



Jari Ristiniemi

***Ethics
Interaction
and
Differential
Thinking***

Potentiality of Future in Paul Tillich's Social Ethics



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Introduction

These essays deal with social ethical issues in Paul Tillich's philosophical and cultural theology. The emphasis is on two aspects of Tillich's thought: there is an analysis of the background of Tillich's social ethical thought, focus on those philosophers that have influenced him, and the development of some constructive themes present in Tillich's writings. The essays try to lift up the potential possibilities of Tillich's thought. Tillich introduced the method of correlation: questions manifested in the human situation comprise one pole, while the other pole is the theological answers to these questions. There are different kinds of theological answers: If we by theological answers mean the application of a certain a priori system of belief in the empirical realm, as we find it in dogmatic thinking, then Tillich was not that type of theologian; he had no dogmatic view of what religion, or respectively, Christianity is. His theological system and thinking were open-ended, and the answers he gave to the human situation, as he understood it, were not final, unchanging answers, but answers that made sense at one particular moment in history. In Tillich's thought an understanding of the human situation and the Christian experience are correlated with each other. The emphasis of the essays is on the philosophical side of Tillich's thought: structural, phenomenological, existential, social, and political aspects of Tillich's thought are explicated. "Philosophical" is here understood as the humanly possible in sensing, in feeling, in thinking and in willing. This does not mean that the theological side of Tillich's thought is disregarded, as there is no either/or between philosophy and theology, but rather the mutual conditioning of each other. In theology the starting-point is faith, or rather, faith gives a basic perspective on the world; philosophy is the

thinking, feeling and willing encounter with the world. Defining philosophy in this way, the limited perspective of *cogito*, of reflection, of pure thought, is no longer viewed as the sole perspective of philosophy.

Questions and answers condition each other, and it is important to find the relevant questions in the prevailing historical situation. No a-historical answers are accessible, only those answers are relevant which target the historical situation. Answers should make sense to living human beings, and they should build on realistic analyses of the prevailing social, cultural, and religious situations. Science has both an analytic side and a constructive, synthetic side of “framing”. There is the “said” or the represented, and there are thought-forms, over-all patterns, mind-maps, and gestalts, which structure and precede the represented. Underlying the level of representation is the dimension of structural possibilities. These essays are not only about ideas as ideas, but try to outline those patterns and gestalts that have shaped and shape human self-understanding during recent decades. Patterns are structural possibilities. The essays offer alternative, constructive readings in cultural analysis, economy, politics, ethics, and religion. A constructive reading focusing on economics might be done in the following way:

The essays are written during the era of globalization and economization of human existence. Today there is an economization of the material conditions of human existence and this process is discernible on a global scale: all countries and individuals are affected by it. This present era is partly different from the era in which Tillich lived, but the patterns of understanding he introduced might be applied to our era as well. Economics, as we find it in today’s global world, is, to use Tillich’s language of analysis, pervaded by the “technological gestalt”. We might say that the technological gestalt provides the frameworks of economic decisions; the presumed solutions to economic problems are provided by the means available *within* the gestalt; the economy itself is framed. It is not only the economy that is framed, but the modern everyday-world is permeated by the technological gestalt as well. Machinic operations, to use the language of Deleuze/Guattari, surround and stifle the Earth. Tillich’s writings contain an analysis of this technological gestalt, and an analysis of its function in the modern world. This belongs to the analytical side of his thought and we might agree that talking about the technological gestalt as a pattern of self-understanding, as a pattern of framing the world, gives a realistic analysis even in the prevailing situation: economics both on a national and on a global level is conducted within the

frames of the technological gestalt and the machinic operations inherent in it. It is not only technical devices like “super computers” that are examples of this; decision-making in economics seems to be ruled by the technological gestalt as well. The technological gestalt has invaded, to put this in another language of analysis than what we find in Tillich, the dimension of structural possibilities: it has become a determining structure of modern self-understanding. In Heidegger’s terms, the ontology of “thinghood” characterizes the modern world. But the technological gestalt is only one of the gestalts Tillich pointed out: constructively he proposed other gestalts than that one.

As we learn to discern the technological gestalt and outline its genealogy, society might become fit for another gestalt, this being the constructive part. Other models of self-understanding might be introduced and implemented, and with them other ways of dealing with economics. We might be able to lift our eyes above the technological gestalt and see other possibilities. The technological gestalt is not a necessary all-inclusive framework; it is a result of an historical development in the industrialized countries. When economics is placed above politics, as seems to be the case today, the means become the ends. When the means become the ends, people find it hard to make ends meet. Economics is an anthropo-genetic process; it is of human making, which means that we humans are able to cope with economics in several ways. The way we have construed economics and its basic framework is no necessary process, we might change the basic pattern or model. Economics might be placed within a holistic, multidimensional gestalt or frame as well, not only within the technological gestalt. Humans and other living beings share biological/material, psycho-social, historical and spiritual dimensions; all these different dimensions should have a place in economics and in economic decisions. The basic drive of the multidimensional universe is toward meaning- and reality-fulfillment; humans and the world are in the state of becoming. We do not have to link economics to the quantifiable mass of profit or capital only, as is the case today. Economics might instead be seen as a part of *sense-, meaning-, and reality-making* within the multidimensional universe: economics and existential/spiritual needs are linked to each other. Present economical systems disregard the existential/spiritual dimensions and create large spots of black holes: “holey spaces” (Deleuze & Guattari), for large groups of people. Sense-, meaning-, and reality-making within the secured material conditions of human existence is able to fill the holey spaces

with new meaning-import. It is up to us to make that shift, for example, by guaranteeing for each citizen the minimum income level as a basic right. This would enable us to take a step from the profit determined way of living into a culture of creative self-determination and self-expression. One purpose of these essays is to point to the possibility of creative self-determination and self-expression.

Modern architecture, to give another example, is many times conducted under the technological gestalt. Le Corbusier is usually mentioned as the founder of modern architecture, and his work expressed both a way of understanding and of constructing conditions of human livelihood, including housing. Reading him as a sign of modernity, his work, mentally and physically, was permeated by the technological gestalt: Le Corbusier's architecture is a sign and a symbol of the technological gestalt. In today's architecture there is, in addition to modern architecture the a/modern architecture: the movement from the below, the will to build the social and the natural milieu from below (Gromark). Architectures work by local means and materials with local people and within the local conditions present in the local neighborhood: architecture has social and spiritual/existential dimensions. It promotes the values of participation and shared responsibility. According to Tillich, art, including architecture, show the transcendental conditions which structure perception and understanding.

The essays follow the method of correlation in that they try to speak to the prevailing historical situation, which is partly different than the historical situation in Tillich's life time. The essays contain analyses of Paul Tillich's social ethical concerns; his social ethics is compared to some social ethical issues discernible in recent philosophy. There is an attempt to apply Tillich's social ethical standpoints and positions to the present historical and cultural situation. My hope is that both the analytical and the constructive part of social ethics might be seen in these essays.

Having gone through the First World War as a military pastor in the Prussian army and having suffered severe post-traumatic stress, Tillich was forced to reevaluate his pre-war idealistic interpretation of philosophy, religion, and culture. He was ready for a new radical start. Establishing himself in Berlin after the war, he came in contact with the writings of Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Freud. Especially Feuerbach, together with Nietzsche, became important to Tillich as he

took the first steps towards new philosophical and theological orientation, but it was Marx who led him to see the necessity of societal change.

Romantic Christianity, which is the way he understood pre-war Christianity, lacked in Tillich's view both a radical questioning and a concern for the human social situation. Marx's criticism of religion that religion is opium for the masses hit the point in capitalist/bourgeois society. Traditionally, Christianity had seen atheism as an antagonistic position and the Socialist movement was understood as the atheist threat. Tillich, however, saw atheism as a moment in an integrated and mature faith. He was one of the grounding members of the Religious Socialism movement, which oriented itself out of the proletarian situation and consciousness: thinking should be related to the situation of workers; those who think that the good of the society is not their lot are to be included in the decision-making. Consciousness, if there is to be awareness of the prevailing situation, comes from below; both Socialism and Religious Socialism share this standpoint. The movement went beyond Socialism in the sense of containing both a Yes and a No to Socialism. The representatives of the Religious Socialism movement viewed the answers proposed by Marx and Engels as not the entire answer. They believed that socialist answers tackling the proletarian situation and alienation should be related to the search for meaning-fulfillment and a just society. Part of the meaningfulness involves the overcoming of alienation. In this sense there is a Yes to Socialism: without the overcoming of the prevailing division of classes and of the socio/economical conditions, there is no revoking of alienation! But the ultimate answer involves the meaning-fulfillment of humans, other living creatures, and things; with other words, the meaning-fulfillment of the universe as a whole. Religious Socialism offers a message and vision of meaning-fulfillment for all living things. In the light of this proposal, Marx' analysis (or any other analysis) gives a limited perspective.

There is in Tillich a holistic pattern of meaning-fulfillment already in the 1920s: the gestalt of grace or love. The pattern shutters self-sufficient finitude, offers the affirmation of all things in their particularity. A holistic pattern is able to affirm the particularity of things and humans, without disregarding the interaction between them. In his last great work *Systematic Theology III*, the holistic line of thought reaches its peak in the model of the multidimensional unity of life. The ultimate

answer to the question of a meaningful society is above history, it might come at the “end” of history, the “Kingdom of God” being a symbolic expression of that society. The complete meaning-fulfillment has not happened and will not happen in history, but history runs in the direction of meaning-fulfillment, and humans have a role to play in that fulfillment, for better or worse. Through human struggle, risk, and decision something of the meaning-fulfillment might be reached in history. There is no necessary historical process leading to meaning-fulfillment, as history might as well run out of the direction of meaning-fulfillment. History does not have any a priori direction; pre-war romantic understanding of providence is no option any more. A real possibility is that the drive towards meaning-fulfillment comes to naught through human self-destruction by nuclear war, by pollution, and by the will to nothingness discernible in Western culture. The constructive possibilities, according to Tillich, must be discussed in the light of a realistic view of the present situation: despite the experience of meaninglessness and the threat of destruction, constructive possibilities are there; through risk and choice, we humans are capable of realizing these constructive possibilities. This way of dealing with the questions facing humanity is, I believe, true to human basic experiences: there is the negation, the No, and the affirmation, the Yes; there is the critique and the affirmation. Differential thinking comprises the – and the +, it contains both the No and the Yes. Differential thinking is aware thinking which knows its otherness.

Tillich’s position is that the infinite is in the finite, his is the position of *immanent transcendence*. The infinite is not above or beyond this world we live in. Tillich’s is not a two-world doctrine; the infinite is in the depth dimension of the finite world. It might be said that these essays try to bring out the position of immanent transcendence, including its presuppositions, implications and consequences. This position might be expressed in other terms as well: the trans-moral world (the Ideal) is in the world of morals (the Real) as its *telos* and future goal. The relationship and the interaction between these two dimensions are discussed in chapter 4. There is a relationship and interaction between the world of morals and the trans-moral world: the trans-moral world is effective in the world of morals through its *directing activity*. The idea or the ideal of a meaning-fulfilling society might function as a corrective correlate in present society. There is a directing activity coming

from the trans-moral dimension in and above the historical dimension, and there is human cooperation with this directing activity through *creative justice*. In creative justice art has a central place in sense-, meaning-, and reality-making. Art as sense-, meaning-, and reality-making is discussed in chapter 5.

Even if the message of the meaning-fulfillment of all things comes from the trans-moral dimension, it has corrective and directive power in the present historical situation: it helps us both to say No to a kind of society that does not promote the meaning-fulfillment of all things and to say Yes to the constructive possibilities. A society permeated by the technological gestalt does not promote the meaning-fulfillment of *all* things, as it gives humans the position of control and power in relation to things. The message of the meaning-fulfillment of all things in the multidimensional universe is not a No to technology, but it is a No to the hegemony of one gestalt to determine the human self-understanding in the individual, in society, and in the global world. One constructive possibility, to repeat, is to link the economy to meaning-fulfillment; hence using the model of the multidimensional unity of life as the paradigmatic model in ethical, economic, and political decision-making. In the technological gestalt, only quantifiable factors are allowed in economic decision-making. The model of the multidimensional unity of life also allows for qualitative dimensions like cultural activity (creative justice) and sensed meaning-fulfillment (directing justice) to be part of this decision-making. If the trans-moral world is in the world of morals, then we no longer operate within the frames of the two-world doctrine. Between the world of morals and the trans-moral world, the finite and the infinite, immanence and transcendence, there is no duality, no binary opposition, but an immanent transcendence. There is a mutual immanence between the finite and the infinite. The relationship between God and human beings is not a black and white relation (darkness in man, light in God), it involves all possible colors and anti-colors. These essays trace the idea of immanent transcendence to Schelling. Today the standpoint is to be found in Mark C. Taylor.

