

nonverbal communications to declare their “gang-ness” and the group has a 3) sense of permanence, 4) occupies some identified territory or turf, and, importantly, 5) engages in crime. With changes in technology and mobility, some argue whether the 4th element (territoriality) is as relevant in the 21st century as it was previously. With electronic communication, mass transit, and ownership or access to motorized vehicles, gangs are not always local or neighborhood based as they were in the early days of gang research.

After considerable debate and discussion, *the Eurogang (EG) Program of Research* introduced the following “consensus” definition of gangs in 2001: “A gang (or a troublesome youth group corresponding to a street gang elsewhere) is any durable, street-oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal activity is part of its group identity” (Weerman, et al., 2009). Arriving at this consensus definition was no easy task and took several years of debate and discussion. The first objective was to identify “gang qualities” that should or could be incorporated into a definition that would be acceptable in multiple cultural contexts. While a number of factors can be used to describe gangs or gang members, the EG group sought to specify elements that were deemed essential or necessary for a group to be classified as a gang. This prompted the distinction between gang “definers” and gang “descriptors.”

Such commonly mentioned gang characteristics as group names, colors or symbols, and the use of tattoos, while often useful when describing gangs, are not essential for defining gangs. That is, a group does not have to use a name to be considered a gang. A group does not have to adopt specific colors or symbols to make it a gang. And, having a tattoo does not make someone a gang member. While these various characteristics might help to describe a gang or gang members, they are not essential elements of a gang.

This Eurogang definition highlights several key elements. First, the group must be durable – that is, exist as an identifiable group for some period of time. Second, the group must be street-oriented. By this, the EG definition stipulates that the group must congregate or be visible in public places that enable the group to gain a reputation. Third, involvement in group illegal activities must be a core aspect of the group’s identity (thereby differentiating it from other pro-social groups such as the scouts). Also, the types of behavior that evoke public and law enforcement concern need to be considered. We do not dispute the fact that many groups (primarily middle class and/or subur-



A gang is any durable, street-oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal activity is part of its group identity.”

ban youths) may be involved in troublesome and illegal behavior from time to time; however, the street-oriented aspect of gangs is what elicits fear and concern.

To illustrate the importance of definition, especially with regard to the magnitude of the gang problem, it will be instructive to summarize findings from an American study (Esbensen, et al., 2001). Depending on the definition used, the prevalence of gang membership varied from two to 17 percent. One common approach used in American research is to have study participants “self-nominate”; that is, survey participants are asked if they are a gang member. Remember, this is the same criterion widely used by law enforcement. The researchers created five definitions of gang members based on the following criteria. The first two types were identified by use of single items: 1) “Have you ever been a gang member?” and 2) “Are you now in a gang?” Three increasingly more restrictive definitions of gang membership were then created. The third definition, “delinquent gang,” included respondents who indicated that their gang was involved in at least one of the following illegal activities: getting in fights with other gangs; stealing things; robbing other people; stealing cars; selling marijuana; selling other illegal drugs; or damaging property. The fourth type, “organized gang,” included delinquent gang members who also indicated that their gang had some level of organization. Specifically, the survey respondents were asked whether the following described their gang: “there are initiation rites; the gang has established leaders; the gang has symbols or colors.” The last characteristic used to determine gang membership was an indicator of whether individuals considered themselves a “core” member or a “peripheral” member. Each increasingly restrictive definition of a gang resulted in a lower prevalence: 17% were ever gang members, 9% were current members, 8% were in a delinquent gang, 5% were in a delinquent organized gang, and only 2% were “core” members of an organized delinquent gang. Clearly, the magnitude of the gang problem in a given area varies with the definition used. Interestingly, and somewhat surprisingly, the demographic characteristics of those classified as gang members did not vary significantly with the different definitions. This is not to say that there were no differences but they were modest and the overall conclusion is that there was relative stability of gang member demographics across the different definitions.

Definitional issues have become increasingly important outside of the research



arena. How gang membership is defined has major repercussions for the life chances of gang members. An increasing number of jurisdictions in the US have enacted “gang enhancement” statutes, meaning that a gang member convicted of certain offenses will receive a longer prison sentence simply because s/he is classified as a gang member.

Gang Crime

Establishing the criteria necessary to define a gang and to identify who is a gang member is important in its’ own right. From a policy perspective, however, it is also critical to agree on a definition of gang crime. We know from years of research and practice that gang members engage in a disproportionate amount of crime; in fact, some estimates suggest that gang members (who comprise a relatively small percentage of the population) account for anywhere between 50 and 80 percent of crime (e.g., Thornberry and Burch 1997). What is less clear is what proportion of this illegal activity is gang-related? That is, gang members can be involved in “normal” criminal activity that is not related to their gang status, other than the fact that they are gang members. Other illegal involvement, however, is a direct consequence of their gang affiliation. Both types of crime are of interest but the latter may be more consequential for law enforcement and prosecutorial purposes. The former is of interest to researchers and theorists in terms of understanding what it is about the gang that promotes these high levels of offending. Is it a matter of greater opportunity or a change in routine activities? Is it related to group dynamics? Shared expectations? For enforcement purposes, however, these crimes committed by gang members are no different from other crimes except for the status of the offender. The second category of crime, however, results specifically from the person’s association with the gang and the crime is a direct consequence of the gang. Gang-motivated is a term that has been coined to identify this type of offending. Retaliation is an example. One can ask; what is the difference and who cares? Here I will rely on work conducted by Maxson and Klein in the 1990s (Maxson & Klein, 1990; 1996) in which they examined homicides in Los Angeles and Chicago. Traditionally, Los Angeles (LA) reported a high level of gang homicides whereas Chicago reported substantially fewer. Were LA gangs more violent? Were there more turf wars in LA? Was the Chicago Police Department more effective in combatting gang warfare? What could LA learn from Chicago in terms of reducing gang homicides? It turns out that one way to reduce the gang homicide rate by approximately 50 percent was to simply change the definition of gang homicide. While LA used a gang member defini-

tion (any crime committed by a gang member was regarded a gang crime), Chicago relied upon a gang motive definition (to be classified a gang crime, there had to be an underlying gang motive and not just be a crime committed by a gang member).

Concluding Comments

In the course of numerous conversations with researchers and law enforcement officials in Europe, one common theme has been the role of immigrant (non-native) and racial/ethnic minorities in the emerging gang problem. The gang problem has repeatedly been identified as one restricted to non-native groups and individuals. However, upon closer examination and/or through more general surveys of the youth population, it has become clear that the European gang problem is quite similar to the American situation. Gangs and gang members come in multiple shapes and sizes and appear to be non-discriminating (equal opportunity providers, if you will), including native and non-native youth, girls as well as boys, and urban and non-urban. Two observations about gangs and gang members appear with consistency; 1) there is something about the gang environment that 2) promotes or facilitates high rates of involvement in illegal activity. Thus, from a policy perspective, it is important to accurately assess the nature and extent of the gang problem in order to implement effective prevention and intervention efforts.





1 The Influence of Research on Policing

By: Fredrik Leinfelt

There have been several advances made to policing in recent past. Many of these advances can be attributed to research findings and the work of talented multidisciplinary researchers. However, although research is important, it is of little use if it cannot be applied and used by those who need it the most. Traditionally, there have been thick walls separating researchers and the police, creating two distinct camps that look at issues in different manners. We need to tear down the walls and exchange knowledge and experience. That has become the essence of this EU project: bridging science with practice.

No other profession is more unique and diverse than law enforcement. In some ways, its idiosyncrasy can be derived from the wide variety of duties performed by law enforcement members on a daily basis. Police officers are faced with situations where they have a few milliseconds to make a decision regarding life and death; whether to shoot, arrest, or protect citizens from harm. As a part of their duty, officers accept the risk of being shot at, stabbed, or assaulted.

Few other professions require this risk for bodily harm. In addition, officers also make arrests, enforce traffic violations, conduct search warrants, pursue suspects, and seize contraband. Officers can be called upon to diagram vehicle crashes, to reconstruct crime scenes, and to conduct surveillance on known or suspected criminals. Modern law enforcement officers are also expected to calm and comfort people in need, to look someone in the eyes and tell them they are going to make it; to console victims of crimes, and to take statements from witnesses.

Officers are also a source of general information to the public. They inform the citizenry of available community assistance programs and answer questions. Officers are also called upon to deliver death notifications, to serve subpoenas, civil papers, and to enforce evictions. Law enforcement officers also mediate verbal and physical disputes between irate and upset parties. Some officers are encouraged to take an active role in community organizations, after-school programs, and act as role models to the local youth.

In other ways, the uniqueness of law enforcement can be traced to the “tools of the trade.” A limited number of professions require the daily use of body armor, firearms, expandable batons, handcuffs, and canisters of pepper spray. Even fewer jobs necessitate the use of force in order to perform essential work duties, or involve the ability to restrict, control, and dictate the personal freedom of others. Indeed, law enforcement is in many ways truly an extraordinary profession, which over time indisputably form and shape law enforcement professionals.

Law enforcement in general and policing in particular has become increasingly complex and multifaceted in the past few decades. Modern police officers are faced with shades of gray. Encounters with the public are no longer a black or white issue. Rookie officers quickly realize that there is more than one way to solve a problem and that there are no “rulebooks” on how to solve them. As such, officers are called upon to use personal discretion, judgment, and in many ways pure “common sense” in resolving citizen encounters. The days of brute force and pure muscle are fortunately gone; modern officers are more likely to resort to their “verbal judo”



In countries such as Great Britain, the police are becoming more and more involved with applied criminological and policing research.”

skills and intelligence rather than relying exclusively on strength and power.

In countries such as Great Britain, the police are becoming more and more involved with applied criminological and policing research. Indeed, Reiner (2010) argues that the greatest volume of current policing research no longer comes from academia – it comes from the police themselves. The Home Office (Great Britain) is another governmental body that has called for scientifically sound policing during the past 25 years (Reiner, 2010). But are we

currently at a stage where police officers can, in addition to everything else, also be expected to become “practitioner-researchers?”

The “practitioner-researcher”

During one of the final presentations of the 2011 Stockholm Criminology Symposium, Peter Neyroud of Cambridge University called for an increased partnership between police practitioners and researchers in an attempt to integrate theory with practice and create what he called “practitioner-scientists”. Indeed, Neyroud argued that universities must become an important part of the police infrastructure, with a continued commitment to publication and the sharing of practice. This is commendable since law enforcement agencies have a long-standing tradition of doing what they have always done, without looking for ways to improve their operation by way of empirically evaluated methods and/or programs.

In his book about the politics of policing, Robert Reiner wrote:

“... as recently as the mid-1980s in-house police research departments were mainly one-or two-person operations with little research expertise. Their function was primarily to collate the statistics and information required for such routine publications as the chief constable’s annual report and the design of bureaucratic forms. At best their research projects were ‘foregone conclusions’, evaluations of pet schemes which were designed never to show failure (Weatheritt, 1986).” (Reiner, 2010, p.10).

Indeed, it is interesting that many of the major changes in policing practices in the past three decades can, in fact, be credited to research efforts. Whether those changes have been good, bad, or indifferent, however, are still being debated and questioned by practitioners and academics alike (Leinfelt, 2006). Despite this debate, however, research has unquestionably played an instrumental role in shaping mod-


ern policing, as noted by Petersilia in the late 1980's. Furthermore, the importance of research in improving policing has been instrumental, according to some. For example Brown and Curtis (1967, p. 3) states that:

"Many practitioners within criminal justice have met with repeated failure over the years because they relied upon only their common sense. Thus, millions of dollars have been spent on police patrol efforts that do not reduce crime, judicial practices that are widely perceived as unfair, rehabilitation programs that do no rehabilitate offenders and countless other failures." (from Palmiotto, 2011)

So there is little doubt that research has played an instrumental role in forming policy and guiding police practice. A quick literature review from the past few decades shows evidence of many research-influenced police programs, including topics such as preventive patrol (Kelling et al., 1974), response time and the nature of calls (e.g., the Kansas City Response Time Study, 1977), differential response to calls (Cahn & Tien, 1981), the investigative process (Greenwood, Chaiken, & Petersilia, 1977), criminal investigations (Repetto, 1978), case screening (Eck, 1979; Johnson & Healy, 1978), police response to spousal abuse (Sherman & Berk, 1984), the treatment of spousal assault (Sherman, 1993), procedural justice (Paternoster et al., 1997), and police targeting of career criminals (e.g., Martin & Sherman, 1986). Some have argued that this "research boom" was caused by an explicit rejection of the earlier "nothing works" negativity (Sherman 1992, 1993, 2004; Bayley 1998; Bratton 1998; Weisburd & Eck 2004).

Petersilia (1987) argued that research has had a particularly important conceptual and operational effect on how our cities and counties are being policed. In a time characterized by pending budget deficits and resource tension among social control agencies, it would seem feasible that the importance of police research should remain at the forefront of academic and practitioner attention (Leinfelt, 2006). The challenge, as noted by Neyroud at the *Stockholm Criminology Symposium*, becomes to integrate theory with practice to a larger extent.

Throughout the "nothing works to control crime" discussions in the early 1990's, agencies failed to take ownership of the problem – crime and disorder was always someone else's fault; the police, for example, was quick to blame social services, the courts, probation,



and vice versa. Today, however, things are more optimistic. We can say with a solid empirical base that some things can be effective to control crime. Indeed, if law enforcement agencies are to become more like “practitioner-scientists” – and if law enforcement agencies adopt a paradigm *truly* guided by problem-oriented policing and the systematic inquiry of social ills – they will hopefully find that changes in policy and practice will allow them to “do more with less.”

Resistance to change

Robert Reiner (2010) described the policing tradition in Great Britain as one being highly influenced by practitioner-scientists. For example, Reiner suggested that early examples included serving police officers as students, which resulted in several influential publications and that “*a significant number of former police officers have become academic specialists in police research*” (p.10). Indeed, the tradition of police research appears quite different in the U.K. compared with countries such as Sweden. For



...organizational change and development have been identified as one of five strategies needed for a comprehensive model to reduce gang involvement...”

instance, in the U.K. there is a “Police Executive Programme” at renowned Cambridge University¹ designed to encourage senior police officers to reflect on, review and evaluate past, current and future police practice during a two-year program, leading up to a Master’s Degree. According to a former Detective Chief Inspector that I spoke with at the Metropolitan Police (New Scotland Yard), being promoted to a position beyond Chief Inspector is extremely difficult without an advanced degree that integrates a solid research understanding (Grattan-Kane, 2011). This notion is further supported when you examine the positions held by recent

graduates from Cambridge University’s Police Executive Programme.

Naturally, we can’t speak of the U.K. experience, but experiences from Sweden and elsewhere (such as the United States) seem to suggest that implementing research-based programs is a difficult task. We believe that this is a very important component to consider and ponder if you are implementing a new gang program. Besides, organizational change and development have been identified as one of five strategies needed for a comprehensive model to reduce gang involvement (see for example, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2008), which makes it a necessary component of this text.

¹ See website: www.crim.cam.ac.uk/courses/police/ Accessed December 2011.

Indeed, one of the biggest obstacles that face modern policing is undoubtedly overcoming resistance to organizational change. Perhaps this is deeply rooted in the psychological nature of the people that work within the “changing organization” since people, in general, do not like to change their behavior (Roberg et al., 2011). A change naturally brings about something new - a new way of reporting crimes, a new way of handling calls, a new way of filling out forms, a new way of interacting with the citizenry. Sometimes change occurs due to political reasons and policy space, and sometimes change occurs due to new leadership within the department. A new police chief, for example, may see things differently and make changes accordingly. As such, change typically comes with new tasks for the police officers, it may imply new assignments, and require new duties. Adapting to these new demands may cause stress and fear among the staff, which in turn can lead to resistance (Lurigio & Rosenbaum, 1994).

Police are comfortable in “doing what we’ve always done” (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997, p. 71) and may question the motives behind an organizational change, we may say that it is just a “bunch of crap”, all cooked up by some administrator who is far removed from actual police work (Roberg et al., 2011, p. 158). However, resistance can also occur due to misunderstandings (e.g., when police officers do not understand the purpose or the value of a change) or by a perceived balance of power (Sherman et al., 1973), that is, perceptions within a group that a change will undermine or threaten their autonomy.

The problem is that *we need change* – change is inherently necessary in order to keep up with mission statements and goals (politics and policy), community expectations (public concerns and perceptions), but also for our own professionalism (i.e., occupational pride).

Goldstein (1990), the father of problem-oriented policing, suggested that several factors contribute to the police organizations’ resistance to change. Since the PANTHER gang model is developed on the principles of problem-oriented policing, Goldstein’s reflections should be relevant for our purposes.



Goldstein (1990) presented four primary factors for resisting change (pp. 16-17):

- *The diverse, poorly defined, and sometimes overwhelming character of the police job makes it difficult to establish what, precisely, is the end product of policing (i.e., the type of service that the public should receive). Appeals to focus on the end product therefore understandably meet with some confusion and apprehension.*
- *Police are commonly viewed as palliators – as being concerned primarily with meeting immediate, emergency needs. It follows that greater rewards are attached to alleviating problems than to solving or curing them.*
- *Many of the problems that the police deal with are unsolvable. This is the very reason they come to the attention of the police. The potential for doing anything about an age-old problem like prostitution or shoplifting is limited. Improving a communications system or establishing a new operating procedure, in contrast, is much more satisfying. Nonsubstantive matters are more self-contained within the agency, and the police are therefore less dependent on outside forces for their success in dealing with them.*
- *The constraints under which the police operate in a democracy make police reluctant to take the initiative in addressing problems. Many officers view their function as simply doing what is formally required of them, even if it is widely recognized that this may be ineffective.*

Three key characteristics of a successful program implementation were emphasized by the Home Office (2011) in their report to the British Parliament following the conclusion of the International Forum of Experts on Gangs.

- Quality leadership in the police agency.
- Support of the community.
- Support of the political environment.

These factors were cited as the most crucial factors in working against the modern street gangs and building enduring programs for the future.

Strategies for success

Beyond the above-mentioned factors, Goldstein (1990) also pointed out that progress is heavily dependent upon whether police officers and police management have understood some of the fundamental lessons learned about policing. The greatest barrier in opening the minds of police officers to POP is that they continue to cling to the notions of policing that have been abandoned by more progressive agencies and officers (e.g., the notion of crime-fighting).

Goldstein suggest that the following should be taken for granted (p. 179):

- *Policing consists of dealing with a wide range of quite different problems, not just crime.*
- *These problems are interrelated, and the priority given to them must be reassessed rather than ranked in traditional ways.*
- *Each problem requires a different response, not generic responses that are applied equally to all problems.*
- *Use of criminal law is but one means of responding to a problem, it is not the only means.*
- *Police can accomplish much in working to prevent problems rather than just responding efficiently to an endless number of incidents that are manifestations of a greater problem.*
- *Developing an effective response to a problem requires prior analysis and intelligence.*
- *The police role is more akin to that of a facilitator, enabling and empowering the community to maintain its norms governing behavior, rather than assuming total responsibility for doing so.*

Goldstein's suggestions make up the fundamental framework and platform of the PANTHER gang model, and will be addressed in detail in subsequent chapters in this book.





2 Social construction of gangs

By: David Brotherton, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York (USA)

In this chapter, Dr. David Brotherton will provide a review on the social construction of gangs and the problematics that need to be addressed in gang criminology. Dr. Brotherton argues that we need to critically embrace the literature to create new pathways to knowledge, informed practice and policy with respect to gangs.

What is Social Constructionism?

Social constructionism, or constructivism as it is mostly referred to in sociology, came about as a theoretical and methodological reaction to the structural functionalism and grand theory that held sway in U.S. sociology during the first two decades after World War Two (generally understood to be the range of works from Parsons and Davis and Moore to Lazarsfeld). During this period, sociology became dominated by what C. Wright Mills called the practitioners of “abstracted empiricism,” members of a social science industry made up of white, middle-class professionals committed to positivistic research far removed from the community studies (mainly ethnographic) of the early Chicago School. Methodologically privileging their “scientific” data collections often through the now ubiquitous means of survey research (e.g. Lazarsfeld) and theoretically framed and guided by the modernistic imaginaries of grand theory, i.e., as in Parsons classic works of “The Structure of Social Action” (1937) and “The Social System and Theory of Action” (1950), sociology presented itself as a coherent, indefatigable seeker of social truth (see Pfohl and Gordon 1985).

In direct contrast to the domain of assumptions (Gouldner 1970) within these approaches, e.g. that social scientists were simply highly trained, neutral and detached observers of social phenomena, the proponents of constructivism such as Kitsuse, Spector, Ibarra, Blumer, Schneider, Gusfield, Berger and Luckmann, and Best posited that the primary role of sociology is to discover the various ways that individuals and groups engage in social processes and interactions through which they create their own perceived realities. “How is it possible that human activity should produce a world of things?” Berger and Luckmann (1967: 18) ask. Taking a strong cue from the social psychologists and symbolic interactionists (such as Coolidge, Reckless, Mead etc), they argued that our socially constructed reality is a dynamic, fluid, dialectical and interactive process in which people construct and share meanings regarding the world as it is perceived, interpreted and experienced. For Berger and Luckmann it was part of coming to terms with a sociology of knowledge, particularly with the bases or foundations of knowledge in everyday life. Thus they wrote:

“One may view the individual’s everyday life in terms of the working away of a conversational apparatus that ongoingly maintains, modifies and reconstructs his subjective reality... [for example] ‘Well, it’s time for me to get to the station,’ and ‘Fine, darling, have a good day at the office’ implies an entire world within which these apparently simple propositions make sense... the exchange confirms the subjective reality of this world... the great part, if not all, of everyday conversation maintains subjective real-

ity... imagine the effect...of an exchange like this: 'Well, it's time for me to get to the station,' 'Fine, darling, don't forget to take along your gun.' (p. 147-163)

From this perspective, people make claims about the world (see Blumer 1971) and as such begin to construct a range of social problems that we as a society need to address. In the parlance of social constructionism there are claims, counter-claims, claims-makers and moral entrepreneurs (Becker) that overlap and compete through organized groups, institutions and different disseminating outlets of knowledge and information (e.g. the media, governments, political parties, social movements, trade unions, universities). For social constructionists these claims are implicitly forms of rhetoric and some would even call them performances (Conquergood 1994) and practices of pleasure (Pfhol 1991) which have the goal of convincing or persuading the public(s) (Edelmann 1985) that our attention should be focused on a particular issue or set of issues. Thus Kitsuse and Spector (1973:441) broadly define the process by which something becomes a social problem as the result of:

"the activities of groups making assertions of grievances and claims with respect to some putative conditions."

Over time these claims and interpretations come to be seen as part of a larger, "objective" reality which in effect is a symbolic universe containing many different forms of representation, depending on the angle from which one is seeing and the access one has to power-based resources, including social, cultural and material capitals. Consequently, one's interpretation of an issue and its framing is always a result of our "situated knowledge" and/or of our positionality (Haraway 1991).

However, the claims made about a phenomenon can become widely legitimated by the broader society depending on the dominant ideology of the time, the balance of power in society and the convincing nature of the claim. Thus, in the United States there is a large literature in the field of Social Problems that describes how recurring societal issues such as inequality became the subject of governmental action in one period (such as in the War Against Poverty under presidents Kennedy and Johnson in the 1960s) whereas in another era society's apparent chief concern in terms of where its resources are allocated is the eradication of drugs and crime (as in the Reagan-initiated War Against Drugs during the 1980s and later Giuliani's "Zero Tolerance" campaigns in the 1990s, see Chambliss 1991).

Within the social constructionist paradigm some of the questions consistently asked are: How do private problems become public issues? Why do certain issues gain or lose prominence in different time periods despite their ongoing social im-

portance? What are the rhetorics used to frame and champion these issues (Gitlin 1980)? What is the role of metaphor in such framings (Lakoff 1990, Lakoff and Johnson 2006)? How is action organized in order to lend weight to an issue? What is the relationship between a social problem and public opinion? What are the institutional processes that encourage, shape, refine and select these issues?

Within the field of social constructionism (as it is constituted in sociology) there is a debate between at least three schools of thought: contextual and strict constructivism (Best 2007) and the deconstructionists (Pfohl 1985). The first set of differences came about between the contextualists and the strict constructionists as a result of critics charging social constructionism with “ontological gerrymandering” (Woolgar and Parwich 1985). These critics argued that to insist that all knowledge was socially constructed based on the acknowledged contradictions between the definitions of social reality and changes in the objective conditions was itself a recognition that something called objective reality exists. For how could we observe that reality had indeed shifted in the first place? What was required, they argued, was essentially a constructionism of the constructionists! The third school arose as a post-structuralist (heavily Foucauldian) critique of the social constructionist project (see Pfohl 1985, Pfohl and Gordon 1986, Pfohl 1992, 1993, Orr 1993) based on the argument that rhetorical claims cannot be divorced from the social relations of power and pleasure (Gordon 1993). Hence Pfohl and Gordon (1986) see their constructionist project as follows:

“to de-realize the hierarchical role of modern Man, to intervene within against the hegemonic codes that socially dominate our senses of time and space. Codes of empire. Phallic codes. Codes of economy and color. We want out. We want a different knowledge and want knowledge differently. We want a “partial” knowledge: a cognitive,





Such a project is important given the priority placed on controlling and even eradicating gangs from an array of societies in both the developed and developing worlds."

moral, and carnal relation to power that is, at once, always incomplete and politically reflexive of its own material and imaginary positioning within history" (1986:595).

If we apply these three perspectives of social constructionism to the gang literature we can emerge with a richer appreciation of the gang field by situating "gang knowledge," as it has emerged primarily from within the academy, in a more critical and comparative light. Such a project is important given the priority placed on controlling and even eradicating gangs from an array of societies in both the developed and developing worlds.

Strict Constructivism and the Gang

"In our view, constructionist studies of social problems discourse can profitably proceed by distinguishing four overlapping but analytically distinct rhetorical dimensions: rhetorical idioms, counterrhetorics, motifs, and claims-making styles. The last of these leads us into the study of settings. The inventory of specific idioms, styles and so forth that we offer is composed of ideal types and thus stands to be refined, reformulated, and elaborated upon through empirical observation and further theoretical reflections" (Kitsuse and Ibarra 1993:34).

As can be deduced from the above quotation, the strict constructivists are only interested in the different processes and themes of rhetoric surrounding the construction of a social problem or what they call "idiomatic productions." In the case of gangs the application of this analytical approach is obvious. The subject areas or what Kitsuse and Ibarra call "condition-categories" (e.g. gang related violence, group violence, expressive versus instrumental violence, drug use, drug entrepreneurialism as a group endeavor etc.) proposed by positivist gang social scientists come readily to mind. The emphasis on violence and drugs within this gang discourse is overwhelming as a brief survey of the gang literature should make clear. Such a focus can be easily understood through its idioms, i.e., the way a study is presented via its "moral reasoning," (e.g. we study gangs because they are a "threat" to the community, exacerbate its "disorganization" and/or produce cultures of fear), motifs or recurrent themes that run through a particular gang discourse, (e.g. gangs in terms of epidemics, plagues, territorial expansions, corporations), and styles (i.e., the bearing and tone used to present a claim such as the technical dryness and apparent disinterestedness of a scientific article, the theatricality of an ethnographic

performance, or the naturalism and humanism of an interview citation) .

In addition, there are also counterrhetorical strategies which are the different ways counter-claims are made that also can be grouped under a variety of themes which Kitsuse and Ibarra list variously as unsympathetic, hysterical, perspectivizing, tactical criticism and so forth. These are simply different rhetorical devices used by groups, professional or otherwise, to undermine another party's assertions. For example, in the gang literature there is a constant debate over whether criminality should be included as a definitional property of a gang. One side claims that such deviance is what makes a gang a gang, while critics state that this simply turns the discourse into a tautology and that social science should be about discovering whether a gang is criminally deviant or not (Morash 1983). The latter rhetoric might be described as using a delegitimizing tactic, i.e., such claims asserting the normative relationship between criminal deviance and the gang are not serious social science but rather reflect paradigmatic assumptions about a community or group which is a form of trope or a pathologization. Katz reminds us that a number of criminologists frame the connection causally as in the gangs as a criminogenic milieu (e.g. Thornberry) and go so far as to suggest that denying such causality is tantamount to an act of "moral irresponsibility" (Katz 2004:107).

Both Katz and Meehan (2000) might be seen as exponents of this form of constructivism. Katz has argued persuasively that many gang accounts by criminologists are simply fictitious. This is particularly true, he states in assertions regarding the gang-violence nexus:

"Despite the challenges of studying gangs, American criminology has now been engaged in the effort since the 1920s and shows no sign of retiring. The response to the weaknesses of data has been investigative resolution: the special research challenges in studying gangs are grounds for funding ever-new inquiries. But while admitting weakness in the literature makes perfect sense in grant applications, there is one central problem that has not been acknowledged: we never have had a good basis for thinking that gangs cause crime" (Katz 2004: 93).

For Katz, criminologists of both liberal and conservative varieties, constantly imbue the gang with violent propensities for primarily ideological reasons. The left advances such propositions in order to foreground the negative impacts of marginalizing structures on communities which are reflected in the anti-social, albeit understandable, phenomenon of gangs. The right however sees the ubiquitous presence

of violence due to its conception of gangs as culturally deficient and as harbingers of moral decay and putative threats to social order and the collective conscience. As Katz makes clear,

“treated as transparent openings onto pathological social conditions, the American gang has been portrayed – one might justifiably say, exploited – by one prevailing theoretical perspective after another”)...The gang has been a rich resource for telling stories formatted as social theory. Yet gangs themselves never provide the origin of the theory. The gangs are the provinces, onto which theories developed at the theoretical center are imposed.” (Katz 2004:101-102)

Similarly, Meehan (2000:362) in his ethnomethodological study of the organizational career of gang statistics and their role in the police accommodation of political interests, states:

“Treating these gang statistics as reflecting actual gang activity reifies gangs to the point where a fiction is created...Indeed, it is this fiction that the recordkeeping practices can effectively create and manage.”

But in the case of gangs are we simply telling stories from different societal positions? When a social problem manifests itself is it not the responsibility of the social scientist to investigate the social scene as well as the claims in order to better inform society of its options? It is in this vein that we examine the perspectives of the contextual constructivists.

Contextual Constructivism and the Gang

Constructionist theory warns against being distracted by the conditions about which claims are made, but the implications of strict constructionism push the analyst well beyond that boundary, into a contextless region where claims-making may only be examined in the abstract. The sociology of social problems began with the assumption that sociological knowledge might help people understand and improve the world; strict constructionism sells that birthright for a mess of epistemology (Best 1993: 143). Joel Best is the major proponent of this form of constructivism. He argues that a “strong” reading of Kitsuse’s (1963 with Cicourel) earlier proposition regarding the use of official statistics whereby rates of deviance are seen as the result of organizational (e.g. bureaucratic) practices bound by definitions of behavior specific to a period leads to a rejection of all kinds of data describing or representing social

conditions. Such a pure reading of social constructionism boxes the researcher into a corner for what kinds of data are acceptable for analytical purposes? Case studies are out of the question since they are fraught with subjectivist constructions of reality while large survey data, e.g. census data, are deeply flawed due to the biases inherent in the organized act (as explained above). Best argues that we must move beyond these objections and while we should certainly stay focused on the processes of claims-making as Kitsuse and Ibarra have helped to clarify (see above) at the same time we must acknowledge that there are a range of representations of objective conditions that we need to take into account, be they statistical data sets, ethnographic accounts, archival histories, photographic records etc. otherwise social science is paralyzed, caught in an endless dispute over epistemological principles. For the contextualist, therefore, such social constructionism must be inextricably tied to the sociological imagination or what Best calls “claims-making within its context of culture and social structure” (Best 1993:139).

To a large extent, many of the more critical gang studies fall within this perspective although they rarely acknowledge it. For example, Vigil’s work on barrio gangs in Los Angeles is devoted to understanding and representing the world of gangs through both “emic” and “etic” empirical and analytical devices. He is constantly trying to show the lives of members within a context of multiple-marginality which is ongoing, from one generation to the next, reinforced by the flows of immigration and the socio-economic blockages faced by first and second generations searching in vain for the American Dream (see also Moore and Garcia 1978, Moore 1991). It is within this situated agency of putative gang members that the subculture is constituted and produces meanings for the various generations that join it. However, in the same space or housing project (in many of his cases) he shows that there are families that resist the gang environment and have different socialization patterns especially for the youth



(Vigil 2007). Consequently, there is a range of adaptations to poverty conditions in the same structured environment and this variability contributes to a more nuanced understanding of barrio life which is often portrayed as synonymous with gang life, especially in claims made by the media, conservative politicians and by different law enforcement agencies (e.g. agencies which enforce gang injunctions or carry out stop and frisk policies, see Levine 2011, Fagan 2011).

Another example might be Sanchez-Jankowski (1991) who argues through his ten-year ethnographic study of gangs in multiple-sites that stereotypical claims made about the gang and their irrational practices should be corrected or countered by grounded replicable data. However, Jankowski, despite comparing gangs across place, time and race/ethnicity, concludes with a unifying rational action theory and a series of generalizations (see Burawoy 2003) about the gang and members' defiant individualism that ignores, overlooks, or rejects the possibility of change. Similarly, Venkatesh (2000), also through a study over time, makes the argument that gangs are not always feared by the communities in which they are embedded and may, in

fact, be viewed as a resource for impoverished populations who have been abandoned by political elites and the economic restructuring of society. Therefore, he levels another counter-claim through a counterrhetoric with styles that are both social scientific (e.g. Venkatesh 2000) and public sociological (e.g. Venkatesh 2010).



In my own work (e.g. Brotherton and Barrios 2004) I have used multiple forms of data to launch counter-claims to the gang-pathology nexus which is heavily represented in both the social scientific literature as well as in more popular discourses such as journalism and film. I do this mostly through a social scientific style of presentation including photography, ethnographic accounts, crime statistics and demographic data which are all forms of evidence acceptable to the readers trained in the academy. However, I also use other idiomatic styles which include documentary interviews and short opinion pieces for newspapers in order to reach a broader audience, especially as the gang has become such a ubiquitous symbol of social disorder and threat. For so many societies governed through crime and fear of crime (Simon 2006), the focus on the gang has helped produce exploding prison systems in many different countries, not just

the United States. Consequently, I have also used several motifs in my rhetorical repertoire to demonstrate the undermining of civil society by an array of claims calling for increased gang control which coincide with political campaigns to control immigrants, the poor and certain race/ethnic populations. In this construction of the gang there is a moral or ethical component as I demonstrate the relationship between targets of social control and their intentional and unintentional consequences.

Finally, I try to provide space in my work for the counter-claims of the subjects themselves, which is rare in treatments of gangs. This is also seen in the work of Conquergood (1994) who acts as an interpreter of gang members' transgressive acts of graffiti writing which he argues constitutes a form of street literacy, an alternative language and communication system in developed inter-generationally in response to social exclusion and stigmatization. Thus, the semiotic system of gangland reflects the group dynamics in a particular subterranean and community setting, with graffiti providing a way to read the rituals of inter-group competition and contestation. What Conquergood terms affirmation through negation.

We should also mention the work of cultural and critical criminologists (e.g. Young 1972, 1999; Cohen 1972; Ferrell 1994) who while not necessarily focusing on the gang highlight the power of culture in initiating "moral panics," what Cohen (1972:9) first sociologically described as happening when: "[a] condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests." The emergence of moral panics and their persistency in a highly mediated, networked society raises a host of questions vis a vis the study of gangs, only some of which have been the subject of research. For example, what is the relationship between the social imagery of gangs and their social behavior (Zatz 1987)? What accounts for the "discovery" and "rediscovery" of gangs during certain historical periods (McCorkle and Miethe 2002)? How does this discovery of gangs affect social policy and what are its economic and criminological costs (McCorkle and Miethe 2002)? Does the panic around gangs lead to a specifically structured language that Hallsworth (Hallsworth and Young 2008; Hallsworth 2012) calls "gang talk"? Does such gang talk and gang images now have a global reach enabling social control and media agencies to collude in creating a symbolic product which merges with their vested interests? What does the moral focus on the gang problem tell us about deeper ideological shifts in the power structure and the enactment of both latent and manifest political/economic agendas (Hall, Jefferson, Crichter, Clarke and Roberts, 1978, Conquergood 1991)?


Thus, there are a host of areas which have been studied through this branch of constructivism, albeit generally without much overt recognition, plus a multitude of questions that are raised when such a perspective applied to the social/criminological problem. In the following section I will deal with the more radical or perhaps critical approach of the social constructionism school by considering the contribution of the deconstructionists.

The Social Deconstructionists and the Gang

“In one grand sweep of sociological imagery, the Chicago theorists dismissed both the sentimental longings of the nativists and the structural critique of the radicals. By conceiving the negative consequences of rapid change as a deviant reaction of the naturally disorganized, rather than as a discontented reaction of the structurally or historically disadvantaged, the Chicago school contributed to a depoliticized image of social problems.” (Pfohl 1985:143).

Pfohl is probably the leading representative of this form of social constructionism and the various analytical paradigms which flow from the important intervention of post-structuralism and postmodernism in the social sciences. Taking the lead from Foucault and his power/knowledge dialectic, as well as Bataille (e.g. his work with the French 1930's College of Sociology, particularly the role of sacrifice in collective society and the notion of base materialism which became very influential in the work of Derrida) the social deconstructionists question the assumptions inherent in “enlightened,” binary, neo-colonial Western representations of social reality, especially of the “the Other” (see Said 1978). As is evident in the quote above, they are sharply critical of modernist grand narratives, elisions of voices from the subaltern, presumptions of privileged and valued knowledge which are all frames within which so much contemporary criminology is still performed.

They contest the boundaries of disciplines out of which positivistic narratives gain prominence and disrupt where possible what they call “visions of a perfect world” which, in turn, silence and foreclose on other visions (of a less than perfect world). Hence, these ways of and paths to knowing, experiencing and seeing (see Berger 1972) presume a certain epistemological posture, stance and set of rituals all of which are “raced,” “gendered” and imbued with layered meanings of class.



Further, there is desire and pleasure in these rituals (Kristeva 1980), a semiotic animus and a performance (Butler 1997, Conquergood 1991) that is contextualized and bounded by a “late capitalist consumer culture” (e.g. Phillips 1998: 72). The world is seductive and erotic (Bataille 1986, Jenks 2003), full of taboos, acts of transgression and self-destructive urges. It is also a spectacle (DeBord 1983) in which we all play a role whether wittingly or unwittingly. And it is commodified, almost everything we do seems capable of being turned into a transaction, a subject/object of exchange to enhance our status, our power of acquisition, and our libidinal needs and compulsions. Hence, the value-neutral, dispassionate social scientist viewing the ethnoscares of gangland does not exist. Instead,

“Writing, analysis, and investigation – whether of social or cultural texts – are no longer entirely viewed as a “scientific” project, but as a cultural practice that organizes particular rituals of storytelling, at the center of which is a historically situated investigating subject” (Gordon 1993:321).



At the same time, the deconstructionists do not concur with the strict constructivists and acknowledge that the world is knowable albeit through social scientific truths which are always partial (Clifford 1988), contingent and subject to critical self-reflection. Gordon, therefore, calls for a “sociography” to replace traditional social scientific approaches, which would take into consideration “the ghosts” that haunt our constructions of reality, i.e., the sociological lineages that govern our approaches to and analyses of social phenomena. In this she politicizes all forms of viewing the world and the presumption that we have the right to the power to name and interpret our subjects. Thus she argues that our constructions are forms of:

“Visibility...a complex system of permission and prohibition, of presence and absence, punctuated alternately by apparitions and hysterical blindness” (quoted from Kipness 1988 in Gordon 1993:318)

“ We need a criminology of energy and tension not one of listlessness and inertia”

In his highly critical view of representing the social, Pfohl concurs and calls for a power-reflexive approach which he describes as a method that:

“...demands an impure, if rigorous, commingling of multiple forms of inquiry. Perhaps, only by risking what Jacques Attali describes as the rigors of “theoretical indiscipline” might we today put into practice such epistemological double-crossings (1985:5). For most of us this will involve as much unlearning as learning, a process involving both the dangers and pleasures of speaking (or(w)riting) out of place” (Pfohl 1993:425).

While in the field of cultural criminology Ferrell, Haywood and Young (2008:204) invoke a new criminology to approach the gang and other subjects/objects of criminal inquiry - a criminology which incorporates the criticisms of the deconstructionists but advances social inquiry through embracing the subjective, the aesthetic, the dramaturgical and the innovative in the quotidian. In rejecting a contemporary criminology “dominated by positivism and by rational choice theory” (see also Young 2011) they call for a:

“criminology which can grasp the phenomenology of the everyday life: the experiences of joy, humiliation, anger, and desperation, the seductions of transgressions and vindictiveness, the myriad forms of resistance and the repressive nature of acquiescence. We need a criminology of energy and tension not one of listlessness and inertia” (Ferrell, Haywood and Young, 2008:204).

Conclusion: Social (De)constructionist Questions that Emerge for Gang Criminology

Consequently, emerging from the social constructionist and deconstructionist critiques and perspectives are a range of probing questions that can specifically be applied to gang research. These questions, if taken seriously, can help orient our work in a rapidly changing socio-economic, political, legal and cultural landscape whose physical and cultural borders are constantly transforming and intersecting under the pressures of global capitalism and the attendant flows of people, (sub)cultures, practices and spaces. The constructionists began by calling into question the origins of the realities we were fond of proclaiming - realities that all too often omitted consideration of other ways of knowing, doing, understanding and interacting especially by those who ironically constituted the majority of society. Hence the counter-discourses of feminism, Marxism, post-structuralism, queer theory, post-colonialism and postmodernity, all of which have fed off and into the long term (de)constructionist project. In their loosely combined way I would argue that they have all helped to produce a host of problematics which need to be addressed in gang research if we are to critically embrace the literature and the field and create new pathways to knowledge, informed practice and policy with respect to gangs. We might start this quest by offering the following starter questions to help establish, orient and sustain the expedition:



1. How do we apply criminological tropes such as social disorganization, strain and bond theories, and/or culture conflict to a society that is increasingly “liquid,” glocal, filled with late modern ambiguities and bereft of modernistic certainties and predictabilities (Bauman 2007, Young 2012)?
2. Where is history (particularly from below) in so many contemporary criminological treatments of deviants particularly of gangs (see Brotherton and Barrios 2004, Zinn 1980, Kelly 1994)?
3. Why are so many criminological treatments of gangs still highly gendered, privileging male perspectives about male subjects with little discussion of females, the problems of a gendered discourse or any consideration of masculinity/femininity (Mendoza-Denton 2008, Miranda 2003)?
4. Why is there so little reflexivity in gang research, both in terms of how social investigators affect the subjects and the inherent problems in the discourse itself (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, Burawoy 2003)?
5. Why is it so difficult to include a sense of life, hope and possibility in the representations and discoveries of gang research instead of the standard foci of misery, rational action and pathology?
6. What is the role of heavily funded gang research in the construction of gangs, the production of gang laws and the emergence of gang policy?
7. What are the dominant tropes in the contemporary gang literature and their relationship to the concept of hegemony?
8. What epistemologies of gangs are repressed from research while others are championed and made obligatory?
9. What criminological gazes are reflected in gang studies?
10. How has social citizenship changed for putative members of “gangs” in the age of neo-liberalism, the security state, and advanced marginality (Lea and Hallsworth 2011, Wacquant 2008)?
11. What counter-claims and counter-narratives are suppressed in the gang literature while other claims are repeated as mantras?

Such questions could and should be readily applied to the bulk of contemporary gang studies reproduced in the leading and not so leading journals where few empirical, theoretical and/or methodological criminological contributions attempt to engage other emerging forms or representations of social reality. Or, put another way, so few gang articles question the settings within which “gangs” are suppos-

edly present or seriously reflect upon the applicability of the gang concept (in all its various definitions), preferring instead to unreflectively “claim” the presence of the transgressive subculture then proceed to locate their treatment of the said group within an ahistorical, apolitical, non-contradictory, lifeless and agency-less discourse. As the cultural criminologists have correctly (in my judgment) commented on the vast majority of published, peer-reviewed criminology, and this would very much be the case with gang research:

“Sparks of dangerous sensuality may sometimes fly from bikers or street buskers, or from their flinty clashes with authorities – but as such groups and situations become the subject matter of criminology, those sparks are snuffed out, or fanned into flame, by method” (Ferrell, Haywood and Young 2008).

In contrast, most discourses on “deviance,” especially in the fields of sociology and anthropology, consider such a critical treatment of social phenomena as almost compulsory. This is precisely what Hagedorn (2009) argues in his recent exegesis on the global expansion of gangs when he inveighs against a gang criminology that continues to write within modernist, industrialized, “progressive” frames of reference about a world that is post-Fordist, postmodern, post-colonial and saturated with the culture and practices of neo-liberalism (see also Wacquant 2008).

If the same critique has been articulated for many years of other social fields in sociology and anthropology by the combined likes of Bourdieu (1994), Clifford (1988), Touraine (1981), Giddens (1979), Smith (1990) and Castells (1997) is it not time our critical constructionist sensibilities were more universally applied to the extraordinarily overdetermined social control and criminological study of gangs? Is it not time to really make research (all of it) and intellectual study and contemplation part of society’s manifold responses to one of the social conundrums of our times, the continuity and discontinuity of the street gang – a phenomenon no longer simply imagined within the grid of street corner life in Chicago, Los Angeles or New York but now a highly adaptive and plastic social group manifesting itself on a global stage. The choice is ours. The constructionists have helped to light the way but whether we are willing and able to unthink our disciplinary rituals is another matter.





3 Policing Paradigms: *Some Theoretical Influences to PANTHER*

By: Fredrik Leinfelt

Community police presence is not by any means equivalent to actual community activity (McDonald, 2004). That is, just by being in the community, being visible to the public, etc., does not imply that the police are truly engaged in the community.

Shifting focus from criminals to the citizens was a significant “discovery” that caused a major paradigm shift in how police agencies police their communities today. Before we elaborate on this further, however, let us briefly examine the contextual backdrop of American policing and how this has influenced the Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project (SGIP) and the PANTHER gang model.

A Note on the American History of Policing

Since most of what is known about gangs and the enforcement of gangs come from the U.S., we will start by examining the American police tradition. We do this in an effort to develop and understand the historical context for how the current knowledge on various responses to gangs was shaped.

The history of policing in America can generally be divided into three distinct periods, or eras of law enforcement; the Early Political Era (1840-1930), the Professional Era (1930's-1980), and the Community Policing Era (1980 - Present). These periods have all brought about significant changes to policing and the police in terms of granted authority, organizational design, established relationship with the community, tactics and technology, and their function and role in society.

During the Political Era, the business of the police was to keep the peace and to prevent crime by way of crime prevention. The police provided urban residents and American newcomers with social services that are not recognized today; for example, delivering coal to local residents on cold nights (McDonald, 2004). Under this model, however, the police quickly gained a reputation for brutality, inefficiency, and corruption. This reputation grew out of the integration of police with local political machines where the appointment of police officers by politicians ensured police loyalty to the politicians. This was, as you can imagine, very problematic. Police accepted pay-offs for under-enforcement of unpopular laws and abuse of minorities, and industrialists feared that the blue-collar sympathies of police would make them unreliable in policing strikes.

There were many changes that occurred in America during the 1930's that altered policing. Many would argue that these changes were for the better. The police abandoned their social service role and adopted a strict law enforcement role (McDonald, 2004). Hence, the function of police would shift from crime prevention and the affording of services to criminal apprehension through law enforcement. The police force quickly became a paramilitary organization from top to bottom. Authority was centralized, which meant that police headquarters had oversight of individual departments. The police severed the intimate links with the individual neighborhoods; no idle conversations with citizenry were allowed. Specialized units were created in larger urban police departments (e.g., SWAT, Bomb-Squad, etc.) that were considered prestigious duty assignments by other police officers. New police officers were recruited using psychological screening mechanisms and civil service standards, some of which are still in effect today (McDonald, 2004). At this time, police recruits were sent to an official police Academies were structured

much like military boot camp, including barracks, drill sergeants, and the seemingly obligatory buzz cut.

The Professional Era of policing failed, however, in terms of its own goals: that is, crime control and law enforcement. Academics entered the area of law enforcement and research studies were conducted in multiple sites across the U.S. It was found that the tactics of motorized, preventive patrol were unsuccessful (e.g., Kelling et al., 1974) and research about crime, criminals, and victims suggested that the police are limited in their crime control functions (and effectiveness) by a variety of other factors (see for example: Cahn & Tien, 1981; Greenwood, Chaiken, & Petersilia, 1977; Paternoster et al., 1997; Repetto, 1978; Eck, 1979; Johnson & Healy, 1978; Martin & Sherman, 1986; Sherman, 1993; Sherman & Berk, 1984). Researchers concluded from these studies that factors such as timing and location of crime, and the relationship between the offender and the victim were important.

This propelled a need for the police to be accountable and held responsible to the community and to the public they served. This served as a catalyst and propelled a change in thinking. Police agencies now leaned towards a community oriented mentality and as a result, a reduction of professional policing tactics, including the way police officers are recruited and trained.

To Protect and Serve – Community Policing Strategies

The Los Angeles Police Department's motto "to protect and to serve" is perhaps the most famous of all police slogans. Indeed, many departments across the USA have adopted similar catchphrases – proudly exhibited on squad cars. In Los Angeles, this motto was affixed to squads in 1963 after serving as the official maxim of the L.A. Police Academy. Supposedly, the slogan reminded recruits about the purpose of their training and future profession.

However, the path to "protect and to serve" has been a rough historical journey. Kelling and Moore (1988) noted that the road to a central strategy based on community-oriented and problem-oriented policing began during the last quarter of the 20th Century (Newburn, 2005) and was immensely fueled by the work of Herman Goldstein (1990). Critics might say that American policing are not quite there yet, some three decades later, although the words are proudly displayed on squads all over the country. Some argue that the police still fight crime but offer few (if any) services to the actual communities they police. In fact, the police have remained highly specialized and non-problem solving in their approach, despite pledges to


adopt a community policing approach – an approach where such mechanisms make up the central components (Katz & Webb, 2006).

The problem-oriented approach that sparked a paradigm shift when it was introduced by Goldstein in 1979, has lately been surpassed by the community-oriented policing paradigm – a term that, according to some “masks as much as it reveals” (Newburn, 2005, p. 388). Even though Goldstein sparked a revolution in thinking about improving policing, community-oriented policing effectively became the conceptual engine – the driving force – behind the new era in policing.

Slowly there was a *slight* shift towards community-oriented policing and a corresponding reduction of the devices previously associated with the professional era, but there was not a complete overhaul or transplant of the new concept (McDonald, 2004). The new community era called for a reduction in the paramilitary culture and a reduction in the crime-fighting mentality. In retrospect, however, some have suggested that it may only have changed the *symbolism*, but not the intensity in many areas – such as, uniforms similar to fatigues, the aggressive placement of the shotgun in the police car, etc. (McDonald, 2004).

Skogan and Hartnett (1998) argued that the community-oriented policing paradigm should be viewed a process rather than a product. They suggested that it represents a new “organizational strategy” that allows the police to redefine their role. However, community-oriented policing does not suggest solutions – rather, it is a process, a philosophy and a mindset that leaves the actual means of achieving the redefined goals to the actual practitioners, albeit strongly rooted in a commitment to problem orientation and responsiveness to public demands. In addition, Skogan and Hartnett advocated the need to foster an environment where local communities solve their own problems. For example, in their evaluation of the Chicago CAPS program, Skogan and Hartnett showed promising results in terms of positive trends in crime problems, neighborhood conditions, and police responsiveness. Less effective, however, were the community component and the buy-in of the local Hispanic community to solve their own problems (Newburn, 2005).

Klockars (1988) was more critical and suspicious to the new concept, however. Drawing on the work of Egon Bittner (1970), he argued that the movement towards a community-oriented policing paradigm was yet another attempt to conceal, mysti-



fy and legitimize the monopolization of force. Klockars contended that community-oriented policing was just a smokescreen, cunningly devised to place the police in a powerful and favorable image with the community. Klockars held that community policing simply “wrapped” the police in positive terms in cooperation and crime prevention through a series of toothless rhetorical devices (Klockars cited community, decentralization, reorientation of patrol, and civilianization as such devices).

Wilson and Kelling (1982) argued by way of “Broken Windows” that the police need to recognize the processes, signs, and symbols that indicate decay and intervene *before* crime becomes a problem. To Wilson and Kelling, then, undetected disorder produced crime. Indeed, others have argued in similar terms: “serious street crime flourishes in areas in which disorderly behavior goes unchecked” (Newburn, 2005, p.389). Consequently, the police need to be *proactive* as opposed to being *reactive*. This thinking fueled the paradigm shift further, especially since Wilson and Kelling also recognized the need for communities to self-police (similar to the ideas of Skogan and Hartnett) in *cooperation* with the police and external actors. Moreover, Wilson and Kelling (1982) and Kelling and Cole (1996) stated that the police should return to the idea, concept and notion of *protecting communities as well as individuals*.

One who successfully applied the elements of “Broken Windows” operationally was New York City police commissioner Bill Bratton. Bratton, who previously served as police commissioner in Boston, first came to New York in 1990 as the newly appointed chief of police for the New York Transit Police. In the mid-1990s, under the rule of Mayor Rudy Giuliani, Bratton was appointed as the New York City police commissioner and initiated several programs to improve the social conditions, including hiring new officers, restructuring the department, and introducing a new authority and accountability system for the command structure - COMPSTAT (Newburn, 2005). Bratton (1998) argued that when he took over the controls, New York was referred to as “the Rotten Apple” by *Time magazine* and the *New York Post* called for immediate action against crime and disorder. Bratton reasoned that the city had lost control, largely due to politicians “*explaining away bad behavior instead of correcting it.*” The results of Bratton’s initiatives was striking – a record decrease in crime. According to Bratton (1998) this decline in crime was credited to the police, although others strongly disagree and attribute the decline to other factors (e.g., Blumstein & Wallman, 2001; Brotherton, 2012). Albeit disputed and debated, COMPSTAT enjoyed successes beyond New York City.

Weisburd and colleagues (2003) suggested that the primary reason for the quick

spread of COMPSTAT, and its acceptance among various police departments, was its ability to increase management control over field operations in serious crimes (Newburn, 2005). In contrast, however, Moore (2003) argued that COMPSTAT reinforced the notion of crime fighting by implementing *only one* component of problem-oriented policing (the correlation between disorder and fear of crime) while at the same time applying aggressive, preventive patrol as the sole solution. Moore posited that the true reason for COMPSTAT's popularity rests in the police culture and the ability of police administrators to claim that they are keeping up with the latest developments in policing, irrespective of its effectiveness (Newburn, 2005).

Recall that when Goldstein argued for a shift towards the problem-oriented approach, he reasoned that *"policing have reached a plateau at which the highest objective to which they aspire to is administrative competence"* (Newburn, 2005, p. 387). **Did much change with the introduction of community-oriented policing – or are the police still struggling in applying concepts, resources and management in a holistic fashion?** Are these new directions in policing just a paper product intended to – as Klockars would say – concealing an agenda of crime fighting?



Despite the distinct camps on the utility and effectiveness of community-oriented policing, it is evident that American policing has changed over the past few decades. But putting technological advances such as COMPSTAT aside, it really started with a dedicated effort on part of police administrators such as August Vollmer and the “college cop” movement, with the desire to select police officers that possessed “the right stuff.” After all, it should not be as important for recruits at our modern police academies to understand what they (as a profession) were up against *yesterday*, as it is for them to understand what is required of them *today*. Being successful in policing is measured quite differently today compared with what it used to be.

Research leading up to COP

The community oriented policing approach has not only been embraced by the National Institute of Justice and by the majority of American police departments, it has also been exported to many other countries such as Australia, Canada, Great Britain, India, Kenya, Northern Ireland, Malawi, Sierra Leone, the Solomon Islands, South Africa, Trinidad, Zambia (Martin, 2003), and Sweden (Rostami & Leinfelt, 2011).

Three areas of research findings influenced to move towards community oriented policing and contributed in making it so prevalent; patrol work (Kelling et al., 1974), response time (e.g., Bayley, 1994), and the usefulness of the detective bureau (e.g., Chaiken et al., 1976). Each will be discussed below.


Patrol Work:

Researchers began to ask the question about the value and *impact* of patrol work. Researchers argued that police patrol is not just a ratio of the number of officers employed per 10,000 or 100,000 citizens – that finding is useless as it does not tell us what the officers are actually doing with their time. The underlying assumption was that patrol deterred crime and that random patrol was preventive.

But no data was available on the impact of patrol units, so in the mid-1970s, Kelling and colleagues designed an experiment to test this in Kansas City. As part of their experiment, Kelling et al. set up three types of patrol sectors in the city; (1) a *pro-active sector* with two or three times the normal deployment of random patrol, in effect saturation policing; (2) a *reactive sector* where the police only responded to deployment by dispatch; and (3) a *control sector* with regular random patrol and work style. Kelling and his colleagues used a triangulation research design with crime report data (UCR), citizen and victimization surveys (NCVS) and police officer surveys.

Several findings relates and have impact on community oriented policing; (1) the

level of random patrol (presence, visibility) does not impact official crime reports; (2) the level of random patrol does not impact victimization survey results; (3) the level of random patrol does not impact citizen satisfaction with the police department; (4) the level of random patrol does not impact the citizen's level of fear; (5) the level of random patrol has no significant impact on response time (police data); and (6) the level of random patrol has no impact on the public's evaluation of response time (no change). The implication of these findings seems to be that random patrol is a waste of time if your outcome is crime rate, citizen satisfaction and fear, or response time (has no impact). Kelling and colleagues suggested that the police should use their resources in a better way since the assumptions about the value of random



patrol work (that is, that random patrol will deter and prevent crime and improve public satisfaction) are not valid.

The outcomes of the Kelling et al. study were controversial in many ways. For example, police chiefs across the nation could not believe the results since it turned their world upside down and challenged the core of patrol work. But the findings also did one other thing: it planted a seed, the notion that *it's not the number of police that matters, it's what the police do with their time that makes all the difference*.