The focus of the essays is not only on what Paul Tillich said in social ethics about the human predicament in the modern world, but also on his philosophical positions and standpoints in relation to philosophers like Schelling, Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, Nietzsche, Deleuze/Guattari, and Levinas. These philosophers, more or less, shared the same idea-historical context (that what we today call the Continental philosophy)

and it is not surprising that there are common themes and congruent standpoints. Deleuze/Guattari and Levinas were poststructuralist and post-phenomenological philosophers; Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, and even Nietzsche lifted up some primordial phenomena in their analyses of religion and culture; Tillich's thinking has a phenomenological core. As recent discussions show, the themes addressed by Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche in cultural analysis and in understanding religion are still current, relevant, and actual. One example: we know that Nietzsche wrote that God is dead, but we do not follow him after that sentence where he writes that it is we humans who have killed God, that is, God as living God cannot be experienced anymore due to "our" modern mentality and the frame of mind. The philosophical, critical work is to find out *what kind* of man has killed God: What is a mentality like that has no place for God anymore? The place of thinking for Nietzsche was time and space; there is a coordination of past, present, and future; the analysis of the past, of the genealogy of ideas, has implications for the understanding of the future. In Nietzsche it is left to the philosophers of the future, those with dangerous perhaps, to ponder the possibility of experiencing the presence of God. Tillich saw the orientation towards future in Nietzsche and it became an essential part of his thinking: aim of the philosophical and theological work is the creation of the genuinely new in and through history. Another example: Nihilism is that people do not believe in politics, science, culture, or in religion anymore. Nietzsche thought that nihilism was the European predicament, but we do not follow him when he claims that he is not a nihilist, but an affirmative person. Negation (nihilism) and affirmation (choice and decision), as Deleuze correctly observed, stand in a differential relation to each other: both sides of the relation are there on their own and they exercise influence on each other in every moment. Behind the negation, the affirmation is effective. In Tillich, we find an interpretation of Nietzsche that goes beyond standard interpretations of Nietzsche. The standard interpretations seldom hit the point: they are shallow and unfair, containing only a No, without realizing that Nietzsche was a philosopher of both Yes and No; his is differential thinking. Criticism is not a projection of the No, but it is to ask for alternatives.

In certain recent French philosophers I find parallels to Tillich's thought; it is also in dialogue with them that the constructive approach in Tillich might be taken further. Gilles Deleuze brought differential

thinking and differential relation to the foreground; differential thinking is to be found in Tillich as well. In differential thinking feeling or sensing is integral to thinking itself. Thinking thinks and senses in relation to the different; thinking is an event and an encounter. I consider that Feuerbach has given one of the most fitting definitions of differential thinking when he talked about “seeing-thought, hearing-and-feeling thought ... thinking-seeing, thinking-feeling”.

Under the rule of the two-world doctrine there is the mind/body dualism. Beyond the dualism there is *differentiated monism* and *expressionism* in Deleuze/Guattari. This is what we find in Tillich as well: he was looking for a way out of the two-world doctrine, moving into the realms of expressionism. Tillich and Deleuze/Guattari offer alternatives to dualism or the dualistic way of thinking. Theirs are not the binary oppositions between thinking and sensing, rationality and sensibility, activity and passivity, “man” and “woman”, reason and feeling, consciousness and unconsciousness. Theirs is the differentiation and conscious apprehension of the felt and sensed life-experience. We find the articulation of the differentiated monism in them; life is a unity in difference, with expressionism as the means to make the position accessible and discernible.

The initial signs of differential thinking are to be found in Hegel and in Schelling. The existential turn was already present in Hegel. Schelling, however, was the first philosopher to make use of the existentialist approach as a way of doing philosophy. In Schelling’s vocabulary, the existential approach belongs to positive philosophy. Schelling considered that positive philosophy starts with and from existence, empirically once existence has come in view through the preparatory work of the negative philosophy. The negative philosophy is the critique; it is rationalism and Kantian constructivism, and, given the differential relation between the negative and the positive philosophy, it is the – side of the relation, with empiricism being the + side; only experience in existence gives the plus or existential knowledge. For Schelling rationalism and empiricism are parallel processes. Schelling and Kierkegaard were not the only existentialists during the first half of the 19th century; Feuerbach should be included as well. Feuerbach performed the existential turn as well: the place of thinking is in time and space; he follows Schelling in the historicity of philosophy. In all these philosophers, we find signs of differential thinking. Differential thinking is that reflection and

intuition, activity and receptivity, thinking and sensing are *integral* to each other. One “opposite” cannot be “translated” or fused into the other. If, for example, receptivity is translated or brought into reflection, if we dealt with receptivity reflectively only, then the opposition and the tension between the two are loosened and the differential relation is lost; we start to talk about sensing or feeling as if it was an object, a thing among other things... Differential thinking brings activity and passivity together. Differential thinking maintains the tension between opposites, without disregarding the synthesis of opposites as a step towards development, realization and materialization, only to make way for a new tension and a new dialectical *spannung* in relation to the world. Differential thinking is historical thinking, thinking in time and place. Differential thinking is not only the tension of the opposites, but it is about what is done through opposition, and it is here that differential thinking is linked with ethics and with art. Humans, as thinking and sensing, are in *interaction* with their surroundings: the kind of people, the kind of society, and the kind of design and architecture. “Ethics is aesthetics”, claimed Nietzsche. Democracy, for example, presupposes a democratic people. If, in opposition to this, the self-understanding is hierarchical and dualistic, then society has the congruent organizational forms: the kind of people, the kind of society. Foucault considered that the dualistic opposition between mind and body, between activity and passivity is still the dominating pattern. The genealogy is to dig into the early coming into being of the dominating pattern, once we have done this “archeological work” we are fit for other patterns (Nietzsche in Foucault). Perhaps we now start to understand the role of patterns and gestalts in human self-understanding: they belong to the self/world and the self/self interaction. In Spinoza, there is the interaction between the mind and God. Ideally, the order of the mind should reflect and express the order of nature or of being. Ethics is the science in which the mind strives to reach the order of nature/being. The expressive dimension and the nature of ethical act in Spinoza are discussed in chapter 3.

The first essay was written on an occasion in which it became more and more obvious that feeling is a part of thinking and that all human thinking is affected by emotions; that the kind of thinking which erased feelings was part of the historical era that already was passed by: the era of pure reason and of pure thinking. Today it is more or less a fact that

thinking does not start with *Cogito ergo sum*, but that thinking starts with *Sentio ergo sum* (Feuerbach had pointed this out; Damasio brought out this in 1990s). Sensing is integral to thinking. Following Schelling, Feuerbach and Kierkegaard made sensing integral to thinking: truth and apprehension belong together. The existential/phenomenological line of thought starts with Hegel and Schelling, or, to be more precise, it was Kant with his distinction between the phenomenal and the *noumenal* that gave the first impulses for this line of thought. It is shown that the existential/phenomenological line of thought had impact on Tillich's basic positions and standpoints. Further, the first essay discusses the place of religion *after* the criticism of religion: How might religion be viewed once the criticism of religion is accepted? Here Feuerbach's criticism is taken as an example of the criticism of religion. His criticism of religion is about the role and function of god-images in the human interior; his criticism of religion is about god-images as mental phenomena. The analysis of the thought-emotion-representation interaction has implications for ethics as well:

Moral differentiation is a necessary condition of ethical action: it is about making a distinction between the Other and the image of the other. Prior to moral differentiation we meet other human beings out of our own preferences, presuppositions, and limited perspectives: in meeting the Other, the image of the other comes in between, building a screen of projections between the individual and the Other. We hardly see each other. In meeting the Other, a screen of images appears between us, and we do not see each other as we are; life becomes an image-play. Representation replaces reality. When representation replaces reality, people are not seen as they are in themselves. Their own self-expression is not respected, but a representation, an image of the other is given priority in the interaction between the people. The analysis of the function of images has immediate relevance to ethics. Representation according to Levinas is the tyranny of the same: representations are images and the representation of the other, in whatever form we make it, is an image. When we try to explain who and what the other is, we do that with the help of other images: we add more images to the first image; the same is added to the same and so on unto infinity. Genocide was possible because of the tyranny of the same; it was and is built on the representation of the other. To represent the other, to claim that she/he is such and such, is to shut out the Other; in my/our explanation there is no room

for his or her self-understanding. To claim that science deals with only representations is a very bad way of defining science, given the historical perspective. Science is to study the processes of representation. Differential thinking has sense beyond representation, it is not fixed within the static frames of representation (subject/object, representation/represented, word/referendum, meaning/signified, mind/body, domination/dominated). Differential thinking opens the field of “transcendental empiricism” up.

The second essay deals with Tillich’s political positions during the 1920s in light of Nietzsche’s politics of the soul. The politics of the soul is that the human mentality-structure has direct impact on how we humans relate to each other and how we relate to our surroundings, spiritually and physically. The politics of the soul is about *how* we are as human beings in relation to each other and in relation to society. “Ethics is aesthetics”, Nietzsche wrote and seemed to claim that the way we construe, for example, buildings and cities, is dependent on the structure of mentality. Between mentality and architecture there is a direct, many times unnoticed interaction; ethics is not only aesthetics, but is also interaction. In Socialism it is thought that a change within individuals comes about through societal change: a revolutionary societal change is needed and social relations are to be built up in a new, just, and equal way *after* the revolution. Nietzsche thought that a change in the individual brought about societal change. Perhaps the relation between the inner and the outer, as we already have hinted, is reciprocal; there is an interaction between the inner and the outer, not just a one way direction. Changes in the outer affect the individual. In the interaction between the individual and society, the way of interaction is twofold: from the inside out and from the outer to the inside. *The feedback loop* is effective in the interaction. The result of interaction might be determined only through decision and choice.

Nietzsche claimed that individuals understand themselves as parts of the societal machine. Modern self-understanding prefers the utility. Utility is a consequence and in that sense is of secondary importance, Nietzsche claimed. Philosophical analysis, according to Nietzsche, lifts up what makes the utilitarian approach possible; it shows the constellation of drives, interests, and desires behind the utilitarian way of living. The utilitarian is an expression of the utilitarian personality. In Tillich’s view, the utilitarian personality is not a whole as she/he lets partial drives,

like conscious self-interest determine the personal and collective decisions. Both Tillich and Nietzsche searched for alternative *gestalts* or “shapes of the soul”. It seems to be the case that Nietzsche had a hard time finding a new *gestalt*; Tillich found it in the holistic *gestalt* of the multidimensional unity of life. For us who live today, it is important that the beginning of the 21st century does not become a springboard for catastrophes of universal dimensions. By analyzing the 1920s, its cultural patterns, decisions, and historical settings we might learn something about human shortcomings and about human constructive possibilities.

The 1920s was crucial in the European development. The end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century saw expansive development in science, economics, culture, and technology. The scientific level of this period, when it comes to innovation, has no counterpart in European history, if we disregard the early industrial period in England. Russian symbolic expressionist art, represented for example by Kandinsky and Malevich, had reached its peak in the beginning of the 20th century; architecture in the form of *Jugend* spread with the German cultural influence. What occurred in the 1920s is in strong contrast to this development: the era witnessed the upheaval of both left-wing and right-wing terrorism. How is it possible that the disasters of the 1930s could have been “planned” during the preceding heydays of cultural and scientific activity? There is no simple answer to this question. Xenophobia and racism, with their national and reactive politics, are present in current times like they were during the 1920s. Tillich claimed that already in the 1920s philosophers, theologians, scientists and cultural workers knew what was going to happen, but they were not strong enough to meet the challenges of their times. Tillich lets us know that one part of this failure was due to the nature of reason in the philosophers and the educators: their reason was a formal reason without connection to life; reason was understood as being above life and life-processes. The power of formal reason, with the technological *gestalt*, is no weaker today than it was during the 1920s. The essays discuss a conception of reason congruent with life, a reason which also functions in life: in differential thinking reason and passion are in interplay and interaction with each other. Reason and ethics are in life; ethics is congruent with basic relationality of life. Today the emphasis of relationality is in Daly, McFague, Radford Ruether, and Taylor. Tillich’s was the relational view as well.

From Schelling onwards, sensing becomes an integral part of thinking. In either/or thinking, rationality and sensitivity are set apart from each other. In both/and thinking, in differential thinking, both are admitted. Rationality, as we understand it today, is an argumentative approach following the chains of clear ideas, starting from indubitable principles. Tillich termed that kind of reasoning “technical reason”, and Charles Taylor calls it “procedural reason”. In addition to technical reason, there is in Tillich’s view also “ontological reason” based on an intuition into the depth of being. In my view, there is a dimension of structural possibilities in the depth of reason; the *gestalts*, as the first-forms, prevail in that very dimension. One *gestalt*, then, is only a way of structuring the self-world totality, and the structural possibilities are infinite: art and human action make the first-forms possible, materialize them. Intuition and reason do not stand in opposition to each other; the problem in Kant is that he identified reason with only formal reason. Reason as such is integral and complementary; it expresses itself in and through the differential relation; reason, in differential thinking, is complementary and integral.

There is a standard interpretation of Nietzsche that he was a right-wing philosopher with a nihilistic set of mind, but nothing would be more wrong than to label him this way. Nietzsche analyzed European culture, understanding that he had a share in a culture with roots going back several thousands of years. The physical being, the human being, is not only in time and space; she/he is a cultural being as well and the cultural patterns carried by historical processes affect the individuals’ self-understanding. There are over-all patterns and structures affecting him or her. The main pattern of Western culture since Socrates, according to Nietzsche, is a dualistic pattern with the devaluation of the body and the senses. The way we are as human beings has an immediate impact on the state of our societies and our world. If a dualistic pattern is the dominant feature in human self-understanding, then society has a congruent structure in education, in art, in architecture, in politics: the capacities of the head, the rational capacities of analysis and representation, are given priority before other capacities: artistic, moral, sensitive.