Response Time:

Studies looking at response time, or rapid response studies, are also examining the value of patrol units. Researchers argued that this is important to study since the police fundamentally believe that arresting criminals will deter and prevent future crime, as well as preventing or containing the degree of victimization and harm. In addition, reducing response time will impress the public and therefore increase satisfaction with the police service. Researchers such as Bayley (1994) suggested that there are three parts of response time and that they unfold in sequence – citizen response time, dispatch time, and travel time. Researchers have argued that the police could improve on all of these areas.

Bayley (1994) found that if response time is “quick” and an arrest is made on-scene, *and* the officer reassures and comforts the victim, then the citizen evaluation of the police department increases. However, a “quick” response without an arrest and without reassurance to the victim has no impact on citizen evaluations of the police.

Bayley concluded that there are two ways the police can improve satisfaction with responsiveness; (1) reduce police response time, or (2) affect citizen expectations of police response time – that is, change citizens' expectations. This is achieved by telling caller when to expect the police and then have the police arrive early (e.g., overstating the time needed for dispatch and travel). Another method is to establish a “community public information and education program” (PI&E) to inform and educate the citizens about what the police do, when to call and about the constraints upon police response (issues such as officer availability, shift size, resources, etc.). Some police dispatch departments have moved towards a call delay system – basically a triage of incoming calls, a method of prioritizing police response calls based on parameters such as harm and personal victimization.

The Swedish police, for example, use a call delay system where all calls for service come in to a central dispatch center, where an operator codes the call as “immedi-

ate”, “as soon as possible”, “response later,” or “no response.” Immediate calls are dispatched right away (if no patrol units are available, units are re-assigned from less prioritized calls) whereas as soon as possible calls are handled when resources become available, or alternatively, by re-assigning patrol units currently on “response later” calls.

The realization (by the police) that knowledgeable citizens will lead to a rise in public evaluation of the police department propelled the community-oriented approach. By ensuring that the public realizes and accepts the facts related to response time (impact of citizen response time, demands on police time, limitations of technological advances, the conditions of human resources, number of available units, etc.) all have an impact and that improving them will not reduce response time. That is, the public needs to understand all contributing factors and that response time will never be perfect.

The police could also educate the public that for most crimes, the criminal leaves before the police are contacted. In those cases, even an “immediate response” would not result in apprehension of these criminals.

Detective bureaus:

Chaiken, Greenwood, and Petersilia (1976) with the RAND Corporation used a triangulated design of surveys, field research, and UCR data on 153 police departments to examine what the police got out of their investigation departments. Findings suggested that differences in detective bureau workload, training of detectives, and differences in investigative procedures had no impact on clearance rates since the patrol unit made most arrests. The most important variable in solving a case *is information gathered from the victim*, which raised the notion that people outside the police community are important. Chaiken, Greenwood, and Petersilia concluded that crime victims strongly desire to be notified if their case had been solved, and if not its current status. This called for the need for an increased communication and that the need for police departments to be proactive.

Indeed, the police needs to *understand their audience* and make sure that a message is tailored, since all segments of the community will respond in different ways. Educating the public about what is going on, and letting them know what they can do to be helpful and inform them about their responsibilities is therefore essential.

“ Indeed, the police needs to understand their audience and make sure that a message is tailored, since all segments of the community will respond in different ways. ”

Observations regarding research leading to COP and the work on gangs

Wilson and Kelling suggested that research consistently shows that further or additional resources and/or concentration on crime fighting are a “dead end”. As such, community-policing proponents recommend that police services and resources be dedicated to the prevention of crime and disorder. The same scholars would also argue for a decentralized command where officers independently make decisions in facilitating neighborhood cooperation and collaboration with other actors. As such, resources (i.e., personnel) are not at the front of the discussion; it’s rather a question about how these resources are used and how they police.

Indeed, we need a re-conceptualization of what we are doing with our police resources (McDonald, 2004). However, we should not abandon crime fighting, but rather prioritize crime prevention and introduce components of intervention, especially in working with gangs. In essence, trying to “crime-fight” our way out of a gang problem does not seem feasible. We need enduring, long-term solutions that address the issues *causing* the problem, rather than putting out symptomatic fires of the same.

Undeniably, the COP scholars with Sir Robert Peel at the helm said it first; we need to bring the public into the equation as well as develop and foster relationships with external partners and collaborators – especially when it comes to winning the “fight” against gangs.


Community Policing

Community oriented policing (COP) stem from the early insights of Sir Robert Peel and his Nine Principles of Policing, which was published in 1829. According to Sir Peel, the police are established for the people, by the people. This point was later reinforced by Trojanowicz in 1992 and currently serves as a fundamental platform for the philosophy of community policing. Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) offered the following definition of community policing, as cited in Chappell (2009, p. 6): *Community policing is a new philosophy of policing, based on the concept that police officers and private citizens working together in creative ways can help solve contemporary community problems related to crime, social and physical disorder, and neighborhood decay. The philosophy is predicated on the belief that achieving these goals requires that police departments develop new relationships with law-abiding people in the community, allowing them a greater voice in setting local police priorities and involving them in efforts to improve the overall quality of life in their neighborhoods. It shifts the focus of police work from handling random calls to solving community problems.*

Chappell (2009) also wrote that, “community policing is currently touted by academicians and practitioners as the answer to crime and disorder problems and police–community conflict” (p. 5). This is evident in several ways:

- Police chiefs are held accountable to the public via either city council or mayoral approval. These are in part governed by public elections, thus by the people.
- Police are working with the community in deciding priorities, concerns, and issues facing the public and police. As such, police do not directly rely on internal reasoning in establishing departmental policies and procedures (e.g., by the chief or sheriff).
- Police are proactively policing neighborhoods and communities according to community needs and wants.
- Police rely on information from the public in responding to disorder and crime. As such, the police and public are partners in the effort to achieve order maintenance and crime control.
- Police offer public information and education to the public in an effort to educate and inform about the various constraints and responsibilities of the police. Also, this is furthermore evident by the popularity of “citizen’s academies” where the citizenry are invited to participate in ride-along programs and visit the local jail, etc.

What Sir Robert Peel proclaimed implies that the police would be more effective if they used less force and by extension, made fewer arrests (McDonald, 2004). Therefore, community policing, at least in accordance to Peel’s principles, is about using sound discretion and judgment and by interacting with the citizens in a manner conducive to building partnerships. Chappell (2009) argued that community policing is about police officers making independent decisions and act as “advocates on behalf of the neighborhoods they serve” (p. 7).



The saying "...we cannot arrest our way out the gang problem" (Bratton, 2011) certainly seems applicable and insightful considering the results of the past few decades of work against gangs. Bill Bratton, the former police chief of Boston, New York and Los Angeles used the "broken windows" approach against gangs and crime. He tackled the small things and used data to identify and target crime hot spots to solve problems with repeated calls for police service. In doing so, chief Bratton did not need additional police officers, but rather a focused and determined use of available resources (Pickles, 2011).

However, in order to be effective, the police must be perceived by the citizenry as fair and equitable (Sherman, 1997). That is, the public gains confidence in the police based on positive treatment; even though an arrest is made, citizens are more likely to approve of police behavior if treated with dignity and respect (Paternoster et al., 1997). Some have referred to this as police *legitimacy* (e.g., Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994).

Hence, the struggle between crime fighting and community policing is not a mutually exclusive relationship; it does, however, require a desire to strive beyond the professional era of policing where the role of the police was straightforwardly focused on crime control. **Instead, police must embrace the view of policing as one that is multifaceted; that is, not exclusively focused on crime fighting and catching "bad guys."** This desire must exist in the chief, the community, the polity, and the police (perhaps more importantly, it must also exist in the police union). It would seem that it is equally important that all aspects of the community (e.g., business owners, community interests group, etc.) are supportive and involved in the process. The police cannot function under the umbrella of community policing without the community.


Furthermore, it also requires a realization of police decentralization and willingness to grant increased discretion to individual officers. Failure to do so will undoubtedly result in stratified departments and rigid rank and turf protection, like evident by previous eras of policing. Police administrators must organize their departments in a manner conducive to individual discretion; making decisions for the officers from behind a desk at headquarters, by way of implementing policies and procedures, will hamper the overall effectiveness of the department. Moreover, the police administrators need to *foster an environment that is conducive and acceptant to change*, which may prove to be a hard feat.

A commitment to the community also requires a willingness to identify and address problems in the community. Unlike the professional era of crime control where police officers pursued traditional index crimes (e.g., murder, robbery, arson,

motor vehicle theft, etc.), this requires a desire, skill, and eagerness to interact with the citizenry, local businesses, and stakeholders. Only when officers interact with the citizenry can they learn about their problems. Hence, previous observations were correct in that the police must become familiar with their communities in order to learn about available resources (Trojanowicz, 1992). Utilizing available resources is the key concept of community policing (McDonald, 2004). We should be able to say that we as a community solved the problem presented before us; not solely that we as the police solved the problem – because we simply can't.

These elements all come together in the process of identifying problems (whether it is stabbings at bars or illegally parked cars), adapting the police department to facilitate the “addressing” of these problems, a mobilization to act on problems, and the proclivity to engage in problem solving (Bayley, 1994). Taken together, albeit presented in different formats, the underlying concept comes down to solving a pressing need for the city, community, or neighborhood in the most cost-effective and pragmatic way while considering the restraints in resources (McDonald, 2004).

The “solution” is a custom design tailored to the community (Clarke & Eck, 2005). Therefore, solutions are going to vary between departments, between cities, and between individual states/nations, as each community has unique needs and desires. What works in one department may not work in another department, and vice versa. There are no pre-fabricated solutions to community problems and concerns; it requires the joint effort and cooperation of all stakeholders (e.g., the police, citizens, business community, social service agencies, the mayor, etc.).



Problem-Oriented Policing and SARA

Goldstein (1979) argued that the police had become too preoccupied with being managers and improving administration that they inadvertently neglected and lost track of their own objectives. Goldstein argued that management improvement was important as it addressed the capacity to solve problems, but also argued that the police must begin with addressing the concerns of the public – to deal with the problems that the citizens' expect them to.




GOLDSTEIN (1979) PRESENTED THREE STEPS IN HIS “PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING” APPROACH:


1. Problems must be defined more specifically, including geographic and temporal variables, as well as information about offender motivations, etc.,
2. Information should be collected from internal *and* outside sources since the police rarely use external sources to gather information about community problems. Effectively, Goldstein called for the police to reach out to the community and initiate partnership; and,
3. The police must search for broader solutions to community problems, even solutions outside of, or alternatives to, the criminal justice process. Goldstein argued that the best solutions often involved those who have a vested interest in solving the problem; that is, a combination of private individuals, businesses, and public organizations/agencies.

Goldstein later developed on these early ideas in his book *Problem-Oriented Policing* (1990) and drafted the basic elements of POP. In short, Goldstein suggested that incidents should be grouped as problems and called for an increased focus of substantive problems as the heart of policing. In addition, he also suggested that the police need to strive for effectiveness as their ultimate goal and maintained the need for a systematic inquiry by disaggregating and accurately labeling problems. Moreover, Goldstein suggested implementing tailor-made responses and assessing/evaluating the response, adopting a proactive stance, and strengthening the decision-making processes and increasing accountability within the police. These principles later developed into the SARA method, a problem-oriented approach that is used by numerous police forces around the world today.

The difference between “traditional” reactive police work and problem-oriented police work is illustrated below.



Reactive police work (from Eck & Spelman, 1987, figure 1).



Reactive police work (from Eck & Spelman, 1987, figure 2).

SARA

The acronym SARA was initially formulated by criminologists John Eck and Bill Spelman and is based on the principles of problem-oriented policing (i.e., Goldstein, 1979; 1990). In short, SARA refers to the four problem-solving stages of Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment. The idea is to divide larger problems into stages, which ultimately ensures that solutions are not initiated before a proper analysis of the actual problem (Clarke & Eck, 2005). By way of adopting and implementing SARA, law enforcement agencies avoid the natural tendency of “jumping the gun” and launching resource-costly responses before assessing the problem fully.

The components of SARA

Scanning: (e.g., collecting data on the community): Law enforcement identifies social problems in the area as reported by citizens, businesspeople, patrol officers, and other stakeholders. Data can be collected by way of talking to residents, business owners, by way of surveys, or by other methods in an effort to identify problems and/or underlying causes of concern.

According to the Center for *Problem-Oriented Policing*, the purpose of scanning is to¹:

- *Identify recurring problems*
- *Prioritize the problems*
- *Develop broad goals*
- *Confirm (or null) that specific problems exist*
- *Determine how often the problem occurs and how long it has been a concern*
- *Select problems for closer examination*

Analysis: Law enforcement conduct detailed and specific analyses of the identified social problems. They may use independent data sources to confirm or invalidate the identified social problem identified, but should, however, pinpoint situational attributes that are geographic and time specific (that is, know the details of the problem).

- *The U.S. Department of Justice (1998) and the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing² have noted several reasons as to why this step is often skipped by law enforcement agencies:*
- *The nature of the problem sometimes falsely appears obvious at first glance,*
- *There may be some tremendous internal and external pressure to solve the problem immediately.*

¹ Source: Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, accessed January 2012; available at: www.popcenter.org/about-SARA.htm

² Source: Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, accessed February 2012; available at: www.popcenter.org/learning/model_curriculum/files/Model_Academic_Curriculum-Module_4.ppt

- *The pressure of responding to calls does not seem to allow for time for detailed inquiries into the nature of the problem,*
- *Analysis does not seem like “real” police work, or*
- *Supervisors may not value analytical work that takes time but does not produce arrests, citations or other traditional measures of police work.*
- *In many communities a strong commitment to the old ways of handling problems prevents looking at the problem in different ways.*

Response: Refers to the prevention or intervention program that targets the identified social problem. The response must be specific, customized, and personalized to the problem and the community. That is, generic responses should be avoided. As such, the response phase is built on the findings from previous stages. The importance of targeted responses is essential; responses need to be directly linked to the results of the analysis.



Moreover, the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing cautions by stating that “*quick fixes are rarely effective in the long-term and that problems will likely persist if solutions are not tailored to the specific cause of the problem.*”³

Assessment: Refers to the evaluation of the intervention and its results; did the intervention reduce the identified social problem? That is, were the measurable outcomes those that were intended? If not, then the process starts over again.

A dynamic process

As such, the SARA method is not a linear process with a clearly defined start and ending. Clarke and Eck (2005) argue that **problem solving social conditions can be complex and a difficult task. Indeed, problem-solving stages do not always flow naturally from one stage to another, from scanning to analysis, to the implantation stage and the assessment.** Rather, the process is often dynamic, where an unfolding analysis may lead to a revised problem statement, or render questions about a proper response. This process is illustrated in the figure below.

Clarke and Eck (2005) wrote that:

For example, one might jump from scanning to the implementation of a short-term emergency response to stabilize the problem while further analysis is undertaken. An assessment of the short-term response could add to the analysis and contribute to the formulation of a new response, which is then assessed. This might lead back to scanning as new information forces a revision of the problem definition or the discovery of new problems. The important point is that analysis and evaluation are meaningfully incorporated into the sequence of events and one does not simply jump from scanning to response and declare victory.⁴

³ Source: Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, accessed January 2012; available at: www.popcenter.org/about-SARA.htm

⁴ Source: On-line document retrieved from the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing. Accessed January 2012; available at: www.popcenter.org/learning/60steps/index.cfm?stepNum=7





Source: Clarke and Eck, 2005

COMPSTAT

The notion of “crime mapping” has been building for some time in criminology in general and in policing in particular. From the early work of Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay in Chicago and by way of the mapping influences in Shaw’s work *“The Jack-Roller”* to the pioneering use of computerized mapping tools in the analysis of crime. According to the Police Foundation (2004), the use of such tools is perhaps the most innovative and popular trend in American policing. Conceivably, this trend was solidified with the emergence and introduction of COMPSTAT – or computerized statistics. The underlying concept of COMPSTAT is fairly basic. As one college professor said, *“...if we want to know what we are talking about with some precision, we have to know what we are talking about and where it is”* (McDonald, 2004).

In the 1980’s and 1990’s, some criminologists said that police could not impact crime. Researchers such as Hirschi, Bouza, and Gottfredson, for example, have adopted this position based on the findings from the Kansas City experiment and on the grounds that the police cannot control the causes of crime (e.g., broken families, poverty, etc.). Others, such as Kelling and Cole disagree with that statement and would argue that the police need to recognize the processes, signs, and symbols that

indicate decay and intervene before crime is a problem (e.g., broken windows). In contrast, Sherman and others recommend hot spots and proactive policing, where the police map trends and address them with a sudden and surprise presence, and thus recommending a geographic-typological-temporal precision in policing.

The technical improvements necessary for COMPSTAT coincided with a paradigm shift in American policing from that of a “professional focus” to one that is “community oriented”. The emergence of community-oriented policing (COP) created an interesting backdrop for the development of crime mapping. Three dimensions make COMPSTAT fully compatible with COP: the geographical dimension (i.e., where things are happening), the typology dimension (i.e., what types of things

are happening), and the temporal dimension (i.e., when are things happening). These three dimensions contribute and facilitate the precise deployment of police personnel. Former police chief Bratton, for example, agrees with this and argued that how police resources are used is absolutely critical in terms of effective targeting of street gangs (Home Office, 2011; personal communication with Bratton). In support, Bratton stated that he had some 38,000 police officers at his disposal in New York and “only” 9,000 police officers during his time in Los Angeles – a city regarded by

some as the epicenter of gang activity in the USA. Bratton said that his challenge in L.A. was how to deploy and use his resources and that a huge part of this resulted in the “creative cooperation” with external partners – that is, using available resources in the community and avoiding reinvesting tax dollars by sharing “best-practices.”

In their evaluation of the implementation of COMPSTAT in the Lowell Police Department (Massachusetts) Willis and colleagues (2004) identified seven core components of COMPSTAT, all equally important. The components are briefly described below.

- 1. Mission clarification:** every police department needs a clear mission statement.
- 2. Internal accountability:** achieved through regular meetings where results are discussed and reported to the police administration (deputy chief or chief).
- 3. Geographic organization of operational command:** a police captain can assign patrol officers as he/she see fit, according to the available intelligence (i.e., foot, motorcycle, motor, etc.). That means that police captains have full discretion in the deployment of resources.
- 4. Organizational flexibility:** within each sector, situations need to be solved with flexibility (i.e., having the organizational capacity to move and re-deploy

“...his challenge in L.A. was how to deploy and use his resources and that a huge part of this resulted in the “creative cooperation” with external partners...”

resources, etc.). In Lowell Willis and colleagues found that flexibility and the ability to assist between sectors had a low rating – that is, the police were not helping each other.

- 5. Data driven identification of problems and assignment of a department's problem solving efforts:** the police need to be gathering data for their own purposes (not just to report statistics to the FBI). Data should then be analyzed and distributed on a geographical, typological, and temporal dimension.
- 6. Innovative, problem solving tactics:** the police need to be creative. That includes fostering an environment where police officers are willing and able to think outside of the proverbial box.
- 7. External information exchange:** information should be shared with the public so the public knows what is going on in their sector and/or precinct. (Implementing a media strategy).

What Willis and his colleagues (2004) noted in their evaluation of Lowell Police Department was that albeit COMPSTAT was supposed to *encourage* innovation and flexibility, the opposite happened. Police captains (who were responsible for their



“ For example, Mayor Giuliani described COMPSTAT as one of the pillars in the NYPD model...”

sector) realized that COMPSTAT was equated to data-driven accountability. This accountability sabotaged innovation in the meetings and captains would prepare for two days and then *defend* themselves during the meetings. Accountability also sabotaged flexibility as captains promoted their own sectors, not the department or the city, which resulted in turf balance. That is, the reallocation of resources within (among shifts, type of patrol, etc.) and between sectors (e.g., the sharing of officers, etc.) was hampered.

COMPSTAT is about using data to allocate resources to where they are needed the most, citywide. One problem, as noted in the Lowell evaluation, was that captains had accountability for their own sectors but no mandate or access to resources; most of the resources (such as detectives) were housed at headquarters. That is, Lowell Police Department was highly *centralized* in its organization, which went against the COP notion of a *decentralized* command. When captains asked for more officers in order to become more flexible, they were told to work with what they had. This discouraged police captains to share resources with other sectors, and to just look after their own house. Naturally, this goes against the concept of COMPSTAT and the pooling of resources.

A challenge for police departments implementing COMPSTAT (or similar programs) is therefore to “...*balance the requirement of holding district commanders accountable for specific territories against a capacity to shift resources across precincts—away from where they are needed to where they are needed most*” (Willis et al., 2004, p. 55). This requires a great deal of cooperation (foster non-competitiveness among mid-managers). By way of their findings, Willis et al. hint that this is a great challenge for police departments using COMPSTAT. In essence, it becomes a paradox on resource flexibility: *the fewer the resources the police department has the more the police department needs flexibility of existing resources.*

When Mayor Giuliani (New York City) gave his farewell address some ten years ago, much was about the successful reductions in crime. For example, Mayor Giuliani described COMPSTAT as one of the pillars in the NYPD model and further praised COMPSTAT as a “rational, reasonable, strategic response to crime” (The New York Times, December 27, 2001). But the COMPSTAT evaluation in the Lowell Police Department indicates that this praise was premature and that the Lowell data “call for a more textured assessment” (Willis et al., 2004, p.58).

However, Willis and colleagues also noted that the implementation and appli-

cation of COMPSTAT in Lowell resulted in impressive changes at the police department. More importantly, these changes were not just rhetoric; COMPSTAT in Lowell resulted in some positive changes. For example, Willis et al. (2004) noted that crime analysis has grown to take a central part in policing operations, after overcoming many technical obstacles in setting up and operating COMPSTAT. Moreover, decision-makers at the Lowell Police Department are now better informed and more familiar with the use of data and what the data reveal about crime and criminals in the city. In addition, Willis and colleagues stated that sector captains feel more accountable for identifying and responding to crime problems and that departmental members feel that they have a stronger sense of the departments' mission and the chief's vision.

Given that police departments are notoriously resistant to change and resisting when the change occurs, then the achievements of the Lowell Police Department are especially noteworthy.⁵

Utility for PANTHER

Borrowing from the work of Willis and colleagues (2004) in their evaluation of COMPSTAT in Lowell Police Department, we have taken three of the seven essential components as elements in PANTHER: organizational flexibility, data driven decision-making and innovative problem solving. As such, we do not fully put dots on a map, but we like the concept of "mapping crime" and believe that it make up an integral part of the analysis component in PANTHER.

Enterprise Theory of Investigation (ETI) – Applying it to street gangs

PANTHER is influenced by Enterprise Theory of Investigation (ETI), a unique and highly successful model of investigation against major criminal organizations primarily utilized by the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The idea behind ETI is to encourage proactive and preemptive "attacks" on the structure of criminal organizations, rather than conducting reactive investigations and viewing criminal acts as isolated events (McFeely, 2001). As such, the ETI examines individuals from the viewpoint that they commit crimes in furtherance of the criminal enterprise itself. That is, criminals commit crimes solely to benefit their organization (McFeely, 2001). However, McFeely (2001) point out that this method is only

⁵ However, not all changes are resisted; police rarely resists changes aligned with the "crime-fighting" mentality. For example, the implementation of various "task forces" and SWAT-teams are rarely contested by the police (McDonald, 2004).

effective when the organization engages in a variety of offenses. Criminals that, for example, engage in “cafeteria-style” offending⁶ (Klein, 1995) represent the perfect target for the ETI-method, as they typically have extensive supporting networks (McFeely, 2001). As such, we believe that this method holds promise even for versatile street gangs since our own research seem to suggest that (at least in one sample of seven street gangs in Sweden) street gangs in Sweden are versatile in their offending (Rostami & Leinfelt, 2011).

Determining the scope a problem is key in the Problem-Oriented Policing paradigm (Goldstein, 1990) and by way of the SARA method (e.g., Eck & Spelman, 1987) and an important component in ETI. As such, **identifying the criminal enterprise should be the first step in devising a viable response.**

Moreover, research has shown that a shared understanding of the local problem, including local factors that cause gang problems, is a key principle in addressing gang activity (e.g., McCluskey & Carnochan, 2011). For our purposes, then, identifying whether there is a gang problem should be the first natural step in a comprehensive, enduring gang model. Just as the ETI-method hinges on a successful identification of criminal enterprises,



PANTHER hinges on the successful identification of a particular gang problem at the local level. If no gang exists, then we don’t need to devise a response and waste precious departmental resources. Likewise, if a gang does exist, we need to identify the gang and their activities in order to counter with the most effective response possible, so that we can “do more with less”. Similarly, once the ETI investigators have identified a particular enterprise, they start searching for illicit activities to find a suitable “point of attack” (McFeely, 2001).

Consequently, ETI builds on identifying weaknesses within a criminal enterprise.

⁶ Refers to the commission of a variety of criminal acts, including status offenses (Klein & Maxson, 2006).

This is accomplished by conducting thorough and in-depth *analysis* of the enterprise's activities (McFeely, 2001). In PANTHER, we have adopted a similar response by way of our analysis *component* and the use of Social Network Analysis (SNA). In addition, we also gather comprehensive intelligence about street gangs and gang members through our intelligence registries and by way of annexing *local* and *regional* intelligence groups (LUC and RUC, respectively) to PANTHER.

LUC and RUC

LUC (local) and RUC (regional) is, conceptually, a network of members from various governmental agencies, all cooperating and sharing information. We use both levels of analysis in order to provide a holistic intelligence picture, so that we can discern patterns. Member agencies in LUC and RUC include, but are not limited to, the Tax Agency, the Enforcement Agency, Social Services, the Social Insurance Agency, and the Customs Enforcement Agency (this will be described more fully below in subsequent sections). **Indeed, research has shown that multi-agency collaboration is key for a successful gang intervention and prevention program** (McCluskey & Carnochan, 2011; Home Office, 2011). Likewise, McFeely (2001) suggested that the use of a “joint task force” is a necessary component for a successful implementation of ETI.



Investigative vigor: go for the money

In the United States, “going for the money” have become the norm in larger investigations, especially in organized crime investigations (McFeely, 2001). Attacking assets and removing the fruit of criminality certainly seems to be effective. Within the European Union (EU), international cooperation has improved greatly by the establishment of Asset Recovery Offices (ARO) in member States. This cooperation increases the flow of information and intelligence. Sweden’s ARO consists of the Proceeds of Crime Unit (housed at the Swedish Economic Crime Authority) and the **Swedish Financial Police, FIPO** (housed at the National Bureau of Investigation). Accordingly, “*AROs are national units that exchange information to make it more difficult for the proceeds of crime to be handled, laundered and invested in the EU*” (Swedish Economic Crime Authority, 2011)⁷.

The strategic use of asset forfeiture and money laundering statutes is an effective

⁷ See website for full reference, retrieved November 2011, available at: www.ekobrottsmyndigheten.se/en/our-work/the-proceeds-of-crime-unit--aro/

tool that American law enforcement agencies can employ in more serious criminal investigations, often involving the sale of narcotics (McFeely, 2001). But it is also effective in other places as well. In Ireland, for example, the Criminal Asset Bureau (CAB) has been seizing criminal assets (e.g., vehicles, houses, boats, etc.) for a value of 120 million Euros between 1996 and 2008 (Wierup, 2008).

“ We have adopted an offensive approach to criminal assets in our reactive gang investigations...”

Some 65 police officers, revenue agents and social workers work in collaboration at the CAB office in Dublin to make life difficult for organized crime. Their approach is offensive, freezing assets and stopping social benefit payments to suspected criminals and their families. According to some figures, this approach saves the Irish government approximately 500,000 Euros per year (Wierup, 2008). The “go for the money” approach not only removes the illegal proceeds, but also seriously disrupts the illegal economic


system and hinders its primary goal – to make profit from crime (McFeely, 2001).

Since 2008, Swedish law enforcement agencies can seize assets derived from criminal proceeds under certain circumstances, primarily based on the severity of the crime but also on the ability to yield criminal proceeds. We have adopted an offensive approach to criminal assets in our reactive gang investigations, similar to the one used by the CAB. But we also use the method proactively, in a manner similar to the ETI concept; that is, searching for financial weaknesses within targeted gangs or networks. As such, the “go for the money” concept has become a permanent fixture in the PANTHER model under the investigation component, with the rationale that it disrupts the criminal market and reduces the otherwise strong incentive to commit crime. Because our analysis of the Swedish gang structures (e.g., Rostami & Leinfelt, 2011) yielded evidence that street gangs engage in cash-generating crimes in order to gain materialistic rewards – perhaps not to the extent of organized crime groups who have aspirations of luxury vehicles, boats, and posh vacation homes, but surely to the extent of procuring certain street status-items, such as gold chains, watches, clothing, etc. – we purpose that it is an effective, holistic tool in the enforcement component of the gang model.

The Swedish National Audit Office (Riksrevisionen) recently suggested in their audit report on the effectiveness of government agencies to seize proceeds from crime, that collaboration with other law enforcement agencies, financial institutes and community stakeholders is a key determinant for success (RiR, 2010:26).

PART II

THE PANTHER MODEL





1 The History of Swedish Gangs¹

By: Amir Rostami and Fredrik Leinfelt

In this chapter, we will provide a contextual backdrop of the gang development in Sweden and the establishment of criminal networks, outlaw motorcycle gangs and ultimately, street gangs. We will also highlight some of the Swedish research on this topic and thus provide a perspective and framework for the Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project.

¹ A version of this chapter was previously published in Esbensen & Maxson (Eds.) (2012). *Youth Gangs in International Perspective: Results from the Eurogang Research*.

Early work on criminal networks and gangs in Sweden

Unfortunately, little academic attention has been paid to Swedish gangs. In fact, leading Swedish criminologists have consistently argued that Sweden does not have the long-lasting gangs found in the U.S. (Sarnecki & Pettersson, 2001, 266). Instead, Swedish researchers have explained this type of criminality with juvenile networks. However, we believe this is an oversimplification of the phenomena. Granted, we do not have the “entrenched” multi-generational gangs that you find in metropolitan U.S. cities. Not yet, anyways. But we do have numerous emerging street gangs, similar in their development to their American counterparts. We find street gangs in our bigger cities, such as Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö, but also in smaller rural areas. **In 2009 the Swedish Security Police estimated that there are some 4,000 active gang members in Sweden** (Säkerhetspolisen, 2009). Indeed, in our work with the Stockholm County Police, we have encountered predominantly males of all ages who are caught up in a criminal lifestyle and involved with various street gangs.

Criminal networks in Sweden


In Sweden most research on the subject has been limited to *criminal networks* and juvenile offending (e.g., Sarnecki, 1990, 2001; Pettersson, 2002). Sarnecki (1990; 2001) and Pettersson (2002), for example, maintained that Stockholm, the Swedish capital, has youth groups but not gangs. However, as Klein (1995) points out in his book *The American Street Gang*, **juvenile gang offending should not be equated or confused with street gang criminality**, since research has shown that not all street gang members are juvenile. Consequently, Klein (1995) argued that all street gang members couldn't be considered juveniles in a strict definitional sense; especially since the average gang member is around 20 years of age (Klein, 1995, p 29). We would agree with this statement as our own research has shown that the average Swedish gang member is older than the average American gang member, but similar in age when compared with other European studies (Rostami et. al., 2012). Although interesting, the gang definitional debate will not be discussed in this chapter, as it comprises a separate chapter in this book. In addition, the definitional debate has been well documented elsewhere (see for example, Horowitz, 1991; Decker & Van Winkel, 1996; Klein, 1995; Klein & Maxson, 2006). Somewhere around the end of the 1990s, criminal networks² started to become a sig-

² These criminal networks included both juvenile and adult offenders, although most criminal networks were a combination of both, in addition to already established, hardened criminals.

nificant problem in Sweden, particularly in the southern districts of Stockholm. Police officials and politicians watched as criminal networks grew in size and criminality, ranging from petty crimes to serious violent crimes. The criminal activities of these networks soon increased exponentially, almost to a point where they became a direct danger to citizens and law enforcement personnel. In fact, the situation was so serious that the National Police Board intervened, stating that the problem was of “national interest” and urged an immediate response by the regional police (BIS, 1999). **Consequently, in 1999, the Stockholm County Police, Södertörn District, responded to the directives from the National Police Board, and formed a Special Gang Commission called *Fittjakommissionen*.** The ambition of this “gang commission³” was to tackle the growing gang problem in the southern parts of Stockholm, especially in the borough of North Botkyrka. For the Swedish Police, the method of implementing a special unit with essentially free operational reins was unconventional and had never been done before.

Since Sweden did not yet have street gangs comparable to those found in the United States, *Fittjakommissionen* worked primarily against criminal networks. These networks consisted of both juvenile offenders and serious organized crime factions⁴. As such, its operational spectrum ranged from targeting minor offending (e.g., muggings, shoplifting, traffic offenses, possession of narcotics, simple assault, theft, etc.) to more serious and violent crimes (e.g., aggravated assault, kidnapping, extortion, tampering with witnesses, etc.). Some of the early problems included the selection of strategic individuals within the different criminal networks, especially since *Fittjakommissionen* did not utilize criminal

intelligence. This was a problem because strategic individuals were seemingly selected at random, or by “cop intuition” instead of by methodological selection. **Subsequently, problems surrounding how to approach and incapacitate selected target individuals also became an issue since the police executed it without a methodological approach,**



3 The term “gang” has a different meaning in the Swedish language than in English. This causes some definitional problems already described elsewhere (e.g., Horowitz, 1991; Decker & Van Winkel, 1996; Klein, 1995; Klein & Maxson, 2006; Sarnecki, 2003). Up until today, all group-related crime in Sweden has often been characterized and/or described as “gang related”.

4 The initial purpose of *Fittjakommissionen* was to regain control of the problem areas. As such, police operations were initially neither systematic nor planned, and it certainly did not rely on intelligence information. The strategy was mere suppression – that is, seizing as much contraband as possible and incarcerating as many “gang members” as possible.

seemingly shooting from the hip. Although facing some challenging issues at first, *Fittjakommissionen* was eventually successful at curbing the growing problem, bringing back law and order to the southern boroughs of Stockholm.

The success of *Fittjakommissionen* (measured primarily by the volume of seized weapons and narcotics and the incapacitation of key-figures) resulted in a permanent organizational unit within the Stockholm County Police. In addition, its operational boundaries were expanded to include the surrounding boroughs. Methods were modified to include more intelligence work, which resulted in planned stops and searches with a high rate of suppression against targeted individuals. Even so, the selection process of targeted individuals was not methodical or systematic in nature. Instead, the selection process was based on police knowledge about and experience with individuals, in addition to available intelligence. The idea of intelligence-based policing, all the way down to the operational sub-station level was, at this point, a fairly new concept within the Swedish Police.

The establishment of modern criminal gangs in Sweden

Criminal gangs are a relatively new phenomenon in Sweden. Modern Swedish criminal gangs can be traced back to the early 1990s, when outlaw motorcycle gangs tried to establish themselves in Sweden⁵. During the years that followed, the outlaw motorcycle gangs, particularly the Bandidos MC and Hells Angels, rapidly increased their activity in Sweden and formed chapters around the country. This development was similar to that seen in Denmark some years earlier, and it's not unusual that Sweden lags a couple of years behind Denmark in terms of gang development. Typically, gangs tend to spread to Sweden through Denmark. However, the response to this development by the Swedish law enforcement community was, unfortunately, not very rapid.

As such, the Bandidos MC and Hells Angels have dominated the Swedish gang landscape for over 10 years, and have become a “role model” for other criminal networks trying to form an organizational platform. In many respects, these outlaw motorcycle gangs have been the backbone of what we today would consider organized crime in Sweden. Many groups have tried to “copy cat” their structure. For example, it was popular and fashionable among criminal networks to have a “business interaction” with the

“ Modern Swedish criminal gangs can be traced back to the early 1990s, when outlaw motorcycle gangs tried to establish themselves in Sweden.”

⁵ For example, the first Hells Angels chapter in Sweden became official in 1993 in the city of Malmö (the third largest city in Sweden) in the southern part of Sweden.

motorcycle gangs as it produced “status” and a sense of criminal legitimacy. Consequently, doing business with Hells Angels or Bandidos MC was something that many criminal networks wanted. Therefore, criminal networks actively sought to establish relationships with the outlaw motorcycle gangs. In light of the establishment of the outlaw motorcycle gangs, the so-called “Yugoslavian mafia” lost some of its status in Swedish organized crime. Several key figures within the “Yugoslavian mafia” were assassinated due to internal conflicts, which further weakened their prominence in Swedish organized crime in favor of the outlaw motorcycle gangs. This internal conflict in the “Yugoslavian mafia” gave the outlaw motorcycle gangs increased room to maneuver, which facilitated further development. At the same time, media attention surrounding the conflict between the outlaw motorcycle gangs and established criminal networks increased. In this media coverage, the criminal lifestyle was – in some cases – romanticized, which added further interest about the phenomena.

Recent developments – The Swedish street gang

We noticed a shift, away from the established outlaw motorcycle gangs and criminal networks towards a totally different kind of street gang, somewhere during the early 2000s. These new “street gangs” attempted (with varying degrees of success) to model themselves after Hells Angels and Bandidos MC, especially in terms of organizational structure, attributes, and even argot. However, these street gangs lacked organizational skill and were therefore scattered, unstructured and very dependent on strong leadership. As such, these street gangs had more in common with



We noticed a shift, away from the established outlaw motorcycle gangs and criminal networks towards a totally different kind of street gang, somewhere during the early 2000s.”

the loosely organized American street gang than any other types of criminal groups / networks in Sweden. We would argue that these street gangs fit nicely with Maxson and Klein’s (2006) typology of the “compressed” and “neo-traditional” gangs⁶ (Rostami & Leinfelt, unpublished report).

We also noticed that the street gang members openly promoted and described themselves as a “criminal gang” with criminal values. They also rejected “mainstream living” and society as a whole, and used various symbols, signs, tattoos and argot to promote their lifestyle. This development was new in Sweden. Although the outlaw motorcycle gangs by way of their 1% lifestyle⁷

6 In a forthcoming article, publishing date unknown, we will delineate this matter further, adding support for the notion that the Maxson and Klein (2006) typology can be applied even to Swedish street gangs.

7 The 1% lifestyle, simply stated, represents the outlaw lifestyle, often signified by a diamond patch with a “1%” worn on the left side of the club vest; it denotes the desire for members of outlaw motorcycle clubs to live outside of the law and mainstream society.

rejected mainstream living, the outlaw motorcycle gangs did not openly declare and promote themselves as being “criminal” (Wierup & Larsson, 2007). This was a significant difference between the two.

We have seen, through our criminal investigations and through other sources that street gangs developed their own set of rules (rules were often written down, much like a charter) on how gang members should act – both within the gang and when interacting with outsiders. Rules were established on how the gang should be organized and how leadership and power was distributed within the ranks. There was also a list of agreed-upon consequences if gang members did not follow the rules (usually a large monetary fine, and/or a serious beating or expulsion). Rules also specified consequences for leaving the street gang and for being expelled or kicked out. Often these consequences were monetary – where the member had to buy their way out of the street gang; sometimes these sums exceeded 50.000 Swedish crowns (approximately 7.000 U.S. dollars or 5.000 Euros). However, even with an aspiration of living a “Tony Montana” (the main character from the 1983 movie, *Scarface*) lifestyle, there was always a shortage of cash, and street gang members frequently used drugs, adding further credence to the idea that street gangs are far from sophisticated.



We also noticed that involvement in illegal activity (including violent crimes) was a central part of the group identity within these street gangs. Klein and Maxson (2006) point out that the most enduring finding in gang research is that youth who join street gangs commit more crime than those who do not join street gangs (p. 72). This finding seems to hold true even in Sweden. For example, we noticed that these street gangs used criminality and turned it into a business trademark, or as branding. The street gang relied on the built-up trademark (reputation) in their criminal activities – as such, the gang trademark became a sort of “violence capital” used as an intimidation technique. That is, once people knew about the gang (and how violent they were) no one would dare to say “no.”

Recruitment

In his book *Islands in the Street: Gangs and American Urban Society*, Martín Sánchez Jankowski (1991) describes his experiences as to why young males join gangs. Sánchez Jankowski dismisses several commonly held notions as to why young males join, and argues that the answer to the question is a “...complex inter-

play between individual's decision concerning what is best for him and the organization's decision as to what is best for it" (Sánchez Jankowski, 1991 p. 62). Sánchez Jankowski (1991) also argued that gangs generally recruit their new members by way of "word of mouth", persuasion, and coercion. In Sweden, we see a similar type of recruitment pattern, although we have not seen any evidence of males being physically coerced to join.

“...street gangs function somewhat like a franchise organization, similar to McDonald's or Starbucks.”

On the average, the Swedish street gang has a rapid and more flexible recruitment process than for example, the outlaw motorcycle gangs. Consequently, it is relatively “easy” to become a member of Swedish street gangs. On the flip side, there is also a great turnover rate of gang members (i.e., gang members come and go in great numbers). This is consistent with a considerable body of American research that has found that the majority of gang-involved youth report being gang members for less than one year. One of the consequences of this “rapid recruiting” and fluid membership structure is that it makes it more difficult for law enforcement to target individual members and control the gangs. As such, we need to take this into consideration when developing an enforcement response model (more on this later). When we interviewed Swedish street gang members, they indicated that street gangs function somewhat like a franchise organization, similar to McDonald's or Starbucks. Gang members told us that they choose to join a particular street gang only to use its “gang trademark” in their own criminal activity. This is compatible with the notion of “violence capital” and the offending patterns evident in much gang research (Maxson and Klein 2006).

It is, based on our observations in working with street gangs, that there is a widespread perception among gang members that the gang trademark will boost their criminal enterprise and/or career. Gang members are allowed to use the gang trademark in exchange for a share/percentage of their revenue. Another way to look at it this is as a classical pyramid scheme. The street gang is interested in adding more cities and members only because this will maximize the profit at the top tier of the gang. All income flows upward in the organization, with everyone taking his share. However, the gang members who are doing all the hard work (and taking all the risk) are usually left with the least amount of money – they have to pay high fees for using the gang trademark. Gang members who have left street gangs and changed their lifestyles tell us miserable stories about how they were recruited and how they were exploited. For example, one gang member (who obtained a high ranking position in a large street gang) said:

“...the errand boys all aspire to become members, they do whatever it takes to get the patch, but they never will. They do not fit the profile of full members, they are just bitches. And the thing is, they did all this for free. We never paid them anything. They were allowed to come to parties, hang out with the girls, and ride in our cars. Nothing more. But they wanted the patch. That was the only thing they wanted. We told them they could, but we knew they would never get it. They got fucked.”

The recruitment process varies by how established the street gang is. A new or recently established gang has a more flexible recruitment process (less stringent) than one that has existed for quite some time. When street gangs have established themselves in a different city or area and are attempting to expand to new territories, another recruitment trend is evident. Instead of recruiting individuals, these street gangs tend to “recruit” already established gangs and/or criminal networks. This practice is similar to expanding companies buying out already established businesses in a particular field or area, instead of attempting to set up their own shop. The notion of organizational transformation by consolidation and splintering is not new. Thrasher (1963; 1927) described how gangs consolidate through mergers and acquisition of smaller gangs. This procedure will allow street gangs to withstand external threats in areas they do not control or dominate. This was the first time we’ve seen this type of gang consolidation in Sweden.

Occasionally, street gangs adopt a more aggressive recruitment strategy in order to quickly drive away any perceived opposition, or to avoid a struggle with an established street gang or criminal network. In these situations, street gangs allow almost anyone to join; it is all about quantity, not quality. This is also something we have seen recently in Sweden. One example illustrates the point further. 2009 – 2010 ago, ranking members of the then-new and emerging street gang “Black Cobra” visited a minority area of southern Stockholm (called Botkyrka). They walked around in plain sight; visiting public places such as squares, parks, and shopping malls, and openly talked to male teens about joining Black Cobra. The ranking gang members explained all the perks and advantages of becoming a member, much like a retailer would talk about a particular product to a prospective customer. However, this particular approach was not very successful. It drew so much unwanted attention from the general public, so the police were called every time these gang members showed up. As such, Black Cobra recruitment strategies had to be revised to be less visible to



the public. Other gang members we have talked to say they never recruited openly. They only allowed new members through personal reference; you would need to know a gang member to get in.

Based on our experiences, the nature and extent of recruitment efforts appear to be decided by the positioning of the gang itself and by the stage of gang development. It should be noted that we have seen some variation in this. However, not every street gang is operated as a corporation according to the franchise idea, in fact, far from it. Swedish street gangs, in our experience, are not that highly organized and do not have the organizational skill set to achieve this. However, we would posit based on our own experiences from working with street gangs that these types of “street gangs” behave more as a criminal network, than as a street gang. For example, these networks consist of individuals who are tied together by criminality (for example, robbery networks, “smash and grab” networks, etc.) rather than sharing a name or an emblem. These networks do exhibit more organizational skills than street gangs, which is an important distinction.

The move towards a specialized gang unit – SGI

For the past ten years the Stockholm County Police has been working to refine its skills and methods to control and combat criminal street gangs and networks. The Fittjakommissionen is no longer an active unit, as it has been transformed into a larger and organizationally permanent unit called SGI (Section against Gang Crime). For the first five years of operation, until roughly 2005, no attention was given to Klein’s notion and definition of “street gangs”; all operational and investigative focus was placed on criminal networks and motorcycle gangs (much like Fittjakommissionen). SGI initially tried various suppression methods and techniques, often modeled after American anti-gang programs and police gang suppression units, to target gangs and criminal networks. Some were more effective than others. This created the need for self-evaluation. In a time of limited police resources, administrators attempted to ascertain what worked and what did not work.


SGI was tasked with developing and structuring an operational criminal intelligence unit from the backdrop of what was currently known about street gangs (note, not criminal networks). Consequently, SGI started to collect information from various sources. For example, SGI began to analyze the growth and maturity of different street gangs in an attempt to produce better street gang intelligence. SGI administrators wanted to know why street gangs grow and how they recruit. They quickly realized that they needed more in-depth knowledge about street gangs to achieve their objectives. Information was also needed in order to make informed operational

decisions and to guide policy development within the department. SGI discovered a fundamental shift in the structure of Swedish street gangs. This understanding laid the first foundation for what would later, in 2009, become the Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project (SGIP) – an attempt of looking at existing gang research, involving academia in field operations, and developing new strategies.


Brief historical review: 2005 – present

The shift to a new phase of street gang development in Sweden included both the expansion of existing, albeit to some extent dormant, street gangs and the emergence of brand new street gangs. What was especially disquieting was the attempt of Swedish street gangs to “take control” of major city suburbs throughout Sweden – much like the criminal networks did in the late 1990s. Previous street gangs had been more geographically confined; now we noticed that they were mobile and expanding according to the franchise model. This pattern was not unique to Sweden. Some other Scandinavian countries faced many of the same problems and developments. The criminal street gang Black Cobra, for example, emerged out of Denmark and quickly spread into Sweden and settled in several Swedish cities. In Norway, the “Organized Gang Unit I” was established due to a growing gang problem in the capital city of Oslo. Other European countries experienced similar developments, such as the violent youth gangs in Great Britain and the creation of operation TRIDENT by the Metropolitan Police Service.

SGI administrators realized that it was time act on this development and to closely monitor and evaluate methods and techniques, as well as to increase collaboration with colleagues in other countries⁸. A collective and holistic approach to the growing situation was necessary. This included granting exclusive access to researchers for unbiased evaluations, and an increased collaboration with other Swedish governmental authorities. From this recognition, SGI began to develop the idea that would become the Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project (SGIP). SGIP provides a unique and important opportunity to examine street gang development in Sweden in depth, while at the same time increase the understanding of different aspects of street gangs and gang crime. Ultimately, we hope that SGIP can turn into an effective strategy of street gang prevention and control.



⁸ SGIP is project partners with the Metropolitan Police Service in London, the Danish National Police and the Oslo Police District in Norway.



Bridging Science and Pragmatism:

2 The Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project (SGIP)

By: Amir Rostami and Fredrik Leinfelt

The Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project started in September 2009 and is funded through August 2012. One of the focal objectives of SGIP is to prevent and deter youth from beginning criminal careers in street gangs or other criminal networks. The purpose is also to develop, in close cooperation with Social Services and other local and regional agencies, short and long term methods against street gangs and organized criminal networks.

Overview

SGIPs methods will be based on empirical findings and “best practices” strategies. This will be accomplished by adopting a *holistic* perspective, mixing suppressive methods with intervention and prevention efforts. The suppressive methods will utilize intelligence-led policing strategies in conjunction with the “hot persons” notion in established street gangs and/or organized criminal networks, focusing on seizing contraband, incarceration, and asset forfeiture.

In addition, intelligence information will be used to identify potential “targets” for intervention efforts, such as desistance actions. Moreover, the intervention efforts will focus on facilitating ways for those who openly would like to leave their criminal lifestyle. The focal point of the preventive methods will be placed on impeding the recruiting efforts of street gangs and/or criminal networks, and working closely with “social intervention groups” in area schools and communities. As such, an important goal is to develop methods, routines and suggestions to help motivate and inspire gang members to change their lifestyle.

Demographics and the SGI organization

The gang unit is housed in the southern parts of Stockholm, in the 7th Police District (Södertörn), and is organizationally part of the Stockholm County Police. The Stockholm County Police consist of eight different police districts, all geographically and demographically different (see map).



Illustration:

The Eight Police Districts in Stockholm County

The 7th Police District (Södertörn) consists of four municipalities: Botkyrka, Huddinge, Haninge, and Nynäshamn. Demographical data from December 2010 shows that 283,146 people reside within the District (SCB, 2011). Two of the municipalities are ranked in the top 10 in terms of residential diversity in Sweden. For example, Botkyrka municipality has the highest percentage of non-Swedish born residents in Sweden (53,3%) and Huddinge municipality is ranked seventh in Sweden with 34,3 percent non-Swedish born residents (SCB, 2011). Consequently, the 7th Police District is a very diverse district. The annual police budget is approximately 430 million SEK (Akbari, 2011).

There are approximately 650 police officers and 100 civilian staff working in the 7th Police District (Akbari, 2011). Roughly 30 police officers are assigned to the gang unit (SGI). Officers are both male and female (roughly 25% female) and officers range in age, work experience, and professional rank. There is one civilian secretary assigned to the gang unit. Most officers have at least a few years experience as uniformed patrol officers before being assigned to the gang unit.

SGI consists of two tactical teams (tactical officers) and one investigative team (detectives). Also, there are three police officers assigned to intelligence and analysis. A senior officer, a police lieutenant, commands the gang unit and has operational responsibility. A tactical sergeant commands each of the tactical teams, and a detective sergeant supervises the investigative team. The intelligence and analysis unit, as well as the civilian secretary, is structurally organized as a support function, directly under the unit lieutenant. Two police officers (from the intelligence and analysis team) are assigned to conduct research and development, and to present findings and results from the project at conferences and symposiums. For example, several presentations about the project were presented at the 2011 Stockholm Criminology Symposium.




Illustration: Gang Unit (SGI) Organizational Chart

The fundamental building blocks of SGIP

In order to meet the overarching goals, the project is divided into three main blocks, as shown below: 1) Research and Science, 2) Policing, and 3) Collaboration. Each will be discussed in detail.




Illustration: The logic model of the three fundamental building blocks of SGIP.

Research and Science

The ambition with the research and science area is twofold: first, to implement scientific methods and standards into our daily work, and second, to conduct a program/process evaluation. The goal is to make police work more evidence based and consistent with best practices. An objective third party, the Linnaeus University in Växjö, Sweden, is conducting the program/process evaluation. The purpose of contracting a university to conduct the evaluation work (as opposed to an in-house program/process evaluation) is to achieve credibility and to guarantee overall project objectivity.

SGIP is one of few police-based projects in Sweden to utilize an external evaluation. During the evaluation phase, researchers will be involved with police personnel directly on site. At this time, researchers have proposed and scheduled approximately 90 days, full time, for the evaluation. For example, the evaluation team has developed a research plan where they will meet with the project coordination group and conduct participant observation studies, in addition to carrying out individual case studies and interviews with SGI staff and project members. In addition, the research team monitors the implementation process to identify and help correct mistakes, and makes clarifications in an effort to find links between theory and practice. This should facilitate new innovative ways to look at, and deal with, street gangs. The evaluation will be published separately, by the Linnaeus University, and is therefore not included in this book.


Policing

All police officers assigned to the gang unit (SGI) will conduct and participate in the policing and technology block of the project. Operational methods and strategies from SGIP are implemented to the regular line work at SGI, where the methods are “field tested” and experiences documented. A separate section in this book will highlight some of the “operations” that were conducted within SGIP.

Police methods are primarily based on previous success stories in other countries and other units in Sweden. For example, the investigative focus is not only concerned with incarceration and conviction rates (traditional focus). Rather, the investigative focus is congruent with more innovative investigation techniques, such as the “go for the money” concept, which has been successful in the United Kingdom. As such, one special investigative detail at SGI looks exclusively at Asset Recovery and investigates the criminal proceeds of relevant street gangs (depending on the case, one-three detectives). This unit works closely with other Swedish governmental agencies, such as the Swedish Tax Agency and the Swedish Enforcement agency, sharing intelligence and expertise. From

what we have gathered so far, this cooperation

has generated many new interesting leads and produced valuable intelligence, in addition to uncovering new white-collar crime among the more sophisticated gang members (e.g., tax fraud and tax evasion).



The tactical teams utilize traditional suppression methods, such as stop and search, and maintain an “offensive” tactic when interacting with gangs and gang members. The term “offensive” is misleading, however, as tactical officers rely on effective communication strategies (e.g., the cognitive interview, etc.) with gangs and gang members rather than just pure muscle. As such, offensive tactics are based on *consistency* and *contingency*; that is, to let the gangs know we are there and that they are going to be stopped and searched, regardless whether they like it or not. The strategy is intended to disrupt and make gang life as hard as possible, without resorting to unnecessary use of force. In addition, tactical officers will try to investigate a case as much as they possibly can “out in the field” as opposed to just taking up a report and passing it along to the detectives. This has greatly reduced caseloads and increased efficiency within the unit. Tactical team officers may seek ways to build a case on scene, finding ways to support a search warrant and gain entry to “safe houses” and other places of interest. The Swedish Law, for example, is fairly liberal in terms of conditions and prerequisites regarding search warrants, so this is used as much as possible.

Another important element of SGIP is to test new technology. For example, police officers are currently using encrypted mobile phones with special applications (apps) that allow them access to the gang intelligence database at the touch of a button. Information such as pictures, addresses, vehicle registration numbers, as well as other relevant information is therefore readily available in the field. This reduces time spent making calls or requests through regular police dispatch. In addition, the tactical team has tested various digital cameras, surveillance equipment, and various other technological solutions. The purpose has been to show how technical solutions can make operative police work more effective by providing sophisticated technical surveillance tools at the local level.

Collaboration with other authorities

The third block of SGIP consists of extended collaboration with other governmental agencies⁹ to build an informal network of agencies with a common goal to reduce gang crime, with the Police (SGIP) as the central and coordinating unit. For example, in one particular case it may be determined that the best way to target an individual may be to “go for the money”, and reduce the proceeds from criminal activity.

⁹ SGIP have entered into bi-lateral agreements with the following partners: The Metropolitan Police Service (London), New Scotland Yard; The Danish National Police; The Norwegian Police Service, Oslo Police District; The Swedish Public Prosecution Authority; Södertörn District Attorney; The Financial Intelligence Unit, Swedish National Bureau of Investigation; The Swedish Tax Agency, Tax Fraud Unit; The Swedish National Economic Crimes Bureau; The Police Education and Training Program, Växjö University; The Swedish Social Insurance Agency, Control Unit; The Swedish Prison and Probation Service, Intelligence unit; The Municipality of Huddinge Social Service Administration; The Municipality of Haninge Social Service Administration; The Municipality of Botkyrka Social Service Administration; The Swedish Enforcement Authority.

In another case, suppression methods against one or several key individuals may be the best method, and in a third case, suppression methods may be counterproductive, so gang members are approached in close cooperation with the social services.

SGIP has added two coordinating groups to handle this collaboration. The first group works closely with social services in an attempt to assist and reach out to gang members who want to leave their gangs. This “social intervention group” has members from the Police, Social Services, the Swedish Public Employment Services, the National Board of Institutional Care, and the Swedish Prison and Probation Service¹⁰. The second group is charged with creating a “Local Intelligence Centre” (LUC) with other law enforcement agencies to target particularly hard-to-reach gang members. Our experience to date shows that the LUC facilitates timely decision-making and information sharing among participating agencies. This will increase efficiency and, hopefully, produce results in the long term.

The three phases of SGIP

The Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project was divided into three phases: a data collection phase (2009-2010), an implementation phase (2010-2012), and an evaluation phase.



...SGI created a significant library of criminological literature... and established relationships with leading researchers in criminology, sociology, and gang research...”

During the data collection phase, information about the specific gang context was collected and the foundation of the PANTHER gang model was created. Information was collected from a variety of sources, both official and intelligence-based sources. The research literature on sociological and criminological theories in general and street gangs in particular was reviewed and analyzed. Lists were composed of which theories that works and which theories that might constitute an appropriate foundation for PANTHER. The gang unit (SGI) created a significant library of criminological literature (e.g., books and research articles) and

established relationships with leading researchers in criminology, sociology, and gang research, both nationally and internationally.

The second phase of SGIP constituted the meat and bone of the project; the implementation of the PANTHER gang model, which was launched in the fall of 2010. However, the first true SGIP Operation in which the PANTHER gang model was fully functioning was initiated in January 2011. Since January 2011, several

¹⁰ The notion of “social intervention groups” can be derived from the Stockholm Police Commissioner, Carin Götblad, and the Swedish Government Official Report (SOU 2010:15) on the recruitment of youths into crime groups.

“PANTHER Operations” have been initiated, which will be described separately in this text.

The final phase of SGIP will be the evaluation, which is currently ongoing. Independent researchers from the Linnaeus University in Växjö, Sweden, are conducting the evaluation, which will be published separately.

Central goals and objectives in SGIP

SGIP integrates social science research with pragmatism. Although SGIP is constructed on theories of crime and delinquency, we realize that it's of little practical value if practitioners cannot apply it. Since SGIP will be carried out and implemented in the field – most likely by law enforcement officers – it must be practical and easy to use. There are three overarching objectives, each with various goals:

- Prevent and impede recruitment to criminal gangs by way of working together with social coordination groups (**prevention**).
- Establish detailed gang intelligence and analysis – a special gang registry – to be used in intelligence-led gang operations (**suppression**).
- Develop systematic routines for managing gang members who want to quit and assign social intervention teams that work with youth in social deprived areas and to develop individualized action plans for those who want to quit (**intervention**).

Counteract gang recruitment – Prevention efforts

The first overarching objective of the SGIP deals with developing viable methods to **prevent or impede recruitment** to criminal gangs among young males. This is based on scientific research and pragmatic experiences gathered from our project partners. For example, research has shown that young males who join local street gangs usually graduate to more sophisticated and organized criminality and make up the recruiting pool for qualified criminal organizations (e.g., Puhakka, 2005; Lafontaine et al., 2005; Libak Pedersen, 2011).

Research from Sweden shows that a large percentage of all reported juvenile criminality is committed by previously sentenced youth. For example, out of a sample of 112 juveniles sentenced to juvenile detention, 78 percent recidivated within three years (SOU, 2010:15 appendix 4). Moreover,



official Swedish data shows that youth under the age of 25 has the highest recidivism rates among all age groups in society (Krantz & Lindsten, 2008). Indeed, Swedish and international research has consistently shown that juveniles who are part of a criminal gang commit significantly more crimes than juveniles who are not associated with such gangs. For example, in Denver, Colorado, gang members committed three times as many violent and serious crimes than non-gang members (Esbensen and Huizinga, 1993) and in Rochester, New York, gang members committed approximately seven times as many crimes as non-gang juveniles. Research also suggests that gang members are associated with drugs and guns (e.g., Bjerregaard & Lizotte, 1995; Esbensen et al., 1993; Esbensen & Huizinga, 1993; Goldstein, 1991; Gottfredson, 2000; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Huizinga et al., 1994; Sarnecki, 2001; Thornberry & Krohn, 2003). In addition, it is also important to remember that the majority of juveniles who commit crimes are not alone; they tend to commit crimes with their peers, with other juveniles of the same age, gender and often come from the same neighborhoods (Sarnecki, 2001). This strongly suggests the presence and influence of social structures in gangs.

Knowledge of the risk and protective factors that contribute to joining and leaving gangs, respectively, is therefore important in order to devise effective prevention programs (SOU, 2010:15). For example, Thornberry (1998) has shown that the risk and protective factors for joining gangs are the same as for committing crimes in general. Decker and Van Winkle (1996) posit that the decision to join gangs can best be described as a series of “pushes” and “pulls”; that is, the “pull” refers to the factors that attract and draw youth into gangs (e.g., prestige, excitement, and perceived status) whereas the “pushes” represent various social structures (e.g., social,

economic, and culture) that push youth into gangs. Decker and Van Winkle (1996) also argue that gangs offer protection against enemies and rival gangs, which offer a form of well-being and nurtures the need to “belong”. However, just as for criminal behavior in general, research has also shown that the most people who join criminal gangs tend to leave after a short period of time (e.g., Loeber et al., 2008).

Cooper and Ward (2008) conducted a systemic review of the literature on strategies for addressing young people’s involvement in gangs and identified several key risk factors for joining gangs. From their work, we learn that a youth is more likely to join a gang if they *use drugs, is aggressive and violent, have a positive attitude*

“

...we learn that a youth is more likely to join a gang if they use drugs, is aggressive and violent, have a positive attitude towards committing crimes, have difficulty saying no to peers, and struggling in school.”

towards committing crimes, have difficulty saying no to peers, and struggling in school.

Now, we realize that the police have limited resources in carrying out remedies to all social ills, and in fact, such responsibilities should perhaps not be bestowed upon the police. Undoubtedly, there are other social agencies and departments that are better suited to deal with these issues. Nonetheless, it is important that a comprehensive gang program includes and incorporates prevention efforts by way of *collaboration* with other agencies – agencies that are equipped, trained and experts at providing the required services.

A note on prevention measures

Research suggest that it is hard to develop and implement enduring solution to the underlying problems surrounding the social milieu that contribute to the formation of street gangs and the recruitment of gang members. It would seem that one of the most important aspect of prevention is to *identify* and *connect* local community resources to the model. By realizing that the police cannot achieve this feat alone, some have argued that we need to focus and pool scarce resources among all stakeholders and partners (McCluskey & Carnochan, 2011; Home Office, 2011). Only then are we equipped to deal with the core problems.

Indeed, preventive measures are one of the hardest elements to incorporate into a gang program, model or paradigm, for various reasons. Furthermore, the police and police actions alone are poor general deterrents. As such, we need to add other components in order to be successful. The literature suggest that long-term, enduring solutions require dedicated efforts from all partners – including the police. Consequently, we need to recognize and appreciate that the police are only one piece of the puzzle – **gangs are not simply a police matter – it is a societal matter**. If we do not address the underlying causes of why young people join gangs, then we will not succeed (Brotherton, 2011). Only by way of preventive measures can we limit the pool of “gang eligible” youth.

We will illustrate how the Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project have utilized this knowledge and attached **social coordination groups (SCG)** in the preventive work against gangs.

Social Coordination Groups (SCG)

When various police agencies launch programs to target gangs and gang recruitment, they tend to focus on already established gangs. This is an important component, but we also need to remember that gangs exist on a continuum from emerging

to established to entrenched gangs (Kutzke, 2011), and that this calls for a multifaceted response that incorporates more than one response strategy. We, as a society, cannot address the underlying problems that breed criminality and gang crime by suppression alone. As such, we have attached a social intervention concept called UNGSAM¹¹, a *social coordination group* at the local level. This social coordination group consists of several key individuals from the municipality with the mandate to take decisions and initiate action. The purpose is to find collaborative ways to divert at-risk youth (the target group is 12-20 year olds) away from gangs, drugs and crime, and to inform about the risk factors associated with gang joining (e.g., drug use and peer pressure).

The SCG teams consist of the following, at a minimum:

- Principal / Deputy Principal (local educational board)
- School Nurse / School Counselor (local educational board)
- Youth Counselor / Social Secretary (local social service offices)
- Deputy Director (local cultural and recreation management)
- Police Officer (local sub-station or police borough)

Drug and rehabilitation specialists are also part of the local SCG, with the primary role of implementing and advising on current prevention programs (UNGSAM program description, 2007).

These coordination teams will examine and chart local problem areas with a holistic paradigm and act in accordance with problem-solving strategies. Actions can

be taken using a situational or social approach to crime prevention. The police have a coordinating role during the regular meetings and are responsible for providing the SCG with relevant information regarding local youth (i.e., criminal intelligence on police-identified youth in the “risk zone” of becoming recruited by criminal gangs) and information on other specific problem areas, as identified by the other components of PANTHER. Naturally, the other actors, such as school officials and counselors may also provide information on



¹¹ UNGSAM is a collaborate effort between the local social authorities and the local police in Haninge municipality in southern Stockholm (Haninge is one of four municipalities in the Södertörn police district, the venue for SGIP and PANTHER). UNGSAM was initiated in 2007 and delegates meet three times every school semester. In addition, department heads at the respective authorities meet once per semester at a breakfast meeting (UNGSAM program description, 2007).

identified at-risk youth. After all, it is plausible that representatives possess varying levels and accuracy of information on at-risk youth. Hence, by pooling and sharing the knowledge, the SCG will be able to make well-informed decisions and take decisive action. Indeed, actions taken by the group can be long and short-term, depending on the specific problem being addressed. Since the SCG consist of members from the school district, the police, and social services, individualized plans may be devised for at-risk youth based on the identified risk factors. For example, if a youth have learning difficulties (a risk factor for gang joining as identified by Cooper & Ward, 2008), the school will be able to put in extra resources. Likewise, if a youth have problems with “saying no to peers” (also risk factor for gang joining), the school counselor can initiate immediate action and offer extra training on smart decision-making, life-skills, etc. If there is an emerging drug problem, social services and the police can devise an action plan.

How the prevention efforts are incorporated operationally into the PANTHER model will be discussed in the next chapter.

Establishing and maintaining gang intelligence – *Suppressive efforts*

The second overarching objective of SGIP is concerned with **establishing and maintaining detailed gang intelligence by developing a special registry** in order to delineate, define, analyze and chart gang members and associated individuals, vehicles, residences, corporations, family members, etc. This information will guide intelligence-led police suppressive operations against gangs and gang members. The idea is to “strike” at the most vulnerable point and thereby maximizing the effect with limited resources. Furthermore, it is important to identify the type of organization a particular gang has (if any) before planning a response strategy since gangs exist on a continuum and vary in time and place. Having a detailed gang database with intelligence information is therefore essential.

Tactical teams have utilized a wide variety of techniques in working with gangs and gang members, most of them “offensive” in nature – that is, tactical teams actively seek contact with gang members and let them know the police are “watching” them. However, these confrontations are not physical in nature; tactical officers rely on communication skills and actually have a good working relationship with most known gang members. Tactical officers have a solid working knowledge of the gang structures and organizations, who belongs to which gang, etcetera based on the available gang intelligence information. Gang members are frequently stopped and


searched for weapons, their vehicles are stopped and searched for contraband and weaponry, and whenever possible, search warrants are obtained to search residences and other gang-related premises. If crimes are detected, the tactical officers take

up a report and investigate the case as far as possible right there on the spot (that is, they do not just take up a report and hand it over to the detectives, who begin working the case the following day). It is not uncommon that a “simple” possession (narcotics, weapons, etc.) is completed in full the same shift. That way, gang members see that criminal cases related to gang activity are dealt with swiftly.

A note on gang organizations

Research literature quite often depicts gangs as disordered units without cohesion (Yablonsky, 1967; Klein, 1971) and some Swedish researchers argue that “gangs” are merely loosely organized juvenile networks (Sarnecki, 2001). However, some argue that some street gangs have well-defined leadership structures and are organizational cohesive (Rostami & Leinfelt, forthcoming; Keiser, 1969; Sánchez Jankowski, 1991). For example,

Rostami and Leinfelt (forthcoming) examined gang leaders from seven of the most prominent street gangs in Sweden, and found four distinct leadership and organizational styles. The organizational structure greatly depended on the disposition of the leader, but also reflected the current needs of the organization. As such, structures were flexible and could change over time. For example, when a gang is emerging and trying to establish themselves, the gang may resort to a hierarchical structure with a well-defined leadership structure and a clear power distribution. However, a gang may later shift to a more flexible and “democratic” structures where leading gang members get an equal vote. Both external and internal forces may precipitate this shift in organizational structure but it could also be seen as a natural developmental process. In other cases, leadership structures may be ambiguous or purposefully “fuzzy” to thwart unwanted police attention (e.g., avoid being targeted by police gang units). From our previous work with street gangs, we have found that gangs quickly adapt to new police methods. Consequently, if street gangs notice that police continuously target certain individuals within a gang (e.g., the leader), then the organizational structure may simply change as a defensive measure. There is a “leader” and gang members recognize the need for



such a leader, but it is not spoken of, or mentioned, to outsiders.

Martín Sánchez Jankowski (1991) identified similar patterns in his impressive study of American street gangs. He argued that there are three basic elements to a gang organization: 1) a formal leadership structure that outline authority structures within the gang, 2) a definition of roles and responsibilities among members, and 3) a set of rules that dictate appropriate behavior and consequences for deviating from the established rules. Sánchez Jankowski found that street gangs (U.S. based) could exist in different organizational forms. This is in concert with our own field experience from street gangs in Stockholm, Sweden, as well as with police experiences elsewhere, such as in London, Manchester and Barcelona (Metropolitan Police, 2011; Home Office, 2011). Sánchez Jankowski presented three possible organizational forms in his book:

- **Vertical/hierarchical** – this gang usually uses titles such as “President”, “Vice President”, “Warlord” and “Treasurer”. In this type of structure, the President has full authority to plan and authorize gang operations, as well as setting short and long-term goals (Sánchez Jankowski, 1991 p. 64).
- **Horizontal/commission** – this gang usually has officeholders, where all hold an equal rank and no one is ranked hierarchical. Decisions are reached in consensus among the officeholders (Sánchez Jankowski, 1991 p. 66).
- **Influential** – in this gang, formal leadership is enforced through the guise of informality. There are no formal titles or set responsibilities for the leader, although all members would recognize the leader. Leadership can, for example, be based on charismatic authority, and is not limited to only one person – a gang could therefore have two or three influential leaders operating at one time (Sánchez Jankowski, 1991 p. 66).

We have seen examples of all of the above in our work against gangs, and we believe that this is an important piece of information since each “type” of gang would have to be approached in different ways in order to achieve maximum effect (Rostami & Leinfelt, 2011). For example, if the police operate according to the notion of “target lists” and in accordance with the “hot person” concept, whom would they focus on in a horizontal/commission or influential gang? By adopting a *holistic model* that is based on intelligence-led policing techniques (such as the current PANTHER model), however, the police can operate in a multifaceted manner instead of being linear in thinking and practice.



...each “type” of gang would have to be approached in different ways in order to achieve maximum effect...”

A more detailed review of different gang leadership styles, including our own findings, is presented in subsequent chapters in this book.

A note on the intelligence registry

The intelligence registry is designed to help law enforcement agencies identify and track gang members in Sweden. This information is used to create comprehensive social network analyses¹² of known gang members within the problem oriented policing paradigm, and to improve the effectiveness of the police by providing for the timely exchange of documented and reliable information regarding gangs and gang members.

How these intelligence strategies are incorporated into the PANTHER model will be discussed in the next chapter.

Managing desistance from crime – Intervention efforts

The research tradition in criminology has undoubtedly been focused around answering the question *why people commit crimes*, whereas few have looked at why people

stop committing crimes (e.g., Laub & Sampson, 2001). The third objective of SGIP is to develop guidelines, based on our own experiences and current research, on how to respond and deal with gang members who want to change their lifestyle and leave the criminal milieu. This work began in 2009 and has included members involved in a criminal street gang or criminal networks. Members from the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, Social Services, Swedish Public Employment Service, and The National Board of Institutional Care have formed “work groups” under the coordination of SGIP and SGI. These multi-agency work groups have been tasked with developing individualized plans that cater to the individual needs of the individual who want to desist.



The research tradition in criminology has undoubtedly been focused around answering the question why people commit crimes, whereas few have looked at why people stop committing crimes...”

Social Intervention Teams (SIT)

The so-called “Social Intervention Teams” are created as a pilot program under the paradigm of community-based interventions with the intention of becoming a permanent attachment to the police organization in general, according to the findings in the Governmental Report 2010:15 (SOU 2010:15). The primary purpose of


¹² For more details, please refer to the chapter: “Scanning, mapping and analysis in PANTHER”.

these teams is to identify, locate and motivate individuals to desist from crime and to prevent youth from joining gangs. However, these teams differ from the Social Coordination Groups (SCG) in that SIT's are primarily concerned with individuals already caught up in criminality. The intervention then, is to motivate the individual to desist from gangs, crime, and to change lifestyle. The police have a coordinating role in these teams, although the primary responsibility falls on social services at the local level.

Members from the social service agencies at the local community (borough) level meet on a regular basis to **develop individualized action plans for gang members who want to quit or exit gangs**. These plans include follow-up and appropriate referral activities (e.g., to mental health and/or narcotic/alcohol rehabilitation programs), in addition to providing opportunities for the removal of “gang tattoos”. We feel that these issues have been neglected in the past, and that the boundaries for agency responsibility and accountability have been formless and vague. Hopefully, the experiences gleaned from SGIP can provide some guidance in this matter.

In March 2011, the Swedish Department of Justice initiated an investigation on how law enforcement agencies and social services should handle desistance and youth being recruited into gangs (Justitiedepartementet, 2011). As such, there is currently little guidance from the Swedish National Police Board on how the police should deal with gang members who want to quit. Consequently, local police districts have been left to make decisions on their own accord. Without proper routines and structure, however, the end result is not always the most favorable. Unfortunately, the limiting factor in most cases is funding.

Unless we can inspire, motivate, and encourage gang members to quit, we have gained little. The sole use of suppression techniques and incarceration of gang leaders (i.e., the hard components) will not get us to the finish line. We must get better at handling and managing people who want to leave the gang environment. As such, there must be guidelines and procedures for referrals to other agencies and/or volunteer organizations that are better equipped to provide assistance and support (i.e., the soft components).





*Illustration: Example of how Social Intervention Teams (SIT) are organized.
Taken from SOU:2010:15 p. 17 (translated from Swedish to English by author).*

Hybrid efforts - Intervention and suppression (ALFI)

ALFI is an independent project that runs parallel to SGIP in the 7th Police District, in two of the most socially deprived areas in the district. ALFI was initiated in March 2011 and will run through December 2012 with the main purpose of increasing police presence and increasing citizen safety, in addition to creating meaningful opportunities for youth in these areas by working closely with local actors.

ALFI utilizes some of the concepts from PANTHER in that it includes intervention efforts, in close cooperation with social services and the municipal government, with traditional police suppression techniques. For example, Botkyrka municipality will build and open a new youth recreational facility where local youth can meet and spend time after school while engaging in pro-social activities. In addition, Botkyrka municipality will increase its staff at another youth recreational facility to provide a better service to local youth. Volunteer staff will also be recruited to “patrol” the Fittja and Alby neighborhoods during evenings and at night, in an effort to instill safety and report problems directly to the local police. The local schools will also

participate in ALFI by increasing their staff for after-school activities for certain age groups. ALFI also consists of the following:

- Targeted informational campaigns in local schools
- Police intelligence: identifying, mapping and charting frequent juvenile offenders.
- Increased patrol and police presence in troubled areas.
- Establishing a youth council where local schools elect representatives (students) to attend meetings with municipal agencies, including the police, to discuss and voice concerns, etc.
- Arranging pro-social recreational activities for youth during school holidays and off-days.
- Developing a confidence-building program to increase and strengthen the relationship between youth in socially deprived areas and police (this is another EU-funded program in Södertörn Police District called “Give and Take–Every Day”).

Historically, the police have primarily been focused on hard components (i.e., suppression) in their gang work. We believe that a successful program incorporates both soft (i.e., the prevention and intervention components) and hard components.

How the intervention and desistance part fits in the PANTHER model will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.

Operational staff meetings

Meetings were conducted on weekly basis. These were *operational staff meetings* and were in addition to meetings that had to do with the project (e.g., budget, goals, etc.), which were conducted throughout the entire project at various intervals. As such, operational staff meetings were chaired by the section commander but also included team leaders for the investigative and tactical teams. The project manager also attended these meetings and was responsible for ensuring that operations were carried out in accordance with the project idea. In addition, the intelligence and analyst officers also attended the weekly operational staff meetings.

The purpose was to review and evaluate goals and assignments from the previous month, and to review their respective progress. For example, topics included issues such as how much work-related time the tactical teams spent on operational (project) goals. Time management was identified as a central issue, since it was not uncommon for officers to work in cases not related to specified goals. As such, these meetings were an attempt to keep everyone “onboard” and also provided the sergeants with a “holistic picture” of what the gang unit was currently involved in.

Each team leader was assigned a variety of assignments to be solved during the next month. These assignments could, for example, consist of conducting surveillance operations and document movements on certain individuals as prep-work for an upcoming sting. Likewise, assignments could consist of making contact with property managers in an attempt to close down a “club house”. The assignments varied depending on operational needs and status (note: only one operation was conducted at a time, but each operation could have several subsidiary goals).

Each sergeant reported to the lieutenant during the operational staff meeting and decisions were made in consensus on how to proceed. If assignments were unsolved, however, then the group discussed alternatives and/or made an adjustment in resources (e.g., shifting personnel resources, etc.) – depending on the reason why the assignment had not been completed.

Time sheets were reviewed (note: each sergeant was responsible to keep a “diary” after each shift, including time spent on various tasks) to ensure that tactical teams were working towards the goals and not being caught up in non-project related cases, or “pulled” to other assignments. This was initially primarily for project evaluation purposes, but was actually an excellent way for the administration to get a clear picture over how the tactical officers spent their time. This procedure made it easy to identify whether the unit had assisted other units too frequently (e.g., helping other similar gang units in a nearby district, or conducting search warrants and interrogations with gang members not currently being targeted). Consequently, a time reporting sheet made tactical teams more focused and “on-the-ball” and eager to work towards the decided goals (as opposed to just “drive around”).

During the meeting, the group also decided on how to proceed in the current operation, whether to revise current operational goals or to consider them accomplished. In essence, these operational staff meetings became a mini version of the larger SARA process.

Having a positive attitude

Finally, before proceeding to the actual PANTHER model, we would like to comment on something just as important as having the right building blocks for a successful program: attitude. In this context, having engaged and positive co-workers is essential for success. Consequently, we need to shortly comment on some factors that we think contributed to the great working milieu for the past three years.

Some factors have been identified in the research literature¹³ as especially impor-


¹³ See for example Roberg et al. (2011).

tant in implementing new programs. As such, during the implementation phase of the Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project (year 2-3) we worked actively in implementing and following the following general suggestions, as noted in Roberg et al. (2011, p.161)

1. *Supervisors should offer frequent feedback through performance evaluation of COP activities, so that they are aware of their level of performance.* Feedback is an important factor in creating an environment in which officers can take own initiatives, learn new skills, become more engaged in their work, and to thrive. It is our belief that if the officers thrive and are successful, then the program will thrive and be successful as well.
2. *Training in COP is paramount and should include information regarding policy, methods, history and examples with hands-on opportunities and presentations.* Within SGIP, we used this is to offer a frame of reference – we found that the program becomes less theoretical and more pragmatic if it's explained and presented in simple terms. Also, officers need to understand the program (and its benefits) before they can fully implement it. We offered continuing education throughout the project and distributed selected literature on gangs and criminal organizations to staff members, which they were required to read.
3. *Participatory management should be practiced, allowing officers to exchange ideas through informal meetings as well as by conducting surveys and interviews on a regular basis.* Regular operational meetings were held during which all staff participated to evaluate the previous weeks work and plan for the coming week. This was an excellent forum for keeping everyone on-track, up to date, and engaged. Management need to make time for this activity, as it will make officers feel like they are a part of the program – it will create a sense of ownership.
4. *Management should ensure that officers have adequate resources to engage in COP activities- this can be accomplished by building partnerships with outside agencies.* For the purposes of our project, the gang unit lieutenant was responsible for assuring that all officers had adequate resources to engage in all program activities.

The SGIP used these general suggestions as much as possible throughout the entire operational phase of the program. At least from our experience, we believe this contributed to a continuous high morale and an attractive and positive working environment. This was reflected by low personnel turnover rates.





3 The PHANTHER Gang model: *Preventive Analysis about Network Targets for a Holistic Enforcement Response*

By: Fredrik Leinfelt and Amir Rostami

Within the Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project (SGIP), an operational model for a holistic gang prevention program was developed. This model goes under the name PHANTHER: Preventive Analysis about Network Targets for a Holistic Enforcement Response. The goal is to incorporate police suppression and enforcement methods in conjunction with intervention and prevention methods, into one fully operational model against gang crime that is enduring and flexible enough to meet the policing challenges of the 21st Century.

“If your only tool is a hammer, all your problems will look like nails.”

- Charles Pollard (2001)

The PANTHER model

The starting point for PANTHER is that specific problem areas are regarded as unique and that every street gang and criminal network is a distinctive and unique phenomenon (that is, they all have their own unique weaknesses and strengths). This is then put into a knowledge-based context. The aim of PANTHER is to change the way police view gang prevention and intervention work; that is, change from a purely *reactive* approach to a more *proactive* approach.

We believe that proactive work against street gangs will interrupt and disturb the individual members as well as the criminal structure itself, thereby making the criminal lifestyle progressively harder to maintain and/or uphold, especially if such efforts are coupled with suppressive strategies and an offensive investigative approach, such as “go for the money” to reduce the proceeds of crime. The PANTHER method does not only focus on crime committed by individual members, however, but is also interested in criminal processes and reducing the “branding” effects that street gangs aspire to. In addition, PANTHER can also be used in socially deprived areas, which require special responses due to local challenges. Since PANTHER operates under the umbrella of SGIP, it is a *holistic* approach, which will incorporate social service needs and other

“ We believe that proactive work against street gangs will interrupt and disturb the individual members as well as the criminal structure itself.”

appropriate responses, as needed.

Flexibility

PANTHER can be modified to fit contextual needs, which is why it is inherently flexible by design. There are undoubtedly numerous rationales for incorporating a flexible model, but we focused and designed PANTHER around addressing two specific needs.

First, the fewer resources a particular police department has, the more flexibility that department needs in its use of



existing resources. This has constantly been a challenge for the police; that is, how do you do more with less. Second, we believe that street gangs are a fundamentally multifaceted problem, varying in severity and prevalence, depending on several variables such as gang type, structures, crime of choice, cohesion, and area of operation – just to name a few (Klein & Maxson, 2006). Consequently, in order to be successful in the work against the gang problem, we need a solid, durable, and flexible model that address gang *prevention* and *intervention* work, not just another police suppression model. That is, in order to address as many variables as possible, a gang model needs to be flexible and adaptable.

Adaptability

We share Klein and Maxson's (2006) view that before deciding on a gang prevention strategy and agency-wide responses, it is important to consider several factors¹. PANTHER, therefore, is designed to be adaptable so that it can adjust to the problem at hand, and allow the *problem* to guide operational responses, as opposed to the other way around. The supposition is that the police need to adapt to the local gang situation and not assume that gangs are linear and indistinguishable.

A model that relies upon and is dependent upon operational responses to address the problem is rigid and stiff. Since street gangs can adapt and adjust to police activities and strategies², we need to do the same. As such, the strength of PANTHER lies in its flexibility and durability. The principal focus of PANTHER is *knowledge* and *familiarity* of the problem at hand. To achieve this, PANTHER uses a modified version of the SARA principle of problem oriented policing (Goldstein, 1990) and the National Intelligence Model (Ratcliffe, 2008; NCIS, 2000).

¹ Before deciding upon an appropriate strategy for gang control, one needs the requisite data to determine the gang type, size of the gang, its duration, any possible subgroupings within the gang, age range, territoriality, and criminal versatility and/or specialization (Klein & Maxson, 2006).

² Over the past decade, we have noticed that street gangs are evolving and constantly trying to change their behavior and criminality to "outsmart" the police. An example: gang members stopped sending sensitive information in plain-text messages (SMS) once they discovered that the police used this information against them in court. Instead, the (Police Foundation, 2004) started using coded messages and/or only relayed sensitive information face-to-face.

The PANTHER process





Illustration: The basic PANTHER model – process from scanning to evaluation.

As illustrated above, the PANTHER gang model is a continuous process consisting of five basic elements or factors; scanning and analysis, method selection, tactical operations, investigation, and an evaluation component. Each of these components will be discussed in detail below.

Scanning and analysis



The most central and important aspect of PANTHER is scanning, mapping, and analysis. It is the fundamental building block of SGIP and, as such, lays the foundation for the enforcement response.

Scanning

The first step is to find out whether there is a perceived problem in the community; that is, to scan for a particular problem of interest. For example, a street gang in a particular geographical area could be one problem of interest. Alternatively, a set of loosely connected individuals who are actively recruiting members to start a new criminal gang could be another. Alternatively, another relevant problem of interest could be an already existing street gang that is actively committing crimes.

After deciding which problem area to focus on, an information-gathering period ensues to ascertain and map the extent of the identified problem. That is, we want to answer the question: what are we up against? This period effectively consists of two separate but equally important parts: (1) collecting and collating information and (2) extensive cooperation with information-sharing partners and other law enforcement agencies (steps 1 – 6 in the illustration below, top circle).

Collaboration with other agencies

In PANTHER we collaborate with several agencies to gather information about gang members. For example, we get intelligence on income, current and previous employers, whether they own real estate, etc. from the Swedish Tax Authority; the Social Service Administration can provide information on welfare payments, etc., and the Swedish Social Insurance Agency (Control Unit) provides information on other social insurance payments (e.g., whether gang members have claimed and/or receive medical payments, paternity/maternity payments, etc.). The Swedish Prison and Probation Service (Intelligence Unit) can provide valuable information on known associates, networks, and current conditions of probation/parole. The Swedish Enforcement Authority provides information regarding current monetary debts and creditors. They have the legal capacity to repossess property to secure outstanding debts. For example, if we discover that a gang member has a significant outstanding debt and the gang member is subsequently stopped by the police and found carrying a heavy gold chain, a luxury watch, or similar item of value, we would work with the Enforcement Authority to repossess that item on the spot. Without having an established relationship and intelligence available ahead of time (i.e., collaborating), our chances of aggressively “going for the money” and reducing the proceeds of crime when randomly encountering gang members, would be significantly reduced.

Naturally, the partnership with the Public Prosecution Authority is nothing new or novel to PANTHER. Indeed, police agencies and prosecutors have a well-es-

lished relationship, working closely together to discuss matters leading up to new criminal gang-related investigations/charges, or working diligently together on current investigations. What might be different in this model, however, is the inclusion of the Prosecution Authority at an early stage – that is, even before suspects are identified and arrested. Typically, a prosecutor is only contacted when a suspect is apprehended or arrested (some exceptions exist, as defined by Swedish law). In most cases, however, the prosecutor will defer the investigative lead back to the police.

In those cases, the prosecutor is contacted at the end of the investigative process, when the case is ready for court. The prosecutor would then have to spend a fair amount of time familiarizing themselves with the particulars of the case. In our model, however, a prosecutor is involved from the start, which streamlines the entire investigation and facilitates a productive collaboration where ideas and suggestions are shared and discussed throughout the entire investigation.



Collecting intelligence

Research has shown that one of the most important components of gang development is the individual gang members' gang identity – or gang cohesiveness (Klein, 1995). Some studies have even shown that agencies' "preventive work" can have the opposite effect; it works to strengthen the gang identity and facilitate gang development and criminality³. The PANTHER model avoid strengthening gang cohesiveness by way of the scanning and analysis stage; that is, by carefully studying the street gang and its members before deciding on enforcement actions. The idea is that local intelligence center (LUC) and police (gang officers) meet to discuss individual gang members and potential enforcement options (e.g., the top circle in the illustration). The sharing of intelligence (information) about gang members and other individuals of interest will lay the foundation for the operational enforcement response.

The bottom circle (steps 1 – 7) in the illustration addresses the information gathering process and various forms of criminal intelligence available to law enforcement agencies. Each will be discussed below.

Social Network Analysis: Finding Strategic Individuals

After the scanning stage comes the mapping and analysis stage. This is where individual gang members (or entire street gangs) are analyzed and mapped – the idea is to chart whom they associate with and what type of criminal activities they are engaged in. This stage is important for several reasons, perhaps the most important being the ability to grasp the extent of the problem and determining possible responses.

Mapping is a great visualization tool in several academic disciplines, especially in microbiology and chemistry (e.g., the mapping of the human DNA and the mapping of organic molecules). The technique, however, is not foreign to social science. Some network researchers argue that social scientists have made extensive use of this visualization tool since Moreno first introduced the sociogram (Moody et al., 2005). Johnson and Reitzel (2011, p. 3) define social network analysis (SNA) as:

"Social network analysis is a social science methodology that can provide crime analysts with a set of quantitative metrics and robust visual displays, through which they can quickly discover, analyze and visualize network-based criminal action with the goal of developing rigorous interdiction strategies."

³ Klein (1995) argued that gang cohesiveness is central to the nature and control of street gangs. Klein suggested that stronger gang cohesiveness would result in more gangs and more gang crime. In addition, Klein also posited that the opposing forces, such as justice officials, easily feed gang cohesiveness.

Social networks consist of several “actors”, typically depicted as single points and where lines specify relationships between individual actors with relational directions indicated by arrows (Batagelj, 2005). The advantage of using network analysis and visualization is undoubtedly the ability to see data clearly since it “...creates a capacity for building intuition that is unsurpassed by summary statistics” (Moody et al., 2005, p.1206).

SNA is conducted to glean more information about a network or constellation. For example, Malm (2006) and Bichler and Malm (2008) have provided some examples on how SNA can be used by police in the analysis of organized crime, especially in underlining prevention and intelligence efforts. Johnson and Reitzel (2011, p. 4) also point out that research has constantly shown “...that social networks can both facilitate (Patacchini & Zenou, 2008) and inhibit (Haynie, 2001) delinquent behavior such as involvement in gangs and organized urban drug networks (Murji, 2007).” As such, it would seem that the principles of SNA could to be a valuable tool that we could use in mapping criminal networks and gangs^{4,5}.

In PANTHER we use SNA methods to locate key individual members in a particular network, and to identify the “organization” structures. This is important since research has shown that law enforcement is often fooled by the linear illustrations of criminal networks (Stovin & Davies, 2008). That is, where the “most obvious” individual in a particular network is in fact, not the leader nor the most influential person. As such, a carefully conducted SNA is essential in identifying potentially “hidden” leaders. Naturally, SNA is most often conducted with the aim to incarcerate gang leaders through traditional police enforcement and investigation, but SNA can also be used to identify *weak* links in an organization. That is, we suggest that SNA, within the PANTHER concept, can be used to identify key individuals who may be susceptible to intervention efforts – and thus, *excellent prospects for the social intervention teams (SIT) described in the previous chapter*.

Consequently, SNA identify key members who become the focus of the enforcement response. However, these responses are not limited to suppression and traditional law enforcement actions; rather, the enforcement response can also include social service-oriented efforts, whenever appropriate. Just as SNA can be used to identify potential candidates for desistance, it may also be used to identify at-risk

4 For our representations and visualization of criminal gangs in Sweden, which are presented as examples below, we have used the software Pajek, available for free download at: <http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/pajek/>.

5 Johnson and Reitzel (2011) argue that social Network Analysis (SNA) is both a theory (e.g., social actors are influenced by social structures) and a method (e.g., a quantitative method for accurate visualizations and mapping of social structures and relationships between social actors). For an excellent discussion on this topic, please see Johnson and Reitzel (2011) available at: www.ipes.info/WPS/WPS_No_39.pdf

youth in the periphery of the gang structure/network. *These kids become prime targets for the social coordination groups (SCG) and can hopefully be “persuaded” not to join the street gangs by early preventive actions, such as extensive parental contacts, and/or by utilizing other informal social control (e.g., religious leaders in the community).*

Another important aspect, that should be given attention, is to identify new potential sources of confidential information (e.g., recruiting confidential informants). Several examples of a operational SNA in PANTHER, are provided below.



An example of SNA conducted in PANTHER. The analysis shows one of the oldest street gang in southern Stockholm. Each dot represents an actor (individual) and each line corresponds to associations (co-offending) with other actors.

Using Social Network Analysis to track gang development

Even though SNA is primarily used as a tool to lay the foundation for method selection and the subsequent tactical operation, it may also be used to track gang development over time. We will illustrate this by way of a series of network figures. We have examined police and official data on gang members and gang associates

in one Stockholm-based street gang over time, from 2001 to 2010. This study was conducted as a part of SGIP in determining the viability of using SNA in the PANTHER model (Rostami & Leinfelt, 2011).

As shown in the first illustration (data from 2001-2003) shows seven independent networks of criminally active youth. Each dot represent an actor (individual) and each line represents co-offending. Data from 2006 (second illustration) also shows seven different networks, although one is more prominent than the others. In fact, this would later become the core of the new street gang that coincidentally began to commit crimes in the southern parts of Stockholm around 2006-2007. Data from 2010 shows how the seven independent networks have merged, creating a massive street gang consisting of 28 core gang members and roughly 900 fringe members. Now, it seems commonsensical to us that it would be a lot easier to initiate an enforcement response in the emerging stage (e.g., during 2001-2003) and be proactive – rather than relying on reactive policing, and wait until 2010 when the street gang already have established themselves and developed a fully blown gang identity.



This illustration represents members and fringe members of what would later become a major Stockholm street gang. This data comes from co-offending (conviction) records, 2001-2003.



This illustration shows data from the same street gang in 2006. As noted, a few individuals “met in the middle” and brought the two distinct networks together. In this stage, the “PANTHER response” would be directed at removing the individuals that organize the two groups. They are not “high-ranking” gang members, which support the notion that law enforcement can be fooled by relying on traditional hierarchical representations of street gangs (e.g., Stovin & Davies, 2008).

Determine Type of Gang and Developing Appropriate Response Paradigms

Since criminal networks and street gangs do not form overnight, and considering that there are several phases of establishment, recruitment, and development, the goal is to target these structures as soon as they have entered the first establishment phase. Naturally, any structure is vulnerable in its earliest stage; individual members have not yet found their roles, the organization is weak in numbers and structure, and leadership has not yet solidified. The organization may not have established criminal connections and allegiances to other criminal entities, making them vulner-



This illustration shows the same street gang four years later, in 2010. The question obviously becomes – at what point in time is a particular street gang most easily enforced? Using our data, would it be most easily enforced in its emerging phase in 2006 or, in its relative well-established phase in 2010?

able to enforcement responses. The notion of early enforcement actions is supported by our own experiences and analyses, as well as past research (Klein & Maxson, 2006; Klein, 1995). Consequently, we do not agree with the notion that law enforcement action should be delayed, or withheld, until a particular street gang or criminal network is fully operational.

By knowing what type of gang (and gang leaders) you are up against will greatly enhance your chances of implementing an appropriate enforcement response. A linear response may not be effective against all types of gangs; law enforcement need to adapt to the identified problem and act accordingly. As a result of our own research, conducted within SGIP, we have examined various gang types and gang leaders

in Sweden. These findings are discussed in length in the “SGIP Research” section of this text. However, our findings suggest that gang organization is influenced by leadership styles, making it an important factor in devising appropriate law enforcement responses.

Deciding on a Media Strategy

A separate chapter will be devoted to media strategy.

Background Checks

Naturally, you glean important intelligence on gang members by conducting comprehensive background investigations and “mapping” known gang members. However, by taking time to also map and chart associate members, fringe members, current (and past) girlfriends, wives, parents, siblings and likely employers and corporations, you will get a wider picture of what you are dealing with. By knowing who the girlfriends are, for example, will provide valuable information on potential “hide outs” or places where contraband, narcotics, or weapons are being held. Our experience is that gang members usually have their girlfriends hold valuable goods since they are less likely to be stopped and searched, or revealed by the police. Corporations that are doing business with gang members are of great interest to the police as they may be potential places of money laundering or fencing stolen goods. Targeting these corporations will disrupt the business aspect of gang activity and thus limit the proceeds of crime.

As such, ample time and resources should be allocated for proper background investigations (individuals and businesses/corporations) at the front end of an operation. The information gleaned from this process is then used throughout the entire PANTHER process.

Strategic and Tactical Analysis


The last step is to combine and collate all of the gathered information and make sense of it. This is where a police agency should put their analysts to work – to discern patterns and conduct a strategic analysis that the team then can use to develop the most favorable tactical approach.

The most important question to answer is naturally - is there a problem? If so, what is the extent of the problem, and who are the key individuals that contribute to the problem? Who are the beneficiaries? Are there any stakeholders involved? Are there any businesses or corporations involved and, if so, why? These are some

examples of possible questions that should be addressed before moving on.

The information collected during the scanning and analysis stage will influence the choice of method and have a critical bearing on subsequent tactical operations.

Method selection and tactical operations



Depending on the operational suggestions derived from the mapping and analysis stages, various operational measures can be taken. For example, the police may target key individuals within a particular gang, or take actions against an entire gang structure; conducting surveillance operations on one or several members to document their movements, actions, who they meet, their lifestyles, etc. This information may be used for subsequent operations, or as valuable information in the initial phases of the current operation. Information on living conditions, such as an excessively extravagant lifestyle with fancy vehicles, motorcycles, boats, apartments or houses, etc. that lies beyond the available legal means, may be used in a subsequent investigation phase as evidence for a possible asset forfeiture.


Another appropriate method selection for a tactical operation is enforcement actions against certain areas of criminal activity to disrupt gang activities. This may include an increased police presence and increased stops and searches. Police actions will disrupt the gangs and force them to change their procedures and operations to account for the increased and unwanted police attention. Police may also look for creative (albeit legal) ways to obtain search warrants for gang members' residences and/or "club houses" by using the law to its fullest potential. That is, the police should not regard the law as a "hurdle" in achieving success, but rather as a valuable tool. These search warrants may yield contraband or weapons, which will be grounds for criminal prosecution, and/or aid in other on-going investigations.

Another strategy may be to reach out to the community and gather the local business owners to various meetings. This is a good method to use if the police have little or no intelligence information regarding a specific area or gang – that is, the police may use the community as a source of information to answer the question: is there a gang problem in this area? If so, then revert back to the scanning and analysis stage and plan an appropriate response. If the area is socially deprived, then the CODE component of PANTHER can be used (se separate section on CODE).

As such, the focus during tactical operations differs depending on available information, purpose, and overall strategy, which are decided upon during the scanning and analysis stages. However, the key word in all operational work in PANTHER is flexibility. Indeed, the notion of flexibility is the fundamental premise of the method selection stage in PANTHER – that is, each member of the targeted street gang should have an individual “enforcement plan”, based on information gleaned from the scanning and analysis stage. Consequently, an enforcement response may differ within the same street gang or criminal network, depending on the target.

Thus, enforcement varies across members since PANTHER regards members as unique; all having different sets of predispositions and premises for success. Some gang members may require extensive work, with a combination of social service interventions and programs, and some may not be receptive at all, leaving few responses applicable other than incarceration and incapacitation. Others may require very little effort up front, and may be exceptional candidates for various social service programs.

Illustration: Using PANTHER and adding relevant components during method selection and tactical operations/response stage.



Allowing research guide the choice of operational methods


Earlier in this text, we talked about how police research has influenced policing in recent past and about the contributions of research in terms of guiding policy and practice. A subsequent chapter in this book will cover research conducted as part of SGIP, but in one such study we proposed using a “gang leader typology” to gain knowledge about how leaders function as individuals as a valuable tool in guiding practice – or selecting an appropriate enforcement response (Rostami, Leinfelt, & Brotherton, forthcoming). In order to provide a more tangible example, we will also present an application of this method (Operation LIMA) in a chapter 7.

The empirical support for using gang leader characteristics in guiding enforcement responses is based on our own phenomenological study (in collaboration with Dr. David Brotherton) that identified several key characteristics of street gang leaders from seven major street gangs in Stockholm. The purpose was to create a preliminary gang leader typology. In this study we combined ethnographic fieldwork observations with in-depth interviews with Swedish street gang leaders and associate gang members. The primary goal was to understand the driving forces behind street gang leadership and gang membership by delineating the multiple themes of the subjects’ narratives. A descriptive and interpretive analysis of the data suggested four ideal-types of street gang leaders, each with specific goals, aspirations, and motives, all of which accord with the gang literature that has emerged from the United States. We found that these ideal-types differ significantly in how they govern and rule their gangs, which ultimately influence how the gang operate and how they behave. Consequently, we believe that using a single enforcement response against these different gangs would be ineffective. But by using identified weaknesses among the leaders, we can capitalize by selecting the “right” method of enforcement going into the tactical operational phase. We have applied this knowledge operationally in several operations. One of them will be described as an example below (Operation LIMA).

In terms of policy implications, these findings are important for government agencies in their enforcement, prevention and intervention efforts against street gangs. They reiterate the need for a street gang leader typology to aid preventive efforts and ensure that resources are deployed in the most optimal way. In terms of research, these findings suggest a need for further in-depth, holistic studies to create a more empirically grounded gang leader typology.

“...by using identified weaknesses among the leaders, we can capitalize by selecting the “right” method of enforcement going into the tactical operational phase.”

Investigation



Braga and colleagues (2011) have commented on the role of the moving criminal investigations towards crime control. They argue that police investigative work has largely remained in the professional era of policing while other aspects of policing and technology have undergone considerable reformation. Indeed, Braga et al. (2011, p. 2) posit “...in terms of controlling crime, investigators essentially conduct ad-hoc reactive investigations to hold offenders accountable for crimes in the hopes of generating deterrence through making arrests.”

Several research studies were conducted in the 1970's and 1980's that dealt with police effectiveness in detective bureaus (e.g., Chaiken & Petersilia, 1977; Ericson, 1982; Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, 1981) what demonstrated the need to work with the public, the need to develop hard facts necessary to prosecute, developing working hypothesis, the use of informants and the reliance on forensic evidence. Braga and colleagues (2011, p. 5) summarized these findings in their text:

1. *The vast majority of crime that police investigate is brought to their attention by the public. Police discover very little crime on their own. Except for a few proactive investigations into corruption, vice, and organized crime, most criminal investigations involve crimes that have been committed, not those in progress or not yet committed.*
2. *The essential ingredient in solving almost every crime is the identification of the suspect by the public. If the offender is not caught on the spot, success depends on the victim or witnesses providing information that specifically identifies the likely suspect, such as a name, address, license plate number, or relation to the victim. If an offender has not been identified by the public for detectives, the chances of solving any crime fall to about 10 percent.*
3. *Contrary to fictional portrayals, detectives do not work from facts to identification of suspects; they work from identification of suspects back to facts that are necessary to prosecute and convict them. The primary job of detectives is not to find unknown sus-*

pects, but to collect evidence required for a successful prosecution of known suspects. Although fictional detectives are constantly warning against the danger of forming a hypothesis too early, that is precisely what real detectives do most of the time. For all the drama of novels, movies and television, the fact is that criminal investigation is largely a matter of processing paperwork. This does not make it easy. Knowledge of the law and of people is critically important. But it is work that does not rely on the skills of Kojak or Dirty Harry. Instead, it requires the steady discipline and persistence of an accountant or bank examiner.

4. More crimes are solved through information provided by arrested or convicted offenders — called “secondary clearances” — than are solved by the original work of the police. Indeed, the major opportunity for raising clearance rates — the ratio of solved crimes to reported crimes — lies in having the police work more systematically to encourage criminals to confess to previous criminal acts.
5. Detectives generally have more information about particular crimes than they can assimilate and use. Furthermore, physical or forensic evidence makes only a small contribution to either detection or prosecution.
6. Neither the way in which criminal investigation is organized, nor caseloads of detectives affect the success police have in solving crimes.

The Victoria Police in Australia, the second largest Australian state, has implemented a new model in how they approach criminal investigations based on a report submitted by the Boston Consulting Group (2005). Braga et al. (2011) highlight this an example of how police departments can move towards a crime control focus.

- Strategic because modern policing is as much about staying ahead of criminals as it is about catching up with them.
- Dynamic because the ability of the police to prevent, investigate and prosecute crime must evolve at least as quickly as criminals’ ability to find new or more effective ways to profit from it.
- Collaborative because the magnitude of the challenge is such that investigators need to be able to draw on capabilities from across the force, as well as from partners outside it.
- Developmental because the model must provide the means to continuously improve the skills and processes needed to anticipate and meet evolving challenges. (Source: Braga et al., 2011, pp. 21-22. See also the Victoria Police Annual Report 2004/2005, p.32⁶)

6 Victoria Police Annual Report 2004/2005 available at: www.police.vic.gov.au/retrievemedias.asp?Media_ID=1838

There is a body of literature that suggest that addressing recurring crime problems by way of careful systematic analysis is an effective to control crime (e.g., Braga, 2008; Weisburd et al., 2010).

Building on the implementation of the Victoria Police investigation model, we approach criminal investigations from a traditional perspective, although the PANTHER process integrates the notions of strategy, dynamic, collaboration and development by way of each component (e.g., scanning and analysis, method selection, and evaluation).



...The use of aggressive interrogative tools is avoided in favor of the cognitive interview where the investigator can build trust and rapport "

The investigative process is also an excellent opportunity to build trust and establish rapport with gang members and with the local community, which increases chances of procuring informants and information from the citizenry. The police should capitalize on this opportunity by being communicative and professional in their demeanor. The use of aggressive interrogative tools is avoided in favor of the cognitive interview where the investigator can build trust and rapport.

Types of investigations

In PANTHER, all types of criminal investigations are possible, ranging from misdemeanor or petty offenses to serious, violent crime (as illustrated below). The model, or philosophy, does not limit or restrict investigative work in itself. The goal of the investigation component in PANTHER is similar to other gang investigation departments; that is, to carry out criminal investigations of suspected criminal activity involving gang members, incapacitate key individuals by successful prosecution, seize criminal assets from gang members in an effort to reduce the temptations of a criminal lifestyle, examine corporations that are being used as puppets or fronts to launder illegal money (e.g., proceeds from drugs, extortion, racketeering, etc.), and to fight white-collar crime, when appropriate (or collaborate with other agencies when necessary).

The difference, however, is the seamless connection with the other components in the model, as well as the external collaboration with other agencies. In addition, no investigation is too petty – investigations can be an awesome tool that propel and develop larger cases on key gang members.

The backbone of investigations: interviews and interrogations

Police gather information in many ways. For example, information is continuously accumulated throughout an investigation – a process where witnesses may offer

information voluntarily and where suspects may decide not to talk at all. But the information that the police gather varies in quality; some is useful and propel the investigation forward, other information is not useful at all, and some is actually misleading (Bennett & Hess, 2004) and potentially harmful for the investigative process.

Police officers that fully buy in to the concepts of community-oriented and problem-oriented policing arguably spend a lot of their time talking with citizens and with other community actors in an effort to elicit information; information about community concerns and problems, in addition to providing information. In addition, police officers also gather information from witnesses, victims, and offenders – a process generally referred to as interviewing (non-suspects) or interrogation (suspects) (Bennett & Hess, 2004).

Bennett and Hess (2004) argues that the purpose of the interviewing and interrogating process is to glean enough information so that the police can eliminate those innocent of suspicion and arrest and charge those responsible for a particular crime. Others posit that: **“... solid interviewing skills stand as the cornerstone in law enforcement’s arsenal of crime-fighting weapons”** (Einspahr, 2000, p.20).

Recently, researchers at *John Jay College of Criminal Justice* in New York (Kessin et al., 2010) suggested that American law enforcement is preoccupied in soliciting confessions in interrogative situations, which poses several problems, most notably the risk of false confessions. They pointed out the need for a new model of interrogation, a model that *“... reconceptualize the social influence process of interrogation by making it less confrontational and more investigative”* (Kessin et al., 2010, p. 46).

Outside of the United States, several police forces have adopted a different approach to interrogations. For example, Kessin et al. pointed out that *“...the British took this step several years ago when the Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act of 1984 sought to reduce the use of psychologically manipulative tactics”* (Kessin et al., 2010, p. 46) and since then, other countries such as New Zealand, Norway and Sweden have adopted alternative methods of interrogation.

Problems with Using a “Confession Focus”

One popular interrogation technique used widely by American and Canadian law enforcement agencies is the *Reid Technique*⁷. This method is based on a mixture of factual analysis, behavior analysis, and interrogation with the purpose of identifying liars and distinguishing between the innocent and guilty. The Reid Technique is not

⁷ Available at: www.reid.com/training_programs/interview_overview.html Accessed: December 2011.

allowed in many European countries because of the incidence of false confessions and wrongful convictions that result (e.g., Beck, 2009; Drizin & Leo, 2004; Vrij, 1998; Kassin et al., 2010). Indeed, cases of false confessions have been recognized in Canadian media as a result of using the Reid Technique (CBCNews Canada, 2003). The news article stated⁸ that the **"...judges in the cases had harsh words about the Reid technique. In Alberta, the judge called it a 'huge psychological brainwashing exercise.' And in Manitoba, a judge called the technique 'repugnant to society's sense of decency,' and urged police to stop using it."**

Undeniably, there are several legal issues associated with police questioning that is substantially centered on obtaining confessions. One of the problems highlighted in the literature is that these types of questionings can lead to either voluntary or compulsory false confessions (e.g., Christianson et. al., 1998; Granhag & Christianson, 2008). Researchers have also argued that voluntary false confessions are a par-



⁸ Full-text article accessed January 2012, available on-line at: www.cbc.ca/news/story/2003/01/27/interrogation030127.html

ticular risk to legal certainty since the suspect receives a form of satisfaction from the ensuing attention (Gudjonsson, 1992), or that a suspect no longer can distinguish between imaginary and factual. These suspects are therefore particularly susceptible to suggestion techniques (see Gudjonsson, 1991).

Christianson and colleagues (1998) argue that voluntary false confessions are particularly problematic when the suspect believes there is a potential gain (for example, to end the interrogation or to protect another offender). Some researchers have even argued that false confessions are the dark yield of incompetent police officers (e.g., Zimbardo, 1967). But the paradox of forced false confessions, where the police use “fuzzy” or “sweeping” claims of proof is used as a lever, is that the police themselves tell a lie. This is illustrated by Gudjonsson (1994) who writes that **“... this means that police officers are encouraged to make a false confession themselves in order to obtain a confession from suspects”** (p. 239).

But there are also situations in which an overemphasized “confession focus” leads the suspect to internalize the recognition they get from the interrogator and, therefore, falsely believes that he, or she, has committed the alleged offense (Granahag & Christianson, 2008). This occurs when the suspect doubts his, or her, own memory (which may already be weak due to a traumatic experience, etc.) and instead trusts the external information that is presented by the police as facts (i.e., by what the interrogator says or by what is presented). Of course this is an intrusive threat to the rule of law and undermines the overall legality and credibility of true confessions.

A review of case studies in interrogation analysis shows a similar problem. An overemphasis on confession focus may also lead the interrogator to actively ignore what the suspect is saying because it does not fit with the preconceived notion, or police version, of the events (e.g., Jakobsson-Öhrn & Nyberg, 2009). In these cases, the police accept a series of hypothetical events as an absolute truth, without objectively considering the evidence.

Moston and colleagues (1992) found similar results, where over 70 percent of interrogators were sure of guilt before the questioning had begun. Furthermore, researchers of qualitative studies have shown that over 80 percent of police officers thought that the purpose of an interrogation was to develop, or extract, a confession (e.g., McConville & Hodgson, 1993). Both of these studies are based on the concept that police officers have a negative attitude towards suspects (see for example, Van Maanen, 1978).

This approach is based on the premise that police afford suspects a stigma, a perception that is grounded in the notion that a person is always arrested for a reason; perhaps loitering near the crime scene, perhaps by way of a matching description, or perhaps as a result of an eyewitness identification. Regardless, an arrested person is most likely held as responsible. Ainsworth (2002) argues something similar. He states that regardless of the reason for arrest, the arrest itself smears a negative image over the suspect – and if the person has a record, a previous conviction for a similar type crime, then guilt is automatically assumed. Against this backdrop, then, it would seem utterly important that police interrogations are conducted in a proper manner - a manner that generates information so that the question of guilt may be determined from an objective approach.

In Sweden, there is body of legislation that regulates interrogations; designed, in part, to minimize the risk of police coerced confessions. For example, a police officer is by law prohibited from using deceit and lying, or making promises in exchange for information and/or a confession (RB 23 kap., 12§). A violation of this law could result in dismissal, fine, and/or (in severe cases) imprisonment.

The PEACE model

Kassin et al. (2010) provided an example of an alternative model, based on the mnemonic PEACE, which was initially developed by the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice in 1993. PEACE describes the five distinct stages of the interrogation process: ‘preparation and planning,’ ‘engage and explain,’ ‘account,’ ‘closure,’ and ‘evaluate’. The wider purpose of this model is fact-finding rather than eliciting confessions (Kassin et al., 2010).

“In this model, interviewers are encouraged to be fair and open-minded and to pursue reliable, true, and accurate information. Observational research has suggested that such investigative interviews enable police to inculcate offenders by obtaining useful information from them (see Williamson, 2006). Moreover, laboratory experiments have shown that a challenging investigative interview can also lead suspects to produce more verbal (Vrij, Mann, Kristen, & Fisher, 2007) and non-verbal (Vrij, 2006) cues to deception.” (Cited from Kassin et al., 2010, p. 47).

In developing the investigative approach for PANTHER, we used the PEACE model as a starting point. This was a natural decision since PEACE is widely used by Swedish police and also taught at the Swedish National Police Academy. In evaluating the model, we found no inherent need to change anything – the PEACE

model was an excellent vehicle for us to use in conducting interrogations. However, we made some modifications so that it would apply more readily to gang crime and interrogating gang members.

A similar approach: Information-gathering interrogations

We drew from the work collated by Christianson and colleagues (and others) – the cognitive interview and the information-gathering interrogation.

An information-gathering interrogation is based on the principles of the cognitive interview methodology where subjects are allowed to elaborate freely under guidance from the interrogator (Christianson et al., 1998). That is, a suspect is channeled through a number of phases in the interrogation process. The advantage of this “structure” is that the interrogator will gain rapport while at the same time creating a safe environment and promoting an informed discussion. As a bonus, the interrogator also creates a “mental map” of the information seeking process, which generates a sense of professional security and consistency. This is, in essence, very similar to the PEACE model.

Christianson and colleagues (1998) describes information-gathering interrogations by way of four main components: 1) orientation phase, 2) listening phase, 3) query phase, and 4) consultative phase. Each phase is discussed below, highlighting benefits and potential difficulties.

During the initial phase, the interrogator gives information regarding the purpose of the interrogation and its implementation, and collects the necessary formalities as well as providing the suspect with the formal charge/suspicion (i.e., the reason for the interrogation), the right to the council, etc. The challenge for the interrogator at this point is to convey “gloomy information” in a live, non-bureaucratic manner. An interrogator should not be provocative or accusatory, but rather try to convey a sense of calm by way of a fair presentation of factual circumstances (Christianson et al., 1998, p. 230).

The second stage, the listening phase, is based on stimulating the suspect to talk freely. The interrogator should not be in focus; rather the interrogator should encourage the suspect to talk by using open-ended questions, working from the larger to the smaller picture. Consequently, **the suspect should be talking**

“...the interrogator will gain rapport while at the same time creating a safe environment and promoting an informed discussion”

the majority of the time, leaving the interrogator time to take detailed notes.