The third chapter, Ethics and expressionism, includes a comparison between Deleuze and Tillich. An expressive dimension is to be found in both Deleuze and in Tillich. The expressive dimension in Tillich is discernible after the First World War. Not only depth-psychology

in Freud and in Jung (Carl Gustav Jung became later influential for Tillich in construction of symbol theory), and not only socialism, but art in the form of expressionism become crucial to Tillich. In the art of Cezanne the infinite shines or breaks through, according to Tillich. But this is only one side of Tillich's theory of art. Another point is that art expresses the transcendental conditions of perception and understanding, it has ontological meaning. Art reveals the basic dimensions and elements of being: the first-forms of our world. Art is able to reveal the human existential predicament, but art is also able to show the existential import: the dimension of depth and the overcoming of the negativities of human existence. Art, ever since Schelling, deals with and comprises both the positives and the negatives of human existence. One interesting theme in Schelling is that of Sensibility. We tend to interpret sensibility as an individual capacity: that individuals, humans, animals and other living organism *have* sensibility. In Schelling's view, Sensibility is over-individual, in the sense that it "attaches" the individuals to the universe: Sensibility stretches all over the universe and the universe is a living organism. It is Sensibility that *has* the individual in its grasp, not the other way round. Most probably Schelling got the idea from Giordano Bruno. Sensibility in Schelling and in Bruno is on a plane beyond subject/object distinction. Expressionism in both Deleuze and in Tillich deals with the plane which transcends subject/object distinction. Leibniz *monadology* depicted the plane beyond the subject/object distinction; Deleuze/Guattari *nomadology* depicted the way to the plane transcending the subject/object distinction, and in Tillich's expressionism, the plane transcending subject/object distinction makes itself known out of itself, expressing itself. Metaphors and symbols, according to Tillich, express this very plane. Deleuze and Guattari, in *Through a Thousand Plateaus*, set out on a journey through the binary oppositions contained in language, science, culture, and philosophy, creating a "plane of immanence" or a "plane of consistency", which are their names for the planes that transcend the subject/object distinction. Expressionism in philosophy, in Deleuze's view, is about those fields that transcend this very distinction. He finds an expressive dimension in Spinoza.

The fourth chapter deals with citizenship in modern society. Nietzsche's analysis of Western culture and democratic society is discussed. It is shown that Nietzsche's analysis is twofold: he both analyzes the prevailing state of things during the 19th century back to the beginnings

of the civilization, to nomadic times, and he gives an alternative to those shortcomings that he finds in modern society. Nietzsche posed questions about the modern world and about democracy that still are highly relevant in the present situation. The movement of life is both an upward and a downward going movement according to Nietzsche. During certain periods in history and in certain contexts, humans feel that they have a part in the ascending movement; at certain periods they feel that life is out of touch. Democracy did have its own upward going movement, but now, during the 19th century, faith and trust in democracy is fading; the declining movement of life is discernible in democracy. To talk about the ascending and the declining was Nietzsche's way of talking about life-experience; humans, like all other life-forms, possess these two elements. Or perhaps it is an inaccurate way of expressing them, saying that we possess these elements, as the elements possess the human beings and all other living "organisms": Nietzsche was dealing with the over-individual elements of life. Further, he did not think that humans are passively in the hands of these powers, but that we have possibilities of action and activity. We are able to act, and even truth is dependent on this activity; there is a strong dimension of constructivism in Nietzsche. In Tillich, both the analysis of the society in the light of the ascending and the declining movements and the constructive dimension are to be found. The chapter makes a comparison between Nietzsche and Tillich, and it deals with Tillich's view of the constructive possibilities of action. Both in Nietzsche and in Tillich, we find the view that truth is in making.

The fifth chapter points to art as the means of change in society and in ontology. In Schelling, a new conception of philosopher/poet/artist is discernible, he offers an alternative aesthetic theory to that of Kant's. For Kant, aesthetics is about the observation of the beautiful, and the beautiful, like the sublime, might have terrifying aspects. Still, art in him is "only" observation; it is not an agent or medium of deep change, as is the case in Schelling and in today's aesthetic theories. Schelling offers us a conception of art, in which art is the agent of profound change in humans, in society and in being itself. The artist or the philosopher/artist is able to change God or the recesses of being itself; she/he is both able to create matter and to form matter. Humans, according to both Schelling and Kierkegaard, are God's co-laborers in the creation of the universe.

The sixth chapter deals with ethical action. Tillich and Kierkegaard are discussed in the light of Schelling's negative and positive philosophy. It is shown that both were inspired by Schelling's distinction between the negative and the positive philosophy. The distinction provides the foundation for the architectonic structure of thought in Kierkegaard and in Tillich. The architectonic structure of thought is used as an interpretative pattern and as a heuristic key to the philosophies of Kierkegaard and of Tillich. Further, Schelling's (and Hegel's) conception of duplication is discussed in relation to Kierkegaard. In Kierkegaard, a distinction is made between two kinds of duplication: natural duplication and spiritual reduplication. In Schelling's philosophy of Nature there is a duplication between active/outgoing elements and receptive/passive elements of an organism: the organism moves outward in its action/activity and inward in its receptive passivity. In Kierkegaard's natural duplication, the activity and the passivity of personality come together: the individual enjoys the receptive/sensual self. In spiritual reduplication love creates a bond between the individual and the Other. The last chapter deals with Tillich's philosophy of education.

The basic perspective of interpretation in these essays is the perspective of interaction: the individual is in interaction with other people, his or her surroundings, society, nature, and with God. She/he is an agent of change in universal life. There are structures and patterns that affect human self-interpretation, and the influence of these patterns can be seen on the societal plane or on the cultural plane. Paul Tillich says something essential about modern life when he talks about the determination of the individual and society by the technological gestalt; modern self-interpretation and self-understanding is often determined by thinghood and those presuppositions implicit in that very interpretation. It is important to analyze the coming into being of the technological gestalt and its presuppositions, but it is equally important to present alternatives. Not only is the technological gestalt active in the world today, but even the holistic multidimensional gestalt is appearing more and more today in different sciences. Paul Tillich was one of the first who let the holistic gestalt come through, and that breaking through is discernible in his works already during the 1920s, with its final breakthrough in the *Systematic Theology III*, which was published in 1963. The question is not only what type of interaction, but in what way and how do we let the structural patterns affect our self-understanding?

Religion in a Non-Religious Age; Criticism of Religion and After

Giving a definition of religion is something Kierkegaard warned against in his *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. He praised Lessing for not doing this; Lessing had shut himself up within the isolation of his subjectivity, dealing only with God in his innermost being. At the end of his book, Kierkegaard warned readers about half-dialectical scholars, hoping that his thought-project was spared from all-too-abstract analyses. In view of such warnings, one can only hope to stand on the right side of this divide when trying to discuss religion in the light of recent philosophical and theological development. The recent period here refers to the period *after* Hegel. However dialectical Kierkegaard was he had *his* thinking, his view of faith and religion that came from a certain cultural and personal context. His thought was deeply influenced by his life-experiences, upbringing, his mental constitution and, not least, by his idea-historical context. All of this affected his thinking and writing. It did not determine his thinking and authorship entirely, however: that would be an incorrect conclusion.

There is a standard interpretation of Kierkegaard which states he was a fideistic theologian who made religion, especially Christianity, into an independent and autonomous sector of life; faith and with it religion is beyond reason; Christianity lives a life of its own out of reach of cultural analysis and common human understanding, Kierkegaard was an exclusivist. This kind of interpretation or categorization of Kierkegaard is misleading. Kierkegaard also claimed that there was nothing new in Christianity that had not been seen in the world before.¹ And we may add: there is nothing exclusive in Christianity that could not appear in other contexts than an explicitly Christian one. The exclusivist interpretation of Kierkegaard disregards his philosophical background.

Reading Kierkegaard in the philosophical perspective shows another Kierkegaard: tolerant pluralist interested in the relation to the Good. Instead of only giving birth to Christian exclusivism, also a part of his thought, an overwhelmingly major part, Kierkegaard opens up the possibility of a pluralist position. At the end of his life, even Tillich seemed to adhere to that position. We have a view of another Kierkegaard if we read him in the light of his philosophical context: he is in polemical dialog both with the leading philosophers of his times and with the prevailing cultural climate. It is rewarding to read Kierkegaard in the light of his philosophical background; to see the traces of Schelling, Hegel, and Feuerbach in him. Further, Kierkegaard claimed that there is actuality in Aristotle; the actuality for Kierkegaard is in the second philosophy.² Kierkegaard's talk of the second philosophy was directly influenced by Schelling's distinction between negative and positive philosophy, the positive philosophy being the second philosophy in Schelling (p. 119). Schelling's positive philosophy starts with existence and Kierkegaard's second philosophy starts there as well.

Feuerbach, whose criticism of religion is discussed here, followed Schelling: thinking starts with existence. It seems to be obvious that Feuerbach, given his basic moves and standpoints, had influenced both Kierkegaard and Tillich. One common theme for the three is that consciousness and being are not to be divorced from each other as is the case in Descartes' rationalism and in other forms of mind and body dualisms. Both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard claimed that truth is to be found in the unity of being and consciousness, when *consciousness is out of being*, and not the other way round. Feuerbach wrote:

The true relation of thinking to being is only this: being is the subject, thinking the predicate, such a predicate that shows the content of the subject. Thinking is out of being, but being is not out of thinking. Being is out of itself and through itself – being is given through being – being has its ground in itself.³

In the contrary position, when being is out of consciousness, thinking moves within the representational realm only. Representations, that is, images, pictures, simulacra are the material of thinking and, since Kant, it is presumed that it is impossible to go beyond the representational realm: representation is all there is. When being is out of consciousness,

then consciousness moves within the realm of representations only; representation has replaced reality. Even in Tillich we find the first position: "True consciousness, however, is consciousness that arises out of being and that at the same time determines being".⁴ In Tillich's view, consciousness does not only rise out of being, but it also determines being, that is, the relationship between being and consciousness is not only the passive relation of receiving, but also the active and constructive relation. We find the same view in Schelling as well. The active and constructive element for Tillich is the production of the new both in history and beyond history. The theme of creating the new follows him throughout his life. In the end of *Systematic Theology III* this theme is expressed through essentialization: human activity reaches into the recesses of being, affecting the being itself; human activity enriches God.⁵ What links Feuerbach and Kierkegaard with Tillich is the focus on the *phenomenological content* in their philosophies.⁶ The root-meaning of phenomena is that "something shows itself or gives itself", something gives itself out of itself. They all had incorporated the phenomenological approach in their thinking: being reveals itself in and through encountered phenomena, and the phenomenological content shows itself in the being/consciousness interaction.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger made the following claim: "Only as phenomenology is ontology possible".⁷ I consider that Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, and Tillich would have agreed with this, not in the Husserlian technical sense, but in the sense that the realm of phenomena or the phenomenal field is the starting-point of thinking. This gives birth to questions such as: If phenomenology grounds ontology, do we have an epistemology? Is being knowable? If being is knowable, what is it? To ask what being is presupposes that being might be done to an object, but it is this that all three philosophers deny. They claim that being is not an object, but they also claim that human beings stand in relation to being; theirs is the relational view. When consciousness is out of being, then consciousness is brought in relation to being and the relation is explicated in consciousness. The question has been discussed whether or not Kierkegaard had an epistemology. Louis J. Pojman claims that Kierkegaard had an epistemology, that he put forward a certain kind of objectivity.⁸ I am inclined to agree with this, but I also argue that Feuerbach's philosophy was of the same epistemological order as Kierkegaard's philosophy. What kind of epistemology do we find in Feuerbach

and Kierkegaard? What was the impact of Feuerbach and Kierkegaard on Tillich? Feuerbach's criticism of religion is well-known, Tillich accepted that criticism, but he also tried to go beyond it. How is it possible to look upon religion after the criticism of religion? In order to make the positions clear, I discuss Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, and Tillich in relation to three lines of thought: (a) the idealistic line of thought, (b) the empirical line and (c) the existential/phenomenological line. Definitions of idealism and of empiricism are brought out and Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, and Tillich are discussed in relation to those standard definitions. I try to point out their respective positions regarding some central issues.

One purpose seen in Kierkegaard is to awaken the reader to prejudices and foreground evaluations infiltrating the mind, so that the individual's own thinking, with its preparatory work, might begin: How it is possible, Kierkegaard asks that "the outer and the inner had become entirely commensurable, so totally that the inner had dropped out"?⁹ If the inner has dropped out, the individual has identified himself or herself with the outer state of things; she/he has become an objective personality. I think it is important to make a difference between objectivity and objective personality.

Three lines of thought

Episteme is translated as knowledge or understanding. Aristotle used it to refer to scientific knowledge, to the intuition of the first principles of being, but one of its root-meanings seems to come from the skills of the hand, or manual skills. *Episteme* was, most probably, closely linked to the skills of hand and skills of body. The placement of knowledge "in the beginning" is not in the head, in abstract bodiless reflection; instead, even in Aristotle, the region of true scientific knowledge lies somewhere near and around the heart. A reminder of this state of things is that the word *pneuma* was used both to refer to breathing and to spirit or to the spirited part of human beings during Aristotle's lifetime.