The challenge becomes to invite the suspect to use his/her own words, and to provide as much detail as possible about a particular event (Christianson et al., 1998). Nilsson and Waldemarson (2007) write, among others, on the importance of social perception, nonverbal communication, and active listening as basic building blocks of an effective information retrieval. This phase is potentially problematic since it requires a positive personal contact with the suspect (Christianson et al., 1998). This could be especially problematic in dealing with gang members. If the interrogator fails to create or promote such a relationship, either before the interrogation, or during the orientation phase, it could result in a very laconic narrative. This is why police officer attitude (and social interactions) becomes essential in the PANTHER model. Gang officers need to treat gang members with respect and be courteous and correct – all the time. Officers need to follow the rules, not operate in the legal shades of gray, just to make an arrest or as a proxy to search a vehicle. It is our experience that this is the fastest way to “burn” your reputation with gang members – they are fine with having their vehicle searched, or having to ride to the station to submit to a drug test, as

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...the key is to treat gang members as human beings, as opposed to hardened criminals that ought to be locked-up and have the key thrown away.”

long as the police have legal grounds. Gang members have told us that it’s “part of the game” implying that each “side” have a set of rules they adhere to. Once the police step over the line, so to speak, and construct something out of nothing, then gang members become upset and your social capital with that gang member is bankrupt. On the contrary, it is also our experience that you could conduct a search warrant in the middle of the night, seize valuable contraband and make an arrest, without it damaging your reputation. One gang leader once told me “... hey, I lost, you won. I won’t make the same mistake twice.” Then he laughed and pleaded not guilty for good measure.

So, we strongly believe that the key is to treat gang members as *human beings*, as opposed to hardened criminals that ought to be locked-up and have the key thrown away. In deed, we have had good results by adopting this method in our work (both in the field and in our investigations) and gang members recognize us as just and fair, which makes future interactions so much easier. In essence, to adhere to the code of the street - *to get respect, you have to give respect*.

One example to illustrate this:

Late one Saturday night, 2008, uniformed patrol officers from police district 2 in Stockholm, responded to a domestic disturbance call. At the scene, the police officers were met MB and his girlfriend. MB was in his mid twenties and acted as a role model for the youth in the area, mainly because of his gang affiliation. His girlfriend was 19 and showed signs of abuse. Besides, she stated that MB had struck her twice in the face due to some disagreement they'd had. Consequently, MB was arrested for assault and brought in for questioning at the police station. Once there, however, MB refused to talk to the on-duty investigators. MB stated that he'd only talk to one of the investigators at the local gang unit; no other cops were to be trusted. When they explained that unless the gang unit was on-duty, he could have to spend the entire weekend in jail, he said he didn't care.

An active listening, free of cultural bias (Nilsson and Waldemarson, 2007) and pre-conceived ideas (Christianson et al., 1998) is therefore a must for any gang investigator. One advantage of this method, as it is used in PANTHER, is that the suspect decides what to say and what words they describe an event with. In addition, the suspect is provided an opportunity to give their “personal touch” to an event. This provides the interrogator with an excellent opportunity to form an impression of the suspect, both as a person and about the event. The benefit derived from this is that any factual evidence that the interrogator presents – evidence that contradict the suspects’ own story – then becomes more prejudicial. Consequently, the contradiction in itself carries more evidential strength in court⁹.

Any “gaps” in the suspects’ story created by the second phase is covered during the third phase. Christianson et al. (1998) emphasize that this is the phase where

⁹ The Swedish legal system is based on an oral tradition – that is, written statements and affidavits, for example, are not used during legal proceedings. Instead, a person (e.g., a witness, victim, or suspect) has to tell the court what happened. What they told the police at an earlier stage of the investigation (e.g., what's written down in the submitted investigation) has little significance, although it could be used in court to point out contradictions, etc. For example, if a person says something in court that is contrary to what they previously told the police investigators, its evidentiary strength would be valued less than a “story” that is inherently consistent throughout the investigation and in court. Also, it should be noted that it is not illegal in Sweden to lie to the police. It is, however, illegal (and also punishable) to deliberately lie to the court during official legal proceedings. The police, on the other hand, are not allowed to lie to suspects at any time (e.g., saying there's evidence that does not exist to force a confession, etc.).

the interrogator “... *complements the story where there are gaps*” (p.230). Unlike previous phases, however, the interrogator is more proactive in this phase, primarily by confronting inconsistencies or asking additional follow-up questions, as needed. The horn of the dilemma at this stage is to maintain a positive relationship with the suspect, even when the questioning arrives at potentially sensitive matters and/or when the suspect is confronted with evidence or information that is conflicting with their own story. The risk is that the suspect will “lock up”, leaving the interrogator with an incomplete interrogation. The benefit, however, is that the interrogator is provided with an excellent opportunity to develop a theme of questioning that is based on the suspects’ on words and the evidence at hand.

The final phase deals with substantive feedback. Christianson and colleagues (1998) describes it as an opportunity to resolve any potential misunderstandings from the interrogators’ written notes (i.e., interpretations) regarding the suspect’s story and answers. The interrogator will review their notes with the suspect and have them sign off on it. This will reduce the risk of retracting statements and/or changing a story in court. **The difficulty lies, in part, to understand and identify the different nuances in language, or in behavior, during the actual interrogation, while at the same time keeping a detailed record of what is said¹⁰.**

For example, an overly active listening, without the associated active writing, leaves a weak record and subsequently a weak feedback. The benefit, however, is that the interrogator will build trust and rapport with the suspects’, as they are seen as being conscientious about getting their story right. Furthermore, the interrogator can use this time to address any potential questions or concerns about what happens next in the investigation (Christianson et al., 1998). We have also found that this provides a “natural ending” of the interrogation, and an excellent opportunity to “chitchat” and perhaps even glean additional information (intelligence) about other gang matters that are not related to the case-at-hand.

Moreover, it is pointed out that providing information about or on upcoming events in an investigation strengthens the relationship between the interrogator and the suspect (Christianson et al., 1998). Besides, taking the time to field questions at the end will also create a good foundation for future interactions and/or interrogations (like in the MB case).

In conclusion, there are few benefits associated with a judgmental and accusa-

¹⁰ Videotaped interrogations, which would provide a verbatim account of what is said, is not always done in Sweden, although many police districts are now moving towards enacting a videotape requirement for certain interrogations and/or offenses.

tory attitude in interrogation situations involving gang members. Instead, a gang interrogator has much more to gain by seeking information by using information-gathering interrogations and the cognitive interview method. This is especially beneficial in situations where interrogators frequently meet the same suspects over and over again, during extended periods of time (e.g., gang unit investigators). Naturally, if an investigator has acted in a manner that is not conducive to establishing positive relationships and rapport, future interrogations will become problematic. Conversely, if an interrogator is perceived as being fair and just, and as someone who takes the time to listen to a story (even if it may be proved wrong...) has much more to gain.

Go for the money: white-collar crime, examining corporations and seizing assets

One investigative strategy used in PANTHER is to "go for the money." That is, to take every opportunity during criminal investigations to seize assets and limit the proceeds from crime. The rationale for this is naturally that the primary driving force behind organized crime (and gang crime) in Sweden is undoubtedly money and luxury (Korsell et al., 2009). Indeed, in our daily work as gang officers in Stockholm county, we have noticed that gang members value certain materialistic goods such as vehicles, luxury watches, brand-name clothing, gold chains, etc.

An effective work strategy must therefore be focused on the tracing and confiscation of proceeds from criminal activities. For the past few years, this has been discussed by Swedish law enforcement authorities and the issue has also been open to a public debate. The



issue of criminal assets and the work against the proceeds of crime has also been discussed at length in Europe.

For example, in its annual assessment regarding the threat from organized crime,



...the European Police Agency (Europol) emphasized that member countries must get better at focusing investigative resources to detect, identify and secure assets derived primarily from organized crime...”

the European Police Agency (Europol) emphasized that member countries must get better at focusing investigative resources to detect, identify and secure assets derived from crime, primarily from organized crime (OCTA, 2009). Moreover, in 2008, the European Commission urged Member States to actively pursue an effective way to fight organized crime, and suggested that an effective way of achieving this is through the confiscation and recovery of assets derived from criminal activity (European Commission Communication, 2008).

The Section against Gang Crime (SGI) has intensified its efforts at asset recovery and taken an aggressive approach towards “criminal money.” By using PANTHER, this work is primarily

centered and designed around collaboration with local and regional intelligence centers (called “LUC” and “RUC”) where representatives from other governmental agencies freely share information on identified gang members. Since 2009, this work has resulted in tax adjustments from undeclared income corresponding to approximately 10 million SEK (approximately 1,5 million U.S. dollars) and forfeiture of property equivalent to roughly three million SEK (approximately 425,000 U.S. dollar) including 10 high-end cars (Gustafsson, 2011).

Besides investigating suspected criminal gang activity by using traditional investigative techniques, we also conduct parallel personal investigations on strategic gang members (gang leaders) that “map” their legal incomes and document their lifestyle (access to luxury items, cars, motorcycles, etc.). These are then compared and more often than not, it becomes evident that these individuals live above their means. Documentation is secured through the use of various surveillance techniques (e.g., photos, film, or other technical solutions) or by traditional police work – like stop and search and then documenting what type of vehicle they were driving, etc. The gang leaders (or strategic individuals in criminal networks) are then questioned by gang investigators about their extravagant lifestyle and asked where they get the funds to purchase the documented luxury items. Depending on how these questions are answered, appropriate actions are taken. For example, a gang member may say that they have worked construction illegally over a period of time, not wanting to

incriminate himself with the sale of narcotics. If the criminal case against the gang member does not render a guilt verdict and the gang member is cleared of all charges (a guilt verdict is a prerequisite for sequestering the assets), then the investigator could contact and provide the information regarding the untaxed income to the Swedish Tax Agency, who would then make an income tax adjustment and subject the gang member to a substantial fine.

Another way to “go for the money” is to target social benefits. For example, a gang member might receive money from social welfare benefits because he is unable to work (In Sweden, citizens are entitled to money from the State if they are unable to procure employment due to an illness or handicap, etc.). However, if the police by way of surveillance or otherwise, can show that such a claim is fraudulent (i.e., a gang member have claimed “social phobia” as reason for not being able to procure employment, yet they spend everyday hanging out in public places) then a criminal fraud investigation is initiated and assets can be seized to secure reimbursement to the state (such as high-end vehicles, etc.). This method – targeting social benefit fraud – has been very effective at pursuing certain gang members that have otherwise eluded prosecution.




Illustration: Using PANTHER and adding relevant components during investigation stage.

Reflections on Investigating Gang Crime using the PANTHER model

By: Detective Inspector Torbjörn Hermansson, Senior Investigator and SGIP Project Secretary, Section against Gang Crime, Stockholm County Police.


The investigative background to SGIP

When the Section against Gang Crime (SGI) was created about 10 years ago (although initially under a different name and organization), the idea was that tactical gang officers would work aggressively out in field (i.e., using suppression) and conduct various investigative work in close collaboration with other police staff and external services.

Initially, there was a full-time detective attached to each tactical team/group. However, we soon realized that one detective was not enough due to the investigative workload that quickly filled the dockets. As a result, the gang unit created a separate team/group of detectives with a detective sergeant in charge of all the investigative work conducted at the gang unit. As such, the detectives were removed from the tactical teams. This created a division of labor – tactical vs. investigative.

This organizational format is still in use – that is, a separate team of detectives and separate teams of tactical officers. However, the staffing numerals have fluctuated over time, in all groups. Albeit the teams have varied in size over time, the detective unit has always worked very closely with the tactical teams and with the district and county criminal intelligence units. However, the cooperation between the teams have crystalized following the implementation of SGIP and PANTHER. The teams now work more seamlessly and integrated with a common goal or purpose (more on this below).

Traditionally, the majority of criminal investigations carried out by the Swedish police (and presumably in many other police forces) are reactive in nature. That is, criminal cases are initiated after a criminal complaint is received. The criminal complaint is then investigated and subsequently reported or handed over to the prosecuting authority for legal action, and ultimately decided in a court of law. Organizationally, this is a very time consuming process for the police – first, the com-



plaint is registered at a police station or by some other venue (e.g., on the phone). Then the complaint is reviewed by a senior police officer and a decision is made to investigate or dismiss (e.g., the complaint may not be a crime – it could, for example, be related to a civil matter, such as custody of children). If a decision is made that it is a police matter, the complaint is sent to an investigative bureau or unit. The receiving unit, depending on the types of cases it handles, may only be staffed Monday through Friday 08:00 – 16:30. If a case is received Friday afternoon, for example, the complaint will lay unattended until Monday morning. Once received, a senior detective will review the merits of the complaint and assign one or more detectives to it. This means, roughly estimated, that it could take up to one or two days before a case finds its way to a detective, depending on the size of the organization (some variations exist in Sweden since there are 21 different police authorities nationwide).

The Section against Gang Crime (SGI) is organizationally different in that it is self-sufficient – **SGI has the mandate to independently authorize initial investigate decisions on filed criminal complaints that are gang-related**. That is, make the decision whether to investigate a complaint as gang-related or not. Moreover, SGI it has the expertise and know-how to handle all sorts of criminal complaints (i.e., misdemeanors to felonies). Normally, cases are sorted and assigned depending on severity and types of offense (e.g., felony investigations and street-crime offenses). SGI has the resources to deal with incoming matters very quickly, which creates investigative momentum – a great feat when the first few hours are critical in some investigations. Investigative expertise and experience is crucial when investigating criminal gangs and networks, which typically commit all types of offenses – from violent crimes and property offenses (i.e., murder cases, attempted murder, extortion, aggravated robbery and serious drug offenses, in addition to theft, fraud and vandalism).

These investigations, although varying in nature, are reactive – that is, we are simply responding to reported crime. However, the original idea in the creation of SGI was to initiate criminal cases based on intelligence – that is, intelligence-led investigations. Consequently, SGI began to seek out people who had been victimized by gangs but, for various reasons, had not reported it to the police. This information reached SGI by way of criminal intelligence and/or confidential informants (CI's). SGI officers then wrote a formal criminal complaint (report) and encouraged victims to fully participate in the investigation.

This proved to be a difficult task. One reason was the social environment we worked in – that is, socially deprived areas where there was a great mistrust in the police. Language and cultural barriers posed another problem, as did the fact that our investigations often were in areas with great residential mobility and in areas where criminal street gangs thrived and, in some cases, controlled the neighborhood. We also tried, seemingly fruitlessly, to get gang members to assist us in the investigation when they were, themselves victims of crimes. This was, not surprisingly, like talking to a wall. The “code of the street” was strong in these areas.

So, the investigative work was initially challenging, and consisted mainly of motivating and influencing victims and witnesses to participate in criminal investigations – more so than conducting actual investigations. This experience served as a backdrop to the current project (SGIP) – that is, a need to create long-term investigative solutions in socially deprived areas, in conjunction with intervention and prevention efforts to create and foster a positive relationship with the residents of these areas. In essence, it has a lot to do with building relationships and trust, and less to do with pure suppressive and aggressive methods of policing.

New methods refined

The role and use of gang detectives was another part of the investigative work that was significantly different from traditional investigative work at other detective bureaus/units in Sweden. At SGI, detectives are involved with preliminary investigations out in the field (i.e., the detectives initiate cases independently).

Traditionally, uniformed patrol officers respond to calls for service, and when needed, they take up criminal complaints. Moreover, patrol officers are expected to conduct a preliminary investigation at the scene (e.g., take the case as far as they can immediately, such as interviewing witnesses, victim(s) and collecting evidence). If SGI have resources available (on-duty personnel), **gang detectives would immediately respond alongside the tactical gang officers.** This facilitates momentum and case familiarity; detectives get a unique opportunity to be involved from the beginning of a case. Also, it builds a strong team – it creates a “we” instead of deep fissures between tactical and investigative staff. In addition, having been “on the scene” is a great advantage in an arrest, search, and interrogation situation where the detective can draw on their own experiences, understandings and impressions from a particular crime scene, instead of having to rely on the notes and reports of tactical or uniformed patrol officers.

Building relationships with victims of crimes through investigations

SGI repeatedly receive intelligence information (e.g., from confidential informants) indicating that people have been victims of extortion by criminal gangs. By contacting the alleged victim, as soon as possible, and informing them that “we know what’s going on”, and informing what we can do to help, detectives and tactical officers have been successful in convincing and motivating victims to participate in criminal investigations. This is a new way of handling criminal intelligence – that is, to respond to it rather than just collect and store it in a database.

Partly, this success in extortion cases comes from providing information to the victim that the problem will not “go away” by paying money the gangs. On the contrary, it is likely to get worse. Moreover, by informing victims about what the police can do, how the legal system works, and what protection and support that is available, detectives and tactical officers are able to “win” confidence and participation.

Since these cases are unreported crimes (information comes through intelligence and not by a criminal complaint), SGI detectives and tactical officers are uncovering crimes and initiating investigations by being responsive and attentive to intelligence information (many times, this information is offered by sources who have previously been victimized and part of SGI investigations, and/or sources that have developed positive rapport with staff). The assigned case detective then follows victims throughout the entire investigation, through the legal process, and subsequently, conducts a follow-up debriefing post-trial and conviction. This builds up and fosters a positive relationship, centered on consistency and trust. This has proven to be a very effective way to increase intelligence flow, long-term, since many previous “victims” contact SGI officers directly with tips and information about what is going on in a particular neighborhood. This has been extremely helpful in the initial stages of the PANTHER process (scanning and analysis) and when planning operations. As such, detectives and tactical officers contribute to the PANTHER process by feeding in information and intelligence.

“Partly, this success in extortion cases comes from providing information to the victim that the problem will not “go away” by paying money the gangs.”

The investigative process: experiences from SGIP / PANTHER

The collaboration between detectives, intelligence officers, other police staff and external actors have increased with the start of the Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project. The entire gang unit began working more strategically against

various individuals and street gangs, as guided by the PANTHER model. Following identification and analysis of “strategic individuals”, open cases were gathered from police departments all over the country, which allowed for a speedier and more substantial investigation (case) against selected individuals – individuals who were too involved to target with intervention methods. This, in turn, generated new leads and new charges. The general idea was to prosecute strategic individuals and remove them from the gang environment by imprisonment (e.g., incapacitation).

This process, however, allowed detectives and tactical officers to locate certain “at-risk youth” for targeted intervention and prevention efforts. As such, by investigating the circle of individuals around various strategic gang members, new intelligence was collected that were later used in intervention efforts. Without the targeted investigation against strategic individuals, these at-risk youth might have been missed, and therefore not been identified until their first formal arrest, and when they are already wrapped up in career criminality. This important work has been carried out in close collaboration with local social services, social intervention teams (SIT), social coordination groups (SCG), as well as with other identified stakeholders.

Focusing on “gang money”

One aspect that is considered during SGI investigations is the suspect’s financial situation. Since the concept “go for the money” is a part of the PANTHER method, an important part of the criminal investigation process is, consequently, to examine suspects financial situation and identify potential criminal assets and locate proceeds of crime. This is accomplished by employing traditional investigative techniques, such as interrogation and interviews, but also by way of gathering intelligence and following up financial leads, and collaboration with external agencies (e.g. The

Swedish Tax Agency, The Financial Intelligence Unit, Swedish National Bureau of Investigation, The Swedish National Economic Crimes Bureau, The Swedish Social Insurance Agency, Control Unit).



The suspects are then confronted with gathered information and, if possible, assets are seized and/or confiscated. In some cases, criminal assets are used to repay outstanding debts to various creditors by working closely with The Swedish Enforcement Authority, the governmental agency with the legislative power to seize and confiscate personal property.

Tactical gang officers and gang investigations

Tactical gang officers are frequently assigned to conduct various investigative duties. Albeit these duties are purely investigative in nature, they are considered “ordinary tasks” for SGI tactical officers. As such, investigative duties are not bestowed upon tactical officers in addition to “traditional” gang officer duties (e.g., surveillance, stop/search, suppression).

Tactical officers frequently assist gang detectives with duties, especially during on-going, larger investigations. Duties may include, but are not limited to, locating and interrogating suspects, interviewing witnesses and victims, conducting and executing search warrants, tracking down stolen property, conducting financial inquiries, talking with attorneys and other external actors, etc. By using the tactical teams in this fashion, the gang unit can increase its efficiency in investigating gang related crimes.

Tactical officers rely on investigation training received at the national police academy (two years) and additional, practical training that is received at the gang unit.

For example, all tactical officers that are recruited to the gang unit (SGI) serves at least six months as gang investigators. The rationale is that investigative duties will provide new recruits with a solid platform for further tactical gang work using the PANTHER model.

In addition, in order to achieve sustainability in criminal investigations, tactical officers need to be able to assist permanent detectives – perhaps even conduct minor investigations all by themselves (as detectives might be caught up in larger, felony cases). In essence, it all comes down to maximizing the use of available personnel. However, the idea behind this requirement is centered on personal development and increasing knowledge and expertise among staff. We believe that a police officer will perform at a higher level and produce high quality work with increased experience, training and skills.

“ Tactical gang officers are frequently assigned to conduct various investigative duties. Albeit these duties are purely investigative in nature, they are considered “ordinary tasks” for SGI tactical officers.”

From the case files – an example of a gang investigation

By: Detective Sergeant Torbjörn Hermansson, Senior Investigator and SGIP Project Secretary, Section against Gang Crime, Stockholm County Police.

The strength of having a close working relationship between investigators, tactical officers, and other police units is demonstrated in the “El Burro” case.

“El Burro”

“Tom” owned and operated a technology store in a suburb of southern Stockholm. Tom and his wife lived in a small house with their young child. As a juvenile, Tom had committed a burglary along with two friends, but Tom got away, although the police chased him. As such, Tom never got arrested for the offense. One of his friends, however, was caught and later sentenced to prison for the burglary. Tom’s friend never told the police the names of his two accomplices and served his time alone. After Tom’s friend was released from prison, they had sporadic contact. Being chased by the police, and almost being caught, had changed Tom’s view on life, and he had made a clean break. As such, he did not actively seek contact with his former two friends. Instead, Tom found a girl and later became a father and started his own business.

After some time, however, his former friend contacted him and suggested they would stage a burglary at Tom’s store and then split the insurance money. Tom said absolutely not, but his friend kept calling him, over and over, suggesting they partner up in the scheme. Tom kept saying no and that he was not interested in committing any more crimes. Tom’s friend then started coming by the store, suggesting they stage the burglary, fence the goods and then divide the settlement between them. Who would ever find out? But Tom kept insisting – he was not interested.

Tom’s friend then showed up at the store, along with two other “tough guys” Tom did not know. But he kept saying no. Finally, his friend gave up and some time passed without any further contact. Tom thought this was a relief, because he did not want any con-

tact with his former friend, and besides, he was quite afraid of him. Tom had heard through mutual acquaintances that his former friend was involved in a criminal street gang, was extremely violent and unstable, had trained karate, and could do anything just to get his way.

One evening, when Tom was out with some friends, his former friend paid a visit to Tom's house. His wife had answered the door, explained that Tom wasn't home. When Tom later found out, he became upset and irritated that his former friend had come to his house. He called his former friend on the phone and asked him what he wanted. His former friend told Tom to meet him in a parking lot adjacent to Tom's house, as soon as possible. Tom was told to come alone.

When Tom came to the parking lot, his former friend and another man he did not know waited for him. His former friend accused Tom of having betrayed him and demanded 60,000 Swedish Crowns (approximately 8,000 USD), or alternatively, that he let them into his store and give them the insurance money. Tom's former friend showed a gun and told him that he knew where Tom's mother and his family lived, and that an accident could easily happen. Wouldn't that be too bad? Tom protested and tried to talk his former friend out of it - said he was not interested in committing any more crimes. His former friend said that Tom had two weeks to pay the money, or things would get ugly. Tom was shaking, scared and worried about his family and his mother, but left the meeting unharmed.

By way of intelligence sources, the Section against Gang Crime (SGI) learned about this case and initiated an extortion investigation. Tom was contacted by detectives and, after many attempts, encouraged to participate fully in the investigation. Tom and his family were moved out of their house to a secure location officers from the Protection Detail had regular contact with them.

The case was presented to a district attorney (prosecutor) who took over the lead on the case. The prosecutor quickly decided

that SGI should rig a trap by having Tom talk to his old friend on the phone so the police could trace the call, and maybe even arrange a staged money-drop meeting. A special case task force, consisting of SGI tactical officers, officers from the Protection Detail, and the Stockholm County Police SWAT team, was formed to make this happen. At the same time intelligence officers at SGI mapped and charted the known suspect and tried to ascertain the identity of the second suspect.

When Tom's former friend called, Tom replied that he could not talk, told him to call back later, and then quickly hung up. This allowed the police to track the phone number used, which proved to be a pay phone at a train station in southern Stockholm. The pattern from previous calls suggested that the suspect used the same pay phone every time. So, the next day, SGI tactical officers initiated surveillance on the pay phone in order to identify the suspect making the next call. However, it took two weeks before the suspect called again.

But the police were ready and the conversation was recorded and the surveillance team was able to take several pictures of the suspect placing the call. On the phone, the suspect said he was getting tired of waiting, and that he wanted his 60,000 plus interest, since Tom took so long to get the money. The suspect said he wanted the money in two days, and that Tom would find out later where to drop it. When the suspect had finished the call, he was followed leaving the train station in a vehicle. The vehicle was linked to several other gang members, who were quickly identified. One of these gang members matched the description of the second suspect. A surveillance operation was initiated with the purpose of watching the vehicle.

Tom was told by the task force to leave the bait money in his car, at the location suggested by the suspect. The SWAT team would then move in and arrest the suspects. On the day of the drop, the suspects drove the vehicle into an indoor shopping center, where they called Tom from a pay phone. They told Tom to meet them at a McDonald's restaurant in south Stockholm, where he would give

them the money. Tom told them he was scared, and that he did not want to meet them at all, but that he would leave the money in the glove compartment. The idea was that an undercover police officer would drive Tom's vehicle to McDonald's and that Tom would sit safe at the police station.

The task force now hurried to get everyone in place; the SWAT team infiltrated McDonald's and Tom's vehicle was parked at the restaurant. At the same time, the tactical officers following the suspects' vehicle were getting closer to the restaurant. Once at the restaurant, the suspects' drove around the parking lot, seemingly suspicious. They also entered McDonald's twice, like they were casing the place. Then they got back in the vehicle and drove another lap around the parking lot.

After several minutes, one suspect got out of the vehicle on a street adjacent to McDonald's and entered a forested area. He went through the forest and then backtracked to Tom's vehicle, located the key that had been left on the front tire, as agreed upon, and unlocked the car. SGI tactical officer watched the whole event unfold through their binocular lenses, and the SWAT team members watched from their hide out in McDonald's. The suspect then got into the vehicle and took the envelope from the glove compartment. When he started to walk back through the forest, he noticed the police officers that were on their way to arrest him. He started to run, but was quickly arrested.


At the same time, the SWAT team blocked in the suspects' vehicle in the parking lot. The driver tried to escape by backing into a squad car, but got stuck. SWAT team members smashed the windshield on the suspect's vehicle and subdued the man. Both men were taken to jail and charged with attempted extortion.

During the investigation, SGI detectives found additional victims of extortion and the case grew to also include several counts of extortion. Both suspects were sentenced to long prison terms.



Photograph taken from the investigation – one of the suspects makes a call to “Tom” from a pay phone at a train station in Stockholm.

Evaluation



The evaluation component in PANTHER has nothing to do with “project evaluation” or an assessment about overall program effectiveness of SGIP (the project evaluation is conducted separately by an independent third party). Rather, the evaluation component is designed to be an obligatory step in the PANTHER process, a step

that allows for individual self-evaluation and collective reflection about the current tactical operation. As such, police administrators using PANTHER need to schedule sufficient time for evaluations when planning tactical operations using PANTHER.




Illustration: PANTHER is constructed around the concepts of problem-oriented policing and the notion of a proper self-evaluation and reflection (process evaluation).

In that sense, we draw heavily on the work of Clark and Eck (2005) and the process/impact evaluation flowchart (shown below). The goal is bifurcated; (1) to learn from operational mistakes and to continuously improve and refine operations (i.e., process evaluation), and (2) to determine whether set outcomes were achieved – that is, did we achieve what we set out to achieve (i.e., impact evaluation).


However, as noted before in this book, problem-oriented police work and the social condition is thorny and complex. As such, there are plenty of sources of error. As with any process that includes multiple, interrelated components, there are consequently many things that can go wrong (Clarke & Eck, 2005). A proper process evaluation, however, will help an agency to identify those components that were successful.

Documentation is essential for success

Accomplishing this, however, is one of the hardest things to do within the problem-oriented approach and has been cited as an overall weakness of POP. For example, proper process evaluations require solid information and reliable data. Police offic-

ers are usually not experienced data collectors (e.g., the notion of the practitioner-scientist) although the data needed in these types of evaluations undoubtedly come from members of the problem-solving team. Consequently, Clarke and Eck (2005) note that it's extremely important that activities and actions are carefully documented and logged. Clarke and Eck suggested that this responsibility is assigned early, preferably while planning the operation or response. That way, there are no misunderstandings as to who is responsible for what.

In PANTHER, we have created a simple Excel spreadsheet that is made available to all members on a shared folder at a secure network. This folder contains a “diary” where tactical sergeants are responsible for logging major events or incidents following each shift. They are also responsible for filling out an electronic statistical sheet that collects information on actions, decisions, seizures, warrants, arrests, collected intelligence and other relevant events. This information is periodically reviewed by the section commander (Lt.) and reported up the command structure. The sheet is also used to calculate “hit percentages” for vehicle and people searches to ensure a professional standard. For the purposes of PANTHER, a “hit percentage” of 75 percent is regarded as an appropriate level – that is, when contraband (typically possession of narcotics) is discovered in three out of four searches when legal conditions are met. The rationale for this is simply that a high hit percentage (e.g., 90-100 %) suggests that police officers are being too hesitant in their work; subsequently, a hit percentage that falls below 75 percent is indicative of an approach that is too aggressive. As such, the hit percentage of 75 percent becomes a benchmark, or bar, for the gang unit's tactical work.



Source:

Clarke & Eck (2005), Step 46 in “Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps”. Available at: www.popcenter.org/library/reading/PDFs/60steps.pdf

Problems associated with evaluations – when there’s no impact

In their book, Clarke and Eck (2005) list several reasons as to why a problem-oriented “solution” does not work or shows no impact. For example:

You may have an inadequate understanding of the problem. You may have focused too little on repeat victims, for example. This can be caused by invalid assumptions about the problem or insufficient analysis (you did not look for repeat victimization, for example). If, while developing the response, you can identify weak spots in your analysis, then you can create contingency plans (a plan to address repeat victimization should this prove to be needed).

Components of the project have failed. The process evaluation checklist shows that there are many potential points of failure. However, not all components are equally important for success. Further, it is sometimes possible to anticipate components with high failure rates. Citizen groups in general are quite variable in their ability to carry out tasks, for example. Building in redundancy or formulating backup plans can mitigate component failure.

Offenders may react negatively to your response. Some forms of negative adaptation can be anticipated and planned for. Sometimes geographical displacement locations can be identified before the response, for example, and advanced protective actions can be taken to immunize them.

There are unexpected external changes that have an impact on the response. A partner agency’s budget may be unexpectedly cut, for example, forcing it to curtail its efforts on the problem. As the problem will not dissipate on its own, the only recourse is to alter the plans.

(Source: Clarke & Eck, 2005, Step 46 in “Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps”. Available at: www.popcenter.org/library/reading/PDFs/60steps.pdf)



4 Communication Strategies in Policing Operations

By: Hesam Akbari, Public Relations Officer,
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In this chapter, Mr. Akbari will provide a useful introduction on developing and using effective communication strategies in policing operations. In PANTHER, media is an important component, especially when it comes to informing the community about what the police are doing and why. The importance of having a clear media strategy from the onset of each police operation is also discussed.

Using Communication Strategies in Policing Operations.

Communication strategies are important but often forgotten. When police departments, or gang units, are planning tactical operations, they instinctively focus on the practical aspects of the operation – that is, on the “nuts and bolts” of the operation. Administrators decide on various strategic matters, lieutenants and sergeants are tasked with devising a tactical plan of action; tactical officers are mobilized and equipped. Tactical gear is selected and made ready; vehicles are refueled and ready to go.

What the police often forget to reflect on is on the type of message they want to convey to the public from a communications perspective. That is, how do they want to be perceived? As a result, when faced by the media, following a successful (or, for that matter, unsuccessful) operation, it is not uncommon that the police become unclear or ambiguous in their message. This weak message affects how the media portray police work and, ultimately, how the public perceives and rates the efforts of the police.

However, this is a problem that can be fixed by deciding on what the *desired effect* is, and how a clear communication strategy can be employed to achieve this. By planning information and communication strategies in a methodical manner, the police can create the necessary conditions to materialize all the “*things we write or talk about*”. In doing so, actions can speak louder than words, and the words we say will have meaning.

A communication strategy can be used in various ways, depending on the purpose. For example, communication strategies can be long-term, designed to achieve a sustainable effect in a particular community; or, alternatively, communication strategies can be short-term, designed around intelligence-led tactical operations, designed to quickly reach out to the public. Either way, the police need to go through a number of steps to make this happen, which is why the PANTHER model incorporates a communication component.

As such, this chapter will serve as a “cursory guide” on planning communication strategies in policing while using PANTHER.



This weak message... can be fixed by deciding on what the desired effect is, and how a clear communication strategy can be employed to achieve this.”

Communications 101

The basis for successful communication is to relate to the target group’s interests, knowledge and commitment to the subjects and issues you want to communicate.

It is the target audience that determines whether you will succeed in achieving the desired effect.

Successful communication is about relating to topics and issues important to the receiver. If a relevant link is missing, it will be significantly harder to reach out and establish a successful communication. Consequently, you need to know your audience and know what benefits they have of your information. In short: in order to be successful, you need to understand your target audience - this is called audience targeting. As such, it is important not to be so caught up in what we want to say, that we forget who we are talking to.

Consequently, communication is not unconditional – it takes place on the recipient's condition. So the challenge for law enforcement becomes how

to relate to their audience – that is, finding ways to convey and address the perceived problems at the local level, while at the same time assessing the audience attitude towards what you are saying. This can sometimes be a challenge, especially in socially deprived areas where residents may not trust the police.

Designing communication

When you are planning your communication strategy, always base it on, and adjust it to, your specific audience. Then, give priority to your message and choose an approach that supports your overall communication goal, that way you can maximize your chances of reaching out to your most important audiences, and ultimately, achieving the desired effect.

The term “communication planning” broadly means that you go through and answer various template questions, which becomes your support in the implementation of your communication activities. The next eight planning steps offer several relevant examples.



Step 1. Survey and assess background factors and determine the overall purpose

The first step has to do with what the actual communication strategy should contribute or achieve. That is, we need to answer the question “why”. In law enforcement operations, especially larger tactical operations, there is a “tactical order” or “tactical plan” that contain valuable background information for communication purposes. As such, this document can be used as a starting point to find support for arguments and messages, if it does not already contain a communication/media strategy section.

- What is the background and underlying reason for the planned activity that the communication strategy should support - that is, why are we doing this?
- What are the goals or objectives of the planned activity?
- Is this something new, or have this issue been addressed/talked about before?
- What other relevant activities, events, or contexts are taken into account? Can any of these be annexed to this strategy, built on, expanded on, etc.?
- Are there any additional facts, information or relevant accounts available that can be used in planning for the communication strategy?

So in the background description section of the communication strategy plan, you will need to address and describe the present situation and the basis for the activity. In essence, the public wants answers to the following questions: why are the police doing what they are doing, and why is this activity important?

It is also important that you decide what the mandate of the communication effort should be. Are you going to use communication as a tool to convey your work to young people at risk joining street gangs, or are you using communication to gain or rally the support of a local community for a future planned event/operation, an event that will affect people over a period of time (e.g., sudden increased police presence in a neighborhood, increased traffic stops, etc.)¹.

Naturally, everything can't be accomplished just by using communication. As such, it is important to consider and refer back to your overall goals and objectives.

Step 2. Identify your target audiences

In order to achieve the desired effect of your communication, you need to identify who your most important target audiences are. Consequently, you require a solid

¹ How to address these specific issues in socially deprived areas are addressed in the CODE component to PANTHER.

understanding and good knowledge about the audience you wish to target in order to influence them with a particular message. Information content, the way you communicate and convey the message, and the choice of arguments used in support of your message, should be chosen depending on the target audience composition. A common mistake is not specifying the key target groups and to think that everyone



A common mistake is not specifying the key target groups and to think that everyone needs to know everything – that is, being too broad and general in the delivery.”

needs to know everything – that is, being too broad and general in the delivery. Then the communication task becomes both too large and too difficult to grasp. If you have a large audience, for example, then the most important group should be targeted with a direct communication effort. Being too broad, that is, trying to reach the entire audience, will only create “white-noise” and the message will be lost. In such situations, a targeted communication strategy is more effective (e.g., differentiate and focus on a few).

Identify potential obstacles and opportunities by asking direct questions to the target audience (if possible) and take their answers into account when devising a plan. In particular, pay extra close attention to those who are negative or hold attitudes/opinions that differ. Also, do not forget to pay attention to those who are positive towards the police, and those who are interested in the topic. They can assist in conveying your message and are good sources of information and assistance.

Step 3. Develop communication objectives

The next step in planning is to think about the communication goals, and formulating communication objectives. Your communication objectives are important since they will set the foundation for the message design and choice of channels. The communication goals may vary over time and differ depending on your target audience. The communication objectives are furthermore influenced by the information gleaned from identifying and analyzing the target groups.

It is important to be precise in the formulation of what the target is (target audience). If the target(s) are expressed in general terms, the risk is that it's too vague and, therefore, difficult to monitor and/or evaluate. As such, formulate different objectives for different audiences. A primary goal may be to familiarize the target audience with the subject matter, and the ultimate goal could be to have the target audience to alter/change their behavior or to do something new. Also, set clear timelines as to when each step in the communication strategy are to be completed.

Step 4. Determine and formulate your message

Messages will only work if they are clear and credible. They must also address the recipient. A message should be designed so that it speaks to both the heart and brain. In general, messages should answer the questions “what”, “why” and “how.” Moreover, a successful message contains hard facts and soft values.

When formulating a message, it is important to include the following:

- Firstly, a message should answer the question “what” – that is, the main focus should in communication is explaining what is happening, what is being planned, what the police are doing, etc.
- Secondly, there should be arguments supporting the operation or activity. Consequently, a message should address the underlying problem and address causality. That is, address the issue of “why” something is happening. This puts the main message in context and makes it easier to understand.
- Thirdly, a message should include potential benefits and opportunities, as well as implications, derived from the operation for the involved organizations, businesses, groups or individuals. That is, what does the message mean to the recipient. In addition, explaining how the message will be implemented is also an important part of successful communication.
- Fourthly, supporting arguments such as facts and external factors, information, and circumstances should be included. Other arguments that can be used are similar experiences or changes experienced elsewhere.
- Fifthly, secondary messages can be used to exemplify and complement the main message. Secondary messages can be adapted or tweaked depending on the audience, and include things such as schedules, different stages, process steps and who the responsible persons are.



The real challenge for any press officer is to make yourself heard and to reach out to the target audience and deliver a clear message. But what is it that makes messages so hard to disseminate and achieve impact? Here are some examples of how to achieve a greater effect when delivering a message:

- Include relevant and important concerns that are crucial to the recipient.
- Agree with other things that are said about the issue.
- Try to find ways to connect to an issue at a larger context.
- Include and talk about a clear solution that demonstrates the ability to act.
- Be well articulated and speak so that people can understand what you are saying.

Here are some examples on how to prepare for and think about issues that may arise from the own organization and from the media:

- What authority (rule, law, statute, etc.) are the police acting on?
- What happened that precipitated this course of action and what will likely happen as a result?
- What good arguments are there for/against the planned activity?
- Who has worked on this and for how long?
- What are the foreseeable consequences, positive and negative?
- What is the timeline?

A requirement to succeed in a communication strategy is to have a good, solid foundation and to be familiar with the subject matter. Having a positive attitude towards the message, for example, rub off on the messenger, resulting in a more believable delivery. On the contrary, a negative attitude will cause the message to sound weak and unbelievable. Be honest and up-front; talk about both positive and negative consequences. That is, don't just favor your position and omit all the negative issues. It's very important that the recipient experiences a message as credible and relevant – which they won't if a message is too “cosmetically pleasing.” Do not spend time and energy on things that are not relevant to your audience.

Step 5. Determine your plan of action

It is almost common sense that the implementation of various initiatives in the business world requires careful planning. Similarly, communication activities are also planned. The Action Plan describes how the communication will be conducted to how it will achieve the best effect. An Action Plan also ensures that the key target

groups have been identified, that there is a well-formulated message, and that there is a sound decision on when and how to communicate. However, life is unpredictable and, as such, there are situations and circumstances that call for certain flexibility. In these cases, there should be a generic “back-up” plan available to avoid having to “scramble” to get a message out, etc. An Action Plan also allows for a structured approach; that is, it specifies in which order various actions are to be implemented. For example, it can sometimes be strategically important to inform certain target groups over others, or to inform target groups at different times.

Another important aspect that is addressed in an Action Plan is quality assurance; that is, assuring that the information is understandable and relevant, that it is in concordance with, or supported by or in connection with other communication activities. A message should not be contradictory to another message from the same organization. Interacting and cooperating with other external actors may also be appropriate (e.g., incorporating an actor responsible for business intelligence that can “alert” when certain information is conveyed by the mass media and when information was not properly received or covered by the media).

“ The Action Plan describes how the communication will be conducted to how it will achieve the best effect.”

Choice of method and channel of dissemination:

Depending on the goal and objective, the method of deliver is important. That is, whether to use oral or written communication, or both. The advantage of written communication is that it is available even when the organization is not. On the other hand, messages cannot be tailored to a specific target group since all recipients gets the same message. With oral communication, the advantage is that a message can be specific and delivered to a selected group. The ability to create commitment also increases with successful verbal communication. If the goal/objective is to change or alter behavior and attitudes, more in-depth communication efforts are required, perhaps a mixture of both written and oral, disseminated at carefully planned intervals and times.

The recipients could be internal or external audiences, depending on the goal/objective. It may be worthwhile to reflect on appropriate channels of dissemination, and how different channels can be combined, in connection with the overall communication effort. In some cases, it may be appropriate to use the mass media as an outlet for dissemination. However, there is no guarantee that journalists will bite;

the message must be sold. For example, journalists use the “journalistic approach” and techniques to catch readers’ attention and to make information more accessible



Another technique used by journalists is “angling”. Angling is used to customize things and to make them competitive in the battle for editorial space and reader interest.”

to a wider audience. As such, in order to capture journalists’ attention and interest, it is important to use similar techniques in the pitch and in what is communicated.

Another technique used by journalists is “angling”. Angling is used to customize things and to make them competitive in the battle for editorial space and reader interest. When contacting the press and when providing journalists with information, a presentation or pitch should be based on the most interesting aspects from a journalistic point of view, not from a police point of view. Journalist will not print a story if they feel they are being “used” to portray a particular police message. Journalists are, in essence,

all about “societal interest” – so is a message lacks a common interest to the public, it will not be printed.

If a message carries “common interest” then *exclusivity* is often a prerequisite for an editorial board to write an article. That is, the story won’t be leaked elsewhere. If a journalist can tell his/her editorial leader “we are alone in this” then this is a strong argument for inclusion. Giving exclusivity can be attractive for the police, since the message is more likely to be printed in its “original”. That is, the journalist will not put his or her own spin or version into the piece. In general, there will also be an interview with the source of the information. In an exclusive situation, the interviewee is in a far better position to influence article content than when just approached for a comment about an article that is not an exclusive piece.

Step 6. Prepare your materials

When communicating, you need well-designed materials. It can, for example, be plain text or handouts with illustrations, step-by-step description or a full story, all used in support of oral communication. A story can be used to clarify a message and create a mental picture of the desired effect. By using a story, you can tie components together and be meaningful in your delivery. It also helps you to concretize the abstract, and stories easier to remember than numbers. Also, it is important to check with your colleagues and co-workers to see if the story makes sense, as well as running the story by your supervisor, before releasing it to everyone.

Step 7. Perform communication activities

Once planning is complete, it's time to implement the communication activities. The foundation for a good implementation is that all preparatory work has been done properly, and that the Action Plan is completed. That is, there is a clear sense of what should be communicated and to whom, when and how it should be disseminated, and through which channel, and also by whom.

The contents of the Action Plan need to be anchored and understood by those individuals who are involved in the activities. Naturally, the press officer has the overall responsibility, although they may not have to perform all the activities themselves. Also in on-going communication effort over a long period, for example, it is important to “keep the pot boiling” by creating and paying continuous attention to the delivered messages. If there's nothing new – then convey that and say “there are no new developments.” The lack of progress, for example, is also important information.

Step 8. Evaluate and track the impact of communication

In connection with the preparation procedures for the Action Plan, follow-up evaluation should also be planned. Evaluations are important to ensure that a message has “arrived” and that it had achieved the intended effect. Whatever the goals are, it is important to follow up the communication at various intervals to decide whether to continue as planned or to make adjustments. Do not put in time afterwards to explain and defend a plan if it's not going well. Instead, use the follow-up evaluation as basis for further, more attuned communication.

In that sense, the communication strategy follows the same general thought process as the PANTHER model – scanning and analysis, choice of methods, implementation and evaluation.


Monitoring the communication goals:

When evaluating communication goals, ask the following questions:

- Where you communicative in your delivery?
- What specifically do we know, feel or see about the targeted group that suggest that the group is affected by the communication? Change in behavior, attitude? Positive/negative feed-back?
- Do the stakeholders (external actors) know what is going on and what the pros/cons are?
- Did you achieve the external/internal commitment wanted or sought?

Some follow-up communication activities and questions include the following:

- What went well?
- What didn't go as well?
- Was the message clear from the beginning, or did you make adjustments along the way?
- Did you think of/reflect on all pertinent issues ahead of time or as they appeared?
- Were your meetings satisfactory?
- Did you include all the intended audiences, did you forget someone? Why?
- Reflections about the next strategy? Any particular experiences that can be incorporated into the next strategy.



So, in essence an evaluation is basically the answer to: What parts should you keep, what went well? Can you learn something from the things that were less successful? Would you have structured it differently, if you had a chance to do it over again? What areas require a more in-depth follow-up? Is there anything about what you communicated that is still unclear, or are there issues surrounding the feedback from the target audience? Is there any group that needs more information, clarification or assistance in further communication with stakeholders?

As such, the evaluation should create a learning experience for next time. It is not designed to find faults or to place blame. If the evaluation of the Action Plan gives rise to new initiatives, you need to go through and adjust your communication effort and Action Plan accordingly. The process for communications then start all over again...

Closing remarks

Even if a communication model contains several steps, it does not take long to plan. You can rapidly move through the first four steps by yourself if, for example, you are received a short-notice meeting with the media. That is, ponder and answer, “What is the background?”, “Who do we disclose the information to?”, “What is our overall goal?”, and “What is our main message?”

A common mistake is to go directly to step 6 and start designing the communication material. The result is often that the time and resources devoted to designing the communication is wasted since it does not reach the right audience, and consequently, not achieving the desired effect. It is also important to remember that not everything can be resolved with communication! However, if communication is planned based on these simple 8 steps, it will greatly increase your chances of you reaching your goals and objectives.





5 **PANTHER Applications:** *Desistance and Working in Socially Deprived Areas*

By: Fredrik Leinfelt, Amir Rostami, Johan Åkerlund and Johanna Sundh

In this chapter, we will present the work on incorporating gang desistance work into the PANTHER model. Based on this work, we will also present a suggestion on how a “desistance unit” could be structured and organized within a police department or gang unit. In short, having a flexible and enduring organization to handle those who want to quit is essential for gang intervention work.

Desistance

As a subsidiary goal of SGIP, we were charged with the task of developing suggestions regarding how desistance work could be structured and organized within the Stockholm County Police. On October 27, 2011, we presented a proposal to the county police commissioner and her staff during a departmental seminar on desistance and gangs.

Desistance is usually defined in criminology as “...*the end of a period of involvement in offending*” (Farrall & Calverley, 2006, p. 2) or as the “...*sustained absence of crime*” (Maruna, 2001, p. 17). However, some have suggested that the path to desistance is not straightforward – rather, it is “tumultuous, dynamic and uncertain” (Healy, 2010, p. 4) and is characterized by the gradual reduction of frequency, versatility, and severity of offending (LeBlanc & Loeber, 1998). Even so, results from longitudinal studies (Nagin et al., 1995) suggest that desistance is not absolute as many ex-offenders continue with various forms of anti-social activity (e.g., drug use, driving without a license, brawling, etc.). Leibrich (1993) suggested the notion of “improvement” where ex-offenders offend less frequently and less seriously over time. As such, Leibrich posited that desistance away from crime was curved.

Laub and Sampson (2001) argued that the life-course paradigm (specifically, a life-course theory of the age-graded informal social control) offers the most relevant framework in studying the onset of and desistance from offending. They argue that this approach is most beneficial since it takes into consideration the “unfolding of lives in social context” (Laub & Sampson, 2001, p. 4). Moreover, they suggest that “desistance” is really the cause creating the outcome – termination from criminality. That is, Laub and Sampson also recognize desistance as a process that is dynamic and therefore not free from various forms of anti-social activity, although it supports the process of termination.

The police are one of the societal agents that frequently come in contact with gang members caught up in a life of crime. Indeed, it is not uncommon that the police – especially officers from dedicated gang units – frequently deal with the same individuals over and over again. That is obvious from our own work in Stockholm.

The work is seemingly endless and never-ending; a gang member is arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced, but is put on probation or gets out on parole after a short jail sentence. In some cases, gang members elude incarceration with a fine and are,

“...it is not uncommon that the police – especially officers from dedicated gang units – frequently deal with the same individuals over and over again.”

subsequently, released. However, after a short time, the same individual is arrested again... and so the story goes on. From this perspective, criminal justice sanctions do not seem like feasible long-term solution – it's a vicious cycle draining police resources and hampering the natural desistance process; a process that might even strengthen the gang identity (e.g., Pyrooz & Decker, 2011). That being said, as a society we cannot – on the other hand – allow people to freely commit crime as they see fit without the possibility of sanctions, including imprisonment.

Regardless, it seems evident that we need a holistic approach, where prevention efforts (i.e., hamper recruitment to gangs) are coupled with directed intervention efforts (i.e., desistance). The only feasible way to accomplish the prevention efforts is to collaborate with agencies that interact with these individuals before they meet the police, such as social services, schools, counselors, community actors, etc. We are convinced that the “red flags” are there, and we need to become better at recognizing them. Likewise, in order to be successful in intervention, we (the criminal justice system) need to learn how to recognize the factors in the social context that will facilitate termination through desistance.




Illustration: Desistance as a process that supports the cessation (termination) of crime. In this model, desistance is dynamic and influenced by the social context. Laub and Sampson (2001) argued that this process is best examined over the life-course.

Why should the police care – isn't this a matter for social services?

A recent publication by Pyrooz and Decker (2011) examined 142 former gang members from three U.S. cities (Fresno, Los Angeles, and St. Louis). They reported that the mean age for joining gangs was 13-14 years old and that the average gang member left the gang at age 22.67 years. As such, the average gang membership was 11.36 years.

In their analysis of “push” and “pull” factors involved in leaving the gang (see illustration below), they found that the self-reported “pull” factors were largely consistent with previous literature; over half (54 %) reported that familiar responsibilities were an important consideration for leaving the gang (e.g., having a baby). Job responsibilities (32 % major influence; 18 % minor influence), the presence of a significant other (28 % major influence; 10 % minor influence), and moving out of town (20 % major influence; 9 % minor influence) were the next three most significant factors that “pulled” the gang member out of the gang.

In terms of “push” factors, Pyrooz and Decker reported that the vast majority, 73 percent reported “aging out” as a major influence in leaving the gang (13 % minor influence). This was followed by involvement in the criminal justice system (37 % major influence; 10 % minor influence) and being “harassed” by the police (25 % major influence; 13 % minor influence). These figures would suggest that “gang life” takes its toll over time. Indeed, Pyrooz and Decker noted that their interview data indicated that the pressure of constantly being stopped by the police, being arrested, and being victimized or living under the threat of victimization finally got to them, prompting a desire to change lifestyle. As noted by Pyrooz and Decker, this realization coupled with other familial responsibilities (e.g., having a baby, marriage, etc.) created the “groundwork” for leaving the gang environment.



MOTIVES FOR LEAVING




Illustration: Findings from the Pyrooz and Decker (2011) study on the “push” and “pull” factors motivating gang members to leave the gang. Source: Eurogang Network’s 11th Conference, Denmark, September 2011. “They say that breaking up is hard to do: Motives and Methods for Leaving Gangs.”

So, these findings suggest that desistance is a process and that it does not happen overnight. Becoming an ex-member will take time, but as Pyrooz and Decker noted, almost everyone that join a gang will also – at some point – leave a gang. The police and the criminal justice system are important push factors in motivating gang members to leave gangs, but Pyrooz and Decker also posit that stakeholders should address and promote healthy families and other informal factors that contribute to natural desistance.

“In many ways, the very factors that make gangs unique - violence, intimidation, and group-based processes – are the internal factors that ultimately push or drive individuals away from gangs. When gang members are ready to redefine their relationship with the gang, it is the responsibility of the stakeholders to provide the much-needed ‘hooks for change’ that helps rather than hinder movement out of the gang.” (Pyrooz & Decker, 2011, p. 17).

Moreover, Pyrooz and Decker argue that it is extremely important that stakeholders (the police) become proficient in identifying when gang members are ready to become an “ex” and therefore support the natural desistance process. They also argue that reinforcing the gang identity of an individual, especially as it relates to forcing a change in behavior, will be self-defeating (Pyrooz & Decker, 2011, p. 18).

As far as the police is concerned, these findings suggest that we need to be capable of several things; (1) the police (especially gang units) need to have the skills necessary to recognize the natural desistance process, wherever it occurs; (2) have organizational resources that can support the natural desistance process and promote change over the long-term; and (3) collaborate with other stakeholders (e.g., social services, employment and housing agencies, etc.) to facilitate and promote the informal factors to change.

Recommended structure and organization

The police frequently come in contact with gang members, as do other agencies such as the department of corrections. However, there are few policies in place in Sweden that dictate how law enforcement agencies should work with and/or handle issues such as desistance and gang members who want to change their lifestyles into something more productive. From our experience with SGIP we have recommended to the Stockholm County Police Commissioner, that the police create “desistance groups” or “desistance teams” (staffed with 6-8 police officers) at the county level that can devote their efforts, full-time, to these issues.

We see at least three possibilities in terms of how the police can come in contact with gang members who want to change lifestyle:

First, there the “seekers”, the gang members who finally had enough (for whatever reason) and who make the active decision to quit and go to the police, not seldom as a result of being victimized of a crime. This individual is highly motivated to quit – at that time. We need an organization that is able to work with this individual right there and then, not wait until Monday morning when the regular shift comes back on. By then, the motivation to quit is diminished and we have reinforced any preconceived notions that the “police don’t care.”

Second, the police can actively find suitable candidates in their daily work. We see at least three possible stages where this could happen, as shown in the illustration below (during the scanning and analysis phase, during tactical operations, or during investigations). If the police come in contact with someone who might be a *potential* gang desistor, then there should be an organization equipped to handle that. The

overall gain for society is far too great not to capitalize on this opportunity, especially in terms of tax money being saved in the long run.

Third, gang members could indicate to someone else that they are motivated to leave the gang environment, but without feeling the need to come knocking on the police station door. For example, a gang member might say something to a social worker, to a school counselor or to another societal agent. In these situations, it is important to have a holistic structure in place where information can be shared and disseminated quickly, so that the appropriate agency can act. Again, the societal gain in diverting a gang member away from a gang is great, not just in terms of crimes committed (e.g., the finding that gang members commit more crimes than non-gang members) but also in terms of capitalizing on the opportunity to create or facilitate a constructive future for that individual.

So, should the police do all of this? No, of course not. The police are not equipped, staffed or trained to be social workers, but by way of adopting a holistic-oriented policing mentality, and by way of adopting an organization and structure (e.g., a police desistance group/team) that is geared towards collaboration and coordinated social interventions, the police will become more effective in desistance work.




Illustration: Using PANTHER and adding relevant components in desistance work with people who want to leave their criminal lifestyle

Social Intervention Teams (SIT) in PANTHER

As noted in the illustration above, we have used the concept, notion and idea of SIT's as an integral part of desistance works in PANTHER. As shown in the model above, SIT consists of six collaborating agencies: (1) Police; (2) the Social Service Administration; (3) Swedish social insurance agency; (4) the Swedish Prison and Probation Services; (5) the National Board of Institutional Care; (6) the Swedish Public Employment service.

These SIT's work in close collaboration with the recommended police “desistance group/team.” Since the police are the agency that most frequently comes in contact with non-incarcerated gang members (e.g., out in the streets, during investigations, etc.) it would seem logical that the police should have the ability to refer these individuals to a specialized in-house unit (i.e., a desistance group/team) for further contact and referral. Once referred in-house, the desistance group/team can make an initial assessment on the next appropriate step – such as referral to the SIT.

The collective goal of the SIT's is assess the needs of the gang member and then develop an individualized action plan. Since individuals have different sets of skills, knowledge and opportunities coming in to a desistance program, we need to be flexible and devise *customized responses*. There are a plethora of possible responses; initially the focus may be 100 percent on protection, for example, as the ex-gang member may be at risk for retaliation from his gang. During this time, no other interventions are provided. After awhile, the risk level may have decreased, enabling pro-social interventions such as job skills and education programs, followed by job placement and assistance in finding housing.

Another key component in this process is the evaluation component, where the individualized action plans developed by the SIT's are carefully followed up and adjusted accordingly, if needed.

How do we accomplish this?

In order to create a sustainable organization that can handle the complexities that often surround the lives of gang members who want to quit, we need cooperation and collaboration from several social service agencies and departments. We see three general ways in which gang members come in contact with the police and a “desistance team.” First, we approach them out in the field; we see gang members every day and we meet them in various situations and during criminal investigations. These are all golden opportunities to, at least plant a seed of change. These are excellent opportunities to try to motivate and inspire gang members to quit and

change their lifestyle. However, if we do that, then we also – in all fairness – need an organization that can help them. It is hard to motivate someone to quit and then have nothing to offer when they ask.

We also see that gang members actively seek us out and ask for assistance. In some cases we can help, perhaps with a temporary solution or with a referral, but this is more often than not based on the individual officers professional network. We need an organization that is specialized in handling these types of cases; an organization that is structured and designed to help gang members. In working out the details, we figured that a “desistance team” could consist of 1+8 staff (that is, one supervisor and eight staff). That size would allow for three field units to handle calls and receive and meet gang members. We would also be able to have a stand-by organization to cover weekend and non-business hours. Also, this organization would also allow for at least one person who could conduct personal investigations (collect information for informed decisions on who to grant assistance to), and to conduct briefings and de-briefings.

A third way gang members could come in contact with the “desistance team” is by way of referrals from other departments or units within the police organization, or from external agencies. An important role of the desistance team would be to lobby and promote their existence by way of educating the internal agency and external partners about what they do and what services they can offer.


Once a gang member is approached, has contacted, or been referred to the team, a decision is made whether to proceed or not. This decision is based on several factors and is ultimately hinged on the success probability of the individual. As such, we would need a “screening tool” to assist in allocating the desistance resources. There is some screening material available elsewhere, such as the CRIME-PICS II (Frude et al., 2009)¹ that could be used in full, or at least serve as a starting point in the development of another, applied instrument.

If given a “green light” the desistance team would create an individual action plan. This action plan would be tailor-made and custom to the individual based on his/her qualifications, previous knowledge and skills, or alternatively, based on filling immediate needs, such as housing and safety.

The appropriate agency or external actor would then implement the action plan. This is why collaboration and cooperation is essential for success. The police cannot accomplish this feat alone – it requires a joint, societal effort to encourage and motivate gang members to quit.

¹ www.crime-pics.co.uk

The action plan is then evaluated after each step and adjustments are made accordingly. If something doesn't work, then it is changed or modified. It is important that the gang member feels like something is being done – by our experience, saying “you'll have to wait until Monday...” doesn't work well. By Monday, they have forgotten all about quitting... As such, we need to capitalize and offer continuous support throughout the entire process. Are we going to “win them all” – no, of course not. But one thing is clear – we need to get better at intervening and offer assistance and support to steer people away from a continued criminal career!



Recidivism


Recidivism will most certainly be an issue for ex-gang members, where they may leave their criminal lifestyle temporarily only to drift back into it a few months later. To expect ex-gang members to stop committing crimes “cold turkey”, however, is probably too ambitious of a goal and would probably be equated with setting yourself up for failure. However, we should keep in mind that just getting ex-gang members *out of the gang* is a huge gain for society given the consistent finding that gang members are involved in higher rates of offending/delinquency than are non-gang members (e.g., Battin et al., 1996; Thornberry, 1997; 1998; Fagan, 1990).

Again, flexibility is the key to find the most appropriate enforcement response, along with basing decisions on solid and thorough analysis and intelligence.

Implementation (time line)

For this to work (at least within our own organization) we would feasibly require approximately two years of start-up and implementation time. As shown below, a "desistance team" could be established in three steps; first, two individuals (supervisor and deputy supervisor) would be hired to run the unit. Their initial tasks would be to develop relevant policies, procedures, and to build a professional network and establish the necessary bi-lateral agreement with partnering agencies. Having this in place before "going live" is a crucial component, at least by way of a Swedish context and legal environment. Second, a few staff would be hired on (e.g., operative staff) who could start taking "live calls". Their duties would be to implement and evaluate procedures and to test the theoretical model. After a trial period of approximately one year, additional staff could be hired on. The ambition would be to have the unit fully staffed after two years.

We also played with the idea of mixing police (sworn) personnel with non-sworn personnel, such as hiring a full-time psychologist to assist in the decision-making process of determining who is "qualified" for the program. That is, who is most likely to succeed given what we know about theory of desistance, pushes and pulls, and motivation for making a life altering change in lifestyle.



PANTHER in socially deprived areas (CODE)

Since PANTHER is flexible in its design, it is not excluded from working in certain “problem areas” and in larger urban environment. The CODE component (Context Oriented Dialogue and Empowerment) is added to the PANTHER model before launching tactical operations in socially deprived areas. Essentially, CODE is a communicative approach to information and information gathering in socially disorganized and deprived areas, or during riot-like situations, the so-called “social anxiety.”

CODE grew out of an internal police inquiry regarding the strengthening of strategic input and operational capacity during riot-like situations. The goal was to identify the factors that trigger social unrest and riots, and whether the sequence of events could be influenced by police behavior or strategies (Hernerud, 2011). An action plan was developed and distributed within Stockholm County Police on how to prevent and act against social unrest. The backbone of the action plan is to rely on “self-policing” within these groups by relying on four conflict-reducing principles:

1. Knowledge and information
2. Facilitation
3. Communication
4. Differentiation

Research has shown that by applying these four conflict-reducing principles, the police can create an environment conducive to “self-policing”; that is, a situation when the groups take responsibility for their own actors and behavior (Newburn, 2008; Newburn & Neyroud, 2008). In essence, unwanted behavior from individual members within the group is negatively conditioned by the larger group, which will result in an elimination of the behavior.

The four conflict-reducing principles imply knowledge and information about what affects a certain situation (from intelligence information about individuals, goals, agendas, etc.). Knowledge and information also makes it easier for the police to facilitate for groups/crowds to achieve their goals (e.g., get rid of a gang problem), and for the police to actively communicate with the public/residents in order to mingle and to differentiate by identifying those who pose problems (Hernerud, 2011).

Other success factors include informing and communicating with gang leaders (or top-tier criminals) in a certain area that mischief conducted by younger gang mem-

bers or juveniles (e.g., arson, vandalism, etc.) during riot-like situations is drawing too much unwanted attention to the area and that it can potentially spin out of control. The top-tier criminals can then “self-police” and from experience from the riots in Rosengård (Malmö) during 2010, this technique was used effectively.



Another successful tactic is to mix uniformed police with plain-clothes officers, which creates a heightened sense of police presence. This creates uncertainty for the criminal elements and leads to an increased visibility for the citizenry”

Media attention should consist of an active dialogue with media representatives on which image that are being portrayed to the public and whether this representation is accurate, depending on the severity of the riots. Police should have media-trained officers (PR officers, etc.) on-site who can handle all media questions and give a nuanced picture of the events. Another successful tactic is to mix uniformed police with plain-clothes officers, which creates a heightened sense of police presence. This creates uncertainty for the criminal elements and leads to an increased visibility for the citizenry (Hernerud, 2011).

Does social unrest relate to street gangs?

The overall idea is to prevent criminal street gangs from using social unrest and urban disorder as a method to challenge policing and social measures against criminality in general and gang activity in particular. Although, talking with residents, business owners and other local actors is not new or even controversial. For example, community oriented policing (COP) is based on a well-prepared police strategy that includes reaching out to the local community (Bullock et al., 2006, Newburn, 2008). However, the notion of using COP within the framework of preventing social unrest is less developed, especially when it is linked to street gangs (Katz & Webb, 2006).

There is evidence both from Sweden and other countries that suggest that criminal groups (gangs) have been behind initiating riots in order to create a social chaos, especially in marginalized areas. There is also evidence of the contrary, where street gangs use “self-policing” to stop an out-of-control riot. One example of this interesting symbiotic relationship between organized crime and social unrest is the violent riots that occurred in Denmark in February 2008. The police were almost powerless at the sequence of events that took place there and rallied to just keep status quo. The criminal street gang “Black Cobra” then rallied the young people in the neighborhood and demanded that they stop the arsons and setting of fires because

it interfered with the gangs drug trade and resulted in a loss of income (National Criminal Investigation Department, 2009). The riot died out almost instantaneous.

Theoretical considerations

According to research from the U.S., poverty and social inequality in segregated areas is of great importance in terms of human potential and life opportunities, including the risk of falling into a life of crime and drug abuse (e.g., Smith, 2002, Tham, 1979). According to recent developments in the classical social disorganization theory, crime can be explained by a particular neighborhood's social capital (e.g., Coleman, 1988) and by its collective efficacy (Sampson et. al., 1997). In essence, collective efficacy is the ability for a neighborhood to self-police. That is, a disorganized neighborhood has a lower degree of collective efficacy due to weakened social control. Relationships within the neighborhood are weak since the population is transient due to a high degree of residential mobility – that is, everyone is trying to move out as soon as possible (Shaw & McKay, 1942; Park & Burgess, 1938).

Indeed, in explaining juvenile delinquency in Chicago Shaw and McKay (1942) argues that poverty, ethnic heterogeneity and high residential mobility are particularly important factors in explaining enduring crime rates. These conditions will likely lead to a weakening of social control in the area (e.g, schools and social institutions) and thereby suffer an increased risk of crime. Where you live is in turn not random, however, but financial resources generally govern residency and resource-poor individuals are therefore assumed to be more vulnerable.

Against this context then, it is of great importance that the police inform residents about why a small group of individuals act the way they do, and show that this is not acceptable or condoned behavior. An increased police presence contributes to an increased (temporary) formal control, but at the same time, through information campaigns to residents and business owners, the police can contribute to the strengthening of informal social control (e.g., the residents / business owners stand up for their neighborhood).

Applying the CODE component in PANTHER

The overall purpose of CODE is two-fold:

- 1) Retrieve specific information and intelligence about individuals or gangs by working with local residents and businesses in socially deprived areas in terms of local criminal elements and other perceived gang-related “problems”, and to

- 2) Create a network of actors in a particular neighborhood to inform about police work in general and gang-related operations in particular, in order to avoid a counter-productive situation where increased police presence (and subsequent stops & searches) add to the decline of police – resident relationships.



A PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF CODE:

Police management decides to initiate a major tactical operation against a street gang in a socially deprived area. Before they launch the operation, however, they find out which community actors/stakeholders that are active in the area (e.g., NGO's, religious congregations, businesses, schools, etc.).

The police then contact stakeholders to obtain information and intelligence, both in general but explicitly on the targeted street gang. The police also inform the stakeholders of the coming increased police presence and the reason why. Religious leaders can, for example, be used as effective information dissemination to local residents.

By way of an active dialogue with the community, potential problems of residents feeling discriminated and/or uncomfortable due to the increased police activity can be avoided during the operation. In addition, residents will understand that the operation is directed against criminal elements in their community and that it is for the greater good of the community. By way of communicating with certain identified stakeholders, information can both be disseminated and gathered quickly.

Consequently, the communicative approach is not only a conflict reducing strategy, but it also allows for greater information and intelligence gathering in socially deprived areas, while at the same time reducing street gangs through targeted operations (suppression). In addition, it will restrict the ability of street gangs to use social unrest as a method to keep the police out of these areas where much of the lucrative drug trade is taking place.

However, even though the CODE method is used to suppress gang activity in a certain area, it does not exclude a communicative approach towards the street

gangs. Rather, it advocates a dialogue with both gangs and gang members. The core of CODE is to reduce conflict, not to create a conflict. As such, CODE should be seen as an excellent tool to identify potential confidential informants, as well as identifying people who want to leave the gang environment (desist).




Illustration: The CODE component of PANTHER – added when working in socially deprived areas. Relies heavily on the notion of self-policing and establishing clear information channels with the residents, especially regarding issues surrounding increased police presence and enforcement.



6 PANTHER Limitations

By: Fredrik Leinfelt

We covered several strategies for successful program implementation earlier in this book. Although we have incorporated a new way of thinking by way of SGIP and the PANTHER model – especially in terms of working smarter and exploiting perceived weaknesses within gangs, there have been some limitations in program implementation. However, these implementation issues are not novel or new to police organizations...

Implementing Problem-Oriented Policing

As mentioned earlier, implementing a new program, policy or project in law enforcement can be challenging for a variety of reasons. Besides issues surrounding organizational resistance to change, a review national review in the U.K. found several implementation problems with problem-oriented policing (Bullock & Tilley, 2003). For example, Bullock and Tilley found consistent support for problem solving in the U.K. police force, but evidence also suggested a lack in proper, high quality problem solving and analysis. Other commonly encountered implementation problems, as noted by Bullock and Tilley (2003) were:

- *Weakness in the data analysis*
- *Inadequate time set aside for problem solving*
- *A focus only on local low level problems*
- *Crudely operated performance indicators*
- *Inattention to and weakness of evaluation, and*
- *Inadequate partnership involvement.*

(Bullock & Tilley, 2003, as cited in Knutsson, 2010, p. 151).

Research from the U.S. seems to support Bullock and Tilley's findings. For example, Katz and Webb (2006) argued that police agencies rarely engage in formal problem solving and that officers are untrained in using problem-solving methods such as SARA. In their review on policing gangs in America, Katz and Webb (2006) suggested that police do not regard addressing underlying issues to gangs as a priority. Instead, the police usually enter the gang arena with the attitude that "it's too late to do something." Katz and Webb (2006) suggested that gang units should collect and analyze available data about a particular problem before initiating responses - a crucial step in the SARA method that was omitted by the examined police departments.

Other gang experts are also in agreement, suggesting that inadequate analysis is one of the major flaws of current problem-oriented crime programs. At an international meeting of gang experts in October 2011, it was stressed that *truly understanding the problem* was extremely important in devising an effective and enduring enforcement response (The Home Office, 2011).

Our challenge, therefore, is to think holistically and to involve external partners and stakeholders early and to conduct *thorough analysis* of current



Our challenge is ... to conduct thorough analysis of current situations before launching costly gang operations."

situations before launching costly gang operations. Moreover, we need to set aside ample time to allow for analysis and, perhaps more importantly, the evaluation component.

Implementing Community-Oriented Policing

Oliver (2008) talked about several potential “implementation caveats” regarding the community-oriented paradigm of policing. For example, Oliver argued that the most significant hurdle is the lack of an accepted definition of what community-oriented policing is and how the police identify with their new role as community actors. Oliver’s (2008) “caveats” are discussed briefly below:

1. *Lack of an accepted definition or program understanding*: one problem associated with the implementation of a new program, initiative, or project is that the personnel do not understand what the new policy or program entails. As such, a clear definition of the problem at hand is necessary and instrumental in achieving success.
2. *The role of the police*: officers may resist a new program or project on the basis that it is not perceived as “real” police work. According to some, this resistance to change is rooted in the strong police subculture (e.g., Anderson, 1998; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1995). **Duties that do not align well with the perception of “real police work” will be viewed with suspicion.** Consequently, police administrators need to consider the subculture when designing new programs and decide on how they can “sell” the program to the line personnel. Working closely with the Police Union may, for example, be one avenue.
3. *The ability to fail*: police officers have traditionally not been allowed to fail, which ultimately hampers new initiatives, innovative ideas and thinking among the individual officers. In order to be successful and become a “learning organization”, however, police officers need to be afforded the “luxury” to try new things and the ability explore whether a particular method works or not. As such, **officers need to be encouraged to try new things and to learn as they perform their daily duties**, as opposed to reprimanded by administrators for their failure. Only then will officers grow, both personally and professionally, and continue to be hungry to solve community problems; that is, to find new, alternative solutions and vigorously implement them until the problem is alleviated.

4. *Altering the qualifications for police officers:* With the shift to a research-based program, there is a risk that everyday duties of officers change and become more complex. Officers may feel like they do not have the qualifications (or desire...) to become “research-practitioners”. As a result, officers may think that their job has less to do with “real policing” than with pleasing academics or administrators with their “pet-projects”. Consequently, this may cause negative stress that negatively affects program implementation. Over time, however, this may become less of an issue, as Swedish politicians are moving in the direction of changing the police officer training program (from a two year practical program to a three-year university degree). However, **the need for training and education is essential in order to get “everyone on-board” with the implementation of a new program.** Also, to frequently schedule work time for continuing education and reiterate the main points of the program/project. This is essential for reaching a clear understanding of the objectives and to harmonize a common goal.
5. *Community involvement:* Since input from residents and, for example, local business owners is essential in obtaining information about community concerns and/or problems, the community has to be involved to a full extent. Indeed, Goldstein (1987) and Mastrofski (1988) noted that problems with implementation included communities not being included in the systemic process; that is, either excluded fully or involved too late in subsequent steps in the process. Skolnick and Bayley (1988) suggested that another limitation is that the police do not completely understand what the community is. That is, the police lack a clear understanding of the communities they police. These are significant barriers in getting the communities involved and engaged.



A couple of years before moving into the new millennium, Frew (1998) examined the state of community-oriented policing to identify success factors and came up with four main points required for a successful implementation. Indeed, the identified success factors align well with what other researchers have identified as weak points in the implementation of POP and COP. Frew (1998) suggested that an effective implementation is dependent upon staff, preparation and analysis. In particular, he argued that *people are critical to success* and that the police need to *gain the right perspective* and *form the right partnerships with the community*, and moreover – the police need to *develop a plan*.

Limitations with the implementation of PANTHER

The greatest limitation in the implementation of PANTHER has to do with losing personnel resources due to organizational restructuring during the summer months: That is, in order to cover vacancies created by summer vacations, officers

“...in order to cover vacancies created by summer vacations, officers at the gang unit are forced to do other types of police work ... and our “targeted gang members” and gangs are left alone for the summer...”

at the gang unit are forced to do other types of police work – such as uniformed patrol duty and non-gang related investigations. This has been a great limitation in implementing PANTHER since the gang unit is effectively shut down over the summer. This has caused a huge gap in intelligence collection and our “targeted gang members” and gangs are left alone for the summer, unless involved in a major crime that requires a police response (e.g., from the patrol division).

So even though the staff turn-around ration has been low (e.g., few people quit the unit) we have had some problematic staffing issues at times. But this is undoubtedly not a novel problem in large police organizations; as such, you make do with what you have.

Another implementation issue has been to operationalize some of the theoretical components of the model. That is, educate tactical officers and other staff members so that they fully and completely understand the fundamental theoretical framework of PANTHER. This is similar to what Oliver (2008) talked about in terms of a lack of an accepted definition or program understanding. We feel that this is an important component – to keep staff informed and educated about what the model is doing and why. Implementing the tactical components has not been an issue, quite the opposite. Tactical execution and method selection have

been performed excellent, but keeping the entire staff in the same boat in terms of understanding the importance of scanning and analysis have, at times, been somewhat problematic.

Closing remarks

It may seem commonsensical to base enforcement responses and policy decisions on solid, intelligence-led information. Unfortunately, our experience is different. Many police departments and agencies adopt a mindset of “just do it”, a mindset that rarely produces positive results. SGIP and PANTHER is heavily focused on POP and the SARA method. We believe that by carefully identifying specific problem areas and key individuals, and then systematically delineating the most favorable outcome and appreciating the value of collaboration with other agencies, we will be much closer to achieving a holistic approach to gang prevention.

The next section will highlight some of the research conducted at SGIP a differential response philosophy based on a Swedish gang typology, and ethnographic research on how understanding gang leaders can influence the enforcement response.





7 Operation LIMA: *Some Strategic Reflections*

By: Detective Superintendent Inga-Lill Hult, Commander of the Section against Gang Crime, Stockholm County Police, Södertörn Police District.

In this chapter, Detective Superintendent Inga-Lill Hult highlights some of her personal, practical experiences from the strategic (management) level in implementing PANTHER in Operation LIMA (the first PANTHER operation). For example, Detective Superintendent Inga-Lill Hult will discuss issues such as command and control, choice of tactics and the need for flexibility.

Background

We launched the first operational mission using the full PANTHER model in the fall of 2010. The aim of the operation (codename LIMA) was to obstruct and hinder the establishment of a criminal gang by preventing them from renting a commercial property in our district. We had previously found firearms and weaponry in this property so it was a “know address”. By using the PANTHER method we gathered reliable intelligence (from our scanning and analysis) that now indicated that members of a motorcycle gang used the property as their residence/clubhouse and that they had an ambition of making it their base of operations.

Start-up Phase

Prior to the operational phase, and in concordance with PANTHER, we conducted an analysis to identify the strategic members of this gang. In this scenario, we defined “strategic member” as someone who carried clout with the gang and as someone who had important connections to other individuals, connections crucial to the gang’s operation. The goal was to work against these members, as opposed to the entire gang, and remove them.

The analysis subsequently resulted in a short, manageable list of individuals. Based on the research on gang members (see separate chapter in this text by Rostami and Leinfelt) we could “categorize” the selected members into a typology. This classification allowed us to draft mission goals and to set up mission priorities. In addition, it provided us with information on which to decide on the most favorable method.

Naturally, to “classify” someone and, in essence, put him or her in a pre-labeled box, we need information. Even though the classification system (typology) is simplified, it helped us in narrowing our scope and focus. We gathered information from a variety of sources. For example, we used the PANTHER method and reached out to the local intelligence center (LUC) and “ran” the identified individuals in each agency’s records/system. For this particular operation, we worked closely with the Swedish Enforcement Agency, Swedish Tax Authority, the Social Insurance Administration and the Swedish Prison and Probation Service.

From this, and other intelligence sources, we drafted a “member profile” that fit nicely with the gang leader typology developed by Rostami and Leinfelt. This

“...we defined “strategic member” as someone who carried clout with the gang and as someone who had important connections to other individuals, connections crucial to the gang’s operation.”

typology showed us that the most suitable method against these individuals would be to keep a law enforcement constant pressure to disrupt their illegal business. We would also focus on seizing money, since this was the primary motivator for these individuals (which is not always the case, especially with some street gangs who may be more ideological).

Command and Control

I scheduled and conducted operational meetings every week with the group leaders (tactical sergeants / detective sergeant) and with our criminal intelligence and financial intelligence coordinator. The purpose of these meetings was to follow up the previous weeks' work and progress, and to lay the strategy for the coming week.

Work activities and assignments were planned and tracked by using the so-called "Gothenburg Window." Each activity/assignment was assigned a window on a whiteboard, where each window consisted of four smaller boxes. Each window was assigned a primary investigator (e.g., the person responsible for the task) whose name was put in one box. The three other boxes were filled with underlying tasks and current status. Windows were allocated different colors depending on the status of the case, activity, or assignment.

A "current" or on-going task had a green color and completed tasks were drawn in red. This visualization model was appreciated by the staff since they could



quickly get an idea of all the current and completed tasks in a particular case. Visualizing each task in this manner also assisted in prioritizing tasks, etc.

Tactics

The working methodology in Operation LIMA was to seek out the strategic individuals and confront them, while maintaining a “humble” approach and attitude. That is, no dramatic traffic stops or search warrants. Instead, the goal was initially to establish a line of communication and encourage them to leave the gang environment (desist), or to secure them as confidential informants to gather more intelligence.

Naturally, since our analysis showed increased pressure as a success factor, we also reported them for any offense committed (e.g., traffic, narcotics, etc.) that was uncovered. The strategy was set up as a long-term strategy based on endurance, which meant that the entire gang unit focused on this operation, which gave us an excellent ability to sustain our “pressure.”

Results

The long-term strategy of outreach and “humble” communicative approach resulted in numerous phone calls where gang members of this particular gang wanted out. They were unhappy with their current situation and with doing all the hard work, and taking risks, for little reward. This resulted in an increased intelligence flow.

We also received information that the strategic individuals were increasingly annoyed with the increased police attention, as it made it hard for them to conduct any business. This validated our analysis.

Operation LIMA resulted in a large number criminal investigations relating to firearm possession and drug charges, as well as a substantial seizure of money.

An Unexpected Event – The Need for Flexibility

The intelligence received by our enduring efforts to seek out individuals was in one case so serious and urgent, that we were forced to significantly increase our staffing



by requesting assistance from the county.

We learned that someone controlled a significant amount of explosives that would be used against rival gang. The plan, we figured, was to use the explosives to blow up a rival gang's clubhouse..

We initiated a wiretap and started to listen to phone conversations between various members. We also received an increase in staffing, temporarily, which was instrumental. In using PANTHER and evaluating our efforts, and found that our analysis now pointed us in a different direction. At this time, it was too difficult to maintain the same level of persistence since the investigation swallowed too many resources to make an increased presence feasible.

Instead, we started with a more aggressive outreach (traditional suppression) with stop/search but also talked and questioned members about explosives. We learned through our analysis and wiretap that several members had jobs where they transported construction-grade explosives; so talking about it openly was not detrimental to the case. In this way, we indirectly demonstrated that we had knowledge that they disposed of explosives and that if something were to happen to a rival gang, we knew where to come looking.

After surveillance effort, we were successful in locating and seizing the explosives and individuals were arrested.

Some Important Notes

My experience with leading this operation shows the importance of keeping a priority on terms of the direction of the work, and to stay focused on the identified strategic persons.

I provided a “platform” and clear boundaries and direction to staff members. That



I wanted staff to think independently and “problem solve” by using the Gothenburg window method and a this creating a foundation that staff could use to work creatively...”

is, I wanted staff to think independently and “problem solve” by using the Gothenburg window method and a this creating a foundation that staff could use to work creatively, albeit keeping within the confines of the platform/direction.

Moreover, each identified strategic individual should have a clear intelligence plan. Tactical officers divided the individuals up among them and were responsible for reporting back. Moreover, each identified strategic member should also have a plan for de-sistance – how can we influence this person to quit, given what we currently know? That was one question tactical officers were responsible to answer.

Also, evaluation and follow-up is extremely important. This example exemplifies this since we had not noticed the change in pace and direction had it not been for our continuous evaluation (weekly meetings). Also, keeping a long-term perspective, in addition to a short-term is extremely important.





8 Operation LIMA:

A Tactical Perspective on using PANTHER

By: Detective Inspector Magnus Sohlén, Tactical Team Supervisor,
Section against Gang Crime (SGI).

Operation LIMA was initiated to "field test" the new PANTHER methodology in a live environment. The operation started during the fall of 2010 and the goal was to prevent a criminal gang from establishing a base of operations in our district. Before going into an operational phase, however, we carefully identified several key individuals to focus our efforts against.

A need to adjust the analysis – flexibility is essential

Once the tactical operation commenced, we found that the "gang" we had initially targeted was in the process of joining a, national motorcycle gang. This was disturbing and, in essence, raised the bar for us. The national motorcycle gang was in an aggressive expansion phase, and we learned that they had contacted several smaller, local motorcycle clubs with offers to join. We conducted a new analysis and found that our targeted gang was in the middle of opening, or establishing, a local chapter for the national MC-gang.. Had we not conducted a new analysis, or systematically adhered to the PANTHER model, we would have missed this information and our operational efforts might have been misguided or jeopardized. As a result, given this new information, we had to take one step back and readjust our initial "plan of attack."

“ Had we not conducted a new analysis, or systematically adhered to the PANTHER model, we would have missed this information...”

The Entrepreneur

The new analysis revealed that one of the leading figures in the gang could fall into the notion of an entrepreneur. A combination of analysis and fieldwork (e.g., surveillance) we could establish that he owned a construction company where several of the gang members worked (without paying their taxes). He also rented the property where the gang planned to establish themselves by opening local chapter to the national gang. We also found intelligence suggesting that he was a strategic person to the gang, in part because of his connections in various fields. In our character analysis, we learned that he was primarily motivated by own gain and profit. We also learned that he was "business-minded" and carefully weighted his actions against pros and cons. He used the gang as "muscle" and protection against other organized gangs and/or motorcycle clubs that might have an interest in bidding for construction jobs. In addition, the gang was also a good source of loyal labor for his construction business. For him, membership in the gang was a win-win situation. It had less to do with being part of a club, as it had to do with making money.

Another strategic individual identified

In our analysis we also noticed that one individual had made a remarkably fast career in receiving full membership. We learned that this person had extended family ties to another member of the gang and from various sources in our analysis phase we learned that he also handled and brokered big-time narcotic deals. This made

him a strategic individual for the gang since he could supply the gang with drugs, which would be an important source of income for the gang and for the individual members who sold the drugs. In our analysis, we also found several other strategic individuals. These individuals were people who we thought were important by way of their connections (e.g., weapons, cars, clean cell phones, other “doers”, etc.). Just by looking at a traditional “police chart” of known gang members, their standing in the gang would not have implied such a strategic importance.

So by using the PANTHER model, we were able to pick out suitable targets for our operation.

Targeting the strategic individuals

Armed with an analysis of the key individuals, we could focus our operative efforts against a few instead of the entire gang and membership roster. This made the operation possible and realistic, especially considering our relative limited personnel resource, at least in comparison to the number of gang members.



Armed with an analysis of the key individuals, we could focus our operative efforts against a few instead of the entire gang and membership roster.”

We carried out the operation using an offensive approach but at the same time maintaining an unpretentious attitude. We initially focused our efforts on the associated gang members to find angles on the strategic individuals and to find grounds for conducting search warrants and other actions. This strategy worked. For example, while serving a search warrant on the above-mentioned Entrepreneur, we found firearms and a larger sum of cash. The money was unquestionably the payroll for the construction business, and it could be seized since we knew from our analysis and intelligence that he did not pay taxes for his business. This seizure was possible by way of our cooperation with the Swedish

Enforcement Agency (who handles these matters). Given what we know about the Entrepreneur as a person, this “bust” undoubtedly made him reconsider his choice establishing his business in our district, since it would cause his profit margin to shine bright red. In other words, his motivation to continue with his plans on our district was minimized. As a result, he left the gang and moved away. This drastically reduced the capability of the gang to operate.

We also cooperated with other units within our organization, which resulted in several narcotic-related arrests. Several members were brought up on possession and possession with the intent to distribute charges and were sentenced to long prison

sentences. This, naturally, also drastically reduced the willingness and ability to continue doing business in our district.

In our follow-up analysis, we found that the gang had, indeed, been considerably reduced in size and capacity.

The members who did not have

a previous criminal record,

but who had joined because

they thought it was “a cool thing” had left. Other

members wanted to quit and approached our de-

distance team. Without a

leader figure, the gang

also went through

internal turmoil; sev-

eral individuals tried

to seize control of the

gang, but their in-

ternal conflicts just

tendered the gang in-

decisive and weak. We

followed this progress close-

ly, and by initiating focused and targeted

efforts based on intelligence and analysis, we

could further speed up the disbanding process. In

order to achieve this, however, it was crucial to have access

to correct and accurate intelligence about what went on inside the gang. We had

secured such intelligence, and we used it to decide who to target and when to initi-

ate actions.



A holistic perspective

One success factor in operation LIMA, in addition to focusing efforts on the strategic individuals, was to adopt a holistic perspective; that is, to look at the big picture and address as many issues as possible and not only focus on the policing aspect of the operation (e.g., using media to our advantage, employing resources to encour-

age current gang members to quit, working with local business owners). In short, we wanted to target the gang from as many angles as possible. For example, we contacted the owner of the property that the gang rented. We worked closely with him and offered support and encouragement, which resulted in him terminating the rental agreement. Naturally, this made it even harder for the gang to conduct their business.

Other governmental agencies were also involved at an early stage in the operation, which facilitated cooperation and commitment. Parallel to our efforts, the Swedish

Tax Authority and the Social

Benefit Agency opened their

own cases on our strategic individuals for suspected fraud. This “heat” made it very uncomfortable to be a member of this gang.

Our ambition was also to reach out to those who wanted to leave the gang and to inform current members about what we were doing. The best way to avoid all the unwanted attention was to quit. One success factor in this work was to establish rapport by acting respectful, correct and professional at all times. Our efforts planted a seed and several members have, after the fact, contacted us for various reasons. For example, some members approached us when they had been vic-



timized or, in some cases, with the desire to leave the criminal lifestyle.

Another important success factor is endurance. In order to be successful, you need time as a primary resource. That is, not being “pulled” on other assignments or duties. This is the kind of operation that you cannot complete in a few weeks – an operation of this magnitude takes months to complete successfully. The length of an operation really corresponds to and depends on which phase of establishment the targeted gang is – the more “entrenched” the longer it will take, and vice versa.

A successful method

A receipt of success came from the gang members themselves. During another surveillance operation, we learned that the remaining gang members were looking for a new clubhouse from which to rebuild the gang. Several properties were discussed during one of the weekly meetings, but the attending members couldn’t emphasize enough that this new property had to be in a different geographical area, outside of our jurisdiction. We take this as a compliment.





9 The AKKA system *A Tactical Management Solution for Operational Documentation and Communication*

By: Amir Rostami

The need for a reliable, safe system that can manage operational documentation is sizeable in police intelligence organizations. For example, virtually all reconnaissance and surveillance units at the Stockholm County Police have stressed the need for a reliable, technical solution that is safe and efficient.

The technology used today is ineffective in several ways, further reinforcing the need for a new technical solution. One problem with the current system is that officers do not have access to current information while working in the field. Working against organized crime and gangs is a dynamic work environment, which means that information may change within a few minutes. How an organization communicate this information is therefore of importance; information is, for example, the source behind tactical operations and is often used to make tactical decisions and analysis. If this changes, however, it is extremely important to have a fast and reliable system in place as a method of dissemination and, perhaps more importantly, for storing and managing operational information. Previously, the police have relied on cell phone conversations, person to person, or by using communication radios. However, these systems have several limitations in terms of operational documentation and tactical management. In addition, when one unit is working in cooperation with another unit, there are often problems in how to communicate in a tactical, operational setting, since they may not have access to the same com-radio channels. The inability for tactical leaders to get a clear sense of available resources (e.g., personnel, etc.) and to effectively share information between them in larger, cooperative, operation often jeopardizes the outcome. The result is an ineffective operation.

The solution is a system called “AKKA Observer” – a system that is jointly implemented by all reconnaissance, surveillance, and tactical units within the Stockholm County Police. The AKKA Observer system was implemented by the Section against Gang Crime (SGI) as part of the EU project on gangs, but is also currently being used by other similar units within the organization.

The AKKA Observer System

Information must be gathered, structured and analyzed before it can be used accurately and effectively in any decision making process. As such, a systematic and accurate handling of information will increase the efficiency and the quality of decisions and, ultimately, produce results. The AKKA Observer is a ready-to-use tool developed by the SAAB Group¹ - a tool that can distribute observations and analysis in real time to multiple users as well as providing accurate, real time, tactical management support. AKKA collates and analyzed large quantities of information and re-distributes information to users in a fast, efficient and secure manner. AKKA

¹ For more information, please see: www.saabgroup.com/Land/Training_and_Simulation/Collaborative-Environment/akka/

can handle and store all sources of information, such as video, footage, recordings, text, GPS positioning, and unique user ID's. This information is then fully accessible from the users by way of Android smart phones and/or tablets (SAAB Group, 2012).

How it works

The AKKA observer builds on a centrally located server that contains several databases that manage permissions and the accessing rights to information sorted on cases. That is, a gang unit working a particular case can access the database that is containing information regarding their case.

As such, individual user levels are created within a database, and a unit is given a group authorization to access the information. Information can also be restricted within a group, and separate authorization level can be applied – such as “super administrator”, “unit administrator”, “team leader”, and “users”. That way, sensitive information can be contained and protected within groups.

An administrator or other authorized personnel can log into a Web portal and create files and add information to the database from a remote location. The administrator also sets and determines permissions and rights regarding who will have access to the information.


The Web portal is designed with a number of tabs / features:

- *Management of users* – A unit administrator can add and edit users within their own unit. Either all or some selected users can be granted access to information, or different levels authorization can be given users.
- *Create and edit files* – Unit administrator can create files in the current case, and assign permission to users to view (read only) or to add to the information. A unit administrator can only influence matters or cases that belong to the unit.
- *Operating mode* – A tool for managing operations. This function contains a map showing the geographical position of all own units (GPS), which provides the tactical leader a clear view of positioning, etc. It also provides a list of connected users for directed communications, a chat function (room) for general information within the group, a documentation overview of what information that is contained in the case, and a separate function for notes (e.g., a diary so that officers can quickly and easily get up to speed).
- *Documentation on the case* – A tool for managing available information in the case – that is, information on suspects, photographs, pictures, available intelligence, known addresses, etc.

Interface: using the system

Each individual user connects to the system by using a special application on their work cell phone (currently we use BlackBerry 9900). At login, the system checks and verifies the user's permissions and then displays the information on the screen. The application has a number of icons that will guide the user in the interface:

- *Documents* – information regarding the case, including pictures, etc.
- *Chat Window* – for quick communication within the group or between members of a group. Similar to a text message in chat rooms.
- *Map function* – the user can see where all the other devices (users) are geographically, and if the administrator has added any information to the map (e.g., information about an interesting address, etc.).
- *News Feed* – what has happened, which will automatically appear after login.



Person document and other documentation

A “personal document” can be generated by an administrator or other authorized personnel. These documents are static and available for users to view only. This information comes from various police records and intelligence records. The information is displayed in a summary format, with the option to “click” to get more in-depth information. For example, this information can include pictures of suspects, addresses, vehicles and license plates, case information and other pertinent information. Other types of documentation can include map images and surveillance photos of houses, apartment buildings, etc.

Protection of Information

The information processed by the AKKA system is protected by a strong encryption. The information stored in the device database is encrypted with AES256, which effectively means that no one can gain unauthorized access to the information in the database. The operating system (mobile phones) also has a strong encryption protection, so that no other program in the mobile phone can gain access the information. If a mobile phone is lost, the system can perform a remote wipe on all information that is stored in the database. This means that all information is lost and cannot be recovered.

Cost

AKKA Observer is built with a number of features unique to the police and has an annual operating cost of 400,000 SEK, a sum that is currently budgeted for by the Organized Crime Task Force at the Stockholm County Police. This cost includes system operation, maintenance, and updates. It sum also includes additional features essential to this type of police work, and the implementation of other techniques currently being developed. The operating cost is fixed over three years and is then evaluated along with the service provider in order to determine what level of dynamic product development that is needed to proceed.



PART III

SGIP RESEARCH





1

The Swedish Gang Leader: *Understanding Gangs by Understanding their Leadership*

By: Amir Rostami, Fredrik Leinfelt, and David Brotherton

In this chapter, we will provide an example of some of the research that has been conducted within SGIP. We will discuss how important it could be for police to know what type of gang leader they are “up against” in designing appropriate responses. In short, by knowing the “personality type” we can design smarter and more effective responses in working against gangs.

Abstract

This phenomenological study identified several key characteristics of street gang leaders to create a preliminary gang leader typology. In this study we have combined ethnographic fieldwork observations with twelve in-depth interviews with Swedish street gang leaders and twelve associate gang members. The goal was to understand the driving forces behind street gang leadership and gang membership by delineating the multiple themes of the subjects' narratives. A descriptive and interpretive analysis of the data suggested four ideal-types of street gang leaders, each with specific goals, aspirations, and motives, all of which accord with the gang literature that has emerged from the United States. However, this finding does not necessarily mean that U.S.-style intergenerational, institutionalized gangs exist in Sweden. In terms of policy implications, these findings are important for government agencies in their enforcement, prevention and intervention efforts against street gangs. They reiterate the need for a street gang leader typology to aid preventive efforts and ensure that resources are deployed in the most optimal way. In terms of research, these findings suggest a need for further in-depth, holistic studies to create a more empirically grounded gang leader typology.

Introduction

The gang research tradition is based on a range of approaches from ethnographic fieldwork (Brotherton and Barrios, 2004; Hagedorn and Macon, 1988; Jankowski, 1991; Moore and García, 1978; Thrasher, 1927; Vigil, 1988: *inter alia*.) to quantitative survey research with supplementary data collection (Bursik Jr and Grasmick, 2006). One of the strengths of the ethnographic and ecological research traditions is their flexibility (Bryman and Nilsson, 2011; Kontos and Brotherton, 2007), useful for subject populations where unexpected obstacles to research are common and new areas of investigation are always emerging. The case study design allows for a descriptive research approach where researchers can describe and analyse behaviours of interest and test universally accepted or perceived assumptions (Christensen, 1997; Gerson and Horowitz, 2002; O'Reilly, 2002). In this study, we have combined a variation of the ethnographic fieldwork with a case study design through in-depth interviews with 24 gang members and leaders in Sweden. Our research goal was to construct a gang leadership typology based on character traits described in gang leader and gang members' accounts as a means to deepen our understanding of Swedish gangs and their organizational dynamics. As Spergel (1995: 86) notes an analysis of gang leadership is critical for policy and theoretical considerations.



...the sociological and criminological literature point to a variety of leadership styles which reflect the broad range of gang types."

Although the public perception of gang leaders are narrowly stereotypical, dominated by media images of demonic and pathologically violent Black or Latino lower class males, (Kontos and Brotherton, 2007; McCorkle and Miethe, 2001; Gilbert, 1986; Jankowski, 1991; Cohen, 1972) or rebellious outsiders (Webster, 2008; Höjer, 2009), the sociological and criminological literature point to a variety of leadership styles which reflect the broad range of gang types. It is not uncommon for gangs and gang leaders to be portrayed through inflammatory and sensationalized descriptions,

often including references to territorial "wars", acts of "urban terrorism", and incessant cycles of inter-group "violence" (McCorkle and Miethe, 2001: 86). This simplistic depiction of street gangs (and other complex race and class-based subcultures) do nothing to extend our knowledge of the continuing and changing nature of these groups, especially as the gang culture takes on a more global characteristic (Hagedorn, 2008). But what are gang leaders like in real life? What are their aspirations? How do they become leader figures? We ask and answer these and other questions in an ethnographic study conducted by police-researchers in collaboration with a social scientist in the first such social scientific investigation of gang leaders in Sweden.

The literature on gang leadership is diverse and does not necessarily accord with Klein's finding that gang leadership is ephemeral, situational and relatively weak due to their weak organizational structures (Klein, 1995). Researchers have generally observed gangs with both weak and strong leaderships (Spergel, 1995) and some (e.g. Jankowski, 1991) have reported on both types. Nearly all the criminological literature in this area comes from the United States and written in English but there is an increasingly important more global literature emerging from Europe (Feixa et al., 2006; Decker and Weerman, 2005; Palmas, 2010), Latin America and other developing geographic areas (Dowdney, 2005; Cerbino and Barrios, 2008) which also divide along the same lines regarding both weak and strong leadership patterns.

Strong Gang Leadership

In one of the first social scientific treatments of street gangs Thrasher (1927) notes that leaders often emerge because of their willingness to try things before other members of the group. In this context, the act of participation, especially being the first to act, also elevates one's status, particularly within juvenile gangs in which courage and boldness are highly esteemed qualities. Thrasher also wrote that this

“gameness” – the idea where the leader goes where no one else dares, where the leader is brave in face of danger – sometimes is developed to the point of exaggeration and “dare-devil type of personality traits” (Thrasher, 1927: 240). However, the strong gang leader (e.g., Thrasher’s natural leader) is often able to back up any daring with physical prowess (1927:241), which makes other, following gang members, feel secure and protected in his presence.

Jankowski (1991) also emphasizes the role of leadership in gangs, suggesting there are three cohesive structural typologies that govern the codes and the rules of gang leadership and behaviour: (1) the vertical/hierarchical, (2) the horizontal/commis-sion, and (3) the influential structure. Regarding the first type, Jankowski argues that some gangs have powerful hierarchies, what he calls “vertical gangs,” the characteristics of leaders are similar to those noted by Machiavelli, namely that the leader is only concerned with the maintenance of power, rather than with any ethical consideration. In this perspective, a successful gang leader must: attend to the needs and desires of the rank and file, maintain a court of loyalists, recruit and train staff to carry out routine duties, be flexible in handling a range of personal and membership problems without appearing “weak”, and be fair in handing out justice (or at least be prudent and not reckless). For Jankowski the gang is often entrepreneurial and thus leadership is part of a rational business model in response to a deindustrialized political economic landscape. A similar argument can be seen in the work on street drug gangs in the work of Padilla (1992) and Taylor (1990).

Staying with the gang as an economic organization of the lower classes, Venkatesh (2008) describes the local Chicago gang captain “J.T.” as a highly charismatic and ruthless leader and shows how gang leaders can be violent, paranoid and manipulative to push their personal agendas. Venkatesh states that the principal trait among gang leaders is the willingness to *use violence* at a moment’s notice arguing that successful gang leaders have to be calculating and possess the organizational skills to maintain cohesion within the ranks, a challenge since many gang members are frequently involved in illegal activities (Ross, 2008). Burns, a former practitioner, argued that gang leaders maintain dominance over members by a “mixture of rewards and violence, with an emphasis on the latter.” He argues that a gang leader “manipulates gang members by testing loyalties, determining status, and keeping members off guard and subservient to his or her will—perfect-



ing a totalitarian form of control” (Burns, 2003). Meanwhile Spergel cautions that too much emphasis on the asocial psychological qualities of the gang leader is not borne out in the research. In some studies leaders or core gang members are deemed pathological (Yablonsky, 1962) and prone to be more “loco” and violent (see Vigil and Long, 1990) than peripheral members whereas in other literature they are often “normal” (Short and Strodtbeck, 1965), possessing a wide range of talents valued by mainstream society (Brotherton and Barrios, 2004).

Looking further afield, e.g. Brazil, Dowdney (2005) argues that gangs have developed sophisticated command structures and have come to resemble inner-city young male armies or groups of organized armed violence as they struggle to defend space against other armed groups including the state while holding sway over the informal economy, principally around the drugs trade. Hagedorn (2008) concurs and sees these new hierarchical gangs as a permanent characteristic of many urban areas as the majority of the world adapt to living within the structures of neo-liberal political economies and punitive social controls.

Meanwhile Brotherton and Barrios (2004) describe various leaders of large “institutionalized” U.S. gangs as charismatic, disciplined organizers of the urban poor who are committed to higher ideals and principles than those normally associated with gangs. In their work leadership varied across the organization with some leaders ready to use violence when necessary to keep discipline and maintain the gang’s reputation whereas others were given to more pacific forms of social control, preferring to rely on moral rather than physical authority. Further, such leaders were strongly embedded in the community, and reflected its myriad ethnic, social and cultural traditions.

Weak Gang Leadership

As stated, Klein concludes that gangs do not require strong leaderships because gangs have weak structures and are rarely tied to the drugs trade or other economic engines of the ghetto and barrio. Vigil (1988) similarly does not see strong leadership traits in his Chicano gangs of Los Angeles and this concurs with Jankowski’s other two models of gangs which he calls horizontal and influential. In the former, the gang is run by a council of equal members and though rare this comes about in times of crisis in the group’s organization. The latter model is more common and fits the gang culture of the West Coast and the ethnic gangs of Chicano and Irish heritage. In such gangs the importance of family and friendship ties are paramount and leadership is achieved through one’s real and symbolic relationship to the community rather than

through strict rules of succession and election processes. In this model the charisma of individuals in leadership positions is critical but the organization must still provide for its members. Finally, Jankowski argues that this latter form of “weak” leadership (in the structural sense) is accepted by the members as it appears to give them more freedom and since most gang members are “defiant individualists” the experience is critical to their continued affiliation and to maintaining the leader’s legitimacy.

Thus, the literature points to a range of findings on gang leadership. However, while such research has generated a plethora of knowledge, there is little information available on the motives and values of these individuals in Sweden where data and analyses are virtually non-existent (Rostami and Leinfelt, Forthcoming). Recently there has been a call for more “practitioner-researcher” to help fill these gaps in the literature, especially from practitioners who possess a wealth of unanalysed data that might be off-limits to academic researchers. At the same time, academic researchers possess other kinds of expertise as well as theoretical knowledge that may guide and influence practice. This study is an attempt to bridge the gap between academia and practice and achieve.

Methods

Based on our reading of the literature it is clear that a greater understanding of the motives, drives and world views of individuals who become gang leaders will advance our knowledge of gang formation and development. This knowledge is especially invaluable in the Swedish context where such data and analyses are so lacking for practitioners and researchers alike. To accomplish these goals we chose a qualitative approach to take advantage of our proximity to gang subjects and thereby come closer to an understanding of the *meanings* behind both individual and collective actions and behaviour.¹

Data Collection

Leaders of prominent street gangs had been identified in a previous study (see Rostami & Leinfelt, forthcoming), and were approached by the field research-



¹ The only way to utilize data similar to that used in this study, is to examine them from the broader context of the participants’ lived experience and to realize that they make choices based on their emotions, reflections and internalized cultural forces (Wright & Decker, 1997).

ers to participate in this inquiry. Such leaders were defined as individuals who had an elevated hierarchical status in these groups and who were seen to possess some “operational responsibility.” Their positions in the group’s hierarchy were also identified by their peers through such as “General”, “President”, “Father” or “Clan Leader”. Some gang members and virtually all gang leaders were also self-identified. As shown in the diagram below, we used three different sources in identifying gang members and gang leaders: police records, peers, and self-identification.



Illustration 1: The Gang Membership Identification Triangle

In total, twelve individuals fit the “leader definition” and agreed to face-to-face interviews with field researchers using a semi-structured questionnaire. Twelve other associated gang members also consented to participate who did not fit the definition of a gang leader but who through both police records and self-identification were members of a gang. The subjects came from a total of seven established street gangs operational in the Stockholm area. All interviews which lasted between one and two hours were conducted outside of the regular line-work of the police, i.e., there were no on-going investigations pertaining to the participants and the subjects were under no obligation (legal or otherwise) to participate. All gang members knew that they were talking to the police, but did so voluntarily and were not offered any incentives. In most cases, gang leaders were enthusiastic about telling their stories with at least one gang leader contacting one of the authors to offer his services stating:

“...I’d like to open this world for you, so that you can change it.” (Respondent A72).

The interviews were conducted over a four-year period, between 2007 and 2011, at various locations, including prison. However, the data are cross-sectional rather than longitudinal. All participants gave their written consent to participate and were informed that the researchers were not seeking detailed information about crimes or

specific events but about their experiences in general and about which types of crime they had committed and for which they had been adjudicated. The aim of the interviews was to gauge and assess their attitudes, values and motivations towards crime and gangs, as well as appraising other emotional components related to criminal conduct. We found that interviewees answered the questions truthfully, although in a few cases they may have lied to protect themselves and at times embellished in attempts to impress. These types of data have been used before (e.g., Wright and Decker, 1997:8-9) without compromising the overall validity of the findings and since we did not concern ourselves with participants' own criminality there is no reason to believe that our data are any less dependable.

Supplementary data were also gleaned from informal conversations and small talk with numerous gang leaders, fringe, or associated gang members during the course of our daily work as police officers in Stockholm County. However, these conversations were not subject to an active data collection process. Consequently, we used these supplementary data to develop, a framework in preparing for the scheduled, in-depth interviews. None of these conversations have been included in this paper since participants have not given us their consent.

Letters were also used as a source of data and gave us further information on subjects' relations with other members, their social networks and their feelings on range of group and non-related matters (see also Brotherton and Barrios, 2004). These were either given to us by subjects during the interviews or taken from publically available sources such as criminal investigation protocols.



Characteristics of the Sample

Data confidentiality was important for us and the participants and a crucial component of this study. Even though the participants seemingly could make a distinction between our roles as police officers and researchers, they were still concerned that other inmates or gang members would find out they were talking to us (outsiders) and risked being labelled as “snitches”. Consequently, we cannot reveal any information on which gangs the participants are affiliated with, or any other identifying information about the sample and/or the participants. However, some demographic characteristics are listed below in Table 1.

As stated, the street gangs in this sample are all prominent Swedish street gangs with membership numbers reaching, in some cases, to 50 members. All the gangs appear to fit the “compressed” or “neo-traditional” gang typology (Klein and Maxson, 2006). In a previous study, we demonstrated that this “American typology” can also be used with Swedish gang samples (Rostami and Leinfelt, Forthcoming)²

Table 1. Demographic characteristics of the sample.

Sex	N Associate Members	N Gang Leaders
Male	12	12
Female	0	0
Total	12	12
Age		
18-29	9	7
30-39	2	5
40 and over	1	0
Total	12	12
Ethnicity		
Africa	1	2
Scandinavia	3	3
Middle east	6	7
Latin America	2	0
Total	12	12

² Gangs are defined by Eurogang as: any durable, street-oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal activity is part of their group identity. “Durability” means several months or more and refers to the group, which continues despite turnover of members. “Street-oriented” means spending a lot of group time outside home, work and school – often on streets, in malls, in parks, in cars, and so on. “Youth” refers to average ages in adolescence or early twenties or so. “Illegal activity” generally means delinquent or criminal behavior, not just bothersome activity. “Identity” refers to the group, not individual self-image; at minimum it includes acceptance of participation in illegal activities by group members.


Gang Leader Typologies

Based on our data we found four different leadership types, some of whose characteristics overlap: the entrepreneur, the prophet, the realist, and society's victim. These types are drawn from other findings and empirical analyses in U.S. sociology and criminology (see Jankowski, 1991; Brotherton and Barrios, 2004; Merton, 1938; Matza, 1964). However, this does not mean that we also see the same U.S.-type gangs rooted in the most marginalized and often segregated urban and suburban spaces of the United States. There are no such Swedish gangs that might be characterized as institutionalized and intergenerational. The interview quotes have been translated from Swedish to English maintaining where possible the nuances, tones, and language subtleties.

The Entrepreneur

The entrepreneur is a pragmatic leader driven by the spirit of business and profit and according to Jankowski is found in all gangs (Jankowski, 1991).³ He is concerned with money and status, but does not necessarily need to engage in criminal behaviour to get there, although crime is usually seen as a suitable solution. For the entrepreneurial type it is important to build an empire to reap the material rewards. Essentially he is an innovative actor (Merton, 1938) who lacks the legitimate means to achieve societal goals, and has found alternative ways of reaching them. A major character trait is that he is selfish and ego-centred with little use for political ideals. Three participants from different street gangs (respondents 912, 1511, and 54) fit this leadership type.

"You know, I'm a businessman. What I do is making money from criminals. You think that is immoral? Hey, I use criminals, not ordinary people. I'm not like those other niggers sitting here [in jail] who do drugs and get caught for shitty offenses. I am innocent; I'm not really a criminal at all [...]. You know how many celebrity chicks I have banged? Come to my cell and I'll show you their letters. [...]. I feel like a king when I'm out and people respect me. I wouldn't make all this money and have this life if I'd stayed at home [...]. I don't give a shit about this life, I just want to make money and live a good life, get respect. You should see how all the celebs cling to me since I am the one who



³ Jankowski (1991) says that the entrepreneur has five key attributes: ability to plan, competitive, status-seeking, desire to accumulate capital and willing to take risks. Similarly, Padilla (1993) presents the notion of an "entrepreneurial gang" that is organized around the drug trade and the prospect of making money, fuelled by the lack of economic opportunities and socio-cultural isolation. Padilla concluded that young people come together, collectively, due to the realization that they are weak individually in an effort to make money.



...the entrepreneurial personality is more greedy than self-occupied and feels little for the gang he leads or is a member of..."

provides them with cocaine. They all like to hang with me since they think I'm a bad boy, they read about me in the papers and shit. Come with me one night, I'll show you. Hook you up with some babes too! [laugh]. If I would have made as much doing something else, I would have done it. You think I enjoy watching my back all the time? To commit crimes is not my thing." (Respondent 912⁴).

Nonetheless, this kind of gang leader is not primarily driven by the criminal lifestyle. Instead, he is more interested in becoming a successful and influential person, obsessed with the notion of power and prestige. To him it is not fame per se that is a motivating force but rather the rewards that accompany it. He is therefore often seen analysing and calculating every possibility to maximize his gains in pursuit of his desire to become financially independent, live a comfortable life, be seen at all the trendy nightclubs, mix with various celebrities and network with the powerbrokers.

"Why haven't you come to me sooner? You should have contacted and interviewed me sooner? You all know where to get me. That guy Wierup⁵ usually finds people, you should too [...]. We could make a deal, you help me start a my own business and I will help you." (Respondent 1511).

Thus the entrepreneurial personality is more greedy than self-occupied and feels little for the gang he leads or is a member of, for it is merely a means to an end. As such, the entrepreneur jumps between gangs as he sees fit, depending upon his calculations of profitability. Hence a characteristic for the entrepreneur might be a long list of previous gang memberships – although there are exceptions. The entrepreneur may be loyal to a single gang, if it is something he created himself and as long as it generates revenue. For example, respondent 54 views himself as having his own business and regards this business as his baby.

"This is my creation. I started this, and it works!"

However, his primary motivation is still money – the financial independence and the fame that comes with it. This preoccupation with *personal* financial gain takes precedence over sharing this wealth with others:

"Sure, I make money for myself, but the guys [other gang members] get the brother-

⁴ Respondent 912 is the only participant who actively and persistently contacted the researchers with a view to being interviewed. Our interpretation of this behaviour is that he using this research to launch a new "career" as indicated by the following exchange with this subject: "I would like to go out to the schools and talk about this. Can you help me get this book published? [...]. I will be able to live well by doing this, I could sell this, by doing this..."

⁵ Lasse Wierup is a Swedish journalist who has written several books on Swedish gangs and organized crime.

hood by being members, we become their family. I didn't have a family growing up.”(Respondent 54).

“I’m going to get a patent and start my own business. I’ll get a job to get experience, but the dream is to start my own company and live well from running it. You know, you should never trust anyone, only your own flesh and blood. You should be egoistic and only think about yourself and your family.”(Respondent 1511).

One common finding regarding the entrepreneurs is the negative view of them by other gang members with virtually all rank- and-file gang members in our sample making disparaging comments about such leaders. It is, therefore, not a surprise that the entrepreneur has the highest turnover in membership among all the gangs we examined (Rostami, 2010). The respondents provide examples of this rank-and-file disquiet of their leadership:

“He [respondent 912] only thinks about himself and money, he’s only interested in that. He doesn’t give a shit about us or the brotherhood. It’s all a fake, a sham, a fuckin’ pyramid scheme for him to make money, he fuckin’ uses kids. He is a fucking pathological liar, he’s a fuckin’ idiot, that what he is [...]. Everything goes to him; everything [money] that was collected had to be kicked up to him [...]. He just talks, but it’s all bullshit, everyone hates him and most have quit. Either they go with someone else or start their own thing, we don’t know yet, but he can go to fuckin’ hell!” (Respondent 9T1).