In epistemological discussions today there are at least two perspectives: the outside-in perspective and the inside-out perspective. In the outside-in perspective, body is interpreted as a machine. Eyes and other senses respond to outer stimuli, nerves carry the stimuli to the brain; and the brain gives birth to a picture of the world. The first impressions are mixed with associations (the structuring a priori categories in Kant, for example). Perception is a bundle, or, rather, a battle between impressions

and pre-sets, which are the interpretative patterns within the associative fields.¹⁰ The main point of this view is that the mind is understood as a passive registration-machine; that there is only a way from the outside-in in the construction of the picture of the world. A rather convincing picture of human evolution, life's development, and the future direction of the universe can be given from this perspective. In the scientific world-view, the construed picture of the world is given objective validity. *Representational objectivity* makes a distinction between the world/the universe and the picture: the picture is a representation and it shows what the world is like. There is a presupposed one-to-one correspondence between the world and the picture. Being, or rather the representation of being/world is, given this perspective, out of consciousness, as the picture is a mental representation, *i.e.* an abstraction. The picture is out of consciousness.

Today it is obvious that the outside-in perspective and the accompanying scientific world-view, gives only one perspective on the world. It is only one way among many others to think about the world. The human mind does not only have passive, receptive capacities, as it is this view of the mind that underlies the outside-in perspective: there is the active, or rather, the self-active mind as well. The mind is active in itself. In the outside-in perspective, the scientist disappears; the subjectivity of the knowing subject is not taken into account; subjectivity is considered as the source of error.¹¹ We are able to think of a situation in which the subjectivity of the individual is immersed into the objective picture to such a high degree that the objective personality and the objectivity of thought are fused together; the inner has dropped out.

The other perspective, that of the inside-out perspective, is built on internal states and stages, such as feeling modes, stages of awareness, insights, intuitions, illuminations, and participations; it is relational. It is this perspective that is to be found in Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, and Tillich. Feuerbach and Kierkegaard (with chelling) were the first after-Hegelian philosophers who applied this perspective; theirs is the interactional and relational view. In addition to the representational objectivity, there is also *relational objectivity*. Relational objectivity is to be found in the interaction between the individual and the world. The representational objectivity presupposes a duality between the individual and the world; the relational objectivity presupposes an interaction between the individual and the world. Simply, humans are relational beings, and

thinking is internal to this relationality. We think both in relation to ourselves (“I to I”) and we think in relation to that which is outside of us; we relate to the different outside of ourselves; in the thought-event we think the difference. Signs of differential thinking are to be found in Hegel. Hegel is the crossroad, with him metaphysics and post-metaphysical thinking meet.

Idealistic line of thought

The idealistic line of thought is that there are two radically different domains: the domain of sense-experience and the beyond (the realm of concepts and of forms). We meet the two-world doctrine here. In Plato there is the physical world and the spiritual world, or the domain of forms. There is the way from the world of senses up to the beyond through a process of philosophical initiation. The beyond is the true world for Plato (ontological idealism). In Hegel, there is the self-movement of the speculative reason in which the individual partakes, leading him or her to consciousness of the Absolute Spirit. The self-evolution of the Concept expresses the teleological, dialectical process of becoming (conceptual idealism). In Kant there is rational metaphysics, the reasonable ideas about the nature of the beyond, and there is the analysis of the transcendental conditions of knowledge and of mind (transcendental idealism). What characterizes this line of thought is that the physical world is not considered as the real world, but the real is beyond and above this world. The real is beyond the world of senses and there is the move away from this world, an upward movement. There are different kinds of idealism, but the common feature is the unreality of what most people call the real world. Plato, Kant, and Hegel might be interpreted following the idealistic line of thought, even if other interpretations are possible. When Nietzsche talked about Platonism he did not intend to point out the true philosophy of Plato, whatever that is, but instead the kind of philosophy that had the dual frame as its overall pattern. In attacking Platonism, he was attacking the two-world doctrine, not Plato the philosopher. He attacked Socrates as the falsifier of Plato and St Paul as the falsifier of the love of Christ. The idealistic line of thought, as it is defined here, operates within a dual frame (ontological and epistemological dualism) and it follows the movement away from the physical world. – The *transcendentalia* in Plato, that is, the forms of

true, good, and beautiful, might be interpreted as the depth-dimension of the physical world: the infinite is in the finite. The transcendent is in immanence as its structuring dimension and as its life-giving power.¹² There is no dualism between this world and the beyond, but the *transcendentalia* are in the depth dimension of the physical world. The *transcendentalia* are to be searched for in the virtuality of being, in the dimension of structural possibilities. This gives an alternative non-dualistic interpretation of Plato.

Inwardness is the individual being aware of his or her awareness – this, as it stands, is Hegelianism, the “I to I”. Hegelian inwardness is not only that the individual is aware of his or her awareness, but that the awareness is there in the power of the Absolute Spirit: the individual partakes in the self-evolving and self-realization of the Absolute Spirit; the participation gives awareness or consciousness. Hegel claimed that consciousness is participation in the Absolute Spirit; consciousness is out of the Absolute Spirit. This is Hegelian Idealism. The left-wing Hegelian critics claimed that the Absolute Spirit is an abstraction which swallows all individuality and particularity; it keeps particular existence, and with it physical/phenomenological being, out of view. Löwith wrote considering Feuerbach’s criticism of Hegel:

The mystery of being does not reveal itself to thought in universal terms, but to empirical observation with the senses, to sensitivity and passion. “Passion alone,” says Feuerbach, agreeing with Kierkegaard, “is the token of real existence,” because passion alone is really concerned whether something exists or not. For purely theoretical thought (like Hegel’s), this practical distinction is of no interest. Even mere sensitivity has a fundamental and not merely empirical significance for the knowledge of being. ... And only thought which allows itself to be interrupted by observation, sensation, and passion, rather than continuing on always within the confines of itself can comprehend, even theoretically, what “reality” is.¹³

There are empirical observations and phenomenological descriptions in Hegel, and it is not these that the left-wing Hegelians criticize, but the process of freeing them from their concrete content on the phenomenal field, and of dealing with them as if they were expressions of another being besides and above the physical being. In metaphysics, we deal with an abstract being as if it was a real being: a secondary phenomenon takes the place of the primary phenomenon. “Metaphysics is an error that

consists in treating the epiphenomenon as another phenomenon, another being, another life".¹⁴ What happens in Hegel is that the phenomena are taken up into the Concept (it is obvious that the actual phenomena become something totally different when taken up into the Concept, compared to what these phenomena are in their concreteness). The next step is that the Concept lays the phenomenal world under it. Abstraction, as the secondary phenomenon released from time and space, triumphs over the real world and its phenomenal field. An abstraction, the left-wing Hegelians claimed, triumphs over the real world and shuts it out of sight; the epiphenomenon replaces primary phenomenon, representation replaces reality. A secondary phenomenon, an abstraction, in Hegel the Concept is treated as if it was the primary phenomenon of life itself, this being the error of metaphysics. Both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard had seen this error in Hegel.

With the above criticism, metaphysics comes to an end, but this does mean that *the metaphysical*, as encountered phenomenon in the phenomenological realm, in actual experience, comes to an end. Metaphysics, then, is on the side of abstraction; the metaphysical is to be searched for in the life-encounter. One way further is the kind of empiricism Schelling introduced: the radical *a posteriori* philosophy or the higher empiricism, which he called the positive philosophy. In Schelling, the negative philosophy takes away all immediate positive represented content; the positive philosophy is beyond representation. Kierkegaard, following Schelling, claimed that the interest of metaphysics remains, perhaps as a new-born and alarming interest, and Feuerbach claimed that human intuition has metaphysical significance. How, then, to express what the higher empiricism shows, if we cannot make any representation of being or being itself? Kierkegaard's answer was indirect communication: the metaphorical and symbolic ways of pointing out the metaphysical. Even Tillich gave that response. The metaphorical and symbolic ways avoid the limitations, traps, and the terror of representation. The distinction between the metaphysical, as encountered in the phenomenal world, and metaphysics, as encountered in books, became essential to the development of phenomenology. These post-Kantian philosophers did not accept Kant's absolute distinction between the *noumenal* and the phenomenal. Instead they claimed that the infinite is in the finite; the infinite is accessible to human beings.

Heidegger wrote that we should both remain with Hegel and go beyond Hegel.¹⁵ Kierkegaard admitted that he often returned to Hegel, and at the end of his life he wondered if he had been fair enough to Hegel. Feuerbach, from his side, claimed that he had been such a Hegelian fool in his youth, because he did not see that the dialectical logic is only abstractions, far removed from the physical life in the physical world. Yet he was still inspired by Hegel's phenomenology and incorporated or admitted the phenomenological descriptions: Hegel's phenomenological descriptions say something important about human life, but the Absolute Spirit following the path of dialectical logic, was not the right way for Feuerbach. Schelling had opened up for empiricism, and it is in that direction Feuerbach goes in constructing his new philosophy: it is the senses that show the world to us, and in this he agrees with the empiricists, but he did not agree with some standard interpretations to be found among empiricists. The following presentation of the empirical line of thought sketches the standard interpretation, and discusses the philosophical starting-points of Feuerbach and of Kierkegaard in relation to that interpretation.

Empirical line of thought

One of the first empiricists was John Locke. Locke took over Descartes' epistemology with its distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities. The world or the substance has the primary qualities of depth, height, shape, and position; human subjects project secondary qualities like hot and sweet onto the world; the secondary qualities depend upon the projection. Science or objectivity deals only with primary qualities. The sensed personal preferences and qualities belong to human subjects or subjectivity and they are not, cannot be primary elements. Science, given this interpretative framework, deals with the objective world of primary qualities, while the secondary qualities are subjective "anomalies". Such is the interpretative frame considering the primary and the secondary qualities, yet observe that this is only one of the ways of interpreting the status of these both types of qualities. In Bergson's view "Berkeley proved, as against the 'mechanical philosophers,' that the secondary qualities of matter have at least as much reality as the primary qualities".¹⁶ The primary qualities, within

the interpretative frame of empiricism, are the measurable *quantities* of height, depth and breadth; science is about the measurable object. This is plain and simple, but from a deeper perspective it is wrong. So many presuppositions must be filled before the measurable object is there:

In history as well as in physics, in ethics as well as in medicine, the observer wants to regard the phenomenon as it “really” is. “Really” means independent of the observer. However, there is no such thing as independence of the observer. The observed changes in being observed.¹⁷

Science, if it is built upon the frame or the model that makes an “absolute” distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities is not unprejudiced science. It is obvious that the measurable quantities are only outer relations, and such relations presuppose the objectifying approach.

There is also the subject-predicate theory of language within this line of thought. Colin M. Turbayne claims that Locke, was fooled by language. Locke in Turbayne’s view considered that the structure of language, in this case the subject-predicate theory, reflects both the state of things in the real world and the structure of human nature. Now, if one starts from language, one only gets language and language-determined structures, and all philosophical thinking and operation happens within the frames of language only; the linguistic turn led to an unnecessary limitation of philosophy.¹⁸ The subject-predicate theory claims that the predicates are secondary and that we cannot know the nature of the subject, for example, the human subject, through the predicates or qualities. But this is what Feuerbach claimed about human nature: if we want to know human nature, we know it only through the activity of the constitutive qualities or “predicates”: human nature might be known through the activity of the quality/predicate only. It is the activity of the predicate that shows human nature, he claimed:

The necessity of the subject lies only in the necessity of the predicate. You are a subject only in so far as you are a human being; the certainty and reality of your existence lies only in the certainty and reality of your human attributes. What the subject is lies only in the predicate; the predicate is the truth of the subject – the subject only the personified, existing predicate, the predicate conceived as existing.¹⁹

For instance: we know love only by being in love, with the difference that in Feuerbach's view this is true of all human capacities like thinking, reasoning, feeling, sensing, and willing. We do not know human capacities or human nature without *sensing* the activity of the capacity or quality. Feuerbach broke with the subject-predicate theory and with substance-predicate theory, but he does not speak nonsense nor lack epistemology. Instead of the subject-predicate theory as the exclusive structuring of the semantical/epistemological field, he opens up for the epistemology of the senses: *to know being is to sense being*, this being the starting-point of thinking. Feuerbach did not accept the mind-map of idealism and of early empiricism; instead he orients within the frames of differential thinking. In differential thinking the relation to the different outside of humans is presupposed and expressed; the sensed relation is brought to daylight.

Existential/phenomenological line of thought

Kierkegaard, upon starting to construct his new philosophy or second philosophy, pointed out that he now enters a new field in which the knower cannot stand in an immediate observing relation to some kind of object: one cannot perceive any object at all. Here the field opens up into that in which the empirical approach, presupposing the subject/object distinction between the observer and the observed, is of no use. He wrote:

Paradoxical dialectic ... had no analogy in any sphere of knowledge since all knowledge stands in a direct and immanent relation to its object and the knower, not in an inverse and transcendent relation to a third, he easily perceived that at this point any empirical observation would lead to nothing.²⁰

In this new field there was no object to point out, but the question of truth remains, because "in the question of truth, consciousness is brought into relation with something else".²¹ Consciousness must have come into being, or it comes into being at the very same time as the relation is brought about. The relation is *apprehended* (*Empfindung*), sensed: "The mode of apprehension of the truth is precisely the truth."²² Even in Feuerbach, truth is proportionate to the degrees of apprehension/sensation or of sensing. Philosophy, Feuerbach wrote, "generates thought

from the *opposite* of thought, from Matter, from existence, from the senses; it has relation to its object first through the senses, *i.e.*, passively, before defining it in thought”.²³ Thinking, then, starts from the opposite of thinking, from the material content present in the senses, but this is only the starting-point of aware thinking. Still, without sensing the world there is no material to work with: there would be no material world to bring clarity to through the activity of reason. Both to Kierkegaard and to Feuerbach philosophy starts with apprehension; philosophy does not start with “I think”. There is the relational view, that is, consciousness is brought into relation with the different. What is the differential or relational object in them?