“The leader sits at home and scratches his balls while he let’s everyone else do his dirty work...” (Respondent XH111)

“I want to quit because when X took over, it was all about money, no brotherhood anymore.” (Respondent OL2)

The entrepreneur blends with his environment and has an amazing ability to adapt to “the client”. These skills are developed by careful observation and research. He is like a chameleon, changing his attitude, dialect and approach depending on whom he meets. For example, the entrepreneur can extort someone by making his voice



and non-verbal communication appear threatening, and in the next breath, speak rhetorically with a business owner about a legal cooperation. Respondent 1511 elaborated on this ability:

“I am an able actor, you have to be in order to be a successful businessman, otherwise you go nowhere.”

To summarize, the entrepreneur is an innovative social actor who appreciates the set goals in society but who lacks the legitimate means to achieve them. As such, the entrepreneur finds alternative means of achieving them. Criminality, per se, and the sense of brotherhood is not a primary motivator for him but are merely tools for success. His traditional leadership styles range from authoritarian to charismatic and democratic. However, it is not his leadership style, background, childhood or type of gang that determines his motivation and driving force – it is in achieving the blocked goals by way of alternative means- with the ends always justifying the means.

The Prophet



The Prophet is concerned with a higher calling – he is devoted and true to the gang notion and holds personal goals that are above those set by mainstream society...”

The prophet can easily be confused with the entrepreneur due to their great rhetorical ability, charisma, determination and leadership abilities. They both see themselves as visionaries, are verbally skilled and grandiose, but the prophet is more genuine and well-liked by his peers. Granted, the entrepreneur can mimic some of the prophet’s characteristics to achieve their goals, but the difference is the enduring nature of these traits. The Prophet is concerned with a higher calling – he is devoted and true to the gang notion and holds personal goals that are above those set by

mainstream society, such as building an army of devoted followers in the cause of personal and collective empowerment (Brotherton and Barrios, 2004). The Prophet sees his groups and his action as the hallmark of strong, male leadership, and a salutary reminder to other members of their mission. Contrary to the Machiavellian style of leadership, which is often in evidence with the entrepreneur, he sees the salvation of the members as his obligation, rejecting the social-Darwinistic approach of attaining collective purity by the purging of weak individuals. The Prophet sees himself, and wishes that others see him, as the righteous leader, whose leadership emerges as much from a moral calling as from any materialistic calculating strategies of gang leadership. In a way he is a romantic – holding on to the belief of leading a selected few outside of mainstream society and mainstream goals.

“Discipline is everything, we are warriors and outlaws. Sure, in the beginning, there

were those who were misanthropes, but now we are holy warriors and thus there has to be discipline in all we do. There's no room for mistake. Now, we're a brotherhood, I can't just kick someone out, just like that, but if you can't follow the rules you can fuck off. You always back your brother, help one and another, do whatever so that they can make it. You know, you don't, I mean, you don't kick a brother out, if you're a family, you're a family. You don't want to lose a brother. But if you rat someone out, your family, you have to take the consequence". (Respondent 21PAK).


Some of the entrepreneur's members surely regard the entrepreneur as a prophet, but unlike the entrepreneur – who markets the “brotherhood” for personal gain – the prophet has dissimilar motives; his goals and aspirations are more than just the material and individualistic. In other words, he is not just trying to achieve societal goals like status, economic prosperity and security, although he accepts these goals, but is driven by a yearning for something more social and even spiritual, for example, maintaining a mutual “brotherhood love” with his closest peers. As such, his quest for power is not to gain control over a group of individuals as a pathway to material success but rather to reap more psychosocial rewards such as being held in high esteem and loved, or deemed irreplaceable and unique by the membership.

“My beloved brother [...]. As God is my witness, you know how much I love you. I love you like no other. I kiss your eyes. You are loved by me like no one else, my love to you is like a mother's love.” (Respondent 126 to respondent 11X)

“You make us proud, I'm proud to be your brother. You have my full support until I die. You have warriors ready to do as you say, General, [...]. Don't forget who you are, brother, and the power you have [...]. Love, brother.

Love you with all my heart, your brother for life.” (Respondent 127 to respondent 11X)

The prophet thus believes in what he is doing and that the brotherhood must do everything possible to create, build and maintain the group. The prophet gets an emotional, intrinsic reward in commandeering his “people” like a feeling of transcendence with the gang representing his creation, a dream



“ The prophet regards his members as apprentices who should look up to their master, similar to a spiritual leader. ”

come true, an extraordinary achievement worthy of praise and recognition. Unlike the entrepreneur, the prophet values devoted members over quantity of members and would rather take a few devotees than a mass of recruits who do not believe in his message. The prophet regards his members as apprentices who should look up to their master, similar to a spiritual leader. It is all about being faithful to your creation and not to lose it to anyone, even if that might lead to personal gain. Consequently, he views his gang as his family, unconditionally and wants his members to stand by

his side until death because that is what he would do.

“The most important thing is to keep the name [the gang] respected, then all is good. It doesn’t matter if it leads to a long trip [long prison sentence]. Once in, death out.”
(Respondent 11X)

“He (the prophet) is treated like a God, everyone calls him big brother, older members too.” (Respondent 46)

“ You should always secure the family interest [gang], the family goes above all else [...]. An enemy of the family is everybody’s enemy. ”

“I know that you have been given a great deal of responsibility, but we trust you 100% and know that you can do this. Like I said to brother, you make the family proud.”
(Respondent 124)

“A member should always obey a direct order and obey his superior, discipline is a must, the one who do not obey will be punished as a traitor. If anyone fails his brother or leave, he will be punished hard or pay with his life. Every legionnaire is their own brothers-in-arms, regardless of nationality or religion, and you should give him the same respects and loyalty that unites the members into a family. They are my legionnaires, my soldiers.” (Respondent 11X).

In summary, the prophet is distinct from the entrepreneur in having goals which are not simply material in nature but emerge from deeper desires and aspirations that are both personal and rooted in the community’s history and experience. He is as much motivated by the satisfaction that comes from creating something new and the unity that is achieved by feelings of brotherhood than mainstream goals of the dominant culture. As such, his aspirations emerge from the power he gains intrinsically from his leadership position and this seems to be his strongest motivator.

“Brother, I know we had conflicts, I know we have not agreed, but the most important thing is the family, we can lead this together, we are brothers for life.”
(Respondent 11X).

"I take care of my brothers, they can count on me, they know I am there for them, when they need, know that I am their family. [...]. He is a fucking idiot, but we can solve this work it out." (Respondent 11NX).

The Realist

Jankowski (1991) conceptualized what he called "defiant individualism" as a series of core personality traits in all gang members. These traits are the results of growing up in a Hobbesian world, which does not lend itself well to the Swedish context. However, what we see from our data is that the realist is similar to Jankowski's notion of the "survivor instinct" – that is, gang members who find a way to make it by doing what needs to be done, whether that is committing a crime or by way of legitimate work. In this context, the realist is a leader with a distinct plasticity and flexibility depending on the situation at hand. He is pragmatic in the sense that he identifies what is feasible and what is not; as such, he is not overly optimistic, utopian or dogmatic in his leadership role. In fact, he does not have direct ambitions to lead a gang unless it is a part of his personal strategy to achieve his individual goals. The realist is therefore a leader who continually adapts to his environment and situation.

Respondent 111b:

"I didn't think about anything, not society, the police, politics, all that stuff is crap, that thing with unity and brotherhood is full of shit. I didn't want it, I just smoked weed and will always do it. I just wanted to find some people to hang with, do drugs, party. Eighty percent was about doing drugs, the rest... criminality was just an image. Crime was spontaneous, just happened; it was not the most important. But I never felt like I belonged, it just created headaches and problems, so I left. I realized it's better to be alone with few friends than to be many with lots of enemies. Everyone who becomes members bring with them all their crap, all their enemies. Their enemies suddenly





... the realist is satisfied when he achieves his goals and if he can find a legal way, then he will utilize it. Further, the realist is not driven by ideology and does not care about brotherhood..."

become everyone's enemies. I didn't gain anything by that, it just gave me a bunch of enemies that I had nothing to do with. Wasn't my problem. So I left that shit. Now I keep to myself, look after myself."

"People have nothing to do, there ain't no jobs available, and this means gangs. You see? I'm sitting here and I want to make money [...]. They say, sell this and you get some money, you do it and you want more. There's nothing else, you see... And you get respect too. People know how you are, they know you [...]. The thing is, you see... the only reason you start a gang is so that people can work..."

(Respondent 13XP)

The realist will therefore be malleable depending on the available means and on what he wants to accomplish and while driven by higher societal goals he will always take shortcuts to achieve them. Crime is not a purpose but usually represents the shortest path to accomplishing his desires, which are primarily materialistic in nature. One of the differences from the entrepreneur is that the realist is satisfied when he achieves his goals and if he can find a legal way, then he will utilize it. Further, the realist is not driven by ideology and does not care about brotherhood and loyalty to a particular cause. Criminality and gangs becomes the means to an end but gang membership does not represent a motivation in itself.

Interviewer:

"Can you tell us why you joined a gang?"

"It's very simple. I am a criminal, and I have decided to keep doing this for a long time, it is my profession, you know. I don't know anything else but this. It's my livelihood, so I thought, am I stronger alone or with others? How can I survive and prosper the best? So I decided to join a gang. I wasn't interested in Bandidos or Hells Angels, so I joined.... Because I knew someone who was with them. It was a simple and logical choice."(Respondent 12X).

This pragmatic attitude for joining a gang is also the rationale for leaving. For the realist has no problems departing from a gang that does not live up to his perceived hopes or opportunities, even if it means terminating newly acquired friendships or long-term relationships with childhood friends. The realist will never favour the road less travelled but will always decide to do what is most convenient at the time.

"I really want to leave this shit, but I have no way back, I have punched a lot of people in the face, you know what I mean, so if I leave, I'll have 1000 enemies waiting to kick my ass. If I leave, I'll stand there with my dick in my hand. I have no way back. No."

While the realist tries to find logical, innovative answers to obstacles and problems he is often guarded and sees a potential enemy in everyone, thus he does not share or open up too much to his members for he believes that many wish him harm. He expects attention and privileges without the need to reciprocate.

"I have one motto: you are with me, you are against me. Black, white, yellow, doesn't matter. You could be me fellow countryman, you can be my brother, but you're either with me or against me, it is that simple. I'll give you a chance, and then it's up to you. I'll meet with you, and then you decide if you are going to fuck me over, or stand by my side. Nothing more than that. Doesn't matter what our history is, how much we have backed each other in the past, but if you fuck me over, what do I need you for? I'm not scared of dying. I believe in God. It has to be within me, if I die today, you think I'll go to heaven? Hell no."(Respondent 13).

Thus the realist is characterized by a lack of empathy and cares little about the feelings of others. During our observations we noticed that if the realist does not get what he wants, he often throws what appear to be contrived tantrums that could be violent. Consequently he is prone to using violence to achieve his goals and can be quite manipulative as he ascertains whether his violence capital is strong enough to leave him victorious. Often, in this scenario, he will mobilize others to do the fighting for him. As such, his outbursts do not seem to be triggered in the heat of the moment but rather are more deliberate and thoughtful, as he carefully weighs the pros and cons before taking action.

"I did what I gained the most out of. If it was shoot-ing someone, then I shot someone. If it meant beating someone up, then I did. I still do, if I need to. But I am not stupid, I know what I am doing before I do it."
(Respondent 12)



.....

To summarize, if the realist believes that his actions accomplish a goal he will go ahead with it. If not, then he does not. Things for him are black or white and actions are dissected and analysed. His motivation is not to become exceptional or histrionic but always focus on what would be best for him given his situation, even if it means that his close friends will face the consequences of his actions. The realist therefore does not care about ideals, conviction or norms but has a realistic view of his daily life and his situation, and adapts himself to it, knowing exactly what he can and cannot do within his strengths and limitations.

Society's Victim

It is hard to characterize this type of leader, since he is a combination of someone whose motivation lies with changing society because of a realization that he cannot control his own destiny, while at the same time showing no apparent interest in ideology or higher societal goals. This leadership type accepts societal goals, but realizes that he cannot achieve them, believing that society will not accept his kind, and will actively prevent him from achieving them. This type of leader ties in well with Sykes and Matza's notion of techniques of neutralizations, especially the denial of responsibility in that everything that happens is due to some unfortunate circumstance out of his control. Indeed, he is a victim of society – where everything is someone else's fault. Moreover, society's victim is convinced that he is justified because what right does society have to criticize him when they have treated him so unfairly? This is well suited with to the notion of “condemnation of the condemners” (Sykes and Matza, 1957). In addition, our data suggests that society's victim is also the type of leader that is quick to “pass the blame”, e.g. the notion of “disbursement of blame.”

Society's victim is the angry rebel who uses criminality as a mean of opposing societal norms and societal values. As a person, he is angry and puts himself outside of society looking in. His motivation for crime is his contempt for society and his latent anger that stems from society's inability to guide him when he was growing up. He blames society for what he has become and sees himself as a saviour, occupying every role from a humble leader to an authoritative leader. Further, has a dual standard in that he will try to revolt against the current system and by doing so he hopes to achieve wealth, status and economic independence. That is, he is actually attempting to achieve societal norms but without having to state explicitly to his peers. He has the ambition to change, but he does not have the motivation

to work for changes. He is pessimistic and only sees the negative aspects of life and of his situation. At the same time, however, he is altruistic in that he wants to treat everyone well and cares about others. Granted, “others”, however, does not mean other people but limited to those in his immediate proximity.

Respondent 13X:

“Fuck the word. Fuck everybody. You see? It is us against you, against the society.”

Society’s victim does not feel happiness in his existence and have few things to be pleased about. When things go well, he does not have the ability to feel joy. He is constantly worried about everything, sees risks everywhere and is scared of potential hazards. The world is a scary and unsafe place, a place he is constantly trying to control. Society’s victim is anxious and has an overwhelming fear of the unknown. Yet, he will portray an image of himself as a secure and safe person, often overestimating his own abilities and capacities.

Respondent 146X:

“You get caught when you do crimes, sooner or later. But I don’t think it’s too hard, I don’t give a shit. I don’t care that I am locked up. I don’t even care when they let me out; I don’t long for being released. Fuck that. [...] I still have the same thoughts and questions as I did when I was with a gang, the only thing now is that I have turned on them. From wanting to bring terror and chaos to society, for that is what it was all about, to helping others. I have lots of experience, and it feels like that, if I throw it all away, I have done all this shit for nothing. So it’s like my duty to do it, to give something back. I’ll be the person that people will listen to, learn from.”



“ Society’s victim is quick to blame others for their errors and for their criminality.”

As stated, society’s victim is angry at society and authority figures since they represent a social order that has victimized him. One respondent, told us he was leaving the gang to give back to kids, only to attempt to start a new gang a few months later

because he felt like society did not want to help him. This leader was constantly worried about getting in trouble from other gang members and exaggerated the threat level against him to both police and family members. Still, he insisted that people wanted to do him harm, and that society was against him since they did not put him in protective custody and issued him new life. Society’s victim is quick to blame others for their errors and for their criminality. They never wanted to commit crimes, but they did not have a choice.

Respondent 13X:

“It’s the media’s fault, they are to blame for this development and they ruin many innocent lives. I never understood the severity of my crimes [...] it was narcotics that made me join my gang, that’s why I joined in the first place, but I will work to change what media destroys. Media forms Sweden’s view on everything from fashion to gang crime.”

“No you don’t. I don’t know anything about how the system works...I would have told them to fuck off. I have nothing to do with you. I get my own money, my own way. I don’t know, I never applied for a job in my life, still today; I have yet to write a resume. I don’t know how. What am I going to put on it? I am not alone in not knowing how. Many with me. How many do you see in the suburbs that are white-collar criminals? Not very many, it’s fucking few actually. Something to think about, why and how that is? Look where they live, where they grew up; they learn from their group, that’s why. We learned something else, we’ll keep learning it and that is that. It will go in a vicious circle, round and round. All the time, round and round. Until someone shows us something else. When there are no jobs, then there are crimes, you see? It’s how it is. I am sitting here and I want to make money; what do I do? Okay, you go sell this, bring me back this, make a cut. Then you do it more often. Get respect for doing it. People will know who you are; you go to clubs. You get it all, you get to go straight inside, don’t have to stand in line.”

Society’s victim’s conviction is that being subservient to society is equal to being defeated. An order, or even simple demands, created a feeling of revolt and frustration. But they do not express this feeling since they believe that saying what you actually

feel carries too many risks. Instead, they commit destructive acts and attempt to go their own way, to act up on the current societal norms. One respondent refused to speak to us since he thought we were bossing him around. After numerous informal conversations, he understood our true intention.

Respondent 13X:

“Everything was fake. He made the whole shit up. I got convicted anyways. But the whole thing was a lie. I am innocent [...]. It was the first sentence I got and I got more aggressive since it was bullshit. So, I was like fuck you, you son of a bitch, what the fuck is this? But no one believe me, not society, not anyone, so fuck it all. What difference does it make? I might as well just do what I do. Things like that makes you go: fuck the world.”

In summary, during our observations and conversations with “society’s victim”, we found him to have an inadequate and intensive rage coupled with problems controlling aggressive impulses and police records often show reports of assaults. Society’s victim portrays significant insecurity and instability in his self-image and sense of self. Further, he does not feel remorse for crimes he has committed since it is not his fault that he is doing what he is doing. He is motivated by his contempt for a society that has failed to show him the right path and uses criminality as a tool in his manifestation of contempt by constantly breaking laws, rules, and norms. However, rebellion for society’s victim does not spring from his class-consciousness or racial solidarity (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960), but from a cynical view of society now channelled through his leadership role in the gang.

Conclusion

Gang leaders, as well as gangs in general, exist on a continuum that includes not only a range of activities but also a range of commitments to specific goals. Gangs are not criminal organizations per se (Brotherton and Barrios, 2004; Hagedorn and Macon, 1988; Klein, 1995) and gang leaders are not managers of criminal enterprises in the strict sense of the term. Most gang research, from Thrasher (1927) to the “underclass school” of Hagedorn (1988) and Taylor (1990) has viewed gang activity as responses to structural constraints. That is, gangs offer new ways to adapt to limited resources (Venkatesh, 2003). But gang diversity cannot simply be explained by “lack of resources” for different gangs can coexist in the same time and place and share the same “social hardships,” and yet may evolve into distinctly different organizations. This could be explained by the fact that individual responses to

social ills, such as poverty and unemployment, are mediated by culture and micro-level ideologies, i.e., people attach their own meanings to their experiences and environment, which will orient their action in one way or the other (Venkatesh, 2003; Bourgois, 1995; Willis, 1977). Our findings show that gang leadership is not a monolithic entity related to structural conditioning and marginalizing contexts, but rather much more diverse and complex with individual underlying causes. The causes can be all from political motivated goals, economic adaptation, pragmatic survival technic and rebellion to mainstream norm and values.

Our conclusion from this study is that criminality is of secondary importance for the majority of gang leaders; instead other forces motivate them to join and lead gangs. Criminality is viewed as means to an end; means to achieve their individual goals. However, their individual goals and aspirations and motivations are what make them different. Gang leaders are not similar to the picture portrayed by the media or by the gang leaders' own self-image. This study shows that not only are there different types of gangs (DiChiara and Chabot, 2003; Klein, 1995; Kontos et al., 2003; Kontos and Brotherton, 2007) there are also different components or building blocks to gang structure including different kinds of gang leaders. Since the situation is so complex, it is necessary for the society and its actors to adopt a holistic approach in studying and working with social entities such as street gangs. This study will hopefully serve as a rudimentary platform for further studies in gang leadership.


Practical utility and policy implications

One strategy within the Swedish law enforcement community, especially among agencies charged with addressing gang crime, is to focus efforts and resources on certain key individuals (i.e., gang leaders) within criminal gangs or networks in an effort to suppress gang activities in general and impede criminal activity in particular (Länskrimnalpolisen, 2003, 2008; Rostami & Leinfelt, 2011). A differential targeting of gang members based on individual characteristics (e.g., criminal propensity) has been suggested by some researchers as a conventional wisdom learned from failed American gang control programs (Klein & Maxson, 2006, p. 135). Differential targeting of gang members is important as these figures act as role models for youth who are lured into a life of crime by hanging out and learning from older criminally active peers (Bandura, 1977, Bandura, 1986, Sutherland, 1947). As such, these individuals are targeted not only for the suppressive effects, but also for crime preventive purposes.

Within the Swedish Police, there are plenty of examples of how agencies use this paradigm in their daily work. For example, units employ analysts to develop and create so-called “target lists” to guide and focus resources against the most criminally active individuals. Within the Stockholm County Police, for example, special units have been established with the sole purpose of targeting street gangs and organized crime, both at the municipal and county level (Rostami & Leinfelt, 2011).

These suppression efforts against targeted persons should be supplemented with intervention and prevention efforts to achieve long-term results. In most cases, the targeted persons are leaders of street gangs as they are very criminally active. However, in order to adopt a more holistic approach and to fully appreciate the problem-oriented approach, we need to gather more information about the individuals leading these street gangs to determine their weaknesses, strong points and their perspectives on life, social issues, and leadership (Bullock et al. , 2006, Knutsson & Sovik, 2005).

Social constructionism states that human behavior cannot be understood simply in objective terms, easily codified and quantified. Instead, fluid motions shape human behavior and it is ultimately determined by subjective and objective realities (Hacking, 1999, McCorkle & Miethe, 2001). This is an important suggestion as it implies that human social interaction has significant bearing on, and implications for, research on the nexus between gangs and crime.



Limitations

The sample used in this study is limited in many ways, which makes findings less generalizable than if we would have used a randomized sample or a larger population of gang members / gang leaders. The problem with this type of research, however, is that you cannot randomize large populations into distinctly different groups and watch who becomes gang members. Certainly, there are longitudinal designs available, but these are fraught with practical and costly limitations. As such, using a sample of 24 gang members from seven different gangs ought to at least provide some insights into the subject matter. For example, Venkatesh (2008) only studied one gang and we have seen doctoral dissertations on gang leaders that have used smaller samples than ours (e.g., Fortune, 2003) we believe that our findings bear merit in terms of a “limited generalizability”, although we recognize that we cannot make any claims that there only are these four categories of gang leaders, or that similar findings would be found elsewhere. However, further study is encouraged – using a similar methodology in other countries in an attempt to replicate or test these categories.

Future directions

Gang leaders, as well as gangs in general, exist on a continuum that includes not only a range of activities but also a range of commitments to specific goals. Gangs are not criminal organizations (Brotherton & Barrios, 2004, Hagedorn & Macon, 1988, Klein, 1995) and gang leaders are not managers of criminal enterprises in the strict sense of the term. Most gang research, from Thrasher (1927) to the “underclass school” of Hagedorn (1988) and Taylor (1990) has viewed gang activity as responses to structural constraints. That is, gangs offer new ways to adapt to limited resources (Venkatesh, 2003). But gang diversity cannot simply be explained by “lack of resources”; gangs that coexist in the same time and place, gangs that share the same “social hardships”, may evolve and grow into distinctly different organizations. In many ways, this could be explained by the fact that individual responses to social ills, such as poverty and unemployment, are mediated by micro-level ideologies – that is, people attach their own meanings to their experiences and environment, which will orient their action in one way or the other (Bourgois, 1995, Venkatesh, 2003, Willis, 1977).

Our findings are in the same line; gang joining or more specifically gang leadership is an attractive “adaptation” to social hardship for many in marginalize areas,

that crime involvement and gang related economic activities are not the primary goal for the gangs and their leaders. However, our findings show that gang leadership is not only a monolithic entity related to structural conditioning and marginalizing contexts, but rather much divers and complex with individual underlying causes. The causes can be all from political motivated goals, economic adaptation, pragmatic survival technic and rebellion to mainstream norm and values.

Our conclusion from this study is that criminality is of secondary importance for the majority of gang leaders; instead other forces motivate them to join and lead gangs. Criminality is viewed as means to an end; means to achieve their individual goals. However, their individual goals and aspirations and motivations are what make them different. Gang leaders are not very similar to the picture portrayed by the media or by the gang leaders' own self-image. In this study, we have used "categories" to describe gang leaders based on our perceptions of them. Any name could have been assigned, however, and our choice may not be the most fitting. For example, our four categories could have been divided into two subgroups – the Entrepreneurs and the Managers. For example, the Entrepreneur could just as easily be named "the egoistic entrepreneur" and the Prophet could have been called "the altruistic entrepreneur". Likewise, the Realist is really "the egoistic manager" and the Renegade could be perceived as "the altruistic manager". We do see some similarities between these distinctions, but in an attempt to be more distinct – in a subject riddled with fluidity – we decided to keep our four original categories of leaders.

This study shows that not only are there different types of gangs (DiChiara & Chabot, 2003, Klein, 1995, Kontos & Brotherton, 2007, Kontos et al. , 2003a) there are also different components or building blocks to gang structure including different kinds of gang leaders. Since the situation is so complex, it's necessary for the society and its actors to adopt a holistic approach in studying and working with social entities such as street gangs. This study will hopefully serve as a rudimentary platform for further studies in gang leadership.

Since 2009 we have been involved with the Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project (SGIP) in which we have collected gang-related data (Rostami & Leinfelt, 2011). By way of SGIP, we have introduced a holistic model of looking at gangs and gang enforcement – a model that builds on the notion that street gangs

“ The causes can be all from political motivated goals, economic adaptation, pragmatic survival technic and rebellion to mainstream norm and values.”

cannot be targeted with a linear or single-approach model (Leinfelt & Rostami, 2012, Rostami & Leinfelt, 2011). Instead, we argue that responses need to be flexible and holistic (multifaceted) since modern street gangs tend to exist on a continuum, ranging from entrenched gangs to emerging gangs (DiChiara & Chabot, 2003, Katz & Webb, 2006, Kutzke, 2012). Just as modern society is fluid and self-identity is reflexive (Bauman, 2006, Bauman, 2011, Beck et al. , 1994, Giddens, 1990, Giddens, 1991) – so are street gangs and gang leaders. Consequently, a single-approach model would not be successful as it would be either too harsh or too lenient, depending on where on the continuum the targeted gangs exist.

Furthermore, reasons for joining criminal street gangs are not always pure criminal – gang members may join a street gang for a variety of non-criminal reasons (Kontos et al. , 2003b) making the rationale for joining and leading criminal street gangs rather complex. Moreover, a gang does not only exist on a continuum in terms of gang activities, they also differ on their commitment to specific goals and agendas (DiChiara & Chabot, 2003) suggesting differences between leadership styles.

Our experiences, coupled with the current research, shows that gang leaders can't be put in a specific box and labeled with a single explanation. Since gangs vary across time and place, so will their leaders. It is equally hard to look at gang leaders as sophisticated criminals and adopt a deterministic approach, arguing that they were born to be gang leaders and thugs. Moreover, gang members and gang leaders are not criminal all the time, 24 hours per day, 365 days per year; their criminality may not even be the common denominator. Indeed, Matza (1964) argued that delinquents drift in and out of crime depending on social expectations, sense of guilt and the individual's techniques of neutralizations.

However, the knowledge about psychological, psychosocial and organizational processes are not considered when police work against street gangs and target gang leaders. At least, that is our experience in our work against criminal street gangs in Sweden. We work (target) gang leaders in a reactive fashion and we ignore their personality, their motivation to commit crimes, etc. In a way, we are not interested in why they offend; we are primarily interested in combating the problem – not solving it. That is not surmising, however. Studies from the U.S. with gang units and the implementation of community oriented policing, for example, have found similar results. Police gang units are interested in reacting to and combating gangs, not addressing the underlying causes of gang crime (Katz & Webb, 2006).

Applying it to PANTHER


In PANTHER we have implemented these findings in the analysis stage in the PANTHER process; that is, identifying the “type” of gang leader in an effort to target our response.

For example, a gang leader corresponding to the role of The Entrepreneur will be weak for responses targeting assets and the proceeds of crime. The Realist, on the other hand, will use reason and logic in their analysis of our efforts, and therefore, we can successfully employ an enforcement response similar to the Boston Model – that is, suppression and constant police pressure and informing the gang members that we will not go away. This will ultimately force the gang to move away, realizing that the increased police presence is “bad for business” and greatly increases the risks – e.g., the costs will outweigh the benefits. The Prophet is best targeted by traditional investigations and by way of incarceration since gang members will look up to their leader for advice and guidance. The idea is that without the sheep herder, the sheep will stray; the gang will dissolve itself without proper leadership. Finally, Society’s Victim can be approached with “soft methods”, basically with open arms (from the police and social services) and with an intervention method that offers a viable alternative to gang crime. We want to show this gang member that there are alternatives, that society has not failed them.




If the police are linear in gang enforcement (e.g., just using suppression) this research, albeit rudimentary and with various limitations, suggest a success rate of 1 in 4 (suppression would feasibly work against The Realist but not against the other types). The value, of course, is that if law enforcement can identify the leadership structure in gangs, they will be more successful in their enforcement.

Illustration 2: Four distinct gang leader types



Part IV:

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON GANGS¹





Preface

The Paradox Revisited: *Recent Research on Street Gangs in Europe*

By: Cheryl L Maxson, Ph.D., Department of Criminology, Law and Society,
University of California, Irvine

The “Eurogang Paradox” was a primary motivation for developing the Eurogang research effort. As described by Klein (2002: 240), “denial of gangs in Europe is based on a ‘typical’ American gang that is not at all typical in America.” The concern was that Europeans could fail to recognize street gangs because they did not take the presumptive form of US street gangs, that is: organized, hierarchical, cohesive and violent. The paradox is that US gangs often do not fit this media-driven stereotype either. There is some evidence that emerging gang issues were not accurately identified in the Netherlands (van Gemert, 2012), Denmark (Pedersen and Lindstad, 2012) and England (Smithson, Monchuk and Armitage, 2012) due to an overreliance on these stereotypic images. Our concern was that absent a solid research foundation on gangs in Europe, responses to emergent gang problems would be uncoordinated and narrowly focused on law enforcement and, in particular, draw from the suppressive strategies practiced regularly in the US for the past several decades. The Eurogang Research Program sought to foster systematic, multi-method, comparative research in order to learn from

¹ The following chapters are contributions made by project partners. As such, points of view or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent the official position of the Stockholm County Police.

the mistakes we made in the US while building a knowledge base about street gangs in Europe in order to inform good policy and practice.

Eurogang researchers have employed several strategies to meet these objectives. We developed a consensus definition that could be used without the incendiary and easily misinterpreted “g word.” Over a series of workshops and focused work groups, we crafted and tested research instruments and methods that could be used by researchers with different training and interests (Weerman, Maxson, Esbensen, et al., 2009). We also hosted regular meetings and conferences to share our work, encourage collaborations and attract new gang scholars. These gatherings have now produced four edited volumes of research reports inspired by the Eurogang Research paradigm. In this essay, I reflect on the current status of gang research in Europe and whether the Eurogang paradox has been resolved. I do this by considering what we have learned recently about European street gangs and their similarities to American street gangs.

But first, it must be noted that the vision of Eurogang has not yet been realized (Klein, 2012). We have yet to produce studies in which the five-instrument research design has been employed in multiple countries (or even in one!). As yet, we have no cases of prospective, comparative data collection in multiple countries using even one of the Eurogang instruments. However, the Eurogang paradigm has guided multi-method, gang research in several cities, including Copenhagen and an unidentified English city. Eurogang instruments have been used in England, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Denmark, and Russia as well as in the US and Canada. Thus, scholars are beginning to build the research foundation on which to inform European gang policy.

Moreover, the Eurogang consensus definition has been employed in a wide variety of contexts and appears to serve its purpose in Europe as well as the US, notwithstanding some ongoing concerns.² The definitional elements have been incorporated into the International Self-Report Delinquency Study in 30 countries, which has produced a large dataset that can be mined for comparison of gang situations around the world, but particularly in Europe. Gang prevalence rates varied markedly from one country to the next and the US was not even at the top of the list—Ireland captured that honor (Gatti, Haymoz & Schadee, 2011).³ While the Eurogang definition appears to capture different youths than a self-definition (i.e. “I am a member of a street gang”) or group nomination (i.e. “I consider my group to be a gang”), the characteristics of gang members, their behaviors and attitudes, and risk factors for joining appear to be resilient to different approaches (Matsuda, Esbensen and Carson, 2012). Recent reanalysis of

² Aldridge, Medina-Ariz and Ralphs (2012) question the relevance of the street orientation/visibility and a group identity including crime as definitional elements. Research in Denmark also challenges the inclusion of street orientation (Pederson and Lindstad, 2012).

³ This study added the element, the youth considered their group of friends to be a gang, to the criteria for gang membership.

US data with the Eurogang definition produces similar findings regarding the impact of sex composition on gang offending (Peterson and Carson, 2012) and the impact of gang participation on offending as well as routine activities, attitudes and identity (Melde and Esbensen, 2012).

What can we say about the similarities and differences in gangs in the US and Europe? Gatti's work with colleagues reminds us that the gang situations in European cities are quite different from one another, so we need to exercise caution about generalizing to "a" European context, as we are with the US gang patterns. Klein (2002) drew from the work reported in the first Eurogang volume (Klein, Kerner, Maxson and Weitekamp, 2001) on eight cities/countries (Holland, Manchester, Oslo, Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Kazan, Paris and Bremen) to suggest that characteristics of gangs derived from several decades of US research were broadly applicable to gangs in Europe. Drawing on the more recent published research about gangs in Europe, we can observe similarities between US and European gangs on several dimensions.

Gangs as groups: While one study suggests that Dutch gangs are less organized than US gangs (Weerman and Esbensen, 2005), we know relatively little about the structural organization of European gangs as groups. The structural forms that gangs take, based on size, age range, duration, territoriality, subgrouping and crime versatility, appear to be quite similar in the US and Europe. Recent studies in a Northern English City (Smithson, et al, 2012), Copenhagen (Pederson and Lindstad, 2012) and Stockholm (Rostami and Leinfelt, 2012) explicitly identify gang structures that capture most of the forms that gangs take in the US (Klein and Maxson, 2006). Group processes such as social identity, rivalries and status issues appear to transcend national boundaries as well; accounts of these dynamics within European gangs will sound quite familiar to US researchers (Alleyne and Wood, 2012; Smithson, et al., 2012; Aldridge, et al., 2012; de Jong, 2012).

Characteristics of gang members: As in the US, European street gangs draw membership from marginalized and socially disadvantaged youth populations. Race and ethnic categories vary from one context to the next, but the marginalized status of gang members does not. Marginalization is evident in the risk factors that distinguish youth that join gangs; gang members manifest social disadvantages in family, school, peer, community and individual arenas. Research on risk factors for joining gangs in Europe (for example, see Pederson and Lindstad, 2012, in Copenhagen; Weerman, 2012, in The Hague; and Alleyne and Wood, 2012, in London) reveals quite similar patterns to what we have learned from the last three decades of gang studies in the US.

The report by Gatti and his colleagues (2011) alerts us to substantial female involvement in many European countries. Over all 30 countries, they found a prevalence rate of girls' participation (3%) to be half that of boys (5.9%). This is about the same relative

rate for student samples reported by Weerman (2012) in The Hague and by Haymoz and Gatti (2010) in Italy and Switzerland. Earlier survey work in England (Sharp, Aldridge and Medina, 2006) and Edinburgh (Bradshaw, 2005) suggests that girls may join gangs at slightly higher rates there. The patterns of female gang participation described by these studies in Europe are not markedly different from those evident in US gangs.


Gang/crime relationship: While there is ongoing concern that European law enforcement and media may overstate the threat represented by gangs (e.g., Smithson et al., 2012 in England; van Gemert, 2012, and de Jong, 2012, in the Netherlands), virtually every study of gangs in Europe confirms the US finding that joining a street gang dramatically increases involvement in crime and violence. Gang-to-non gang offending ratios over three are the norm and are about five times higher in samples from Spain, Iceland, Portugal, Slovenia, and Norway (Gatti, et al., 2011).

As in the US, gang members and residents of European gang communities tend to have tense or uneasy relationships with law enforcement. We know little about the range of law enforcement approaches to street gangs in Europe, although this volume begins to address that gap. The Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project (Rostami and Leinfelt, 2012) is an example of research/practitioner collaboration and an effort to broaden responses to gangs from exclusively suppressive strategies. While the Eurogang has developed a method to inventory gang programs more generally (Weerman, et al., 2009), this instrument has not yet been used. I am not aware of any compendium of European efforts to respond to gangs. Evidence of effective gang prevention and intervention programs anywhere is slender (Klein and Maxson, 2006) but a few US efforts appear to have some promise (for example, GREAT, Chicago Cease-Fire, and Boston's Operation Ceasefire). It is unclear whether such programs could be successfully exported to European settings.

The recent street violence in England and France remind us that disaffected youth in marginalized environments can create widespread panic and calls for suppression. It is important to have a deep toolbox of response strategies and that these are guided by local research knowledge. Decades of gang research in the US suggest that although we can detect broad patterns in gang participation and activity, street gangs are localized entities. Thus the data gathered by local researchers are critical to identifying what practices are likely to be most profitably employed to address gang problems. European researchers are well on their way to producing various types of local data that provide the foundation for resolving the Eurogang Paradox: gangs should be neither denied nor exaggerated, a lesson we learned the hard way in the US.



...the Eurogang Paradox: gangs should be neither denied nor exaggerated, a lesson we learned the hard way in the US."



1 Metropolitan Police Service, London

By: Inspector Debbie Mackenzie, Metropolitan Police Service,
SCD3 Prevention & Partnership

The Metropolitan Police Service in London has been one of three project partners. In their contribution to this book, Inspector MacKenzie will offer a London perspective on gangs and talk about various responses and strategies in their work against gangs. She will also touch on the issue of why people join gangs in the UK and highlight some of the national initiatives currently in place in working against gangs.

Fredrik Leinfelt

Metropolitan Police Contribution to European Gangs Manual: A London Perspective

Whilst gangs are not new to the UK, current manifestations of gangs are considered to be a new phenomenon. New youth fashions lend themselves to the development of a cultural moral panic that leads to negative societal perceptions of youth. This societal perception manifests itself into negative feelings about youths in general, linking them to all youth groups. The negative youth perception is further perpetuated by the media whom make comparisons to the US and have served to Americanize an essentially local problem.

The Americanisation of the gang has led to the belief that the gangs' birthplace was North America. This is a mistaken acceptance and perpetuation by the media has led to a narrowing of the approaches towards gangs. Decker has pointed out this narrowing approach has excluded other forms of the gang such as, football supporters, fraternities, skinheads and motorcycle gangs (Decker, 2007).

Allowing the Americanisation of our perceptions towards gangs leaves us blinded to the issues which lead to gang involvement, thus allowing whole communities to slip through the net. It is time to consider that the rise of these 'gangs' are a manifestation of British social history, as Robert McAuley's research suggests. The transition from an industrial society to a consumer society has, over the past 30 years, caused the growing division between the 'have and have not's. Changes to the economy and lifestyles have redefined policy, employment and crime to help justify consumer lifestyles.

There are a number of studies within the United Kingdom and United States that have identified that gang membership increases the level of offending for an individual beyond that of non-gang offenders.

In general, gang members commit over five times as many offences as non-gang members (Lemos & Crane, 2004). When examining violent offences, gang members may commit in excess of seven times the number of offences as non-gang members (Howell, 2003).

Social research shows that gang members behave very differently in the group than when alone, they take more risks, feel pressure to conform and feel less personal responsibility. It can also be the case that membership of a gang may amplify offending rather than cause it (Marshall, 2005).

“...the gang membership increases the level of offending for an individual beyond that of non-gang offenders.”

Longitudinal studies suggest that the degree of criminal participation among young people increases after they join a gang, decreasing once they leave although their relative crime rates still remain at a higher level. Additionally their involvement in drug use and supply remaining at levels reached during gang membership (Marshall, 2005). It should also be noted that in relation to weapons and violence, the research highlights: "Weapons carriage is more prevalent among gang members compared to non-gang members (Webb & Tilley, 2005).

Youths are significantly more criminally active during periods of gang membership, particularly in serious and violent offences. This particular finding is accepted as one of the "most robust and consistent observations in criminological research" (Thornberry, 1998).


Therefore, by focussing attention on gang and group offending issues it should be possible to have a significant impact on all levels of violent crime including that associated with general anti-social behaviour.

Following the disorder in August 2011 across cities in England, the Prime Minister David Cameron asked the Home Secretary Theresa May to lead a review, into the growing problem of gangs and gang violence.

The findings and new Government Strategy are contained in a report published in November 2011, "Ending Gang and Youth Violence: A Cross-Government Report" which looks into the scale of the problem of gang and youth violence, analyses its causes, and identifies what can be done by government and other agencies to stop the violence and to turn around the lives of those involved.

The report identifies that gangs and youth violence have been a blight on UK communities for years. The disorder in August 2011 was not caused solely by gangs but the violence seen on the streets revealed all too vividly the problems that sometimes lie below the surface and out of sight. Over the years successive government interventions, initiatives and funds have failed to work. The conclusion was that it is time for a concerted, long-term effort.

Since August 2011, a group of senior ministers – led by the Home Secretary, working closely with the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions – undertook a thorough review of the problem of gang and youth violence. They visited a range of projects working to stop youth violence; heard from international experts about what works in the United States and elsewhere; consulted with senior police officers and local authority officials; and talked to young people themselves.



Several key messages emerged:

First, the vast majority of young people are not involved in violence or gangs and want nothing to do with it.

Second, the small numbers of young people who are involved have a disproportionately large impact on the communities around them in some parts of the UK. It is clear that gang membership increases the risk of serious violence.

And third, this small minority of violent young people is not randomly distributed and does not appear out of the blue. Some areas suffer significantly greater levels of violence than others; some individual and family risk factors repeat themselves time and time again.

Why do people join gangs?

Drivers for gang membership are a mixture of social and criminal factors. For instance, gangs provide identity, status, and safety in numbers, financial reward and a sense of community.

As Crime Concern suggest in their report “Risk and protective factors associated with gang involvement in Southwark 2005”, the key factors motivating young people to join gangs are namely:

- Status and credibility
- Security and protection
- Family and peer involvement in gang culture
- A sense of belonging – gangs provide an alternative sense of family for young people who frequently come from broken homes
- Power and control
- The trappings of an extravagant lifestyle
- Identification and reinforcement of masculinity

The Jill Dando Institute of Security and Crime Science has also conducted research examining projects and police operations targeting gangs and has identified many of the factors listed above. Two additional factors identified by their research are of particular importance. The first is victimisation leading to a person’s involvement in a gang for self-protection: the second is the exclusion and omission of individuals from the education system. This highlights the importance of keeping individuals within schools and similarly supportive institutions. These are areas where police

can have a degree of impact in the form of partnership anti-truancy patrols and other prevention measures.

How does the Metropolitan Police Service assess gang problems?

The method for recording gang related offending within the Metropolitan Police Service is the **Gang Related Incident Tracking Spreadsheet (GRITS)**. GRITS is populated through daily scanning of reported Crime in London to identify incidents of gang criminality. This serves to map all gang incidents within the Metropolitan Police district.

The following crime types are currently recorded on GRITS: Grievous Bodily Harm, Firearms, Arson, Murder, Attempted Murder, Actual Bodily Harm, Rape, Sexual Assault, Harassment, Personal Robbery, Commercial Robbery, Affray/Violent Disorder, Common Assault, Theft, Drug Trafficking, Blackmail, Aggravated Burglary, Criminal Damage, Offensive Weapon, False Imprisonment, Residential Burglary and Kidnap and Threats to Life.

Gang related offending in London since April 2010 has seen violent crime and fire-arms offending featuring most prominently in recorded offences. However, gangs are shown to be involved in burglary, drugs, criminal damage, robbery and theft.

Gangs continue to be heavily involved in firearm offending with 42% of shootings in London associated to a victim or suspect who is a member of a gang.

Gang criminality in London is believed to be responsible for a considerable amount of London's recorded crime. Of recorded crime figures 9% of Class A drug supply, 22% of serious violence, 17% of stabbings and 48% of shootings, 17% of personal robbery and 40% of cash in transit and commercial robbery, 12% of all residential burglary and 26% of aggravated burglary, 4% of all sex offences and 14% of rape,

can be attributed to gang activity. They also indirectly drive other criminality through their heavy involvement in street level drug dealing.



Response to gangs

In line with the Governments Ending Gang and Youth Violence report the police and other agencies need the support and powers to protect communities affected by gangs and to bring the violence under control. But gang and youth violence is not a problem that can be solved by enforcement alone. There needs to be a to change in the life stories of young people who end up dead or wounded on UK streets or are getting locked into a cycle of re-offending. Only by encouraging every agency

to join up and share information, resources and accountability can these problems be solved.

In London a range of agencies have a specific role, as part of their daily business, in managing individuals at risk of, and involved in gang and group offending.

Greater London Authority

The Mayor's "Time for Action programme" Equipping Young people for the Future and Preventing Violence¹ presents young people that may have a tendency towards violence with alternatives to the choices they've made by giving them the tools to imagine and build a better future. At the same time, it provides all young people across London with positive opportunities to develop themselves and engage with their peers. The Mayor's programme focuses on these areas:

*Supporting young people who are in custody for the first time
(Project Daedalus)*

Under Project Daedalus the Greater London Authority have developed a new approach for supporting motivated young people in custody. The project aims to break the cycle of youth re-offending by delivering intensive support, which begins inside custody and continues beyond the prison gate upon release into the community to improve the chances of successful resettlement.

Keeping young people in education (Project Brodie)

Project Brodie is a joint partnership between the GLA and London Councils that aims to increase attendance by focusing on three interlinked themes. Firstly, reducing bullying and the violent behaviour of some pupils who make others feel unsafe to go to school. Secondly, reducing absences through early intervention and supporting families. Thirdly, enforcing attendance where preventative measures fail: a joint role for local authorities and the Metropolitan Police Service.

Mayor's Scholars London Academies and Apprentices


The Mayor's Scholars programme seeks to support children in care throughout their educational career, whether they are in school, college or university.

Developing character and responsibility (Project Titan)

Project Titan aims to build character, self respect and responsibility by working with and promoting the work of uniformed and non-uniformed youth groups across the

“...Equipping Young people for the Future and Preventing Violence presents young people that may have a tendency towards violence with alternatives.”

¹ Time for action: Equipping young people for the future and preventing violence - The Mayors proposals and call to partners, November 2008.



capital, and by providing appropriate mentors to boys and young men at risk of offending.

Expanding sport and music opportunities

Give more young Londoners the opportunity to participate in high quality sport & cultural activities.

*Establishing and disseminating what works best
(Project Oracle)*

To improve the outcomes of those individuals targeted by agencies.

There is further information about these projects on the Greater London Authority website: www.london.gov.uk/

The Metropolitan Police Service and Local Authorities

The Metropolitan Police Service has developed a strong 'Children and Young People' strategy which supports the national Association of Chief Police Officers strategy, and an 'Anti-Violence' strategy that addresses the violent behaviour of individuals, of which gang and group offending is part. The Metropolitan Police Service prevents gang and group offending by building policing confidence within London's communities and enforcing the law on individuals who commit crime.

Local authorities have a wide range of powers and duties and are responsible for all day-to-day services and local community matters. They deliver daily services to prevent gang and group offending, such as situational crime prevention, protecting vulnerable individuals, promoting community cohesion and enhancing community safety.

Education services promote pupil wellbeing, community cohesion, and deliver the Every Child Matters outcomes for all pupils. Schools, colleges and other educational establishments work to prevent gang and group offending through providing education to all and early intervention for individuals affected by it. Every Child Matters (ECM) Aims are for every child, whatever their background or circumstances, to have the support they need to: be healthy, stay safe, enjoy and achieve make a positive contribution and achieve economic well-being.

The Crown Prosecution Service

The Crown Prosecution Service has a role in disrupting gang activities. It is the principal public prosecution service for England and Wales. It is the duty of prosecutors to review, advise and to prosecute cases, or to offer an appropriate out-of-court disposal to an offender. Prosecutors must ensure that the law is properly

applied, that all relevant evidence is put before the court and that obligations of disclosure are complied with.

The Youth Offending Service and The Youth Justice Board for England and Wales

The Youth Offending Service supports individuals at risk of gang and group offending through prevention work, but also delivers community punishments safely, and addresses young offenders' rehabilitation needs, supporting them to exit from gang and group offending.

The Youth Offending Service is made up of:

- The early intervention team which manages individuals at risk of offending or those who have not yet entered the criminal justice system; and
- The Youth Offending Team (YOT) which manages offenders aged 10-17 years.

The Youth Justice Board for England and Wales (YJB) is an executive non-departmental public body. Its board members are appointed by the Secretary of State for Justice. The YJB:

- Oversees the youth justice system in England and Wales
- Works to prevent offending and re-offending by children and young people under the age of 18
- Ensures that custody for them is safe, secure, and addresses the causes of their offending behaviour

London Probation Trust

London Probation Trust delivers community punishments safely, and addresses individuals' rehabilitation needs, supporting them to exit from gang and group offending.

London Probation Trust staff work with offenders aged 18+ years, from first court appearance to completion of sentence to protect the public and reduce re-offending, using programmes to change offending behaviour. The London Probation Trust also works with offenders released from prison, having served 12 months or more and are now subject to licence.

HM Prison Service

HM Prison Service protects the public by holding prisoners securely. HM Prison staff manages the risk of harm associated with gang and group offending, to ensure personal safety of individuals, whilst in custody.

Victim Support

Victim Support is a national charity giving free and confidential help to victims of crime, witnesses, their family, friends and anyone else affected. It is not a government agency or part of the police. Victim support provides emotional and practical support to victims of gang and group offending, right up to providing support through the court proceedings. Victim Support seeks to prevent repeat victimisation.

As the impact of a violent death can be so great Victim Support also delivers a national homicide service running across England and Wales. It works extremely closely with police family liaison officers to make sure that every family bereaved by a homicide is offered a Victim Support homicide caseworker to co-ordinate help and support for them. Victim Support homicide caseworkers get in touch with everyone who agrees to their help and plans tailored support to meet people's needs. This can include support from specially trained homicide volunteers. The staff and

volunteers can visit at people's homes or somewhere else where they feel comfortable. If needed, they can see them regularly over a period of time. In some cases they support people after crimes as traumatic as this for many years.

“

...Prime Minister David Cameron's commitment to turn around the lives of 120,000 troubled families with reduced criminality and violence among key outcomes...”

Responses from The UK government

The UK government has already set in motion a number of far-reaching reforms to address the entrenched educational and social failures that can drive problems like gang and youth violence. Government welfare reforms will give young people better opportunities to access work and overcome barriers to employment.

Education reforms will drive up pupil performance and increase participation in further study and employment. A new Localism Bill will give local areas the power to take action and pool their resources through Community Budgets.

Government plans to turn around the lives of the most troubled families will also be crucial. A new Troubled Families Team in the Department for Communities and Local Government will drive forward the Prime Minister David Cameron's commitment to turn around the lives of 120,000 troubled families with reduced criminality

and violence among key outcomes for this work.

Not every area will have a problem of gangs or serious youth violence, so the focus will be on the areas that do. The Government will offer them support to radically improve the way their mainstream services manage the young people most at risk from gangs or serious violence.

At every stage of a young person's life story, the mainstream agencies with which they have most contact – from health visitors, to General Practitioners, to teachers, to Accident and Emergency departments, local youth workers and Jobcentre Plus staff – need to be involved in preventing future violence. That means simple risk assessment tools; clear arrangements for sharing information about risk between agencies; agreed referral arrangements to make sure young people get the targeted support they need and case management arrangements which bring agencies together to share accountability for outcomes and track progress.

A Government report written by Member of Parliament Graham Allen around early year's interventions supports the need for a focus on agencies working with families at the earliest stage.

Early intervention is an approach, which offers a real opportunity to make lasting improvements in the lives of children, to forestall many of the persistent social problems and end their transmission from one generation to the next, and to make long-term savings in public spending.²

Many of the costly and damaging social problems in society are created because **children are not given the right type of support in their earliest years, when they should achieve their most rapid development.** If we do not provide that help early enough, then it is often too late. For example, an impoverished, neglectful, or abusive environment often results in a child who doesn't develop empathy, learn how to regulate its emotions or develop social skills. Consequently, this can lead to an increased risk of mental health problems, relationship difficulties, antisocial behaviour and aggression.

The positive effects of Early Intervention are even more wide reaching. Farrington and colleagues (2006) found that aggressive behaviour at the age of eight predicts the following when the subject is the age of 30: criminal behaviour, arrests, convictions, traffic offences (especially drunk driving), spouse abuse and punitive treatment of one's own children. The Dunedin study³ further explores this, noting that

² Graham Allen, *Early Intervention: The next steps*

³ Dunedin Multidisciplinary Health and Development Study (April 1972).

those boys assessed by nurses at the age of three as being “at risk” had 2½ times as many criminal convictions as the group deemed not to be at risk. In addition 55 per cent of the offences were violent for the “at risk” group, as opposed to 18 per cent of those not “at risk”. Early Intervention will have a positive effect on reducing crime and, therefore, must be at the heart of crime strategies.⁴

The full “Ending Gang and Youth Violence: A Cross-Government report” (Home Office, 2011) sets out the detailed plans for combating gang’s and serious youth violence. The proposals are wide-ranging but focus on five areas:

1. Providing support to local areas to tackle their gang or youth violence problem.

The Government will:

- Establish an Ending Gang and Youth Violence Team working with a virtual network of over 100 expert advisers to provide practical advice and support to local areas with a gang or serious youth violence problem;
- Provide £10 million in Home Office funding in 2012/13 to support up to 30 local areas to improve the way mainstream services identify, assess and work with the young people most at risk of serious violence, with at least half of this funding going to the non-statutory sector;
- Invest at least £1.2 million of additional resource over the next three years to improve services for young people under 18 suffering sexual violence in our major urban areas – with a new focus on the girls and young women caught up in gang related rape and abuse.

2. Preventing young people becoming involved in serious violence in the first place, with a new emphasis on early intervention and prevention. The Government will:

- Deliver an existing commitment on **early intervention** which research shows is **the most cost-effective way of reducing violence in later life**. They will double the capacity of Family Nurse partnerships and recruit 4,200 more health visitors by 2015 and will invest over £18 million in specialist services to identify and support domestic violence victims and their children (who themselves are at particular risk of turning to violence in adulthood);
- Assess existing materials on youth violence being used in schools and ensure schools know how to access the most effective;
- Improve the education offered to excluded pupils to reduce their risk of involvement in gang violence and other crimes;
- Support parents worried about their children’s behaviour by working with a

4 Graham Allen, *Early Intervention: The next steps*

range of family service providers to develop new advice on gangs.

3. *Pathways out of violence and the gang culture for young people wanting to make a break with the past. The Government will:*

- Continue to promote intensive family intervention work with the most troubled families, including gang members, with a specific commitment to roll out Multi- Systemic Therapy for young people with behavioural problems and their families to 25 sites by 2014;
- Set up a second wave of Youth Justice Liaison and Diversion schemes for young offenders at the point of arrest, which identify and target mental health and substance misuse problems. These will be targeted at areas where there is a known and significant gang or youth crime problem;
- Work, through the Ending Gang and Youth Violence Team, with hospital Accident and Emergency Departments and children's social care to promote better local application of guidance around young people who may be affected by gang activity presenting at A&E;
- Explore the potential for placing youth workers in A&E departments to pick up and refer young people at risk of serious violence;
- Support areas, through the Ending Gang and Youth Violence Team, to roll out schemes to re-house former gang members wanting to exit the gang lifestyle;
- Explore ways to improve education provision for young people in the secure estate and for those released from custody;
- Implement new offending behaviour programmes for violent adult offenders in prison and under community supervision, including new modules on gang violence.

4. *Punishment and enforcement to suppress the violence of those refusing to exit violent lifestyles. The Government will:*

- Extend police powers to take out gang injunctions to cover teenagers aged 14 to 17;
- Implement mandatory custodial sentences for people using a knife to threaten or endanger others – including for offenders aged 16 and 17;
- Introduce mandatory life sentences for adult offenders convicted of a second very serious violent or sexual crime;



- Extend the work that the UK Border Agency undertakes with the police using immigration powers to deport dangerous gang members who are not UK citizens, drawing on the success of Operation Bite in London;
 - Consult on whether the police need additional curfew powers and on the need for a new offence of possession of illegal firearms with intent to supply, and on the appropriate penalty level for illegal firearm importation.
5. *Partnership working to join up the way local areas respond to gang and other youth violence. The Government will:*
- Issue clear and simple guidelines on data sharing that clarify once and for all the position on what information can be shared between agencies about high risk individuals on a risk aware, not risk averse, basis;
 - Promote the roll-out of Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASH), which co-locate police and other public protection agencies, to **cut bureaucracy and make it easier to share information and agree actions;**
 - Deliver on the commitment that all hospital A&E departments share anonymised data on knife and gang assaults with the police and other agencies and pilot the feasibility of including A&E data on local crime maps;
 - Encourage the use of local multi-agency reviews after every gang related homicide to ensure every area learns the lessons of the most tragic cases.

Operation Trident and Operation Connect - Two Gang Response Programmes

Trident: Introduction & Context

To have any understanding of what Trident is and how it works, a brief look at what were the conditions that brought about its creation is needed.

In the mid & late 1990's, London's black communities across South, East & North London were subjected to levels of violence using firearms not seen before on main land UK. London witnessed exceptionally violent criminals from Jamaica with links

to the lucrative London drug trade entering the UK giving rise to the term 'Yardies', a Jamaican slum term for gang. The hallmark of

the so called 'Yardie' was the ready use of firearms to intimidate second generation black Jamaican & African criminals already established in running London's street drug trade.