Basic relationality

The first relation I lift up here is the reflection on existence, the “I to I”. Thought turns inward, one turns to one’s self and reflects on the content of the self; attention is turned inward. In Kierkegaard’s view the “I to I” is not enough for one to become a self or, in other words, to become conscious. That the “not-me” or “the other I” is sensed is not consciousness yet, the not-me or the other I being internal elements of the self. Consciousness is in relation to the relational object, which by definition is outside the self.²⁴ Consciousness in Kierkegaard is a matter of relating to a third outside of the relation of the “I to I”. The relation to a third outside the “I to I” relation, is that what we find in Feuerbach as well.

A distinction is made between reflection and the sensation of being in a sensed relation. To reflect upon the self is still within the horizon of reflection, within *cogito*. Sensation, on the other hand, is a passive and receptive mode; it is a bodily mode. Congruent to reflection is the representational objectivity, and congruent to sensation or sensing is the relational objectivity: the individual relates to something outside of the “I to I” relation. We find representational objectivity in empirical sciences. Hegel was one of the first to criticize representational objectivity for its underlying presuppositions. With Hegel, philosophy moves from reflection to reflexive stages; philosophical thought becomes reflexive in Hegel. Levinas’ critical point was that Hegel’s reflexivity is internal to the self. Representational objectivity is defined in the sense that, given such-and-such conditions, all human beings could in principle agree with the truth-claim. That the Earth revolves about

the sun is such an objective truth. Once this kind of objectivity is there, it is hard to break its exclusive spell – this is the only kind of objectivity there is. Yes, it is true that the Earth revolves around the sun, but shouldn't there be other kinds of truths as well? Representational objectivity does not take human subjectivity into account; on the contrary, the adherents try to disregard the influence of subjectivity or anthropology. Representational objectivity is said to be there without human influence, yet it is still a human invention...

In Feuerbach and in Kierkegaard we find objectivity to be congruent with human subjectivity; theirs is a relational objectivity. Kierkegaard wrote: "Quite certainly we have the inwardness at its maximum proving to be objectivity once again."²⁵ Feuerbach on his side wrote that: "The subjective beginning and the way of philosophy is also its objective beginning and the way."²⁶ This second kind of objectivity, starting in subjectivity, might be called relational objectivity. In relational objectivity it is not the relation of "I to I" that is in focus, but the relation to a third outside of the self; we are able to sense the relational object. In Feuerbach the infinite universe, the concrete and sensed universe is the relational object and the relation to the universe gives the measure of the self:

Consciousness, in the strict or proper sense, is identical with consciousness of the infinite; a limited consciousness is no consciousness; consciousness is essentially infinite in its nature. The consciousness of the infinite is nothing else than the consciousness of the infinity of the consciousness; or, in the consciousness of the infinite, the conscious subject has for its object the infinity of his or her nature. ... In the object which she/he contemplates, therefore, the individual becomes acquainted with himself or herself; consciousness of the objective is the self-consciousness of man. We know the individual by the object, by his or her conception of what is external to himself or herself. ... Even the moon, the sun, the stars, call to human beings *gnosti seautón*.²⁷

A human being relates to the relational object outside of the self, and that relating *qualifies* or *determines* the self in Feuerbach's view, consciousness is there in relation to the relational object, and the relational object is the infinite universe. The relational object affects the self; the relation to the infinite universe shows the infinity of human consciousness.

In Schelling, the pre-reflexive stage of mind is characterized by “the infinite potency of cognition” and “the infinite potentiality of being”, that is, there is the relation to being, even if potentially, and there is the possibility of knowing being (p. 121). Feuerbach follows Schelling: the infinite potency of cognition is realized in relation to the concrete physical world or universe. Consciousness comes into being in the relation to the universe.

The above kind of relating comes to the forefront in Kierkegaard’s definition of the self as well, but now the self not only posits itself in relation to the universe, but in relation to God. Kierkegaard writes: “By relating itself to its own self, and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which posited it.”²⁸ There is the relation of “I to I”, but there is also the relation to a third outside of the self, which is the basis of Kierkegaard’s talk of relation: the “inversed and transcendent relation to a third”, as he named it. The third outside of the self, of the “I to I”, sets the measure of the self. The ultimate relational object for Kierkegaard is God. Given this relational object, there is an absolute qualitative difference between human beings and God. The self is affected, qualified, and determined by the relational object: the qualification is in the self, but the relational object is not from the self. The relational object is the different.

The relational object sets the measure of the self both in Feuerbach and in Kierkegaard, but their relational objects are different: in Feuerbach it is the sensed universe that sets the measure of the self, while in Kierkegaard the self relates to God outside the self. If the relational objects are different from each other, then the qualifications, that is, how the relationships are sensed, are also different from each other. It is not the representational objectivity that is to be found in them. They do not build their thinking upon a mental construction and an image of the world. Theirs is instead a description of how the individual *senses* the relation to the relational object (which might vary of course). This sensing grounds relational objectivity. Feuerbach wrote: “The individual who is affected by musical sounds is governed by feeling; by the feeling, that is, which finds its corresponding element in musical sounds.”²⁹ So throughout the entire human scale, not only musical scales, but in thinking, in feeling, and in willing, we are relational beings.

If we are to characterize Feuerbach's and Kierkegaard's epistemology using current terms, we might say that theirs is the *reflexive* or *differential monism*. There are different forms of reflexivity: 1) reflexivity internal to the self: the sensing of the "I to I" relation and 2) reflexivity in relation to the different: the sensing of the relational object. In Feuerbach and in Kierkegaard both kinds of reflexivity are to be found, with the first reflexivity being critical: the "I to I" is a surface phenomenon, a natural phenomenon, we might say. The second reflexive relation provides a relation to the different. Feuerbach wrote: "Real difference can be derived only from a being which has a principle of difference in itself."³⁰ Only in the real world, in existence, in time and space, are there real qualitative differences.

There are different ways of relating. As a first synthesis, following Kierkegaard, an individual is a product of upbringing, tradition, family, environment, and surroundings – all of these factors form subjectivity. Kierkegaard calls the first synthesis the body-soul synthesis. The spirit or consciousness is sleeping at this stage and the individual does not have to be conscious of basic relationality. But there comes a time when subjectivity awakens to itself; the dream is over and the time of relating comes into being, the spirit in the individual begins to move. In that crisis, the relational object sets the measure of the self and qualifies the self. Consciousness or spirit is interaction; it is the relational object that qualifies or sets the self. There are different types of affections or qualifications, qualification by music is one. In Kierkegaard's view, it is God that qualifies the self: "If one would talk about God, let him say, God. That is the quality."³¹ Quality for Kierkegaard is qualification by the relational object: "This formula [namely, that the self is constituted by another], is the expression for the fact that the self cannot of itself attain and remain in equilibrium and rest in itself, but only by relating itself to that Power which constituted the whole relation."³² God is the quality and the ultimate Other for Kierkegaard. Tillich's description of God as the Power of being comes close to this. In *Love, Power, and Justice* Tillich points out that Kierkegaard's stages are "qualities which appear in structural interdependence".³³ Feuerbach wrote that "the being, *when divorced from all the essential qualities* of the thing, is only your representation of being – a constructed, thought being, a being *without the nature* of being".³⁴ In sensing, when consciousness is out of being, being opens itself up and the affection is there. In representation, when being is out of consciousness, being is stripped of its essential qualities, being empty.

Religion and qualitative stages

I have tried to indicate some similarities and differences between Feuerbach and Kierkegaard. Both give a similar description of the nature of the self: it is relational and it has the potential for consciousness. The relational objects, however, are different. For Feuerbach the relational object is the infinite universe which realizes the potentiality of cognition; there is interaction between the infinite universe and the infinity of human consciousness, constituting the differential relation. For Kierkegaard the relational object is God beyond human consciousness. The differential relation in Kierkegaard explicates the God-relationship: between God and human beings there is the absolute qualitative difference. It is here that I find the place of religion, in relation to God as God, without disregarding the infinity of human consciousness (both/and rather than either/or). Religion, despite Kierkegaard's warning, might be given an *integral definition*: there is a feeling for the infinite universe and there is a relation to God as God, pan-en-theism rather than pantheism.

As far as I can see, Kierkegaard was frightened by Feuerbach's criticism of religion and he interpreted Feuerbach in metaphysical, ontological categories. Feuerbach, however, interpreted religion as a psychological/anthropological phenomenon of projection. Feuerbach is famous for claiming that theology is anthropology: religion is a projection of human needs and desires. In religious devotion human beings project the content of their nature "outside" themselves, and create an image of God filled with human qualities; the emotional content is projected onto the screen of imagination; theology is anthropology. Given this projection, "between God and man there is no qualitative, but a quantitative difference".³⁵ The representation and the represented are mixed with each other, feeling and image build one and the same conglomeration, there is no awareness of how the representation and the represented relate to each other. The direction is "away from the individual". Now the individual must turn around, take the projected content back and become a whole, with feeling, thinking, and willing intact. A goal of human life is to become an integrated self. One should not project oneself onto imagination, one should "project" oneself.³⁶

In Feuerbach's phenomenology of religion there is the moment of dispersion and the moment of turning back, of drawing the projected content back. Feuerbach's criticism of religion and Kierkegaard's

description of the first synthesis are on the same qualitative stage or plane. Kierkegaard wrote:

The individual, so long as he or she is an immediate spirit, coheres with the whole earthly life, and now the spirit would collect itself, as it were, out of its dispersion and become transformed in itself; the personality would be conscious of itself in its eternal validity.³⁷

There is the movement of dispersion: the projection of the content of subjectivity unto one's surrounding or unto a projected image, and there is the movement of retrieval, the content of subjectivity collecting itself back. Thus far both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard agree. In Feuerbach's view, it lies in the development of consciousness or in the nature of consciousness to draw the projection back. It seems to me that Feuerbach's projective stage, which grounds his criticism of religion, and Kierkegaard's first immediacy are on the same level; they describe the self as lacking in self-awareness, inwardness and consciousness, and perhaps even the "I to I" relation is lacking, as it has not yet entered consciousness.

There is a further way even if the criticism of religion is accepted. God-images and other images function as projections of human desires and needs. The objective god, in this sense, is a human construction: theology is anthropology. Between this god and human being there is no qualitative difference, only a quantitative difference. In addition to this there is the consciousness of the infinite: consciousness awaking in relation to the infinite universe. But there is also God beyond God, the Power of being beyond pictorial representations. In mature faith according to Tillich, the pictorial representation of God or the theistic God disappears, giving way to God beyond god-images.³⁸ The only way to talk about the Power of being according to Tillich is metaphorically and symbolically.

I think it is correct to claim, as both Kierkegaard and Tillich did, that between God beyond God and human beings there is an absolute qualitative difference; the Power of being does not arise from human nature. At the stage of projection there is no qualitative difference between the individual and the god-image, only a quantitative difference: the human qualities appear enlarged on the screen of imagination. Feuerbach was operating on the anthropological plane, and he described how human

nature comes to expression in an immediate, unreflected type of religion. Kierkegaard and Tillich spoke about the individual's relation to the Power that is ontologically outside of himself or herself. In my view, Feuerbach's view of religion on the one hand and Kierkegaard's and Tillich's views might be integrated with each other, as the individual is both a psychological and a spiritual being.

On reason

The relational view grounds even Feuerbach's conception of reason, he wrote:

Reason is the self-feeling of the human species as such. ...But *universality* lies in the nature of love. ...True love is *self-sufficient*; it does not need any particular title, no authority. Love is the universal *law* of the understanding and *nature*.³⁹

Standard rationality or the procedural reason builds on the argumentative approach of *pro* and *contra*; it disregards feeling or sensing. In Feuerbach, reason is integral with feeling. In his view the active reason is congruent with the self-feeling of the human species as such, *i.e.*, with the infinity of human consciousness, the essential human nature. Feuerbach is expressing the participative view of reason. The activity of reason is in the individual, but it is also above the individual, determining him or her. Beyond, in, and above the individual, Feuerbach expressed the activity of reason in the following way:

True existence is thinking, loving, willing existence. That alone is true, perfect, divine, which exists for its own sake. But such is love, such is reason, such is will. The divine trinity in the individual, above the individual, is the unity of reason, love, will. Reason, Love, Will are not powers which the individual possesses, for she/he is nothing without them; she/he is what she/he is only by them; they are the constituent elements of his or her nature, which she/he neither has nor makes, the animating, determining, governing powers – divine, absolute powers – to which she/he can oppose no resistance.⁴⁰

The individual is lifted above his or her individuality; she/he partakes in the activity of reason. We are dealing with the sensed activity of reason in interaction with the universe.