This sustained intimidation was typified by two high profile murders in London. In 1998, a young black woman, called Avril Johnson, whilst in the safety of own home was terrorised by a gang of three so called ‘Yardies’. Avril was subject to the most appalling beating witnessed by her husband, Kirk, as they looked for drugs and other valuables. During an attempt to protect his wife, Kirk was shot in the neck and left for dead. However, before losing consciousness he witnessed his wife being tied with electrical flex to a chair and shot in the back of head in an execution style murder. The couple’s young children asleep upstairs unaware of what had happened to their parents down stairs. Just five days later in Stratford, East London, another young black mother again at home with young children suffered the same fate. Her name was Michelle Corby. Michelle’s children both under the age of 6, were found running in the street outside the home address crying ‘Mummy’s asleep we can’t wake Mummy’. A third murder in Brent shortly after Michelle’s of a small time cannabis dealer resulted in demands from London’s black communities to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to protect the black community from such indiscriminate & exceptional gun violence. In the shadow of major riots in Brixton & Toxteth trust in policing and protecting our black communities had reached a new low point.

‘Operation Trident’ was as born in 1998. The term ‘Operation’; denotes a temporary Police ‘response’ to a serious threat of criminality in the capital. Trident’s continued success has meant the word ‘Operation’ has been dropped as Trident has become the vanguard of the Community & Policing response to the most serious violence in the Capital suffered by our black communities.

Trident’s approach of working closely with communities gaining their trust and confidence has meant the Trident brand is seen as a model of Policing excellence for gun crime investigations. Trident’s reputation for victim and witness care has added credibility, enabling Trident to bring to justice those responsible for some of the most complex and demanding investigations.

Trident’s Objectives

1. Investigate all shooting murders within London, bringing to justice those responsible where the suspect & the victim are from our black communities.
2. Targeting and bringing to justice the most dangerous & Organised Criminal Groups, within the Capital, where their activity is in supplying/manufacturing of illegal firearms for the criminal world. Trident has a national responsibility to advise the Home Secretary on the criminal use of firearms in England & Wales together with tactics to counter such use of firearms.

3. Investigate & bring to justice those responsible for non fatal shootings within London irrespective of the ethnic background of the suspect.
4. Investigate and bring to justice the criminal use of a firearm used against police officers in the line of duty. This includes all members of the wider Police family, such as Police Community Support Officers & Traffic wardens.

The Trident name was chosen with care & the above objectives are typified by Trident's three-stranded style of Policing, namely, robust Enforcement of the Law, Directed intelligence and Proactive Community Engagement. Trident not only takes the gun out of the killers hand but all those it can show have been involved in the supply of firearms. The use of directed Intelligence spearheads their proactive activities in stopping serious gun related crime in the first instance. Trident is unique in that from its inception it has worked at the both the grass root level & strategic level with London's black communities & their leaders via their Independent Advisory Group. This means listening to & taking on board the concerns of London's black & other communities affected by serious gun criminality.

All three strands of Trident work in support of each other simultaneously to prevent serious gun crime in London. Since 1998 when detections for shooting murders in London typically ran at between 15-17%, they now stand typically at 85%.

During the course of the current financial year (April 2011-March 2012) Trident has on average taken a firearm off the street of London almost every other day. Shootings are down almost 28% on the previous year & murders are down almost 15%. And almost 24,000 young people in London's most challenging boroughs at both primary & secondary schools have received advice on how to avoid becoming victim to gun & gang violence from Trident's Community Engagement Team.

“ Trident is unique in that from its inception it has worked at the both the grass root level & strategic level... ”

Operation Connect

Operation Connect is aimed at pursuing those who are determined to persist in gang related violence and associated criminality, while encouraging and enabling those who choose to leave gang lifestyles behind. For those who do not choose to engage Operation Connect will use the full range of enforcement tactics open to them - whether that is, for example, targeting gang members through fraudulent car insurance, special gang injunctions or for dealing drugs or committing robberies - in

order to **disrupt serious networks**.

However, police cannot tackle the issue of violence alone – they are working tirelessly with local schools and colleges, the local authority and other agencies, third party groups and faith communities to make sure that the most effective arrangements for delivering community safety are in place.

Since Connect was launched at the end of March 2011 a significant number of gang members have been charged with a wide range of offences, including GBH, firearms possession and supply of drugs. In addition, officers and partners are working together to help young people wishing to leave gangs and exit gang lifestyle by directing them towards specialist support.

Operation Connect have two main objectives:

1. To build sustainable capability at local level by working with other agencies to identify, prioritise and risk assess those individuals causing the most harm. They aim to establish effective partnership models to manage those individuals, and utilise 'what works' within existing interventions, to reduce the number of gang-related violent incidents.
2. To carry out proactive work on the agreed, most high risk individuals on behalf of local areas. To work towards long-term prevention by using a problem solving process which encompasses a holistic range of tactics, and evidence-based knowledge to reduce the individuals' gang-related violence.



The Metropolitan Police aim to introduce Operation Connect in all of the 32 London Boroughs.

A framework has been produced to assist with implementation of 'Operation Connect'. It details some of the recommendations for implementing a successful project. The recommendations could be adapted to meet the needs of any country.

There will be a need to set up a Strategic group involving those people, who work at a level sufficient to be able to make and influence tactical decisions (including funding issues), consideration should be given to identifying a gang and enforcement lead. The purpose of any meetings held would be to identify obstacles and barriers to effective working and ensure any issues are overcome. To ensure that those involved know the exact purpose of the meeting there needs to be a coherent and effective communication plan in place. This group should also be open to com-

munity representatives.

In support of any strategic group, consideration should be given to establishing a multi-agency partnership meeting to discuss gang nominal's thought to be suitable for engagement and interventions. This meeting would facilitate the sharing of information and formation of an action plan, which needs to include all statutory, non-statutory and third sector options. Referrals into the partnership meeting need to be wide as possible and ideally they should be held a minimum of one every 4 weeks. It is important that there is robust compliance regarding attendance to these meetings as attendees will be accountable for any previous actions.

An up to date report should be produced for the meetings, reviewing all crimes of note and all gang related intelligence to ascertain if it is linked to any known gang nominal's. This review will also assist in identifying any new subjects and violent offenders. The focus and priority should be directed to those who are causing the most harm, those who are most likely to be harmed; locations where harm is occurring and at times when it is occurring.

Following the agreement of any action plans, consideration should be given to holding a regular enforcement meeting structured to highlight the following: - priority subjects and summary of intelligence, enforcement & prevention activity tasked planned and carried out, also any emerging gang threats / crime trends & the opportunity for new referrals to be evaluated / subjects considered for removal from the priority nominal group.

Any enforcement activity that is prioritised against specific individuals and locations should be tasked to those agencies that have the capability and skills to progress actions to reduce violence such as, the youth offending team, specialised police teams and other partnership agencies.

Any partnership meeting action plans and findings should be fed into local tasking processes. Consideration needs to be given regarding a readily identifiable pathway from engagement into enforcement. Meetings should have clear communication strategies in terms of reassurance to the public (i.e. showing that progress is being undertaken, progress is being made). This should specifically take into account the local press and community representatives.

In order to ensure that the community has a voice with regard to addressing gang issues there should be a range of Key Individual Networks (KIN) in place; these people can also facilitate updates to the local community. KINS are a core group of local people who live, work or regularly pass through a neighbourhood. By the

nature of their place or function in the local community, KIN members will be particularly in tune with the latest developments in their neighbourhoods. They are the people who can bring together the community intelligence we need to act on local concerns and provide reassurance to communities.

To support Operation Connect and other agencies who work with those involved in gang and group offending, the Metropolitan Police Specialist Crime Directorate produced the manual “Gang and Group Offenders, a practitioner’s handbook of ideas and interventions, on behalf of the London Criminal Justice Partnership.

This handbook is available for all agencies to use in their work with gang and group offenders. It has been produced using the knowledge and expertise of relevant London practitioners and shares ideas and current interventions being used across London.

Tackling gang and group offending forms part of the anti-violence agenda, and the handbook will assist in addressing these issues. Of note the handbook contains numerous interventions for dealing with the growing concern of girls affiliated to gangs, those from specific cultural groups and interventions led by religious organisations. There are numerous advantages when using this handbook:

- It collates information from multiple agencies into one place such as; Local Authorities, Education, Police, Victim Support, Crown Prosecution Service, HM Prison Service, Youth Justice Board and London Probation Trust.
- It clarifies each agency’s role in managing group and gang offenders.
- It is London focussed; all interventions have been used in London and contact details are provided, as well as some case studies
- It captures a broad range of work from early intervention to reduce the recruitment of young people into gangs, to reducing serious youth violence through to enforcing the law on serious organised criminals.

The handbook is not a definitive guide on ‘how to manage gang and group offending’. It simply captures some approaches being used in London. It is not a ‘good practice’ guide. The effectiveness of each intervention is not known. However, the handbook will encourage and acknowledge the use of the Mayor of London’s Project Oracle Evaluation Standard for any intervention that uses it.



...the Metropolitan Police Specialist Crime Directorate produced the manual “Gang and Group Offenders, a practitioner’s handbook of ideas and interventions...”

The 'Gang and Group Offenders - A Practitioner's Handbook of Ideas & Interventions' is available on the London Criminal Justice Partnership website: www.londoncjp.gov.uk/

Project Oracle

To improve the outcomes of those individuals targeted by agencies, the Mayor of London's "Project Oracle" aims to establish **a coordinated London-wide way of understanding and sharing what really works** – with an initial focus on preventing and tackling youth violence in London. As the project develops, it will become a resource for all services working to improve young people's lives in London. Project Oracle will produce:

1. *An Evaluation methodology for London to help agencies and commissioners to assess and improve work including:*

- independent standards of evidence to allow objective assessment of programmes and projects;
- a project assessment framework, linked to the standards of evidence; and
- a self assessment tool to improve standards of evidence for programmes and projects.

The Greater London Authority will provide support to the process to ensure independence and credibility.

2. *A web-based repository of interventions that have utilised the Project Oracle methodology to assess their effectiveness.*

The website will increase the availability of quality information to guide appropriate commissioning and policy development

What challenges do the Metropolitan Police Service see in the future in terms of dealing and responding to gangs?

The Metropolitan Police Service has agreed the following definition with regards to gangs.

A relatively durable, predominantly street-based group of young people who see themselves (and are seen by others) as a discernible group engage in a range of criminal activity and violence, (and) identify with or lay claim over territory (or) have some form of identifying structural feature, (and) are in conflict with other, similar gangs.

The disadvantage of definitions is that they can create stereotypes which serve to develop myths among young people and negative responses from community towards youth. It does however; clearly define who is being talked about rather than

a blanket use of the word ‘gang’ for all youths which disenfranchises young people.

Using gang definitions at all may distract and undermine police efforts from the intrinsic problem, which is serious youth violence (Sullivan, 2005). Pre-occupation with defining individuals as gang members may cause misidentification of youth, misplaced prevention / intervention strategies, unnecessary police enforcement and misuse of financial resources (Sullivan, 2005). Instead some academics advocate that police enforcement techniques can be more effective if they target the most harmful / dangerous offenders and those committing the most crime (Kennedy, 2009). Furthermore they argue that police do not need to label individuals as gang members in order to monitor them properly (Kennedy, 2009).

The use of a gang definition permits individuals being recognised as gang members and associates, who in turn can lead to them being placed on a Gang Database.

Risks associated with Gang Databases

Literature has identified a range of risks associated with the use of Gang Databases that affect individuals, communities and police forces.

False Labelling Non-Gang Members

A major risk associated with gang databases is when a non-gang member is classified as a gang member (Barrows & Huff, 2009).



Unnecessarily criminalised

The absence of a definitive gang and gang member definition may result in innocent individuals' human rights being breached (Jacobs, 2009). Ambiguity around what constitutes a gang member may result in misplaced labelling, and unnecessary stigmatization and criminalisation of innocent youth (Jacobs, 2009). Indeed, individuals can even be included onto a database without committing a crime (Brown, 2009). The social, educational and economic consequences for the individuals may have life-hindering effects (Brown, 2009). For example, individuals included on the database may see their future career aspirations affected if they require police vetting to obtain employment.

Personal safety

An incorrect gang label from the police could not only result in undue police attention but may also put the individual at increased personal risk from other gangs

(Barrows & Huff, 2009). The individual is unwittingly exposed to the increased risks, which a gang member chooses to face (Brown, 2009). For instance, the individual may be targeted during an inter-gang dispute if they are associated / labelled as part of the feuding gangs.

Become a new gang member

A potential consequence for incorrect gang labelling is for the individual to become a gang member (Barrows & Huff, 2009). Given the increased danger they are now involuntarily exposed to, they may join gangs for protection (Barrows & Huff, 2009). Therefore, police use of gang databases may consequently be exasperating and furthering the gang problem rather than resolving it.

Damage community relations

False targeting of individuals via a gangs database may serve to increase hostilities among groups that the police are trying to protect (Bjerregaard, 2003). There is evidence that minorities' may be disproportionately targeted by police, which alienates residents, inhibits cooperation and promotes a negative attitude towards police (Bjerregaard, 2003). Therefore correct police targeting of gang members may help bolster relationships with minority communities by targeting guilty offenders only (Bjerregaard, 2003).

Gang members being missed

A second big risk to the use of gang databases is when gang members are not identified (Barrows & Huff, 2009).

Increased harm

Previous academic research has found that gang members commit more violent offences than non gang members (Thornberry et al, 2003b). It could be assumed that the types of gang offences committed are likely to be more serious and damaging to the community. Therefore, to omit a gang member could result in more serious offences being committed without police awareness.

Fill the vacuum

Individuals not classified and therefore targeted by police as a gang member, could experience a rise in status within the gang. It could be assumed that those not tar-


geted or removed from the gang environment by police could have their reputation and status elevated in the group to fill subsequent vacant positions. Consequently, an individual's efforts to fill the vacuum within the gang may result in further gang related violence to reflect their elevated status (Barrows & Huff, 2009).

No desistance support offered

The risk to the individual if falsely excluded from the gang database could be that intervention/ prevention opportunities to desist from crime are not offered to them (Barrows & Huff, 2009). Police use of gang databases to manage individuals allows suitable prevention / intervention opportunities to be offered prior to enforcement activity; therefore police support to desist from crime is not available (Barrows & Huff, 2009).

Young people treated the same as adults

The police use of gang databases to target enforcement activity against gangs means that both youth and adult offenders will be held on the same systems (Jacobs, 2009). Consequently, youth offenders may be targeted the same as adult or life-time offenders which may not be age appropriate or necessary.



These risks have been highlighted to senior management teams within the Metropolitan Police Service, thus enabling them to incorporate risk management strategies within future decision making.

The future

The Government report on Ending Gang and Youth Violence (Home Office, 2011) marks the beginning of a new commitment to work across government to tackle the scourge of gang culture and serious youth violence. An Inter-Ministerial Group will continue to meet on a quarterly basis to review progress on the actions set out in the report and will be supported by a cross-government senior officials group.

The government has also established a forum of key external organisations and individuals who share their commitment to end serious youth violence; they will meet regularly with ministers to hold the Government to account on delivery. The government have promised to work with young people themselves to ensure their views are heard too. Nationally, they are clear that their approach to serious youth

violence will stand or fall on whether it reduces the number of young people killed or seriously wounded – this is the ultimate goal. But crime figures only tell part of the story, so they intend to work with local partners to agree other common-sense measures of wellbeing in high-violence areas for individuals, families and communities. They will then these to help local areas evaluate the impact of the measures outlined in this report.

The UK Government has set themselves clear goals.

By December 2011

- Ending Gang and Youth Violence Team in place, with the support of a virtual network of over 100 expert advisors.
- Up to 30 areas with the biggest serious youth violence and gang problems identified and offered support from the Team to revamp their strategic and operational response to serious youth violence.
- Gang injunctions available for 14-to 17-year olds.
- Consultation underway on the need for a new offence of possession of an illegal firearm with intent to supply, and on the appropriate penalty level for the existing illegal importation of a firearm offence.
- Public health outcomes framework published.
- Child Sexual Exploitation plan published.

By April 2012

- £10m of funding distributed to up to 30 areas identified as having significant serious youth violence and gang problems to improve the response of mainstream services, with at least half of this funding going to the non-statutory sector.



Up to 30 areas with the biggest serious youth violence and gang problems identified and offered support..."

- Impact measures agreed with areas in receipt of funding and support.
- ACPO map of gangs in England and Wales developed and regularly reviewed.
- Second wave of Youth Justice Liaison and
- Diversion sites targeted at areas where there is a known and significant gang or serious youth violence problem.
- Feasibility of including A&E data on local crime maps established.

By April 2013

- Clear, simple guidelines on data sharing that clarify once and for all the position on what information can be shared between agencies.
- Simple evidence-based tool developed that every agency can use to identify the young people most at risk of serious violence.
- Gang Forums in place across England and Wales to enable youth offending teams to share best practice.
- New offending behaviour programmes for violent offenders rolled out, including modules specifically targeted at gang members.
- Specialist services in place for girls and young women suffering gang-related sexual exploitation and abuse.
- New advice available to parents, helping them to spot the signs of gang involvement, and teaching materials on serious youth violence assessed, with schools knowing how to access the most effective.
- Law on joint enterprise publicised, making young people aware of the potentially severe consequences of associating with gang members.

By April 2014

Housing resettlement schemes for gang members and their families operating more effectively in all gang-affected areas.

Intensive Multi-Systemic Therapy will be reaching around 1,200 troubled families in 25 areas.

By the end of the current UK Parliament

- They will have turned around the lives of 120,000 of the most troubled families, reducing their involvement in violent crime and disorder.
- They will have seen a reduction in the number of young people killed or seriously wounded by youth or gang-related violence.
- All local areas with a serious youth violence or gang problem will be able to point to reductions across a range of indicators, for example, an improvement in well-being for individuals, families and communities.

A further Government strategy involves the creation of the National Crime Agency (Home Office, 2011b). **The National Crime Agency (NCA)**, which will be fully operational by 2013 aims to transform the UK's response to, organised crime. It will

be a powerful body of operational crime fighters, led by a senior Chief Constable and accountable to the Home Secretary.

The NCA will fight crime. It will tackle serious and complex crime and bring organised criminals to account, in partnership with local and international forces. As an internationally recognised agency, the NCA will confront the serious and organised criminality that threatens the safety and security of the UK and its economic wellbeing, conducting multi-agency operations to achieve maximum disruption. Accountable to the Home Secretary and underpinned by the strategic policing requirement, the NCA will work with police and crime commissioners, chief constables, devolved administrations and others, genuinely connecting activity from the local to the international – in country, at the border and overseas. The NCA will collect and analyse its own and others' intelligence, building and using a comprehensive strategic and tactical picture of serious and organised criminality.

It will harness the latest technology to ensure that, subject to robust safeguards, its intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities match the threat posed by criminals who seek constantly to evade detection. **The NCA** will prioritise action and for the first time, **will organise and coordinate the whole operational law enforcement effort against crime.**

The NCA will have the specialist operational capabilities that add value to those in police forces and other law enforcement partners, such as those working on cyber crime, economic and environmental crime, human, wildlife and drug trafficking and child exploitation. Collectively these specialist capabilities will enhance the fight against serious and organised crime.

Conclusion

The UK Governments' promising new commitment to tackle gangs and serious youth violence shows a dedicated multi-agency approach to end the durability of gang and youth violence culture. The Government clearly outlines an implementation strategy to prevent young people from becoming involved in serious youth violence by bolstering protective factors for those at most risk, maximising opportunities for intervention strategies for those currently involved in gang and youth violence and by providing increased resources to punish and enforce persistent offenders. Underlying the implementation strategy is the need for localised partnership working in order to fully address the holistic problem of gangs and youth violence.

The MPS currently address the key components of the Governments' strategy

through strategic partnership working, pro-active policing operations and by supporting prevention and intervention tactics. The proposed resources and parliamentary support should enable the MPS to tackle the problem further by creating new policing opportunities, addressing internal challenges and working closely with our partner agencies to eradicate gang crime and serious youth violence from London.





2

Oslo Police Department

All descriptions used in this text are based on actual events. The text (dialogue sections) has been approved by all the implied individuals and can be made public.

By: Police Superintendent Eirik Jensen and Senior Advisor Roger Stubberud

The Oslo Police Department is one of three police partners and have made an impressive contribution to this book by writing on their work on dialogues. In this chapter, our Norwegian counterparts will elaborate on an alternative - and to some controversial - method of enforcing gangs - by engaging in and inviting gangs to a dialogue. Fredrik Leinfelt

15 years of dialogue with criminal gang structures – experience, results and advice

Oslo, June 2011

It is almost one o'clock in a warm street in the city centre on a Thursday morning. A car stops right outside a restaurant where **three members of Hells Angels (HA)** stand smoking. In the car there are **two persons from Oslo Police District**. When they approach the three persons from HA they all shake hands. After this formal greeting, they all enter the restaurant and the meeting begins. On the agenda is **the planning of Euro Officer Meeting and the club's 15th anniversary in September**. The HA members feel greatly responsible for accomplishing a successful event. Many foreign members will participate. Good planning and cooperation with the police are important aspect in order to avoid unnecessary conflicts. They provide information on the number of guests, on party locations, hotels, transportation, sightseeing and other details on the event. They answer the police's questions on other details of the event. The atmosphere is good and jokes are made about all the sights the older foreign members would like to see together with their wives during their stay in Oslo.

The next issue is the police's demands and restrictions for the event. The members are told that the police expect **all HA guests to bring their ID documents, that photos are taken, that they accept the colours' ban in restaurants and nightclubs, and that they follow police directions**. It is agreed that the chief operation officer of the police will stop by the clubhouse to look at the location of checkpoints and parking. **No crime is accepted**. If crime is revealed, there will be reactions. The members accept this. They have already informed their foreign guests on the existing rules in Oslo. After clarifying a few more details the discussion continues on the threat situation for the re-establishment of Mongols in the capital. After having stated their concern in connection with this establishment, **a new meeting is convened after the summer holidays**. They exchange new contact phone numbers and **the meeting ends with firm handshakes**.

The author's reflections

Gang related crime constitutes important police and social challenges. Preventing and fighting gang structures are very demanding issues. There are no simple solutions, neither for the police nor for society when gangs have established themselves and have access to criminal profit and status. Just like other police agencies Oslo has tried out different models and strategies from the mid 1950-ties till today - with more or less success. From the 1980-ties the criminal gang structures still grew to become the community with the largest influence and power in Oslo's criminal underworld around 2000. Members were looked upon with respect and in high regard among other criminals. Young people in the suburbs saw gang members as role models after media exposure of sports car, jewellery, clothes, watches, women and large amounts of cash.

Behind this bright facade there was at the same time a very violent competition between the two largest ethnic minority gangs - a fight for power which had taken several lives and wounded many people. Both gangs had built up large stocks of firearms. They hardly ever went unarmed and without protective vests. In 2006 violence escalated, - the streets and squares of the city became virtual war zones. By pure accident there were no innocent victims in the shower of bullets. I August 2006 a shooting took place in a large crowd. That was it! The police had lost control. Then Oslo Police District for the first time established a special gang unit.

Oslo Police District's vision of becoming *"the safest capital in the world"* will not be reached with armed gangs using the city as their shooting range. In the process of preventing and fighting extreme situations different measures must be taken to create stability and control. This was what we also had to do. But in order to fight and prevent gang structures there is a need for a total package of measures where



Oslo Police District's vision of becoming *"the safest capital in the world"* will not be reached with armed gangs using the city as their shooting range."

the police in cooperation with other authorities work at a long term level. Our paper will not consider the variety of such measures. We will through experience, practical examples and advice account for how the police may build safety and trust through dialogue. Oslo is in extensive dialogue with the whole population independent of age, sex, gender identity, ethnic background, religion, political views, social situation or criminal background. Dialogue is a method used in most negotiations and reconciliation situations in much of the police work in Oslo.

The use of dialogue is based on several central and local guide-

lines. The method is used in many different ways within the Norwegian police, such as in activist groups, causals, honour-related violence, terrorism and organized crime. As is the case with other methods, it takes time to understand and profit from the potential of dialogue. For some people it has been a difficult process to see that the police “talk” to criminal gang members. Many have long experience in working with repressive methods. Results are measured by the number of seizures and arrests. Experience shows that such a partial approach has led to increased antagonism, threats and violence. Our theory is that the police’ use of repressive measures often generates opposition.

Dialogue has contributed to reduced conflicts. The criminal groups’ aggressive attitude towards the police has gradually turned into a kind of mutual understanding. Many serious conflicts are solved by “*talking over a cup of coffee*”. It is difficult to measure dialogue and the absence of crime, just like all other preventive activity. Police leaders and operational officers are not familiar with visualising that things did not happen.

Drawing up this gang manual has been a very informative, and partly rather a demanding, process for all people involved. An evaluation of ones efforts can never be objective. Difficult things tend to be forgotten after some time, and so do the successful results. As time passes the difficulties often are forgotten as well as the skill of manage how to describe what really solved the special situation or conflict, e.g. (=for example); was something said/not said, and what about the look or glance, the body language, and the attitude?

The burden partly related to challenge internal opponents tending to look upon the fact that “*speaking with criminals*” is close to the same as being a criminal yourself, is also very demanding. In the light of this it is of the utmost importance to publicise the dialog by the right name.

Introduction

“The Oslo Police District, the entire city police no matter who we are, where we’re from or where we live. That we as a police officer is talking to people, provides/is to give the police a good reputation. This makes our job easier because through communication we’ll win the respect - and it gives people a reason to rely on us and the job we’re doing”

- Anstein Gjengedal, Chief of Police Oslo Police District

The purpose of our entry in the manual is to describe the gang structures and above all the understanding of and use of dialogue as a method. We wish to share this in the belief that other police agencies may profit from our experience and knowledge. No country or community has succeeded in fighting gang structures through repressive measures. Dialogue is, however, no “magic formula”. The method must be used as part of an overall strategy with focus on means and objectives.

The police district effectively uses dialogue without considering the characteristics of the individual or the community involved. The importance of dialogue was made clear after the terrorist attacks on the 22nd of July 2011. The message from a united political Norway was clear – an including and open society requires dialogue. The leaders of Oslo Police District wrote the following after the terrorist attack: *“the police district’s use of dialogue as a method to build safety and trust for all citizens will be continued”* (Trend report 2012).

Our objective is to increase the understanding of the fact that dialogue, when used correctly, may give short and long term profit. There is, however, no guarantee that dialogue will work for all. It requires cooperation and the use of all available police tools. To choose dialogue does not mean the exclusion of other methods – on the contrary it is necessary to understand that the building of trust is a time-consuming process.

Dialogue is not the same as accepting criminal attitudes and criminal actions. It is not an acceptance of challenging the law – in any way.

Method

Our contribution is based on qualitative and quantitative information, as well as on internal police sources and external sources. The most important sources are statistics on police reports, case files, intelligence, research and interviews and talks with police officers, researchers and representatives from cooperating agencies and authorities.

Definition of a gang:

A group (often limited in age) staying together over a period of time, performing criminal acts and /or disturbing public order and showing aggressive behaviour in public places. The gang has some kind of symbolic expression of their group participation such as name, insignia, clothing, language etc.”

In the everyday use of the expression "*gang crime*" the police must be cautious. The use of "*gang*" may easily be considered stigmatic, but at the same time it may in certain communities contribute to strengthen the group's position and thus strengthen an already negative behaviour. In Oslo Police District the expression "*gang structures*" means established criminal gangs, independent of ethnic background, name, symbols or composition. The gangs do not need to have identical structures, but the structure indicates how the gang is organised and as such the roles of the individual member. We need to adapt the strategy to the different characteristics with the use of all police methods and tools.

Oslo – a capital in development

Oslo is a city in growth with a population of over 605 000 as of 1 April 2011. This means that more than every tenth Norwegian lives in the capital. A fifth of the Oslo citizens are born in a different country and have immigrated to Norway. The birth rate has been all time high and immigration exceeds emigration. In Oslo the number of men and women is almost equal and the average Oslo citizen is 37 years old.

The strong growth in the number of citizens in Oslo over the last years is mainly due to growth in the immigrant population, defined as immigrants and persons born in Norway with two immigrant parents. The total immigration population was 28,4 % of Oslo's population at the beginning of 2011.

Work is an important gateway to knowledge of society and language and with that better integration into society. Immigrants from non-western countries have a clearly lower employment rate than citizens with Norwegian background and immigrants with western background. For different reasons several non-western immigrants also have a lower average income and difficult language and cultural adaptability.

Crime development

As much as 22,3 % of all reported crimes in Norway are registered with Oslo Police District as the crime scene – and the percentage is increasing. For this reason crime figures for Oslo influence to a still larger extent the statistics for the whole country. The police district received 88073 reports on crime in 2010. These figures have been stable for years. The police district has challenges in preventing and fighting serious and organized crime. The city, like other large cities, is influenced to a large extent by



national and international events and trends. It is easier to hide your identity and criminal activity in a large city than in smaller transparent communities. Serious criminal cases in other police districts and to a certain extent in other countries have connections to participants and networks in the capital. The fact that criminals from the capital in periods stay abroad and to a certain extent manage their activity from there is also a constant challenge.

Much of the violent and serious crimes in Oslo Police District are committed by people who cooperate in more or less open networks. There are no indications of special criminal networks with a monopoly or a dominating position on the crime scene. This is evident from the absence of territorial borders in the drug distribution in the city. As of today almost anyone can start selling drugs whenever and wherever they choose without causing violent conflicts.

The capital does, however, have several well-known and well established parties and networks requiring extensive attention from the police, such as the criminal gang structures, drug networks, violent activists, graffiti makers, casuals, money collectors, networks of robbers etc.



...the police focus on the most violent gangs has resulted in an important reduction in gang related violent crime in public areas."

The fact that the police focus on the most violent gangs has resulted in an important reduction in gang related violent crime in public areas. There may be several reasons for this, but there is little doubt that the police' focus and follow-up of the gangs has been observed by other criminal communities. They do not wish to be in the same situation by committing crime that attracts public attention. For the police district this situation is very positive compared to the situation prior to the establishment of the gang project in 2006.

Oslo Police District

Oslo Police District has approx. 2500 employees – more than 1600 of them police officers, 130 public prosecutors and more than 700 civilians.

The police district is divided into two major departments and two smaller administrative departments (Administration and Human Relations). Department 1- the Uniformed Department consists of five police stations and sections responsible for the communication centre, anti-terror unit etc. Department 2 – the Criminal Investigation Department consists of sections responsible for serious violent and sexual crime, organized crime, civilian administrative permits and immigration, financial crime etc.

Being the country's largest police district Oslo has several nationwide tasks, such as providing security for the Royal Family, embassies, VIP visits etc, anti-terror unit (bomb- and hostage negotiators), undercover, secret surveillance and helicopter service.

Gang structures in Oslo

The first gang structures in Oslo came in **the 1960-ties** and were called the “Blackie” gang and the “Frogner” gang. Basically these gangs did not commit crime, but they were young people who protested against a homogeneous society through their clothing and aggressive behaviour. As described in a newspaper from the 1960-ties **“they drove noisy motorbikes, wore black leather jacket and special hair styles”**. The role models came from the US through movies and music. They were the MC gangs of their time. The rebellious youths experienced very little dialogue with the police. Instead they were often met by batons. The clashes of that period were by today's standards clearly defined as very intense and violent. The gangs lived short lives. The most troublesome youths became seamen and were sent out into the world to grow up. The gangs were not an alternative way of life or a career for those who participated.

This changed in Oslo in the 1980-ties. Then Oslo experienced new gangs with a different structure and criminal behaviour. Gang structures may be divided into the following three ideal types still valid today: ad-hoc gangs, ethnic minority gangs and MC gangs.

Today Oslo has gang members with 30 years of experience. Some of them have made a lot of money on their criminal activity, while others have very little left after years in prison and psychological and physical problems. The cost of having chosen a criminal lifestyle can easily be observed. Many have injuries from violence, and some are killed by their own or in conflicts. The largest enemy is, however, for most of them drug abuse. For many this is a career leading to death and to mental sufferings.

Ad hoc gangs

Among the first pure criminal gang structures in Oslo in the 1980-ties was the “Tveita” gang. Their name reflects a neighbourhood in Oslo. At Tveita shopping centre crowds of local young people met in the evenings. The prospect of easily made money tempted them. They started carefully with some small simple burglaries and went on to specialise in “hit and run” from exclusive



shops with gold, watches, stereo/video-equipment and fashion clothes.

The gang was soon known for their fast cars, a lot of money, expensive clothes and watches. Their organisation became more and more ad hoc. The different members were famous for their special skills, such as being drivers, safes, ATMs, drugs, robberies etc. Being a member of the Tveita gang meant an important position and the opportunity of entering other criminal communities. Internal fighting and hostility more or less caused the disruption of the Tveita gang at the end of the 1990-ties.

Some of the core persons in this community continued their criminal career. A characteristic for parts of the new community was cellular organisation. Crime was

directed towards ATMs and robbery of money deposits. These robbers were very active and committed a large number of robberies



with large profits. In 2004 the most active ones robbed NOKAS (a money deposit centre) in Stavanger. During the attack a police officer was shot to death. Massive investigation measures were taken and resulted in arrests and long sentences for 13 persons.

Ethnic minority gangs (street gangs)

Young Guns (YG)

“Young guns” was established by Pakistani youths in 1985. They first of all gathered in order to support each other against the bullying and violence from other groups. Little by little the youths experienced that others feared them and that they got status through their gang membership. In 1988 there was a conflict between a member of Young Guns and the rival gang Killers. Because of this conflict a Young Gun member was stabbed with a knife in his leg. The incident was revenged by a large group of Young Guns members who killed a Killers member. This was the beginning of a long-lasting criminal history for Young Guns and the end of Killers.

Young Guns has for some time had an inner core of 20-25 persons, but altogether the gang is somewhat reduced over the last 2-3 years. Several members of the inner core have been there since 1988. Young Guns has a structure and organisation with few leaders. The leaders of Young Guns are all of Pakistani origin with a criminal background. In addition to the core members Young Guns have associated with a lot of errand boys who perform different tasks for the members. For years there have been split-ups and different internal conflicts in the gang.

The members of Young Guns are all mentioned and attached to different kinds

of serious crime, such as murder, firearms, drugs, robberies and violence. During the last couple of years members have been arrested and serve sentences for serious domestic robberies and drug related crimes. Several members also use drugs. Young Guns have an extensive cooperation with other criminal networks across national borders.

“B-gjengen”

The “B-gang” came into being at the end of the 1990-ties. The members were all mainly of ethnic Pakistani origin. On the outside they appeared to be a rival to the more established and older Young Guns. The “B-gang” is organized and managed by family structures with many brothers. Each family associates with a number of errand boys and assistants who perform tasks for them. The families cooperate and support each other when necessary, such as in situations where they need to defend themselves or in cases of retribution.

They also carry out extensive criminal activity together, mainly drug trade, but also blackmail, robbery, fraud and serious thefts. Members of the gang refer to each other as brothers, even though there are no biological family connections.

Red Dragonz

Red Dragonz is a gang in Oslo consisting mainly of Vietnamese members. The gang is said to have members as young as 15 years old who are employed in drug trade. Several of the older members are in addition convicted for serious acts of violence.

The members should use the dragon insignia, - often in connection with “Dog tags” in a silver chain around their neck and dragon tattoos.

MC gangs

Oslo has from the beginning of the 1980-ties had MC clubs involved in crime. In the mid 1990-ties the international clubs Bandidos and Hells Angels started establishing themselves in Norway. Bandidos was established in Oslo in 1995, while Hells Angels Oslo was full in 1996. In the years leading up to the peace in 1997 there were a large number of violent attacks with several murders and injuries. This conflict gave the police a lot of knowledge about members and on the MC clubs. After the peace agreement was signed in 1997, the knowledge has been kept alive in Oslo Police District, and is the basis for the present dialogue.

None of the international MC clubs in Oslo recruit young people. The new members are often older persons who already have a relation to the club. There are no support crews to the clubs in the capital. The police district has worked actively to

prevent this from happening. Experience from other countries has shown that violence often starts in these crews - often out of control of the full members.

Several members of the clubs have received sentences for different kinds of crime. Basically this is connected with drugs, gain, traffic and violent crime.

The threat from MC clubs in Oslo is considered low today. There are few indications of future conflicts between the rival clubs or other gangs. This may change if other new clubs are established and challenge the power balance.

Responses to gangs and the gang development

"The attitude forced on someone, if often turned into the opposite"

- Göran Sonnevi

The response to gang crime in Oslo has up to 2006 been carried out as a combination of political guidelines, media pressure and measures initiated by the police to reduce obvious conflicts between the gangs. From the 1980-ties to 2009 different projects have been tried out. The first gang unit was established on 1 September 2009. By then the police district had to admit that the gangs constituted a permanent crime problem.

None of the previous projects aimed at prevention of recruitment and new establishments. Good results were linked to seizures and arrests, often in connection with the solving of old criminal cases (reactive). After an investigation phase the projects were closed, but the gang structures remained intact and fully active in crime.

Investigation and penalties have rarely solved the gang problems. There is a lot of literature on the gangs' "push and pull" factors. The gangs are not homogenous groups, but consist of people with different life stories and experience. No doubt the search of a community feeling is vital for some gang members. The feeling of belonging will give a necessary foothold in everyday life. Others see the gang as their family and the members as "brothers". Common experience from conflicts and everyday life will make strong ties and codes. Without the community feeling some former gang members see everyday life as difficult. Adapting to a law-abiding life is demanding. Many have experienced violent conflicts and fear reprisals from former rivals.

Dialogue as method

What is the alternative? A growing enemy potential and in worst case violence. Violence is often a dialogue never started – or ended before it should.

- Inge Eidsvåg

The purpose of dialogue is to improve contact and understanding between individuals. The intention of the method is to build relations and increase insight in the subject, opinions, attitude and the persons' values. The style is equality across all cultural and social dividing lines. Age and social status should be balanced through dialogue on equality. Both parties should experience respect and a high level of personal participation in the dialogue. The conversation has a strong win-win - aspect.

Stereotypes and enemy pictures will be conquered when trying to understand the other side. This kind of insight – together with one's own experience is a strength in the work of creating room for safety and trust. In order to create mutual trust, it is important to understand that different experience and life stories will make the other party in the dialogue think and act differently. It is therefore important that the police in their implementation of dialogue try to understand the other party's way of thinking.

Oslo Police District has divided dialogue into three ideal categories:

- Strategic dialogue
- Tactic dialogue
- Operational dialogue

These are ideal categories. Experience shows that it is difficult to have meetings with a tight agenda. Dialogue often tends to turn in an unexpected direction. The representatives from the gang structures in particular tend to turn the strategy meeting into talks on daily problems and challenges. It is important to allow this, but at the same time not to forget the intention.

Figure 1



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In our experience, dialogue will be much more successful with a certain amount of basic knowledge among the police officers who use this method. It is very important to learn names, nicknames and other particular features of the members in questions, of core gang members and also their role and position in the gangs. Without this basic knowledge it is difficult to initiate a dialogue with people who often are unwilling to identify who they are or who use fictitious or other people's identity. Approaching gang members with their correct name makes room for dialogue and reduction of conflicts.

It is important that the police emphasize the importance of ability and personal qualifications in the use of the strategic and tactical dialogues. These are dialogues requiring police officers with authority and credibility with the other party.

Strategic dialogue

The purpose of the strategic dialogue is to get to know the other party. In the initial phase it is important that there are no hidden agendas (from the police). In an opening phase much time is used in search of factors that may reduce conflicts. There is emphasis on finding mutual interests, learning how to listen and trying to understand the other party. The most difficult questions will not be discussed early in the initial phase. Building trust takes time, for both parties.

Strategic dialogue is primarily used with leaders of the establish gang structures. The leaders and members with authority in these gangs have much experience with and understanding of dialogue. The strategic dialogue often takes time and the meetings are demanding, but very informative for both sides.

For the police **the purpose of strategic dialogue is to obtain information to prepare operational measures according to the police district's planning processes**, in particular concerning recommendations on the use of resources, methods and priorities in prevention, intelligence and investigation.

The strategic dialogue will possibly provide knowledge on the objectives of the gang structures, the present situation, patterns and trends and a survey of potential conflicts between rival communities or the police.

Tactical dialogue

The tactical dialogue is used to **identify short-term problems and to prevent certain situations from developing into violent confrontations**.

The introduction to the tactical dialogue is often based on intelligence information or directly from contact with the gangs.

The tactical dialogue is much used in periods of high conflict levels between rival criminal communities/gangs. Experience shows that it is difficult to be ahead of the situation if the strategic dialogue has not been established. The confidence built at this level will contribute to making the gangs see the opportunity of avoiding conflict by involving the police as negotiators. For the police this will enable them to use the resources at times and on places where they may prevent crime.

The tactical dialogue is often used in combination with the operational dialogue with a clear purpose of establishing strict limits for undesirable behaviour or development, for example when a situation arises in need of quick intervention from the police. Then the police will summon a meeting on short notice in order to prevent a planned or escalating conflict. A meeting may also be required in order to clarify intelligence information given to the police. In such cases there may be specific information on serious damage to people or property.

Operational dialogue

The operational dialogue is used most frequently, because it **takes place in the meeting between the police and gang members every day, out in the field**. It is often taken for granted that operational police officers are skilled in this dialogue. We did, however, find that we had to make our officers confident in their own role through practising possible scenarios. This was very important in order to succeed with the building of trust within reasonable time. The police should feel comfortable in their efforts to build relations with the criminals. A quite ordinary every-day stop-control should be carried out in a professional and correct manner. No-one should feel harassed. This dialogue could also give a good impression of the climate and temperature in the gang community.

It takes time for the operational personnel to get to know the gang members. Before the gang unit was established, it was a problem for the police that only a few officers had the necessary knowledge of persons and communities. It was a continuous challenge to keep the uniformed officers updated on gang structures. These officers often have served on the force only a short time and have little experience. Knowledge on persons and communities requires definite efforts such as repeated controls and observations. Surveillance and control of vehicles and who they



A quite ordinary every-day stop-control should be carried out in a professional and correct manner.”

go out with provides information on networks and acquaintances. This information requires notoriety and the entry of all relevant information into registers for further processing. Then we will have an updated overview of what gang members see, at what time during the week, at what time during the day (this may indicate positions in the gang), dress code, telephones, working conditions, girlfriends, lovers etc. This information has at times contributed to solve several criminal cases. An example is the surveillance cameras. Dialogue will also give a good impression of the climate and temperature in the gang communities.

The operational officers should also take active part in searches in connection with gang members. After some time they will know what is important in the specific criminal case, and also what information is valuable from an intelligence point of view such as clothes, pieces of paper with phone numbers, receipts for rental cars, shoes etc.

After some time dedicated units will experience disappointments and be worn out. This is natural for units working in special fields. In Oslo we started with a rotation of officers in order to avoid this situation. We also wished to share the knowledge between more officers. We lost this opportunity then the unit became part of our regular organisation. Today the officers have the opportunity of internship in other units for a certain amount of time. But it is vital that the problems with worn out of-

ficers is taken seriously in order to avoid further problems such as subcultures.

After some time the gang members will be tired from repeated controls and dialogues. Even though it is emphasized that the police measures should be balanced based on the threat situation, it may be seen differently from their point of view. To be fairly treated by friendly police officers is a cold comfort to gang members when they are followed up closely around the clock. There is a subtle balance between surveillance and the feeling of harassment.

“...it is vital that the problems with worn out officers is taken seriously in order to avoid further problems such as subcultures.”

The dialogue – a multi-tool?

As previously described the gang structures are organized in very different ways. This affects to a large extent the kind of dialogue possible. In Oslo the MC clubs and the ethnic minority gangs are two opposite poles. The MC clubs have a tradition and culture for sticking to internal and established rules (By-laws). At the same time they have a definite strategy for expansion and other aspects connected to the running

of the club and to recruitment. Decisions are made in general meetings where all members have a right to vote. The administrative routines of the MC clubs make it possible for the police to verify later on if decisions made in the club are in accordance with agreements made during the dialogue meetings.

The dialogue with the ethnic minority gangs is different. At times their organization makes it difficult to see who actually has influence in the club. An example: The B gang has a family structure with four strong families. A dialogue with the B gang therefore requires participation of a person with real authority. **The ethnic minority gangs have no tradition for written documentation or general meetings** where they discuss long term strategies. They have large meetings, but their agenda is to solve a conflict or accept a sanction (such as a murder).

It is difficult to explain to what extent the actions and reaction patterns of the ethnic minority gangs may depend on ethnic origin. But like in the MC culture the different gangs have some standards that may not be altered, such as being a man of honour. To "lose face" is not acceptable if respect is to be maintained. This has no doubt contributed to the fact that dialogue and reconciliation are demanding issues in some of the ethnic minority communities. For the gangs the fight for honour has become the same as being feared. This has no doubt made the conflict between Young Guns and the B gang difficult to solve. **There are too many gang members with unsolved matters in need of revenge.** Those who do not revenge their own, their family's or the gang's honour are considered to be weak. This may cause loss of respect in their own ethnic community and they may also be expelled from the gang.

Which individuals have authority in the gang structures and what qualities they possess is of great importance – in the establishment as well as in the understanding of and purpose of the dialogue. In our experience it is easier to create a foundation for dialogue with leaders who have experience from "war" as well as from "peace". These are individuals who have seen their closest friends killed or wounded. They also know that in case of a new conflict, they will be very vulnerable due to their own position. A war situation is physically and mentally very demanding, and then it is all the more important to fight for peace. In Oslo dialogue with the MC clubs started after an exhausting MC war which ended in 1997. By then the presidents of all the clubs were motivated for measures that might reduce conflicts through dialogue – with each other as well as with the police.

For Young Guns the situation was somewhat similar to the MC clubs at the end

of the 1990-ties. The core members all had started feeling the strain of life as a gang member. They had lived through several internal disruptions and conflicts. In addition a new rival gang, the B gang, had shown up and challenged the hegemony of YG. This strenuous situation made room for preliminary talks, but serious scepticism in the police led to the participation of a third party in the dialogue meetings. In the initial talks representatives from mosques (imams) and from the municipality of Oslo (central politicians) participated. To a certain extent this worked, but at the same time we found that the agreements made were broken. Frequent changes in the leader structures, internal conflicts and disruption contributed to this situation. After some time we focused on dialogue with members we knew had authority – and they were not the formal leaders of the gang.

It is important to create room and a basis for dialogue with gangs in the process of establishing themselves. Oslo has done this successfully on several occasions. This happened at the latest in 2010 when the gang MS-13 was about to establish itself in the capital. At this point the police never used the gang name or indicated the members as gang member. The dialogue focused on the leader who was a senior and considered to be a role model for the younger members. In the talks we discussed the police' concern and the consequences of establishment. At the same time several measures were taken towards the younger member to make them understand the costs of choosing a career as a gang member. These huge efforts in combination with dialogue gave results – after a short time the gang was dissolved. By then the police had controlled and seized many of the members. They had discussed their concern with parents and measures were also taken in cooperation with the municipal authorities. The youths who wished to do so were offered free removal of gang tattoos, and many accepted.

Media strategy

The Gang project in Oslo was established as a direct consequence of a serious shooting at Aker Brygge in 2006. This incident brought about war-like headlines in newspapers and on the radio/television. The gang war had reached the city centre with innocent people as victims. The citizens of the capital expressed their fear of ending up in the gangs' next shooting. When the gang project was initiated a few weeks after the shooting, media was very interested in following up the police efforts. This situation demanded a clear and evident media strategy.

During this period the police were under severe pressure of obtaining results. Public opinion was clear – the gangs' violent actions in public areas had to be stopped.

It was quickly decided that the media interest and pressure could be used to achieve trust and safety for the public. At the same time we could send messages to the gang communities telling them that they now had gone too far in view of what was socially acceptable. Media was therefore invited to the gang project and those who wished to follow our work were allowed to do so within certain limits. In short the strategy of the gang project was:

- One regular contact person in the project
- Open, honest and accessible to the media
- Arrange for media to follow up the results of the project
- Give media access to photos.
- The project manager takes part in public debate

In the beginning press conferences were held in connection with arrests and seizures. Media was particularly interested in the seizure of firearms. Still there were restrictions on what was presented to media. Some arrests and investigation steps were secret for tactical reasons.

Looking back it is evident that media responded positively to this strategy. They experienced a police inviting to dialogue. At the same time we communicated that gang structures are a public problem – not only a police problem, and that media is also responsible. One topic of discussion was how the press displayed the gangs as successful criminals with a lot of money and assets. We felt that this display might send the wrong signals to young people at risk of being recruited.

Work experience with dialogue (Best practice)

Strategic dialogue:

<i>Oslo, February 2009</i>
<i>It is a late Thursday afternoon in Oslo in the winter of 2009. In a conference room in one of the city centre hotels there are two representatives from the police. They are starting to be impatient as their appointment is 30 minutes late. The telephone rings again - it is the national president of Bandidos. He is delayed in the traffic into Oslo. He regrets and confirms that he will be there in 15 minutes. The meeting is one of many in order</i>

to consider the climate between the police and the clubs and internally between the clubs. In addition some details need to be settled in connection with a new establishment. This establishment has caused a lot of distress in the communities with several "almost" incidents between members of Bandidos, Hells Angels and Outlaws.

The two Bandidos representatives are on leader level in Norway. It is the national president and the president of the mother chapter in Oslo. The national president comes in working clothes, while the Oslo president wears jeans and a college sweater. There are few symbols connecting them to Bandidos. **During the meetings it is an unwritten rule that each party has two representatives in order to have two witnesses, to avoid suspicion of informant activity and as a security precaution.**

The meeting starts as always with a handshake and some initial comments on the weather and on the absence of motorcycling. As the police have invited to a meeting during dinnertime, food is always offered. The strategic meeting may from experience last long and **feeding is important to create the right atmosphere for negotiations.**

The police representative responsible for the dialog opens by giving a status update and information on how the police see the situation, what works well and what does not work. The importance of the conflict reducing efforts between the clubs is considered. After the MC war Bandidos and Hells Angels were instructed to have a direct communication line between the national presidents/club presidents in case of fixed conflicts in danger of escalating. In addition Oslo has instructed the clubs to arrange mutual meetings/events to reduce conflicts. During these discussions many stories from an event a few months earlier came up. Then Hells Angels had invited Bandidos for tapas in their club house. It sounded

like a successful evening. They concluded that in Oslo there were no problems between the clubs, nor between individuals. This was in agreement with our intelligence information.

In the dialogue about the present climate between the police and the clubs they were basically satisfied. The fact that they were arrested for having committed a crime was not a problem. The Oslo president expressed that this was a risk for the individual member.

Many members were, however, worried about a development with more frequent controls when they were with their wives and children, at the movies or shopping. They were comfortable with it if the control had an obvious explanation, but if it happened for no other reason than the fact that they were members of a MC club it was not acceptable. They compared this to intentional and planned harassment. One of the members had experienced that his little son had a nightmare after an "unpleasant" control in a family restaurant. This made him make plans for revenge towards the most active police officer. This had been avoided, but they brought the matter up in order to emphasize the seriousness. There was a short discussion on where to draw **the line between the private sphere and not**. There was a good conversation.

They agreed that that the **same rules apply for police and criminals**. We have both made choices that may make it difficult to draw the line between public and private life.

Family life must be respected. At the same time we emphasized that **the same applies for threats against police officers**. We referred to the negative development in our neighbouring countries where officers and representatives of the prosecution authorities have become legitimate targets for revenge and threats. Here we told them that there was zero tolerance for such actions and that the

response would be serious.

The meeting closed with a discussion on what the club sees as other potential conflicts in the future. They brought up the expansion and new establishment of Outlaws as a great challenge - in particular in areas where they challenged the other clubs. Different solutions were discussed and we promised to discuss the matter with the Outlaws and report back to them. Their information matched the picture we had of the conflict. In addition we discussed the development in Denmark and how this could affect the situation in Norway. They made it clear that what happened in Denmark was a poor strategy and this would not happen here.

The meeting ended with a handshake and greetings from old acquaintances. Then the meeting had lasted for more than three hours. Still there were a few hours' work to do with minutes from the meeting.

Three days later we had planned a meeting with the Outlaws. We now had a good idea of the climate and of what we should discuss with their leaders.

Tactical dialogue:

In case of large events and incidents where many of the MC clubs' national and international members are gathered, we often have one or several dialogue meetings in advance in order to settle the limits of requirements to the guests and to make sure that the law is followed. This was what happened in connection with both Bandidos' and Hells Angels 15th anniversary in 2011. Both clubs had in dialogue meetings been given clear instructions and limits. An example: They were instructed to communicate with the other clubs in order to avoid running into them in the capital. This question has turned out to be important, as several of the foreign members are at war with Bandidos and others in their home country. Meeting Norwegian members might trigger violence. Other instructions are connected to identification of all members, demands on identification and follow up of laws and regulations with regard to liquor, fire precautions etc.

For the police the dialogue in connection with these meetings is important in order

to prevent crime, but also in order to make the clubs adapt to the laws and regulation valid for everyone in society. Trying to search in the law for different methods for stopping the MC clubs' parties, rarely leads to anything but increasing the distance and reducing trust between the parties. By giving them opportunities, but at the same being clear about demands, the clubs have adapted to the law. For the police this has also contributed to solving problems, good cooperation and low costs. Individuals who have committed crime during the events have been arrested by two to three police officers, although there were hundreds of gang members present.

There are also tactical dialogues with the ethnic minority gangs. These gangs do not have their own clubhouses with celebrations and parties with foreign guests. They live their social lives in public places and illegal gambling clubs. After years of close follow-up by the police the capital has become too small for them and in periods they stay in Dubai, Pakistan and Brazil.

The topics of these tactical dialogues are often future events that could lead to clashes between Young Guns and the B gang. Recent court cases where members from of clubs are involved have led to violent clashes in and around the courts. In order to avoid similar incidents demanding large police resources dialogue has made cooperation possible. There have also been tactical dialogues in order to prevent unacceptable behaviour. This happened in connection with arrests of core gang members and their families, including mother and father. The fact that their own parents were arrested and put to prison is taken seriously in the Pakistani community. The reaction was unexpected to the project management. They experienced to be the target of planned violent retribution. The solution was a preventive tactical dialogue in order to prevent an escalation of the threat level.

Oslo 2008

It had been a good period for the gang project. The most active family in the B gang had been arrested after a long period of secret investigation in Norway and Brazil. Large assets were seized. The press had written a lot about the case and often made reference to the project manager in newspapers, radio and television.

Shortly after the arrest intelligence information indicated that the gang was about to hit back by taking "a central police leader and his family" in order to show

strength and to restore the family's lost honour. The project manager shortly afterwards noticed that there had been intruders in his home. The information was verified through traditional contact with informants and intelligence. At the same time the police were contacted by a criminal who did not belong to the same community and who mentioned that the project manager would be the object of a violent attack from the B gang. After a period of collecting information the police chose to contact the individuals presumably responsible for the planned action. They were already well known gang members and the operational force already had a good dialogue with them. But there had been no tactical dialogue earlier. The dialogue was very well prepared.

The gang members in question were picked up by the police one morning at their "secret addresses". The agenda was an extremely important matter that had to be prepared in an informal meeting. This was met positively by all gang members, even though they felt a little unsure about this unusual request, particularly as the police came to the flats where they considered themselves safe (safe-houses). Further dialogue was carried out in a neutral location by the most experienced leaders of the police district. The issue was that **this was the limit for what the police could accept as behaviour.** They were confronted with the information available to the police on the planned action and on the consequences if the plan was carried out. It was emphasized that **this was not a conflict between individuals.** The police had a job to do, they treated everyone equally, were polite and showed respect. The gang members had to accept to be arrested for their criminal actions and be responsible for their own choices. If they did not wish to continue in this direction, they were given an alternative: more control, intensified investigation and closer follow up day and

night. As individuals they would be held responsible for all actions directed towards the project manager and all other police employees.

In the aftermath of this dialogue there were reports that the gang members had made the decision not to kill anyone or threaten the police. In this case the dialogue worked because the police had sufficient intelligence information. The fact that the police knew the most "secret" plans of the gang was a shock to the gang leaders. After this dialogue there have been no threats from the ethnic minority gangs.

Operational dialogue:

Oslo, June 2008

As we drive down towards the school we see a large crowd of boys of ethnic Pakistani origin in the schoolyard. This place is a well-known gathering place for core members of the B gang, but also for local youths. The age of those present ranges from 12 to approx 25 years. There are also two cars parked on the spot, new and exclusive models of BMW and Mercedes.

As they notice the civilian police car the crowd starts to disperse. Most of the younger boys disappear, but some of the older ones remain. We drive into the schoolyard and stop.

When we have left the police car, I turn to the person I know as the owner of one of the cars. "Hello" I say friendly "could you come over please so that we can talk?" I put my hand out and wave him in my direction. There is no doubt that I am talking to him. He at once becomes very steamed up and answers loudly and aggressively "do not point at me".

It turned out to be impossible for me to engage in a dialogue. At this time I was

unknown to him, but still his reaction made us suspicious that he had something he wished to hide. Later we got information indicating that the same person had a firearm that was hidden when they were aware of our presence. This incident shows us that reactions always must be seen in connection with different factors, such as the number of people in the area, criminal activity, drugs (intoxication), moods, knowledge about the person in question.

Oslo, 2009

We had followed the car for a while and managed to stop it. The stop was made on grounds of high speed and other elements of the driving. This was our opening to a search of one of the gang members who was a passenger. We had intelligence information indicating that he might be in possession of GHB and a firearm.

Except for the driver, who did not have a driving licence, all persons in the car were intoxicated. They were going to a party and did not like being stopped. After a search in the car we found a bottle of GHB. We talked a little to all the persons in the car and little by little "our" gang member took responsibility for the seized bottle. He was handcuffed and taken to the police car. He asked: "May I have my extra pair of trousers left in the car?" I said: "I will see what I can do". We talked a little more and we were then assisted by a uniformed patrol car that took him to the police headquarters. Before they left I fetched his trousers. "Thank you - you are ok" he responded and entered the other police car smiling. In his home we found cartridges (and a firearm during a later search)

This little incident was an entry to following dialogues. A total of many such incidents have resulted in a situation where many gang members now contact the gang unit hot line in order to give information or help solve conflicts. This never happened before.