And, in fact, feeling, the heart of man as a rational being, is as infinite, as universal as reason; since man only truly perceives and understands that for which he has feeling. Thus reason is the essence of Nature *and* Man, released from non-essential limits, in their identity; it is the universal being, the universal God. The heart, considered in its *difference* from the reason, is the private God of man; the personal God (projected god-image) is the heart of man, emancipated from the limits or laws of Nature.⁴¹

It is not personal feeling (*Gemüth*) that Feuerbach indicates when he talks about the heart as a rational being, but instead he talks about individual's relation to "species activity", which is a felt relation.⁴² He states the difference between individuality and the species activity in the following way: "In the activity of reason I feel a distinction between myself and the reason in me; this distinction is the limit of the individuality."⁴³ Given the activity, "reason is thus the all-embracing, all compassionating being, the love of the universe to itself."⁴⁴ To participate in the love of the universe to itself, this is Spinoza. In the same way as in Spinoza, reason expresses the order of things: "Only what is naturally true is logically true; what has no basis in Nature has no basis at all."⁴⁵ Reason, in Feuerbach, is not only formal reason, but the active capacity of intuition and discernment in relation to the universe. "Reason is the midwife of Nature; it explains, enlightens, rectifies and completes Nature."⁴⁶ Compared to formal or technical reason, this participating view of reason does presuppose interaction between cognition and the object of cognition.

Now, in Kierkegaard and in Tillich we also find active and constructive reason. Kierkegaard was attracted by Plutarch's definition of reason: reason is form and it has passion as its content, reason is form and content in interaction with each other.⁴⁷ Later on in the same text comes the climax: to be whole is to have thinking, feeling, and willing in integral activity with each other. Tillich seems to give the constructive/active reason the same status as Feuerbach and Kierkegaard did. In *Systematic Theology III* Tillich writes:

Reason in the sense of *logos* is the principle of form by which reality in all its dimensions, and mind in all its directions, is structured. There is reason in the movement of an electron, and there is reason in the first words of a child – and in the structure of every expression of the spirit. Spirit as a dimension of life includes more than reason – it includes *eros*, passion, imagination – but without *logos*-structure, it could not express anything.⁴⁸

In Feuerbach, reason includes love and in Tillich reason and *eros*/love are in interplay. For both of them, the activity of love is in relation to the entire universe (reality in all its dimensions). In this very activity the individual *partakes* of love that is in and above him or her. This very love is even in Kierkegaard. For all three, love is ontologically grounded. Love is not foreign to the very structure of reason, it is not foreign to the nature of the universe nor is it foreign to a self/world interaction. In Spinoza, to love, to be a reasonable human being is to partake of the love with which the universe loves itself. Here words end and the dimension of expression comes in. A love-with-reason/reason-with-love is what we find in Feuerbach, in Kierkegaard, and in Tillich. Recently this love is pointed out by Gilles Deleuze in his interpretation of Spinoza's expressionism:

Our joy is the joy of God himself insofar as he is explicated through our essence. And the love of the third kind which we feel for God is "a part of the infinite love by which God loves himself". The love we feel for God is the love God feels for himself insofar as he is explicated through our own essence, and so the love he feels for our essence itself. ... The word "part" must in all this always be understood in an explicative or expressive manner: a part is not a component, but an expression and explication.⁴⁹

In the images we form of each other, we project our own desires onto the other. "In the attempts to know the other one, self-seclusion expresses itself in the projection of images of the other's being which disguise his or her real being and are only projections of the one who attempts to know."⁵⁰ The pictures we create of each other are our own images, and they become deconstructive images when we surrender to them. In love the individual makes a distinction between one's own projection and the Other: the Other is always something else than my pictures and images, mixed with clear and confused ideas, say of him or her. Love admits the difference of the selves. In such a situation love is elevated

out of the emotional into the ontological realm. And it is well known that from Empedocles and Plato to Augustine and Pico, to Hegel and Schelling, to Existentialism and depth psychology, love has played a central ontological role.⁵¹

To be able to make a distinction between one's image of the other and the Other, moral differentiation is necessary. In Feuerbach, moral differentiation is an essential part of philosophy.

Endnotes

- 1 "There is nothing new in Christianity in such a sense that it has not been in the world before, and yet it is all new." Kierkegaard, 1974:480.
- 2 "This world of inwardness, this version of what other men call actuality, it is actuality." Kierkegaard, WL, 1946:309.
- 3 Feuerbach, GW 9, 1984:258.
- 4 Tillich, 1936:206.
- 5 Schüssler & Sturm, 2007.
- 6 "By phenomenology I mean a description of the phenomenon as it shows itself". Tillich, 1990:10.
- 7 Heidegger, 1985:60.
- 8 See the discussion between Louis J. Pojman in *Kierkegaardiana*, 15, 1991, pp. 147-52 and Benjamin Daise in *International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion*, 31, 1992, pp. 1-12.
- 9 Kierkegaard, 1991:89.
- 10 Damasio, 1994.
- 11 "Truth, as a concept, is entirely undetermined. Everything depends on the value and sense of what we think. We always have the truths we deserve as a function of the sense of what we conceive, of the value of what we believe. ... It is disturbing that truth conceived as an abstract universal, thought conceived as *pure science*, has never hurt anyone. ... This is what the dogmatic image of thought conceals: the work of established forces that determine thought as pure science, the work of established powers that are ideally expressed in truth in itself." Deleuze, 2006:104.
- 12 Recently Mark C. Taylor has pleaded for this position. Considering the "immanent transcendence" in Taylor, see Taylor, 2009:127.
- 13 Löwith, 1991:140. Löwith cites Feuerbach's *Gesammelte Werke* 1, 256 and 2, 258.
- 14 Deleuze, 1997:92. "The epiphenomenon is the Being of the phenomenon, whereas the phenomenon is only a being, or life". Ibid.
- 15 Gadamer interprets Heidegger' overcoming of Hegel in the following way: "That which we "get over" or "come to grips with" is not simply past or forgotten. Getting over a loss, for example, consists not merely in our gradually forgetting it and "taking it." ... And far from being gone without a trace, the pain in our conscious achievement of enduring it, lastingly and irrevocable determines our own being. We stay with it, as it were, even when we have gotten over it. That is particularly appropriate for Hegel, for one must "stay with" him in a special way". Gadamer, 1976:100f.

- 16 Bergson, 2007:ix.
- 17 Tillich, 1976:70-74.
- 18 "A semiotic chain is like a tuber agglomerating very diverse acts, not only linguistic, but also perceptive, mimetic, gestural, and cognitive: there is no language in itself, nor are there any linguistic universals, only a throng of dialects, patois, slangs, and specialized languages. There is no ideal speaker-listener, any more that there is a homogeneous community. ... There is no mother tongue, only a power takeover by a dominant language within a political multiplicity. Language stabilizes around a parish, a bishopric, a capital. It forms a bulb. It evolves by subterranean stems and flows, along river valleys or train tracks; it spreads like a patch of oil." Deleuze & Guattari, 1998:7.
- 19 Feuerbach, 1957:18f.
- 20 Kierkegaard, 1985:166.
- 21 Ibid., p. 167.
- 22 Kierkegaard, 1974:287.
- 23 Feuerbach, 1957:xxxiv.
- 24 'Relational object' is a descriptive notion, it does not point out the object as object, but it aims to point to the objective pole of relationality.
- 25 Cited by Louis P. Pojman from Kierkegaard's *Papers X* 2, 229 in *Kierkegaardiana* 15, 1991, p. 152.
- 26 Feuerbach, GW 9, 1984:250.
- 27 Feuerbach, 1957:2ff.
- 28 Kierkegaard, 1941:19.
- 29 Feuerbach, 1957:5.
- 30 Ibid., 85.
- 31 Kierkegaard, 1974:528.
- 32 Kierkegaard, 1941:18.
- 33 Tillich, 1960:31.
- 34 Feuerbach, GW 9, 1984:307.
- 35 Feuerbach, GW 7, 1984:281.
- 36 Feuerbach, 1957:6.
- 37 Kierkegaard, 1944:159.
- 38 "When "providence" has become a superstition and "immortality" something imaginary, that which once was the power in these symbols can still be present and create the courage to be in spite of the experience of a chaotic world and finite existence." Tillich, 1980:182.

- 39 Feuerbach, GW 5, 1984:438.
- 40 Feuerbach, 1957:3.
- 41 Ibid., 287.
- 42 “Reason cannot content itself with the individual; it has its adequate existence only when it has the species for its object, and the species not as it has already developed itself in the past and present, but as it will develop itself in the unknown future.” Ibid. Considering species activity in Nietzsche, see Deleuze, 2007.
- 43 Feuerbach, 1957:287.
- 44 Ibid., 286f.
- 45 Ibid., 286.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 Kierkegaard ”recalls Plutarch’s admirable definition of virtue: ‘Ethical virtue has the passion for its material, and reason as its form’.” Kierkegaard, 1974:144n.
- 48 Tillich, 1976:24.
- 49 Deleuze, 2005:309.
- 50 Ibid., 77.
- 51 Tillich, 1960:4.

Politics of the Soul in Changing Society: Tillich's Political Pathos of the 1920s in Light of Nietzsche's Moral Philosophy

Aber er muss wissen, dass die Gegenwart des Unbedingten das Prius
alles bedingten Handelns, dass der unbedingte Sinngehalt das Prius aller
Sinnformen, dass das Wachsen der Gestalt das Prius aller Gestaltung ist.¹

Coming to Dresden from the North, we drove through Berlin and through the forest of Buchwald. Near the city one realizes that this is an age-old area. The city in itself is a mixture of ages and activities. It shows signs of outstanding cultural activities, but it has also been a vital industrial centre. The castles and villas are from the time when, following Christine Boyer, the city was modelled after theatre. Today's cities are construed according to a pattern of spectacle according to her, also true of today's Dresden.²

My family had an opportunity to live in one of the villas near Tiergarten, the central park in Dresden. The villas around the park are beautiful, mostly well restored. The one we lived in was not restored yet, and it was inwardly painted in thick grey latex. Underneath the colour there were details showing outstanding handicraft in wood and copper. We lived in a house loaded with history, but the history was hidden by the grey and the plastic. Something super-individual, as you could find this colour all over the Eastern Europe it was said, was present in this house. On its own it was a symbol of European and German history. "Ethics is aesthetics," claimed Nietzsche, and he linked this to the constructive trend in philosophy. The way we are, the inner structure of mentality, has an immediate effect on how we act, for example in constructing and making buildings. Cities, buildings, houses, and furniture reflect that which we are and how we think, and they also affect us, making us into that which we are. During Nietzsche's lifetime, this bond between the inner and the outer was explicated in Dostoevsky's books as well; Dostoevsky gave it symbolic expression.³ Our mentality, that is, what we are is reflected in how we think and in what we do, is also reflected in our surroundings. We are relational beings: the outer is symbolic of

the inner. Nietzsche's politics of the soul is to be seen in this perspective of holistic bond. Theory and praxis, reflection and action and other related dichotomies do not hold a central place in his thought. Instead, the politics of the soul expresses itself through aesthetics: in architecture, in music, in art. Nietzsche's philosophy was about that which abodes in humans, above the individual, determining him or her, making us into what we are. Few things are so misunderstood as Nietzsche's doctrine of over-man: it considers both the super-individual in us humans which inwardly determines us, and the overcoming of influences from reactive patterns. The overcoming of the influences from reactive patterns is ethics for Nietzsche. Ethics is to replace the reactive pattern with a new, more affirmative and more diverse shape of the soul. An over-man is the one who overcomes the alarming otherness of the self; she/he turns otherness into a nourishment of the self. For Paul Tillich, who lived in Dresden during the 1920s, the super-individual is the gestalt. Gestalts shape the will and they determine the will, giving it the shape it has.

Both Tillich and Nietzsche criticized capitalist/bourgeois society. Both said No to that society. What was their alternative to capitalist society? What pattern of the will did they say No to and what pattern did they say Yes to? In order to seek answers to these questions, I will say firstly something about the political situation in Europe and in Germany during the 1920s. After that, I will try to highlight the pattern both Tillich and Nietzsche seemed to say No to, in order to finally, say something about their respective alternatives to capitalist society.

The political situation in the 1920s

Dresden is a product not only of the politics of the soul but also a product of the European and German political situations. East and West has been and are present in the town, even that which led to the division of Europe: the breakdown of the European dynasties and monarchies. Revolution in Russia sent its signals to the whole of Europe. The revolution came in 1917 and 1918 to Finland, to Sweden, to Germany and to other European countries. Nietzsche and Dostoevsky have a lot to say about the kind of people who were caught up by the revolutionary movement. Nietzsche talked about the swamp exposing itself when the waters of religion draw themselves back.⁴ When the waters of living religion and spirituality draw themselves back, the marshland is exposed

and what is below becomes visible. This is Nietzsche's way of speaking about that what had happened to people, on the super-individual plane, in Germany and in the rest of Europe. To put this into philosophical language, we could say that otherness shows itself and otherness is the fuel of reactive patterns. When the waters draw themselves back, the will leaves the shape it had. A new shape of will is searched for. Such a situation is loaded with danger, but also with possibilities. Libido or desire, the energy of total personality has been released from the previous pattern and it searches for another pattern, shape, or constellation. What kind of people are the terrorists of today, are they the swamp people, taking revenge for the lost shape? I will say a few more words about the situation in Germany before we go over to what Nietzsche said about the possible shapes of the will.

In the beginning of the 20th century capitalists were not getting fewer, but in fact the world was about to see one of the largest waves of stock market speculations culminating in the collapse in New York in 1929. The situation of today, both with regard to the market and to the terrorists, is not very different from the situation in 1920s, there are many parallels. The capitalist/bourgeois society, the German Republic during the 1920s, was not only attacked from the left, but it was also attacked from the right, by the nationalist and the fascist movements. In the beginning of the decade there were several right-wing attempts to seize the power, the first one in the March of 1920. Walter Rathenau, the former prime minister of Germany, now the minister of foreign affairs, was assassinated 24th of June 1922. This was the 376th political murder during the Weimar republic period. In the same year Mussolini received dictatorial power from the hands of the king of Italy. The 24th of February in 1920 the National Socialist Party along with Hitler had sketched its 25 paragraph program. The program attracted workers, shop owners, and the lower middleclass and middleclass. The Nazis and the fascists promoted the strong state. Already at this time the state was getting a firm grip on its citizens, infiltrating several aspects of life, even the most private corners of the self, as Stephen Haffner witnesses.⁵ The totalitarian, controlling state was already there; it was on its way to materialize itself. Tillich seemed to have thought that the reactive pattern is the backbone of the totalitarian state.

The reactive pattern as the shape of will

In 1918 Paul Tillich had come home from his four years of military service in the First World War. During the war, at the age of 29, he had found Nietzsche and Nietzsche became an important philosopher for him during the rest of his lifetime.⁶ Nietzsche's moral philosophy, among other things, is about *the revaluation of all values*. It was not a No to values, not even a No to democratic values. He could claim that institutions like marriage, taking care of the poor and so on, are good in themselves:

For one must grasp this: every natural custom, every natural institution [state, administration of justice, marriage, tending of the sick and poor] every requirement presented by the instinct for life, in short everything valuable *in itself*, becomes utterly valueless, *inimical* to value through the parasitism of the priest [or the 'moral world-order'].⁷

Values are good if the movement of life or the tide that carries them is ascending, life affirming, life supporting; if the tide behind them is expansive then those values are good in themselves. What did Nietzsche say No to if not this? A standard argument against Nietzsche is that he is an anti-democrat, nihilistic social Darwinist. As a matter of fact, he was the opposite of a nihilist. He said No to nihilism, a No to No. In nihilism the tide is in decay, the impulse of will, the instinct that carried life, was descending. His was not a No to democracy, either: democracy is good if the tide behind it is expansive.⁸ Nietzsche said No to life without colour, life without feeling for life. He read the tide in terms of either-or: either the tide is ascending, the feeling for life is manifold and vital, or the tide is descending, going down, vanishing, and drawing itself back. This, I think, is a port of entry to Nietzsche's philosophy: that life is to be read in the light of the movement of the will. It is the movement of the will/life (the two being synonymous), whether the tide of libido is ascending or descending, that determines the revaluation of values. In Tillich we find a similar view.

In internalization, humans draw themselves inward and a cleft between the outer and the inner is created. The inner, or, as Nietzsche observed, the "soul", is created through the process of internalization. The individual is no longer in touch with the flow of life but she/he reflectively turns the gaze inward: reflection cuts into life. In a situation like this the will tends to control itself. But the will cannot be controlled, as it is

infinite in itself, instead it becomes split. The will is split in two: there is now the *controlling, dominant side* of the will (soul) and the other, *controlled side* of the will (body); there is activity (of thinking) and passivity (of passions and sensations), but the two are set apart from each other. Today the pattern of domination, as it comes to expression on the societal plane, is analyzed: man is activity, woman is passivity; man is spirit, woman is nature. Given Nietzsche's view, such dichotomies are historical constructions which depend on the mentality structure. To overcome the pattern of domination is the work of many today.⁹ The pattern of domination could equally be called the reactive pattern.

When the pattern of domination characterizes society, when there are enough people who share this structure, difference, plurality, multiplicity, diversity, or movement, the characteristics of the multi-dimensional universe and of people on the move are not accepted. These elements are not accepted, as the presence of them would touch the hidden and repressed layers of the self. And more: they are not accepted, because they would challenge the structures and institutions based on the pattern of domination. In the pattern of domination only one side is preferred, the other side is hidden. We, however, cannot get rid of the influence of the hidden and the repressed, as the events in Germany during the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s bear witness to. It could be said that *the hidden and the repressed direct the pattern* and give birth to alarming reactions. In the mind of the Nazis, the other of the will was targeted as "the Jew", "the disabled", or "the outcast". The Nazis and the fascists were reactive people with reactive politics. A human being is a whole, a *complexio oppositorum* as Carl Gustav Jung also claim, and if only one side is preferred, socially legitimized, affirmed, the other side lives a life of its own as the other of "all the good and decent people". Reactive politics involves manipulating the other of the will. That which individuals do not recognize as part of their selves, as elements of the self, it arises somewhere else.¹⁰ There is something psychological/differential in our lives and to have sight of that and to get in touch with it is not only alarming but a promise, a possibility. The politics of the soul is that one works with the differential of the soul, makes something in and through it. It is this work that establishes change: one individual working for the change of the shape might change society, world, and, if we are to believe Schelling: God. The direction in Nietzsche's politics of the soul is not only from the outside in, *i.e.*, *gestalts* and patterns shaping the will, but also the movement from the inside out: the individual changing

himself or herself, and through that very change he or she becomes a societal agent of change. Nietzsche's politics of the soul is about the interaction between the individual and society.

Nietzsche's ethics is about how to move from the reactive pattern with its dualism and binary oppositions between activity and passivity, control and sensuality, master and slave, towards a new shape of the soul. It is about activity and passivity coming together, it is about the congruity between the will to power and activity, it is about the spontaneity of the will when the pattern of domination is passed by, and it is about the recognition of the self as the unity of opposites. In the reactive pattern, opposites are placed apart from each other. "It is so pleasant, so distinguishing, to possess one's own antipodes," Nietzsche wrote while pointing to the possibility of wholeness.¹¹ In real life, of course, it is far from pleasant to possess one's own antipodes.

Society with short-term values

Nietzsche read life with the tide in sight; he was a holistic philosopher. With this as a starting point he said No to society in decay. The capitalist bourgeois society is such a society in his view: it is a society filled with *short-term values* like utility and commerce.¹² The utilitarian values are those Nietzsche called "English values", with focus on Jeremy Bentham and others. To be beyond good and evil is to be beyond the utilitarian commercialism of the capitalist society as a way of life. He called the utilitarian values "foreground modes of thought and naiveties".¹³ Pleasure and pain, as they are interpreted in the books of utilitarian philosophers, are secondary effects, not primary events or primal affects. They depend on physiological conditions and stimuli, which on their turn have their own cartography. The focus on pleasure and pain keeps the eyes away from the underlying and determining cartography: the over-individual working through events, affects, conditions, and stimuli.

It was the capitalist/bourgeois society with short-term utility values that even Tillich said No to. He called it the self-sufficient society, self-sufficient finitude, a society with exclusive this-worldly goals. It is a society with absolute faith in science, rationality, technology, progress and materialistic values.

How hopeless all opposition was at the end of the nineteenth century is shown with terrible clarity by the fate of three great warriors against the prevailing spirit and prophets of coming things: Nietzsche, Strindberg and van Gogh. The philosopher, the poet and the painter, all three, were broken mentally and spiritually in their desperate struggle with the spirit of the capitalist society. Thus even the movements of opposition at the beginning and the end of the last century bear witness in defeat to the victory of the trinity of natural science, technique and capitalist economy, to the triumph of the spirit of capitalist society. ... In all this there is no trace of self-transcendence, of the hallowing of existence. The forms of the life-process have become completely independent of the source of life and its meaning. They are self-sufficient and produce a self-sufficient present. And all phases of life which are subject to the spirit of rationalistic science, technique and economy bear witness to the time as one which is self-sufficient, which affirms itself and its finitude.¹⁴

Tillich agreed with Nietzsche in his criticism of capitalist/bourgeois society. In such a society, people have lost contact with the source of life: the coming into being of the dimension of activity and creation, preceding the subject/object structure and preceding the opposition between theory and practice. Like Nietzsche, Tillich searched for a point of departure for new politics, and he found this point in *the proletarian situation*. This at first glance seems to be the very opposite of Nietzsche's aristocratic views. The proletarian situation, as it was understood during the 1920s, was that masses of people were cut off from the meaning of their lives mentally, physically, economically, and politically. To realize meaning "is not possible upon the soil of the capitalistic division of classes. As one of the classes, the proletarian is cut off from the meaning of life, and the whole is distorted and emptied of meaning".¹⁵ Nietzsche was criticizing the bourgeois, its value orientation and its way of thinking; Tillich was searching for a point of departure for new action. It would be unfair to Nietzsche to claim that he did not do that, as the motor of this thought was just where this point of departure for new thinking and new philosophy, for a new politics of the Earth, could be found. The point of departure comes with the individuals who have the courage to envision a new shape, a courage for wholeness. This was the case with Nietzsche, and with Tillich. I think that it is here that a parallel between Nietzsche and Tillich is to be found. The parallel lies in their respective recognition of the human situation. Nietzsche's message was

that we should accept the other of the will. We should work with otherness, catch hold of the differential of the soul and do something with and through it. With an inner change, an outer change will follow. We have eyes for otherness, self-seeing eyes, and we should use those eyes; we should acquire more eyes. The more manifold the human being, the more eyes she/he has and if she/he has eyes for the human predicament, the wider his or her sphere of responsibility and action.¹⁶ Responsibility is to see one's share in what has happened, happens, and will happen. It is to change oneself into an agent for things to come. Responsibility is a *long-term value*; it rings a bell in eternity. This, I think, is Nietzsche. Responsibility is the guiding star of the politics of the soul; it is what coordinates the individual with the whole, directs him or her. Tillich's message is that the proletarian situation is the human situation under the conditions of capitalist society: if there is interaction between the individuals, then each and individual has a share in the proletarian situation. Consciousness is, and in this he follows Karl Marx, consciousness in and of the proletarian situation. The proletarian situation is the swamp of the capitalist society. What the capitalist society does is that it puts the outcasts into the swamp, cutting a group of people off from the common good. The proletarian situation affects all the individuals of society. Responsibility is for Tillich, as it was also for Nietzsche, to see one's share in the events of time, to analyze the prevailing society and to work for an alternative, now in relation to the unconditional or the being itself. Tillich claimed that there was a relation to the unconditional in Nietzsche as well.¹⁷ Like Nietzsche, he could claim that the present is pregnant with the future and that with a changing of the shape or the gestalt of the will, the change of the outer shall follow:

Our consideration of the practical sphere has revealed that the religious situation in it is even more completely dominated by the spirit of the capitalist society that is the case in the theoretic sphere. This lies in the nature of the case. When the spirit is moved in those depths which lie beneath the antithesis of theory and practice it achieves a definite form of consciousness [*Bewusstseinsgestaltung*] first of all in seeing and foreseeing contemplation [*Betrachtung*]. The shaping of concrete reality [*Die reale Gestaltung*] follows and follows necessarily; for it is the same spirit which is effective in pre-vision and in transformation.¹⁸

It is not possible to change a pattern in or out of the pattern itself, a position preceding the shaping is to be reached. The shaping of concrete reality, the shaping of politics and economics, follows with the changing of the pattern.

The just society

Considering the integral mind Nietzsche wrote the following:

In man, *creature* and *creator* are united: in man there is matter, fragment, excess, clay, mud, madness, chaos; but in man there is also creator, sculptor, the hardness of the hammer, the divine spectator and the seventh day – do you understand this antithesis?”¹⁹

All the ingredients needed for the work are already in a human being. Mud and clay is the swamp, the passivity of matter. The creator, the activity in us, works on passivity in the work internal to the self: the swamp is turned into nourishment for the self. These metaphorical expressions perhaps say something about human wholeness. Nietzsche’s goal was a life fit for self-overcoming. In such a life variation is on the scene, giving a new table of values.²⁰ The creation of the new is in Nietzsche.

Self-transcendence is what we find in Tillich as well, not only in his later thought but already in the 1920s. Self-transcendence is the act in and through which the new is produced:

For our purpose it suffices to describe freedom as the faculty of producing the new and realizing meaning. The new, which breaks through the circle of pure being is new only if it is the result of a productive act, in which reality has risen beyond itself, transcending itself. ... The new that is produced by freedom is meaningful reality. The new, of which we are speaking, is not a natural thing or event; it is meaning. ... This definition does not point to a special group of beings in which history occurs. It leaves open the question whether man only or angels or animals are bearers of history.²¹

If it is so that the inner affects the outer, gives valour to the situation, then people who live a holistic pattern are political agents through their very way of living. Tillich wrote, with reference to Nietzsche:

To be sure, “thoughts that come on dove’s feet can rule the world”; to be sure, the thinker and the spiritual person, excluded from all social positions of power, can have immeasurable social effects. But she/he can do so only because a psychical or social trend of life finds expression in his or her thought and thereby attains form and power.²²

As far as the role of the individual in society is under consideration, Tillich and Nietzsche seemed to have similar views. When it comes to understanding society in terms of socialism, they differ from each other. Nietzsche said No to socialism, as he thought it was an expression for a herd-mentality, building on reactive and passive affects, Tillich said both Yes and No to socialism.