Dialogue in threat situations:

Good planning is required in advance, during and after a dialogue in threat situations. It is important that experienced officers handle these dialogues. In our experience the following factors have had a positive effect:

1. Coordinate all information that illustrate the threat.
2. Do we have enough information to initiate criminal proceedings?
3. Will the available information tolerate exposure without being traced back to the source?
4. Are those who plan the threats (backers) open to dialogue?
5. Should the control measures be intensified/arrests/visitations/surveillance?
6. Will it be possible to arrest the suspected perpetrators?
7. How to verify/control the effect of the dialogue?

If it has no effect an alternative solution must be initiated quickly. This means that the pressure on the gang will be considerably increased.

7. The increased efforts must be communicated to the gang as a consequence of the gang's own choices.



Challenges in terms of dealing and responding to gangs

In our opinion there are in particular four future challenges to emphasize:

- The police efforts and measures must be balanced according to the actual threat situation.
- National, regional and local police authorities must not use different strategies against the same gang members and communities.
- It is important that responsibility is clearly defined between different units in order to avoid contra productive measures.
- The gangs' criminal operational area will become larger and cross police district and national borders.
- There will be a need for better cooperation between domestic and international police authorities.
- There will be a need for common strategies, such as the implementation and understanding of dialogue.
- The gang structures' ability to flexibility and quick readjustments.

- The ordinary organization of the police does not over time manage to follow the gangs' crime development. Our organization is too static.
- The multi-criminal activity of the gangs challenges local guidelines for investigation
- Criminal cases involving gang members are given the same priority as the ordinary criminal cases.
- Investigators in other units do not have the necessary knowledge on persons and communities to understand and take the cases to court.
- No one is responsible for coordinating the cases and seeing the connection between the cases.



*Eye of Horus – Protection against
enemies/back-stabbers*

Some concerns for the future in terms of gangs and gang development

There are several indications that the character of crime among the established gang communities have changed from more violent crime to a "softer" trend which does not attract the same amount of attention from the police and media. The response to years of violence is evident with a number of arrests and prison sentences. For many members this has damaged seriously their criminal business activity. The criminal MC clubs in Oslo are today seldom involved in violent activity attracting attention. Intelligence information indicate that they are still involved in money collecting, but the victims are often themselves criminals and do not wish to involve the police. But basically all drug crime and different kinds of financial crime are their main source of income.

Today the threat situation is considered moderate with regard to violent conflicts between the established gangs in the public room. The reason is that there are still some individual members who have informed us that they feel threatened and at the

same time they have some unfinished business with the rival gangs. These persons used to be known for a number of violent actions. The police therefore emphasize the prevention of such violent action through dialogue, focus on control and presence in risk areas.

A number of gang members are active in different criminal networks mainly smuggling and selling drugs in several places in Norway. This activity means that gang members to a larger extent than a few years ago are active in an increasingly larger geographical area. There are several reasons for this change, but evidently they have noticed that the Oslo police focus on measures that disturb and harm their criminal business. This happens at the same time as there is a change in the drug market in the capital with a large number of African distributors and intermediaries. The gang members have therefore entered other criminal networks outside the capital. These contacts have mainly been established while serving in prison like between other criminals. This development with a continued expansion outside Oslo may lead to conflicts with the established criminal networks on market shares.

Implementing projects and resistance to change in Oslo

The implementation of the gang project in an ordinary organizational structure has been very demanding. Early in 2006 the project management experience many challenges connected to the running of the project. The project had engaged many police officers from ordinary uniformed service in the police district. Many people now felt the need to control these resources. We have a superior set of guidelines giving the operational leaders the right to deploy all uniformed forces in the police district. These guidelines were in conflict with the purpose of the specialized efforts against gang structures. The compromise was that the gang unit engaged in ordinary uniformed duty on weekends when there were little police personnel available.

Looking back we would have recommended that the fight against gang crime should have had a more defined mandate concerning responsibilities connected to other police tasks than the primary tasks. A mandate that may be interpreted must be avoided. Specialized units must be allocated resources within the whole chain of criminal cases in order to reach their goals. This is necessary for a dynamic solution of tasks.

A Manual – introduction to dialogue as a method

This manual gives a short survey of best practice in the use of dialogue as a method against criminal communities. The purpose of the manual is to be a guide to those

who try to establish and handle dialogue. There is never only one solution. Dialogue must consider history, culture, tradition and local circumstances.

The most important point of departure is to establish dialogue as a method in the superior guidelines and/or in the local police management. Then you will avoid internal "replay" between different police culture and tradition. Inside the police it is

also necessary to determine who is fit to represent the police in the dialogue. This should be individuals with authority, knowledge on police work and human relations and with the ability to make peace and good diplomatic solutions. They also should have the ability to be professional and not personal. In order to avoid the dialogue being too strongly linked to individuals in the police, all strategic and tactical dialogues are handled by a minimum of two police representatives.



The purpose of the manual is to be a guide to those who try to establish and handle dialogue."

Phase I

- Knowledge of the gang – from establishment to present position (organization and structure)
- Knowledge of persons
- Criminal capacity and skill
- Threat level – incidents and conflicts of importance
- Previous experience in contact with the police

The analysis after phase I is the basis for the further choice of strategy (phase II). The analysis is made available for those with a professional need to know in an adequate data base (intelligence base). This base should be updated on a regular basis, such as every three months.

Phase II

- An ongoing violent conflict
- Take back control
- The police must be considered a real opponent in this phase
- Police response must be linked to the criminal acts committed by the gang members, not to what we think they have done.
- Uncover who has authority and the real power in the gangs.

Phase III

Establish the dialogue – several different approaches:

- No willingness to engage in dialogue from the other party – focus on authorities/leaders by knocking out their most important supporters. After a period of great pressure such a strategy will open up to initial dialogue. This dialogue is not voluntary and therefore great efforts are needed to create the necessary trust. Forcing a dialogue on someone may feel humiliating and may cause more conflicts.
- Contact in ongoing criminal case/custody/imprisonment. Even if this is a vulnerable situation for the other party this is an opportunity to build long-lasting relations. It is particularly important that the other party sees the contact as honest and understands the purpose of the dialogue. It is particularly important to point out the difference between the recruitment of informants and dialogue.
- Direct and open contact from the police side. Such an approach is recommended. This approach is also the closest one to the ideal negotiation position with equal conditions between the parties.
- Direct and open contact from authorities/leaders in the gang communities. When the gang communities reach out a hand, it is important to take this handshake. Take time to listen and learn. Dialogue may be used to prevent many kinds of criminal actions and escalating conflicts.

Phase IV

- Keep up and maintain dialogue
- Stay in contact – even though no incidents had to be dealt with, no strategic dialogues were necessary.
- Take the opportunity of dialogue even though the authorities and leaders are serving sentences or stay outside the local police district.
- In case of change of police representatives there must be a transition phase where the new person obtains trust and feels safe in the role – and with the other party.

Dialogue as a method to prevent and combat serious and organised crime

Oslo Police District has since the 1980s been engaged in dialogue with persons involved in serious and organised crime. The method has been continuously developed and is today considered a well established and approved

both locally and nationwide.

Dialogue was initiated to provide the police with an overview and insight into different criminal environments, primarily to reduce the level of conflict within and between the groups themselves, as well as in interactions between the groups and the police. The method has over time been proved to be cost-effective in terms of reduced need for personnel.

The aim is to prevent and combat serious and organised crime, which is considered to be a major impediment to making Oslo a safe city.

The method of dialogue is based on the following:

- The Oslo Police District will attempt to engage in dialogue with criminals and groups connected to present and future crime.
- Dialogue is along with other police methods useful to mitigate the level of conflict between rivalling criminal groups and reduce the level of risks for police officers.
- The police must facilitate meetings and invest time and presence to develop trust and confidence.
- The police must be transparent and accountable, intervene when appropriate and also make sure to explain police actions.
- At the same time this applies:
 - Criminal behaviour will not be accepted or tolerated
 - Police intervention will be based on the opponents acts
 - A balanced use of coercive measures
 - No harassment or threats will be accepted.

”It all starts and ends with a handshake”





3

Danish National Police

Policing gangs in Denmark:

A glimpse into the policing of criminal groups in The Danish National Center of Investigation and Crime Prevention

By: Kira Vrist Rønn and Tino Snedevig Jensen

In this chapter, Kira Vrist Rønn and Tino Snedevig Jensen delineate the recent danish gang situation and highlight how the Danish National Police work against gangs in Denmark. For example, we can read about the so-called “gang package” and how it was designed in the backdrop of a growing political concern. We also learn how methods such as intelligence-led policing is used to direct resources to better police gangs. Several concrete examples of gang enforcement are also provided.

Introduction

Group-related crime and conflicts related to groups in the form of (among other things) public shootings have taken up a lot of space in the public media and the general view of crime in Denmark. From a police perspective this has meant that many resources and much energy is used to prevent, limit and fight crime committed by persons related to these groups.

In the politically established multi-year agreement for the Police and Director of Public Prosecution's Office for 2007-2010 criminal gangs are designated as one of nine "specially prioritized areas of effort". It is furthermore stated that "criminal gangs shall be fought through a targeted, strategic effort¹..." (Ministry of Justice 2006). This, in the fulfillment of the framework agreement for the Police and the Public Prosecutor's Office for 2011, continues to be a high priority area. The present article will attempt to contribute to a picture of what the police-related "targeted and strategic effort" consists of and included in this what overall considerations and visions lay behind the police's effort, with a special point of departure in the National Center of Investigation and Crime Prevention's (NCI) implementation of this. NCI is organizationally placed in the Danish National Police's Police Department and represents the national police-related effort against serious and organized crime, including group-related crime.

This article functions primarily as an introduction to NCI's work as a national focal point for the reactive and proactive effort regarding group-related crime and thoughts and visions in this area.

Recent Gang Development in Denmark

In the fall of 2008 the armed conflicts in Denmark began and it is considered that these conflicts were sparked by the murder² of a supposed gang member. The term conflicts is used in plural form because NCI is convinced that there is not only one conflict between bikers and gangs, but rather there are multiple parallel existing conflicts, including internal conflicts between biker groups³ and gang groups (Danish National Police 2010). These conflicts have, during the period from 2008-2011⁴ resulted in 203 violent events, 13 killed and 144 wounded (with Copenhagen and its suburbs as the

¹ Our translation.


² This murder is seen as the culmination of a longer period of disagreements, and the date of fall 2008 should be taken with a grain of salt, but in the interest of simplicity this episode is considered the beginning of violent conflicts that still take place today in Denmark. The murder has been solved and the perpetrator was before the court in Glostrup at the end of 2011 and received a sentence of 13 years seven months imprisonment.

³ The expression 'Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs' (OMG's) is from time to time also used in the same context.

⁴ Figures assessed January 2012.

center, but with a spreading effect to the entire country, including, among others, the cities of Odense, Ålborg and Århus). The motivations for these confrontations and shooting episodes are considered (among other things) to be found in shared interests concerning criminal markets and territories. Additionally, the armed conflicts can be explained as a result of vengeance, concepts of honor and identity used in connection with being a part of a group. (Danish National Police 2011).

It is the understanding of the Danish National Police that the current conflicts between groups are unique and specific to Denmark, and that it is difficult to compare directly with similar biker (OMG) and gang conflicts in other countries. Furthermore, Danish biker groups have shown a great amount of creativity with regard to recruiting new members, as is the case with the Hells Angels (HA) support group “AK81” (used as “foot soldiers” in the conflicts with other groups). Recruiting between groups has also taken place, which makes an understanding of the conflicts even more complicated.



This unique situation has also given Denmark and NCI a valuable foundation of experience, which provides an opportunity for counseling police in other countries regarding proactive investigative measures and conflict prevention initiatives in similar situations. It is envisioned that this could take place in countries where the large international biker groups either have not yet gained a solid foothold or are in the first stages of establishing themselves. At the same

time, this of course does not exclude Danish police from also gaining from experience with conflict and group-related crime from other countries.

Historically speaking, crime carried out by groups is not a new phenomenon (from a European perspective), and has been taking place for several hundred years (Spierenburg 2008). That which we refer to as gang-related crime and conflicts in the current Danish context is crime carried out by and conflicts between biker groups and other criminal groups⁵, involving among other things murder, attempted murder, and other forms of armed clashes from the 1980's and on. The starting point for this phenomenon is often dated to the creation of the first biker group⁶, the Hells Angels, in Denmark in 1980 (Danish National Police, 2009).

In 1992 a prospect section of Bandidos (BA) was established, the same as the American

⁵ Including criminal groups primarily of other ethnic origin than Danish.

⁶ This first establishment of a chapter of an OMG in Denmark resulted in a showdown with a local biker group, “Bullshit MC”, and culminated with the killing of the president of “Bullshit MC” in 1984 and the subsequent dissolving of “Bullshit MC”.

establishment, which then became two Bandidos sections, “MC Northland” and “MC East Coast”. Both HA and BA have since expanded and have sections and support groups spread out over most of the country.

Interest in the same market (primarily the drug market) and the same territories led, shortly after BA’s introduction into Denmark⁷, to that which we call “the Great Nordic Biker War”. It includes 11 murders and 74 attempted murders between the two groups’ members. The conflict reached a temporary end when in 1997 a peace agreement was reached between the two groups. As far as NCI knows the peace agreement included (among other things) that neither of the clubs would expand their presence in the Nordic countries and there would be an effort made to avoid violent confrontations (Danish National Police 2009). Additionally, Denmark was divided up into “territories” between the two organizations such that all cities and county areas became either BA or HA territories. The only cities, according to the peace agreement, that belonged to both groups were Horsens and Ålborg.

After the changing of the millennium other groups than bikers (for example the Blågård’s Plads group or the Black Cobra) have become visible, which can be explained (among other things) by the massive efforts by authorities against the biker groups, thereby enabling other groups to establish themselves in markets and territories traditionally dominated by bikers (Danish National Police 2009).

The common denominator for the OMG’s and the gangs is control over (parts of) the drug market, as well as the illegal acquiring and selling of firearms in Denmark. On top of that the OMG’s also play an important role in robberies and the theft-by-burglary and subsequent selling off of designer furniture. Further, control of parts of the prostitution market as well as extortion related to “protection money” paid by businesses to gangs is not an uncommon phenomenon (NCI, 2011).

It is difficult to date when the first non-biker groups, which still play a roll in the current conflict landscape, arised, but there were already signs of their origins in the early 1990’s.

Response to Gangs and Gang Development from the Danish Police

As the above brief presentation of the development of group related crime and conflicts between groups illustrates, since the 1990’s there has been a need for special police efforts. At first these efforts were directed towards biker-related crime, but afterwards were expanded to other criminal groups. A centralization of efforts was

⁷ More specifically - 1996.

therefore seen as necessary, which in 1993 led to the establishment of three regional investigation centers. These focused on chosen crime areas, including especially narcotics crime, which was cross-district and for this reason it was clear that the work should be more systematic and take place via central data gathering and the development of trend analyses (Stevnsborg 2010: 202).

In the wake of the armed conflicts, which later became known as "the Great Nordic Biker War", in 1996 a national biker taskforce was created within the Danish National Police in order to gather and distribute information about the biker area. These thoughts of centralization continued and afterwards in 1998 the National Center for Investigation⁸ (NCI) was established.

NCI has, in cooperation with police districts, the goal of having a national overview of selected areas within serious and organized crime, including gang and biker crime. With the implementation of the newest police reform in 2007 the (at the time) 54 police districts were reduced to 12 police districts. In each of these districts an Operative Planning and Analysis Center (OPA) center was established to act as a primary point of connection between the districts and NCI.

In connection with a prioritization of the fight against biker and gang-related crime, in 2009 the Danish government passed a so-called 'gang package' (law number 501 of 12 June 2009). Further, several common gang-related challenges in a number of Police Districts in the eastern part of Denmark (Zealand) led to the establishment of a Task Force named Task Force East (TFØ). A string of common gang-related issues and challenges also prompted several Police Districts in the Western part of Denmark (Jutland) to form a similar coordinated effort. As a result the country was "divided" up into two special investigative units, whose structure and work areas will be discussed later in this article.

The mentioned 'gang package' includes:

- A massive, visible police effort to combat insecurity in the affected areas⁹
- A notably increased punishment for gang crime and possession of firearms (Danish Penal code, Art. 81a¹⁰)
- An increased cooperation between police and the Danish tax authorities, with the intention of impacting the economic yield of gang and biker members' illegal activities¹¹.

8 From 2010 onwards: National Center for Investigation and Crime Prevention (NCI).

9 There will be more funding set aside to a more visible police force on the streets of Copenhagen and personnel will be given gear appropriate for diverse situations, i.e. bulletproof vests and an increase in pressure on biker/gang members through thorough visitations, targeted investigation and systematic ransacking.

10 For example first time offenders in possession of firearms in public spaces will be punishable by one years imprisonment (formerly ½ year), as long as it is related to gang acts, like murder, in principle it will result in a life sentence (in practice can be served normally between 12-16 years) if the murder is related to gang acts.

11 The so-called 'Al Capone model'.

NCI - A National Overview and Expert Center

The development of drug-related crime and biker confrontations through the 90's led to a greater focus on organized crime across police districts. The term organized crime was "introduced" in Denmark in the 90's as a name for the then well-known forms of crime that were redefined under the umbrella term organized crime (Bay 1998). From the end of the 90's and onwards, organized crime came to be viewed as one of the greatest crime problems in Denmark and Europe in general.

Precisely what and who is included in the definition of organized crime is not unambiguous and is open to the possibility for describing an over category of perpetrators and/or criminal types. Danish police's understanding of the term takes its point of departure in the EU's definition¹². Here, organized crime is defined according to the below properties where at least six of the eleven attributes must be fulfilled and the four bold are obligatory:

Collaboration of more than two people;

Each with their own appointed tasks;

For a prolonged or indefinite period of time;

Using some form of discipline and control;

Suspected of the commission of serious criminal offences;

Operating on an international level;


Using violence or other means suitable for intimidation;

Using commercial or businesslike structures;

Engaged in money laundering;

Exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, judicial authorities or the economy;

Motivated by the pursuit of profit and/or power.



This definition contains requirements partially regarding the perpetrators and partially regarding the acts necessary to live up to the term organized crime. This separation of organizations/groups or networks and criminal types/markets also reflects Europol's work against organized crime and in the structure of NCI's focus areas, where one differentiates between groups and markets. The above definition is criticized for being too broad, among other things because it doesn't make requirements for the concrete criminal act, only that it be "serious", which is seen as difficult to delimit (Bay 1998). In Denmark there is no legal definition of organized crime, in contrast to a number of other countries, there is no legal definition of organized crime in Denmark.

¹² The definition stems from : Annual European Union Organised Crime Situation Report (6204/1/97 (ENFOPOL 35 REV 2) DG H II).

In Norway, for example, in 2003 a legal definition of organized crime was established, which also was built on the above mentioned 11 points and more specifically means that the punishment for organized crime can be extended by up to five years, in relation to the normal framework of punishment. The group aspect, or the conspiracy aspect (which implies that crime is not committed by individuals, but rather in unison with others - in a group of three or more), as well as the relation of the group to primarily commit crime (that is to say that there is continuity in the crimes) punishable by three years, comprises the central aspects of how organized crime is understood¹³. The minimum requirement in Norway is that the crime committed is punishable by at least three years, which can be seen as a specific interpretation of what is meant by "serious" crime or crimes "serious enough" to fulfill point five of the above mentioned definition.

This introduction to the Norwegian interpretation serves simply to illustrate how the definition of organized crime and "serious crimes" in another Nordic country can be applied in a legal definition.

As mentioned, there is no legal definition of organized crime in Denmark, and it is another discussion to what extent gang and biker crime is an expression of organized crime¹⁴. Shootings and other armed conflicts between persons related to gangs and biker groups is not necessarily in and of itself or in all situations an expression of organized crime¹⁵.

In connection with a report about group-related crime in Denmark produced by Rambøll Management in 2002, the two concepts "organized" and "criminal"

(in connection with groups) were placed in a matrix based on a ranking system on axes between high and low, with the two concepts in relation to the definition of the respective types of groups (Rambøll Management: 2002). This analysis resulted in a specification regarding the understanding that for the specific groups there are different levels of organization, and there is not the same level of seriousness of the committed crimes (which is significant in identifying groups and being able to appropriate the right means to each group).

“...for the specific groups there are different levels of organization, and there is not the same level of seriousness of the committed crimes...”

13 According to the Norwegian criminal law here: [www.lovdata.no/all/hl-19020522-010.html#162c](http://www lovdata.no/all/hl-19020522-010.html#162c)

14 For a further discussion of the definition of "organized crime" see (among others) Larsson (2000), Bay (1998), Fijnaut & Paoli (2004), Rambøll Management (2002), Albanese (2008).

15 However, in 2009 as part of the so called 'gang package' the Danish government also adopted a paragraph in the Danish Penal Code (§ 81a) by which the sentence passed can be twice as long in cases where the offender has participated in shootings or other violent incidents, where each episode is supposed to have been part of or originated from reciprocal conflicts between groups of persons, where both sides engage in violent means. Further, homicide principally carries a lifetime sentence (normally between 12 and 16 years of imprisonment) if the homicide took place as part of a conflict between groups of persons, where both sides engage in violent means.

None the less, the current shootings and other armed conflicts between persons related to the actual involved groups is understood as crime serious enough to be the primary reason for the gang and biker area to be seen as a high priority in the police's current work. The prioritization is based primarily on the fact that the clashes often happen in public spaces, where security and safety are threatened and crime committed by these groups¹⁶ is not necessarily understood as organized crime, but rather to a great extent as serious and as such a high priority area.


The NCI focuses on a number of areas, where gang and biker crime has a special attention. Additionally, NCI's areas of focus (among others) are narcotics, human trafficking, human smuggling, hooliganism, serious robberies, etc. NCI's overall task is to monitor the serious, complicated and resource-demanding crime in the districts with the goal of bringing about and maintaining a high level of information and knowledge, so that the police districts gain access to the best possible overview of the international and/or cross-district serious and organized crime related to the relevant police district. A national overview is obtained by monitoring and analyzing, which includes receiving, collecting, registering, grouping and processing information from different sources and communicating these on to the relevant parties in the form of processed and enriched information primarily for use in police district's operational efforts, for example in investigation. This process makes up the definition of the production of the type of information known as "intelligence", which is overall NCI's primary task (Agrell 1998, Dean & Gottschalk 2007, Ratcliffe 2008, 2009). The criteria for success for a high level of NCI's services and products consists of a reciprocally dependent relationship with all our partners, and is based on a good cooperation and flexible flow of information and intelligence between NCI, the police districts and their investigations and foreign police authorities / partners all of which thereby being the primary contributors to and users of NCI's products.

NCI, with its national overview of a number of areas of focus and the three following goals, is intended to:

1. Support the districts in investigations (both with national and international intelligence)
2. Create progressive investigation proposals
3. Assist in goal setting through threat assessments, which also can be a basis for resource allocation at the operational and strategic level.

¹⁶ Also included here are shootings.

In order to realize its status as an expert center with a national overview that supports the districts in the three above goals, NCI conducts monitoring and analysis. Monitoring in this context means registering information that can be used for the above-mentioned specific goals, and analyses require processing, grouping and evaluation of these registrations with the purpose of developing intelligence. Additionally, NCI produces a number of strategic intelligence products, which focus on criminal trends and the latest developments within gang-related crime, and carry out a supporting role in relation to police management's decisions about criminal preventative measures in the long term.



In this connection it is interesting to note the connections to the persons that commit more serious crime related to groups or conflicts within groups. In working with group-related crime the Danish police deal with several different group levels¹⁷. The Danish National Police estimate that at the end of November 2011 there are 156 gang and biker groups with 1,885 associated persons in all. Out of these 1,885 persons 629 were registered with a connection to gangs and the remaining to biker groups (Danish National Police 2011).

Intelligence-led Policing (ILP)

The way in which NCI's role as a national expert center is managed is significant in relation to the quality of NCI's work and the quality of products within the three above mentioned goals. This includes among other things a flexible flow of information, targeted collection plans, analyses and evaluations and clear guidelines and methodology for how these tasks are to be dealt with. The analysis-based approach to police work has in the international police sector gained broad

¹⁷ The division of persons into different group levels does not define simply the degree of relation to a specific criminal group at the personal level, but also sets regional and national areas of monitoring responsibility regarding the fight against group-related serious crime, according to the extent of crimes committed (that is whether the crimes are local or inter-regional) and the crime areas.

support and is described generally as intelligence-led policing (ILP). The concept intelligence is used here as a specific type of information, for which there is processed and evaluated information dealing with threats, possible threats or goals and is directed towards guiding actions¹⁸.

When this definition is in place the strategy itself can be described more in detail. ILP is for most of those involved in police management and intelligence work nothing new, and has been an often-used concept by Danish police during several years. Intelligence-led policing has been one of the most prevalent police management strategies in the last decade in large parts of the western world and has been called a paradigm shift in police work (Ratcliffe 2008). A paradigm shift is distinguished by a radical change of thought relative to previous understandings or norms within the domain – in this case the domain of police work and its priorities.

What are these changes in relation to earlier strategies? That which separates ILP from previous concepts of how police work should be structured can in short be described with the words analysis based and holistic. (These two concepts, as will be reflected below, are closely related.)

The holistic aspect expresses a wish that there should not be a focus only on individual cases and reactive investigations. It is no longer the individual investigations that alone should dictate information gathering, but rather to a greater extent intelligence and analysis products that are determining factors in prioritizing, in relation to gathering and processing of information. According to advocates of ILP, there should be a shift from investigation based on intelligence or policing-led intelligence to intelligence-led policing (Ratcliffe 2008, Cope 2004). ILP is a response to what should guide police work and is central to what strategy that will act as a basis for prioritizing of efforts, relative to resource allocation and identification/designation of work tasks¹⁹.

The holistic view is intended to make the police smarter. It is utopian to believe that one can solve all crimes and catch all criminals and as a result it is necessary to prioritize. This prioritization should, according to ILP, take place based on analyses of phenomena and situations in general, based on stringent methods. This is where police work is faced with a significant chal-

“ It is utopian to believe that one can solve all crimes and catch all criminals and as a result it is necessary to prioritize.”

¹⁸ In other words, the goal in establishing national threat assessments of organized crime could be the establishment of so-called Joint Analysis Teams (JAT), which in the long term could result in the establishment of multinational Joint Investigation teams (JIT), which for example could be used against a specific type of crime or organized criminal group.

¹⁹ Different researchers have also pointed out pitfalls in relation to intelligence-led policing as a police strategy. For example, Maguire, who points out a lack of evidence that the strategy does in fact have an effect on crime rate, and whether one is capable of going beyond “the usual suspects” (Maguire 2000:329ff).

lenge. These priorities should not simply focus on solving already existing criminal acts, but instead the weight of priorities should be placed on a proactive effort and response to identified risks and threats – this is the thought behind ILP. The priorities build on analyses of criminal acts and persons, which make the police force able to see patterns and make both a proactive and reactive effort (Ratcliffe 2008).

The information and conclusions drawn from it have always played a significant role in police investigative work and solving of criminal acts, and this has not changed. The information work has however, according to ILP, changed its character and there are other requirements made to mindset regarding information across investigations and across other institutions that have not previously been systematic contributors to police work.

“ The use of the word policing rather than police, highlights that it is not only the police force that should conduct police work, but that other authorities should also be involved...”

As a result the formation of analyses takes a central place in the police force and there is no longer just a need for methods of information gathering and production of evidence in the individual cases, but to a higher and higher degree a need for stringent methods and strategies for information gathering and processing in the form of systematization, weighing and prioritizing of the gathered information.

The holistic and analytical focus can be seen on two levels: both in relation to the specific police work and as a sub-category in relation to the question of how the work should be set up (also in relation to the organization of the police and the understanding of police work). The use of the word policing rather than police, highlights that it is not only the police force that should conduct police work, but that other authorities should also be involved, and that this policing is a process and not a goal in itself (Ratcliffe 2008) – for example NCI’s inclusion of other public authorities such as the tax authorities in (among other things) the production of an investigation proposal.


The determining distinction between ILP and earlier strategies is a larger focus on proactivity through analysis of patterns and phenomena together with identification and prioritizing of proactive action based on identified threats and reactions towards risks. Another concept that has won support in police science in the past few years is the Problem Oriented Policing (POP), which makes a connection to the predominantly proactive approach to police work. POP stands for the focus on the cause(s) to criminal problems rather than solely solving problems through legal actions. This focus on the preventative effort is based on the principles of the

SARA model²⁰, which underlines the importance of analysis done before and the assessment of efforts done afterwards are highlighted. The thoughts behind ILP are similar to those of POP, but they are anchored to a greater extent in the strategic production and use of intelligence as the type of information and as background for the priorities at all levels of police work.

The purpose of NCI reflects in itself the thoughts of ILP whereby, as noted above, it is NCI's responsibility to have a national overview of chosen areas with serious and organized crime. The national overview reflects the holistic focus, which is central to ILP. More specifically it reflects the wish to work as an extension of ILP in NCI's strategy and vision documents, where it is written that NCI takes its point of departure in "intelligence-led policing", where there is a targeted analytical process and structured information gathering as a basis for every decision or implementation of an investigation.

This reflects one of the most vital points of ILP – the importance of a targeted analysis prior to efforts as well as structure and stringency in dealing with information and the identification of areas of effort on all levels of police work.

NCI cannot in its current form be understood as an intelligence organization in the traditional sense of the word, but rather an organization whose three main goals are built on a stable, solid intelligence production through dedicated workers with a shared understanding of fundamental intelligence principles and of how intelligence comes to being. This reflects a wish in the long term to produce "crime stopping" efforts rather than "crime spotting"²¹ (Agrell 1998) and to have the competencies to use information/intelligence in combination with trend analyses and threat evaluations.



²⁰ SARA stands for: **Scanning**, which contains identification and description of criminal problems. **Analysis**, which contains identification of causes of the problem, and where it would be possible to act. **Response**, which contains identification of possible solutions and the implementation of and effort. **Assessment**, which contains evaluating efforts and effects of a problem. (see, among others, Center for Problem- Oriented Policing: <http://www.popcenter.org/about/?p=sara>).

²¹ According to the English term for train enthusiasts, so-called 'train spotters' whose foremost goal is to know as much about railways and trains as possible through a very stringent and concentrated information gathering without regard for more profound considerations about why, for example, the development behind a new type of train car or changes in routes take place.

ILP presents a natural challenge in relation to its ability to anchor intelligence and analysis based work. This is a general and international challenge (among other things) because investigation-related police work traditionally is composed of producing evidence for a court in order to prove guilt. This analytical practice, bound to the production of evidence, stands in contrast (in multiple ways) to the production of intelligence, given that the production of legal evidence in connection with investigative work most often is composed of testing and confirming of a pre-established hypothesis and identification of clues and the construction of narratives that support this hypothesis (Hald 2011).

Intelligence production can to a greater extent than traditional investigative work be characterized by a process of hypothesis creation that to a greater degree feeds imaginary end competencies and an ability to create relevant possible scenarios based on available information (Anderson et. al. 2005). In relation to armed conflicts and fighting of serious and organized crime, the increasing expectation of intelligence production (which comes with a wish to work intelligence-led) requires to a great degree competencies in the ability to think creatively.

An especially significant part of NCI's efforts is to work towards a more intelligence-led way of increasing competencies in order to produce intelligence and information gathering, as well as produce and implement stringent methodologies for the different types of intelligence which are standard products in NCI, where the requirement of analysis based police work is upheld to an utmost extent.



Examples of Concrete Measures at the Danish Police

Intelligence-led policing is the overall strategy for NCI's efforts against group-related crime. The ambition of analysis-based police work is not only valid at the national and overall level, but to a great extent also at the police district level.

Based upon experience as well as extensive knowledge gathering, research and education in gang-related crime with the main goal of collecting information about criminal areas and related police efforts, one future ambition of the Danish National Police is to strengthen a proactive criminal combating-approach.

An internal manual for proactive crime fighting is to be produced, but this will require the establishment of knowledge about the phenomenon and adequate delimitation as well as a systematic approach to significant questions. This can for exam-

ple be the questions: What constitutes a gang or a biker-related criminal act? What different motives can be behind these acts? How can we best point out the central players in conflicts? The answers to these questions demand a thorough evaluation of case processing and methodological awareness and competencies to carry out the relevant analyses and evaluate measures based on this.

Additionally, the Danish National Police has recommended the prioritization of areas such as knowledge-based and problem-oriented police work (POP), crime analysis, cross-sectorial knowledge sharing as well as evaluation of efforts and initiatives. Beyond this preventative work is a high priority with a clear focus on efforts that are efficient, strengthening of the general preventative effort²², focus on situational dependent preventative measures, the prevention of gang recruitment and the creation of exit programs.

A challenge in connection with successful implementation of a model for proactive crime fighting is actual priorities, because these often time consuming analyses can be produced as well as the addition of competencies for carrying out these analyses, for example in cooperation with universities and sociological researchers.

In connection with the last few years group-related crime in Denmark there have been launched some new initiatives. These are special efforts of a preventative character, of which it can be mentioned that in 2009 Denmark established special gang councils in affected local areas. These local gang councils consist of police, the social authorities, schools, local inhabitant representatives, representatives of leisure clubs and “father groups” and other local network groups. The establishment of the local gang councils was actually part of the Gang Package of 2009. The gang councils are thought of as forums where one can continually discuss concrete safety creating measures and measures that can target and deepen the local crime prevention efforts in order to break the “food chain” for gangs. The focus of this work is on very young potential gang members. Because the program is relatively new is has not yet been evaluated.

Another important measure in connection with the fight against gangs (especially in the long term) is the establishment of exit programs. Such programs make it pos-



...the Danish National Police has recommended the prioritization of areas such as knowledge-based and problem-oriented police work (POP), crime analysis, cross-sectorial knowledge sharing as well as evaluation of efforts and initiatives.”

²² According to the latest knowledge gathering in Denmark there are not many significant differences between the risk factors of biker/gang members and other criminals, which means that one cannot point out special areas where prevention can be put in place in relation to recruitment in the biker/gang environment: The Ministry of Justice's Office of Research (2010), www.jm.dk

sible for members of criminal groups that no longer wish to be a part of the criminal environment to be offered an alternative. In the course of 2011 the Danish police have established a national exit secretariat as well as local exit units in the police districts. The purpose is, within the framework model of the Danish government, to help gang and biker members to leave criminal environments and create an overview of what offers can be made available for these persons. The prerequisite for these exit programs to be successful is the existence of goal-oriented coordinated cooperation between authorities, i.e. the police, the Danish Prison and Probation Service and the municipalities. Representatives of these authorities are therefore part of the local exit units. The evaluation of the Danish exit program is planned for 2013 and as such it is too soon to make a statement regarding the experiences with the program at this time.

Beyond this, the Danish police have in connection with these efforts against group-

related crime in some situations used the so-called 'Al Capone Model'. This is comprised of a strengthened cooperation between the Danish tax authorities, the social authorities and the police and is based on the assumption that a significant motivating factor for membership to these groups is economic profit. Through an increased observation of money flows, tax relationships, etc. it is believed that criminal relationship will become more evident and it will be less attractive to become part of criminal groups. The effect of this effort has not yet been evaluated, but during 2011 Danish tax authorities have claimed approximately 1,800.000 EURO



...the so-called 'Al Capone Model'. This is comprised of a strengthened cooperation between the Danish tax authorities and the police..."

according to the 'Al Capone model'.

As previously mentioned the escalation of shootings in relation to conflicts between different groups from 2008 forth resulted in further police measures in 2009 where several common gang-related challenges in a number of Police Districts in the eastern part of Denmark (Zealand) led to the establishment of the Task Force East (TFØ). This special investigative unit has the primary objective of carrying out proactive investigations with relation to gang and biker crime. TFØ is a cooperation between experienced investigators, analysts and officer personnel from the Danish National Police, the police districts and the tax authorities, (among others) who all have special competencies and great experience with resource-demanding investigations against organized crime. TFØ is the last option in relation to the centralization of police efforts and includes the competencies from the State Prosecutor's Office for Serious

Economic Crimes (SØK) as well as the tax authorities present in special units. A recent evaluation has shown that TFØ was seen to be a well-adapted organizational model for the fight against organized crime (the Danish National Police 2011).

As earlier mentioned a string of common gang-related issues and challenges in 2010 prompted several Police Districts in the Western part of Denmark (Jutland and the central island of Funen) to strengthen their cooperation resulting in the formation of a similar coordinated effort to that of the TFØ, namely the Task Force West (TFV²³).

Furthermore, a national staff²⁴ was established in 2009 with the purpose of following up on the police districts efforts, possible creation of new initiatives, needs for legal changes, adaptation of efforts, etc. The staff also acts as a platform for academic discussions, exchange of experiences, innovative measures and the communication of information.

Challenges: the complicated conflicts and difficult prevention measures

After the establishment of the large international biker groups in Denmark and the violent clashes ended with the Great Nordic Biker War in 1997 there was a relatively simple overview of threats. The Danish authorities knew quite well about the significant players dealing in the lucrative drug market (among other things). For example, in the case of violent actions, there was almost always a good impression of the situation a short time after the actions because of a more or less static power relationship between the conflicting biker groups. At the same time the Danish Police knew where to find the perpetrators, because the biker groups had quite established hangouts, where one could even find further evidence in connection with further ransacking of the hangouts.

With the coming of other types of criminal groups and a more multi-colored conflict landscape the situation today is significantly more unclear. The motivations for violent action are today not just limited to fights over territory or other criminal



²³ TFV started 15th January 2012.

²⁴ With participation of representatives from the Danish National Police, the police districts, the Director of Public Prosecution, the Prison and Probation Services and the Crime Prevention Council.

markets, but instead can have root in purely personal related causes such as jealousy, revenge, pay-back, disciplinary punishment for unpaid debts or other causes. This presents a challenge for the police efforts, and presents other demands on the police information and analysis work.

Another big challenge, especially for crime prevention, which runs parallel to the police operational effort in the biker area, is the prevention of establishment and spreading of criminal groups²⁵ (Ministry of Justice 2011). A strong preventative work with a view to the prevention of a stream of new members to the young criminal groups is a shared societal matter that requires a contribution from several sides²⁶, as long as one truly wants to prevent the young from being attracted to the environment of young criminal groups.

There is a lot of experience with general prevention of child and youth crime, but that which prevents youth crime does not always prevent membership to criminal groups. This is first and foremost due to two different phenomena²⁷. The crime that youths in criminal groups commit cannot just be seen as a more serious form of youth crime. It is necessary that prevention initiatives build on knowledge about groups, including their structures, because it is more the prevention of groups establishment and maintenance that is in focus than the individual members crime.

It is still too early to speak about the effect of the Danish exit program, because it will first be evaluated in 2013, but as mentioned a trustworthy exit program must be part of the prerequisites for a successful holistic effort against the biker/gang environment. At the same time voluntary efforts and engagement in the local society is seen as an important part of the preventative work against biker/gang crime in the local area.

Conclusion in Perspective

This article functions as a presentation and introduction to Danish police's national work with group-related crime, including the changing conflict landscape between gang and biker groups since the 1980's, with a point of departure in NCI. The NCI is in itself an exemplification of the police-related centralization of efforts and knowledge, which also has taken place since the 90's, where expertise and national overview function as a support for police districts investigations and efforts

25 For example "Black Cobra" as well as Hells Angels' support group "AK 81" etc.

26 For example the degree of supervision of parents and the development of pro-social values, a feeling of shame and self-control of youths.

27 Klein, Malcolm W. & Cheryl L. Maxson (2006): *Street gang Patterns and Policies*. Oxford University Press. Oxford.

towards complicated and cross-border, cross district serious and organized crime. Since the millennium change in the national effort and expertise has taken form under the strategy intelligence-led policing, which is anchored in the importance of police based efforts and prioritization of an understanding and analysis of the overall phenomena and patterns that are involved in the specific cases, other current cases and the related dynamics (for example via knowledge about the groups capability, intentions and the general conflict landscape). The analysis-based practice that ILP describes, is a challenge for work practice and for police analysts around the world, who previously predominantly have been taught to produce specific evidence for court cases in connection with investigations. Intelligence production contains another end practice, and demands the upgrading of competencies and knowledge about what should be taken into account (for example normative and analytical aspects) and this requires education and methodologies to carry out the analyses in practice.

In parallel with the vision and strategy of an analysis-based and intelligence-led NCI and Danish police²⁸, there are great demands made on these employees' analytical competencies (Ratcliffe 2008, Ericsson & Haggerty 1997).

The centralization of police resources and competencies in expert centers and special units, and the vision of carrying out thoughts from the intelligence-led policing strategy can be seen as an expression for a tendency towards increased professionalization of the Danish police. The desire for a police professionalization is spread not only through the efforts against group-related crime, but is also relevant for several other areas. An example of this can be found in the establishment of the new Danish police education, which from November 1st, 2011 will result in a bachelor degree²⁹.

The demand of professionalization is a process that may not necessarily result in professionalism - understood as the distinction between vision and professionalization, and that resulting products of intelligence work actually live up to professional standards (Kleinig 2008: 70). Professionalization of the police can therefore be understood as the process of improving the possibility for acting professionally

“ The analysis-based practice that ILP describes, is a challenge for work practice and for police analysts around the world...”

²⁸ Who follow the expectation that the police force to a greater extent should be composed of knowledge employees, who are able to analyze and evaluate of general phenomena, threats and risks and are able to act on these (Ericsson & Haggerty 1997).


²⁹ Professional bachelor is equal to nurses' and public school teachers' level of education.

(Kleinig 2008: 70), and this can be further specified by improved preconditions for gaining competencies to perform the work expected of them. With the desire to be analysis and intelligence based, there comes a natural qualification and assurance of competencies and the necessary space in which to provide these. This is relevant in the police's effort toward gang and biker crime because it is not only the reactive investigations that make up the police's work in this connection, but to an equal extent it is the understanding of overall phenomena, societal processes, etc. that allow for the different types of crime that give rise to a holistic police effort.



PART V

APPENDICES





Appendix 1

Common Myths about Gangs

By: Michelle Arciaga, National Gang Center, USA.

Printed with permission from the National Gang Center

My gang will protect me, and I will feel safe.

Wrong! While you may believe that joining a gang will protect you from bullies or other gang members, being in a gang greatly increases your chances to be a target for rival gang members. You are far more likely to be injured or killed if you are in a gang. Many former gang members report that they had to change their lives dramatically as a gang member. They could no longer wear clothing they used to wear. They got into fights while attending school with rival gang members, and ended up dropping out of school. They felt unsafe going out of their neighborhoods, and they ►

couldn't ever be sure where rivals might confront them. Even if they got out of gangs, their rivals didn't forget them. They still had many enemies who might hurt or kill them.

Other people will respect me more if I am in a gang.

Wrong! Respect in many gangs really means fear. If you join a gang, you will constantly have to commit crimes in order to keep other gang members afraid of you. At any age, respect is something you can earn by getting an education and accomplishing goals in your life. Respect in the gang culture will go away the first time you fail to hurt someone who insults you or puts you down. That kind of respect isn't real, and it doesn't last.

Joining a gang means I'll have lots of friends.

You will have friends, but you'll also make lots of enemies--the members of rival gangs. Also, your friends who haven't joined the gang may stop wanting to be around you. Your gang may not approve if you have friends or date people outside the gang. They may question and test your loyalty, and insist that you hang out only with them.

My gang will be just like a family.

Wrong! Real families don't force people to commit crimes to get respect and love. Real families accept you and love you for who and what you are. Even if your family is having problems, being in a gang will not solve them--it will only make things worse. If you join a gang, your family ►

members may become targets for rival gangs. Joining a gang will only increase the number of fights you have with your parents. You will eventually get into trouble with the law, and your parents and family members will be hurt and disappointed. You will set a bad example for your brothers and sisters. You will not find the kind of love you're looking for from a gang.

I'll make lots of money if I'm in a gang.

Most gang members make very little money being part of a gang. Those who do, usually end up doing time. Plus, if you're in a gang, it's far more likely that you'll drop out of school because of problems with rival gang members. Getting your education is the key to making money--not joining a gang.

I can never get out of my gang.

Wrong! Gang members decide to leave the gang lifestyle every day in cities around the U.S. It is a myth that the only way to leave a gang is by dying. Most gang members who leave are able to live normal lives, going to school and working just like everyone else. However, in some cases, getting out of a gang isn't easy, and you may have to leave your home, school or community in order to be safe. It IS easier to get into a gang than to get out of one, but you can choose to leave the gang life today. The best option of all is to stay out of gangs in the first place.



Appendix 2

Institutions


within the Swedish Judicial System

The National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ)

The National Council for Crime Prevention gathers and spreads information regarding criminality and crime prevention measures. The National Council for Crime Prevention also does research and promotes local crime prevention work. Further information regarding e.g. crime statistics and crime preventive measures can be found on the home page of the National Council for Crime Prevention.

The Crime Victim Compensation and Support Authority

If an offender cannot pay damages or is unknown, and if there is no insurance to cover damages, the crime victim may be entitled to criminal injuries compensation. The Crime Victim Compensation and Support Authority assesses and administers these compensations but is also responsible for the Crime Victim Fund and acts as a center of competence for crime victim issues.



The Judiciary

The judiciary comprises more than a hundred different public authorities and committees: the Supreme Court, the courts of appeal, the district courts, the Supreme Administrative Court, the administrative courts of appeal, the regional rent and tenancies tribunals, the National Legal Aid Authority and the National Courts Administration. The main function of the judiciary is to rule in civil and criminal litigations, litigations between individuals and public authorities, rent and tenancies disputes, as well as to process legal aid cases. The courts judge and sentence according to the laws adopted by the Swedish Parliament.

The Swedish National Economic Crimes Bureau (EBM)

The Economic Crimes Bureau specializes in combating economic crime. Its task is to prevent, detect, impede, investigate and initiate legal proceedings against economic crime. Activities are directed at serious economic crime and so called everyday crime. The Economic Crimes Bureau has a coordinating role and acts as driving force in the combat against economic crime.

The Prison and Probation Service

The Prison and Probation Service comprises non-institutional treatment of criminals, remand prisons and prisons. The Probation Service (non-institutional treatment) is responsible for non-custodial sentences, such as for instance probation. The Service also uses intensive supervision with electronic monitoring (tagging) and conducts personal case studies in criminal matters. The remand prisons are responsible for suspected offenders and the prisons for those individuals already sentenced to a term of imprisonment.

The Swedish Police Service

The Police Service prevents crime, supervises public order and security, conducts surveillance and investigates crime. More information regarding police working methods can be found on this web page. A number of reports, documents, forms, news, and press releases, in addition to contact details of all Police Services in Sweden are also available.

The National Board of Forensic Medicine

The National Board of Forensic Medicine, with 380 employees, is the central administrative authority responsible for forensic psychiatry, forensic medicine, forensic chemistry and forensic genetics. The National Board of Forensic Medicine is divided into ten departments spread all over the country.

The Swedish Prosecution Authority

Prosecutors lead crime investigations, decide on the institution of legal proceedings and appear in court. The Swedish Prosecution Authority consists of 43 Public Prosecution Offices, the Office of the Prosecutor-General and four national Development Centers. More information regarding the work of prosecutors, the Prosecutor-General's work in the Supreme Court, press releases etc. can be found on the web page of the Swedish Prosecution Authority.

The Swedish Enforcement Agency (KFM), the Swedish Coast Guard, the Swedish Tax Agency (SKV) and the Swedish Customs Enforcement

The Swedish Enforcement Agency, the Swedish Coast Guard, the National Tax Agency and Swedish Customs Enforcement are examples of other law enforcement agencies.

SOURCE: www.polisen.se/Stockholms_lan/en/Languages/Victims-of-Crime/The-Judicial-System/

In 2009 we started SGIP with the ambition to find a solution to the growing and alarming gang threat. Together with our law enforcement project partners and researchers from around the world, we wanted to find methods and strategies to avoid the gang development seen elsewhere. Our ambitions resulted in Holistic Policing and the implementation of a gang model against street gangs by way of PANTHER.

During the process of working in SGIP, we determined that “our” gangs have many similarities with gangs in other countries, as well as important differences. As you might have read in this book, every city, region, and country have their own specific problems as it relates to gangs; gangs look different depending on the context in which they operate and develop. However, there are similarities – similar qualities, if you will – which enable us to cross national borders to collaborate with others to arrive at enduring solutions. Gangs may be specific and cause an alarming local concern, but the phenomenon is international in scope. That is, the gangs call themselves many things – they are “Crips”, “Mara Salvatrucha”, “Netas”, “Were-wolf Legion”, or “Fucked for Life”. The one common thing among them is that they pose a problem for residents at the local level and undermine the democratic institutions in society. However, generally it is the gang members themselves who are the biggest victims in all of this. They are frequently victimized by other gangs and, sometimes, from their own “brothers”.

It is, however, important to point out that it is hard –if not impossible – to find a panacea against gang; there is no penicillin or quick fix. As such, we are not making any claims that the PANTHER model is the solution to these problems. Rather, it should be seen as a starting point; a foundation, from which to grow – a way to deal with and try to control the growing gang problem in Sweden and Europe.

It is we, as an organization that must understand the context in which we work and adjust the problem picture accordingly. The problem will not adjust itself according to our organizational structure, with all its limitations – that is a fact. As such, we must be flexible and malleable – we must be able to work against gangs in different ways depending on the type of gang and where it is on the gang continuum. We need to develop the ability to work dynamic and research guided, in

close cooperation with other resources, actors, and members in society. That is really the foundation of PANTHER.

It is also a widely accepted experience that incarceration is not the best solution – we cannot arrest our way out of a gang problem. As such, we as a police organization must have the capacity to offer other ways out of gangs – provide assistance and quality service when gang members want out. Prison cannot be the only way to leave the streets. We must also strive further than to only put out small fires. This is the proverbial tip of the ice berg – the problems are deeply rooted in the areas where we work. We need to increase the accessibility to the police and other democratic institutions and facilitate and strengthen the social capital in these areas. That is, not just solve crime and hunt for statistical improvements.

PANTHER is a holistic model but we do not claim to be the only ones working in this fashion. By way of visiting other European law enforcement agencies, we have noticed that many other distinguished agencies work in similar ways, sometimes under different names and acronyms, but in essence using the same fundamental idea – for example, we see this development in cities such as Barcelona, New York, London and, of course, in Stockholm. We feel that a viable solution to get at the social issues underlying street gangs, organized crime, mafia-like organizations and social depravity need to be cemented in “holistic thinking”. Now, this could go under many names, but the essence is that we need to incorporate intervention strategies, prevention efforts, and traditional reactive and suppressive police work.

In closing, our experiences in developing and implementing PANTHER in Stockholm have given us reason to suggest that the notion of holistic policing be further developed, tested, and implemented in a larger scale. Although PANTHER is a “gang model” based on holistic policing, it may just as well be used against other social phenomena, such as soccer hooligans, criminal networks, extremist groups, or against organized crime. Perhaps we could use this concept to address issues that undermines and limits the democratic rights of citizens?

Stockholm, April 2012

Amir Rostami
Project Manager



Dr. Cheryl Maxson (USA) is an Associate Professor in the Department of Criminology, Law and Society at the University of California's Irvine campus. She received her Ph.D. in Sociology from University of Southern California (USC). She is co-author of *Street Gang Patterns and Policies* (Oxford University Press, 2006) and *Responding to Troubled Youth* (Oxford University Press, 1997) and co-editor of *The Eurogang Paradox: Gangs and Youth Groups in the U.S. and Europe* (Kluwer/Plenum, 2001), *The Modern Gang Reader* (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2006) and *Youth Gangs in International Perspective* (Springer, 2012). Her articles, chapters, and policy reports concern street gangs, status offenders, youth violence, juvenile justice legislation, and community treatment of juvenile offenders. She has served as Executive Counselor and Vice-President of the American Society of Criminology and was elected President and Vice-President of the Western Society of Criminology, where she is honored as a Fellow, and with the Society's Paul Tappan and Joseph Lohman awards.

Dr. Finn-Aage Esbensen (USA) is the E. Desmond Lee Professor of Youth Crime and Violence and also serves as Chair of the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. He is co-author of *Criminology: Explaining Crime and Its Context*, 7th Edition and *Youth Violence: Sex Differences in Offending, Victimization and Gang Membership* and co-editor of *American Youth Gangs at the Millennium* and *Youth Gangs in International Perspective: Results from the Eurogang Program of Research*.

Detective Superintendent Fredrik Gårdare (Sweden) has 20 years of experience working against criminal gangs. He started his career as patrol officer in Stockholm City and then served four years at the Stockholm SWAT team. He then served at the National CID Intelligence Unit with special responsibility for matters concerning outlaw motorcycle gangs and prison gangs, before moving on to the Stockholm Regional CID Intelligence Unit, where he served for five years (1995-2000) as the lead on organized gangs in Stockholm county. Between 2000 and 2003, Fredrik served on various local projects on street gangs and, in 2003, received a promotion to the section commander for the Section against Gang Crime (SGI), a position he

held until 2010. He currently serves as a detective superintendent and is in charge of a Special Task Force against organized residential burglaries.

Detective Superintendent Inga-Lill Hult (Sweden) has 25 years of experience as a police officer. She started as a patrol officer in Stockholm City where she stayed for approximately 10 years. Inga-Lill served five of those years as a patrol shift supervisor. After patrol duty, she took the initiative to implementing a new special plain-clothes unit within the police department focusing on narcotics and vice at inner-city nightclubs and restaurants. She served there for three years as a team supervisor, before moving on to starting up the county special gang task force (NOVA). Inga-Lill served as the deputy task force commander for one year, before moving to Söderorts police district to start up their new anti-gang unit (SYL). In October 2009, Inga-Lill was promoted to detective superintendent and given the command of the Section against Gang Crime (SGI). Inga-Lill has always had a special interest for working against gangs and organized crime, which is reflected in her previous and current posting.

Detective Inspector Torbjörn Hermansson (Sweden) has over 24 years of police experience. He joined the Police Academy in 1988 and started working as a fully trained police officer in 1991. His first assignment included regular patrol duty in the county of Södermanland, just south of Stockholm County – a position he held until 1995. He then moved on to work as a local borough officer for an additional five years, until 2000 when he started working general criminal investigations as a detective. In 2006, Torbjörn joined the Section against Gang Crime (SGI) in Stockholm County as a detective inspector. At SGI, he worked as a tactical gang team supervisor and as a criminal investigation supervisor up until 2012. In February 2012, Torbjörn joined the Stockholm County Organized Crime Task Force (L/GOB), where he currently works as a detective inspector.

Public Relation Officer Hesam Akbari (Sweden) joined the Stockholm Police Department in 2010 and currently works as press officer at the Södertörn Police District. He started his career at the Swedish National Radio as a youth and integration reporter in 2002. During his four years at the National Radio, he held various

posts. For example, Mr. Akbari served as a general news reporter, crime reporter, producer and program leader at several local radio stations. After leaving Swedish National Radio in 2006, Mr. Akbari joined the Gävleborg County Police in Gävle, where he served as the chairman of the non-sworn police union (Saco-S). He held this post until 2010 when he moved to Stockholm.

Kira Vrist Rønn (Denmark) is currently a Ph.D. student at the Institute for Media, Cognition and Communication at the Department of Philosophy, University of Copenhagen. Kira has a M.A. in Philosophy and Science Studies and she is currently working on a doctoral project with the Danish National Police on normative and epistemological aspects of the criminal intelligence production (2009 - 2012).

Detective Inspector Tino Snedevig Jensen (Denmark) is a detective inspector with the Danish National Police and holds a diploma in criminology. His previous work experience includes the Danish branch of Interpol and handling trafficking cases at the National Investigation and Prevention Center (NEC). Since 2008, he works as a strategic analyst.

David Brotherton, Dr., grew up in the East End of London, England where he worked in various blue-collar jobs while organizing labor and youth. In the fields of sociology and criminology Dr. Brotherton is primarily concerned with the dialectical relationship between social exclusion and resistance. The subjects of his collaborative ethnographic studies include high school drop-outs, street gangs, deportees and undocumented immigrants. Currently, Dr. Brotherton is particularly involved in the developing field of cultural criminology and its application to transnational populations. Dr. Brotherton is a member of the Graduate Center Ph.D. programs in criminal justice, sociology and urban education and is John Jay's faculty representative at the European Common Sessions in Critical Criminology. In addition to CUNY, Dr. Brotherton is a research associate at the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo, Goldsmith's College (University of London), and London Metropolitan University. He has co-authored or co-edited five books and is presently finishing work on two manuscripts dealing with Dominican deportees and transnational street organizations.

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The Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project (SGIP)

In 2009, the Stockholm Police Department received a substantial, three-year grant to study criminal gangs in Stockholm County from the *European Commission* to devise a new model of gang enforcement that incorporated multidisciplinary research and practice into a flexible and enduring design.

The PANTHER gang model is a holistic model that builds on the problem-oriented policing paradigm by incorporating three dimensions of enforcement:

- **Suppression** – the use of offensive methods designed to interrupt and deter criminal street gangs by way of increased pressure against selected individuals and gangs, in collaboration with other law enforcement agencies;
- **Intervention** – the use of various social intervention teams, consisting of representatives from various societal agencies and law enforcement, to encourage gang members to change their lifestyles and interrupt a criminal career by individualized action plans;
- **Prevention** – the use of preventive measures to stop the recruitment into criminal street gangs and various educational efforts to inform youth about alternatives to gang crime.

The model uses five steps in its tactical implementation: *Scanning and Analysis, Method Selection, Tactical Operations, Criminal Investigations, and Evaluation* guided by intelligence-led policing and the proper problem identifications of local concerns, and the analysis of local actors by using Social Network Analysis and visualization tools.

This book is primarily intended for police administrators at the strategic and tactical levels interested in gang enforcement, although it may appeal to some gang researchers. There is also an interesting section on gang enforcement from an international perspective with contributing authors from the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Denmark.



**Polismyndigheten
i Stockholms län**

Stockholm County Police, Stockholm, Sweden
7th Police District, Södertörn
Section Against Gang Crime (SGI)



*With the Support of the Prevention of
and Fight against Crime Programme
European Commission – Directorate General
Justice, Freedom and Security*