Tillich did not uncritically accept the socialist-Marxist description of the proletarian situation, but instead tried to understand it in the light of Protestantism and the Protestant principle: no finite entity: society, human being or church is able to come with the claim of possessing infinite value. It is not the classless society that is the ultimate goal of history, but that which in symbolic language is called the kingdom of God. The classless society belongs to a transition, it is not the goal. Tillich saw the development and the process of human societies as steps toward a *righteous and meaningful society*. Socialism with its message of the classless society is a step towards that society:

But Kairos is not perfect completion in time. To act and wait in the sense of Kairos means to wait upon the invasion of the eternal and to act accordingly, not to wait and to act as though the eternal were a fixed quantity which could be introduced into time, as a social structure which represents the end and goal of history, for instance. ... But there are no societies which possess the eternal. According to religious socialism, therefore, the only goal which our eschatological hope can look forward to is this, that the judgement proceeding from the eternal may result in an organization of life and society (*Gestaltung des Daseins und der Gesellschaft*) in which the orientation toward eternal is recognizable.²³

The wholly righteous society is beyond history as the ultimate goal of history, but as such it exercises its influence on historical societies. We should say Yes to any society that works in the direction of meaningfulness and meaning-fulfilling. Something of the righteous society can take place in immanence, just as the relation to God or to the ground and depth of existence is something that takes place in immanence.²⁴

Tillich affirmed the fight for the righteous society and he affirmed the approximation of that society in history. The Religious Socialist Movement was to promote the kind of societies in which righteousness and meaningfulness in the political, social, and economical sphere was striven after and fought for. The Religious Socialist Movement is both a Yes and a No to socialism, a Yes in the sense that changing society will change the humans, but the socialist solution is not enough, as the other part of the interaction is missed: the fact that changed humans change the society. Nietzsche's politics of the soul considers both the interaction and the changing of mentality; the individual is capable of change. Tillich wrote: "The socialist theory is dependent on the presupposition that the changing of society will change the humans also, at the same time it passes the question by how it is possible to change the society without changing humans".²⁵ For the societal change, the inner change is necessary. Religious Socialism is trans-socialism; it aims to show that human history and the history of society have a goal that is beyond history, but this goal is active in history as its direction, promise, and demand. Later on Tillich writes a book on trans-moral conscience. If Nietzsche had lived during that time, he would say that that is exactly what his moral philosophy is about; instead of "trans" he preferred "extra", the extra-moral conscience in contrast to the bad conscience, the kind of created by resentment or No.

The meaningful society, which at least partly could be realized in history, is not only a society in which humans find and come to their meaning. In a dynamic, meaning-fulfilling society even things and animals are included in the sphere of meaning. In capitalist/bourgeois society things are subordinated to utility, they are made into the means for human prosperity and well-being. There is a technical-rational domination over things, humans, and animals in that society: the technological gestalt rules in it. "The technical conception of reality ... is all over victorious because the prevailing shape of things and the shape of soul and the shape of society are determined by it."²⁶ In the technological gestalt, a realm of abstraction, and with it consciousness, is loosened from life and this realm, with its ideas, representations, and descriptions of mechanical laws, is used as the base and the model for the construction of the realm of things.

Profanization is always rationalization, *i.e.*, comprehension of things through resolution into their elements and combination under the law. This attitude, which is in accord with the nature of things and suited to the relationship of

subject and object, is demonically distorted through the will to control, which masters it and robs the things of their essential character and independent power. It is the attitude to reality meant by the concept of intellectualism, which is not to be thought of as too much of intellect or rationality, but as a violation on the part of the rational subject. ... The demonic quality of intellectualism is that it contains the rational comprehension of things and essentially must contain the consequence of infinite progress, but that, on the other hand, with every step forward it destroys the living, independently powerful quality in the things and therewith the inner community between the knowing and the known.²⁷

The ultimate triumph of this technical construction, we could say, is the modern airport, that the world is characterized by uniformity, not by diversity, by one-dimensionality, not by multi-dimensionality, by mechanical speed, not by the soft movement of the human soul, by technical warfare, no matter what the advertisers say about uniting people. We can fly all over, phone to whomever we like, never getting into the depth of life. No matter where in the world we are, the airport is always the same. The technological gestalt gives us more of the same. Tillich's message in the 1920s was, and it was at this time that the technical construction was already triumphant, that life fit for humans, animals, and things, is not a life lived under the domination of the technical gestalt, but life in co-operation and coordination with things and animals. This coordination knows about the differential of our souls and it knows about the Different outside of us. It is life in which the Eternal not only disturbs, shakes up, when it cuts into life, but also promotes and directs every particular to its meaning in "the gestalt of grace" or love.

In the unity of knowledge and love is the meaning of science brought to its highest expression. — But love is not a negation but affirmation of the particularity of the other. True love has justice in it; and justice in the sphere of knowledge is the recognition of the particularity of things and affinity with the unconditional form, upon which every act of knowledge is dependent.²⁸

Things and humans, particulars, are not infinite, but they are parts of the infinite. They are not unconditional, but conditioned in many ways. They have a relation to the unconditional, and as such they are symbolic for that which is beyond them, expressing it through them. In a holistic constellation, all particulars evolve in coordination with all others and they do so with uttermost spontaneity. The reactive patterns and the technical gestalt are not the only patterns capable of directing our lives.

Endnotes

- 1 Tillich, 1962:93.
- 2 Boyer, 1998.
- 3 See for example *The Idiot*.
- 4 Schubart, 1946:10f.
- 5 Haffner, 2002.
- 6 Stone, 1986.
- 7 Nietzsche, 1990:148.
- 8 “*My conception of freedom*. – The value of a thing sometimes lies not in what one attains with it, but in what one pays for it – what it *costs* us. I give an example. Liberal institutions immediately cease to be liberal as soon as they are attained: subsequently there is nothing more harmful to freedom than liberal institutions. ... As long as they are still being fought for, these same institutions produce quite different effects; they then in fact promote freedom mightily. ... Our institutions are no longer fit for anything: everyone is unanimous about that. But the fault lies not in them but in *us*. Having lost all the instincts out of which institutions grow, we are losing the institutions themselves, because *we* are no longer fit for them.” Ibid. 102f.
- 9 See for example Daly, 1979 and Radford Ruether, 1983.
- 10 “Then, in the soul of the oppressed, the powerless. Here all *other* human beings are considered hostile, ruthless, exploiting, cruel, cunning, whether they be noble or low.” Nietzsche, 1969:167.
- 11 Nietzsche, 1988:60. “Thirdly, will is not only a complex of feeling and thinking, but above all an *emotion*: and in fact the emotion of command. ... A man who *wills* – commands something in himself which obeys or which he believes obeys.” Ibid. p. 30.
- 12 “So long as the utility which dominates moral value-judgements is solely that which is useful to the herd, so long as the object is solely the preservation of the community and the immoral is sought precisely and exclusively in that which seems to imperil the existence of the community: so long as that is the case there can be no ‘morality of love of one’s neighbour.’ Ibid. 104.
- 13 “Whether it be hedonism or pessimism or utilitarianism or eudemonism: all these modes of thought which assess the value of things according to pleasure and pain, that is to say according to attendant and secondary phenomena, are foreground modes of thought and naiveties which anyone conscious of creative powers and artist’s conscience will look down on with derision, though not without pity.” Ibid. 135f.

- 14 Tillich, 1932:18ff; 1926:21f.
- 15 Tillich, 1962:148; 1930:1-12.
- 16 “In face of a world of ‘modern ideas’ which would like to banish everyone into a corner and ‘speciality’, a philosopher, assuming there could be philosophers today, would be compelled to see the greatness of man, the concept ‘greatness’, precisely in his spaciousness and multiplicity, in his wholeness in diversity: he would even determine value and rank according to how much and how many things one could endure and take upon oneself, how *far* one could extend one’s responsibility.” Nietzsche, 1988:124.
- 17 “The criticism offered by Nietzsche was more penetrating; it set the ideal of an aristocratic and meaningful personality in contrast to the bourgeois personality. Race-theories, conceptions of national excellence and romantic ideas of nobility and leadership were frequently combined with it as in the case of Spengler, for it is this ethics which forms the background of his philosophy of history. But while there was in Nietzsche’s symbol of the super-man a reference to the transcendently Unconditioned, these modern movements remain almost completely this-worldly.” Tillich, 1932:118f.
- 18 Tillich, 1932:120; 1926:102. “To understand the present means ultimately to understand the future with which the womb of the present is great.” Tillich, 1932:6; 1926:11.
- 19 Nietzsche, 1988:136.
- 20 “The dangerous and uncanny point is reached where the grander, more manifold life lives *beyond* the old morality; the ‘individual’ stands there, reduced to his own law-giving, to his own arts and stratagems for self-preservation, self-enhancement, self-redemption. ... Danger is again present, the mother of morality, great danger, only this time it comes from the individual, from neighbour and friend, from the street, from one’s own child, from one’s own heart, from the most personal and secret recesses of wish and will.” Ibid. 182.
- 21 Tillich, 1936:252f.; 1930:118f..
- 22 Ibid. 191.
- 23 Tillich, 1932:139; 1926:117f.
- 24 “It does not see the realization of the holy in the soul, nor in the church, but in the world – that is its immanence.” Tillich, 1962:90.
- 25 Ibid. 288.
- 26 Tillich, 1930:72.
- 27 Tillich, 1936:117.
- 28 Tillich, 1959:293.

Ethics and Expressionism; Things, Individuals, and Common Concerns

In his early study on Spinoza, Gilles Deleuze speaks about the philosophy of expressionism. He discusses Spinoza in relation to Leibniz, who also, according to Deleuze, had an expressive part in his monadology. With their nomadology Deleuze and Guattari, who became a co-author to Deleuze, relate to Leibniz's monadology; both standpoints have a holistic dimension. Deleuze's point is that something of the unity beyond the body and soul distinction is expressed both in Spinoza and in Leibniz.

Expression takes its place at the heart of the individual, in his soul and in his body, his passions and his actions, his causes and his effects. And Leibniz, by monad, no less than Spinoza by mode, understands nothing other than an individual as an expressive center.¹

Expressionism in Deleuze concerns a plane beyond dual oppositions, and he termed this plane "the plane of immanence" as well as "the plane of consistency".² In his later studies, Deleuze returned to Spinoza, but the focus of his work was now on the interaction between the individual and society, or rather, on those assemblages or constellations that determine the mentality within modern and postmodern societies.

Paul Tillich in his later works talked about "the spiritual unity beyond the subject and object distinction" which could be expressed; there is expressionism in Tillich as well. He claimed that "expressionism is the genuinely theonomous element".³ He even wrote that in Spinoza "the ontology of courage has reached its fundamental expression".⁴ The Spiritual Presence, to Tillich, expresses itself in time and space, in immanence.⁵ How and where does that happen, according to Tillich? I would like to point to some parallels between Gilles Deleuze and Paul Tillich

considering expressionism and social ethics. Firstly I concentrate on societal organizational forms, and their conditions and presuppositions in today's world; I focus on what they say about the human predicament in postmodern societies. After that I ask: What is action and activity according to them? I start with an analysis of the societal/cultural/political situation of the 20th century, which they tried to meet. If there is something salient in their respective thought-form, it is the fact that both were vitalists.

Organizational forms

Regarding organizational forms in Western societies, both Tillich and Deleuze seem to say that the villain here is binary logic, with its binary organizations. Tillich analyzed the conditions of binary logic and pointed to the processes that led to dual oppositions. In *Systematic Theology III* it is the subject/object distinction between the humankind and his or her world that defines the problematic:

This practical gap between subject and object has the same consequences as the theoretical gap; the subject-object scheme is not only the epistemological but also the ethical problem. ... The inherent ambiguity of language is that in transforming reality into meaning it separates mind and reality.⁶

The human subject and the object, that is, individual and the world or the universe are set apart from each other. This separation gives a basic cognitive relation, but it also leads to binary constellations like mind *and* body, thinking *and* feeling, I *and* not-me, and, finally, to the organization of society on the dualistic lines. Binary logic is the logic of either/or: either us or them, either man or woman, either inside or outside, either winners or losers, either rich or poor.⁷ The binary constellations, in Deleuze's view, segment society. "We are segmented from all around and in every direction. ... We are segmented in a binary fashion, following the great major dualist oppositions: social classes, but also men-women, adults-children, and so on."⁸ The way society is organized is dependent on ways of thinking, and it is dependent on the kind of people we are.

The focus of Deleuze's later studies is on the interaction between the individual and society, or rather, on those assemblages or organizational constellations and structures which determine the lives of individuals

in postmodern societies. These assemblages are the basic elements of thought *and* life. “There exist no other drives than the assemblages themselves.”⁹ The assemblage functions like a kind of a regulator in a society, and it functions even on a global plane. Today’s regulators are global, and they are dual or bipolar. In “the machinic assemblage”, this being the regulator in modern societies, individuals are viewed as things, and they are made into parts of a machine. Individuals are run by the machinic assemblages, but these assemblages are also run by the individuals and their mentality structure: mentality and organizational structures interact through feedback loops. Machinic operations rule over the lives of individuals. This is a well-known theme, but Deleuze and Guattari take this theme further. The assemblages, as synthesis, hold together heterogeneous materials.¹⁰ The central assemblage of today’s world is what Deleuze and Guattari call “the axiomatic”. The axiomatic operates on the global plane. Earlier the axiomatic was found between industrialized countries and the Third World, more recently between North and South, and now the center and periphery are internal to each other:

The more the worldwide axiomatic installs high industry and highly industrialized agriculture at the periphery, provisionally reserving for the center so-called post-industrial activities [automation, electronics, information technologies, the conquest of space, over armament, etc.], the more it installs peripheral zones of underdevelopment inside the center, internal Third Worlds, internal Souths. ... Subjection remained centered on labor and involved a bipolar organization, property-labor, and bourgeoisie-proletariat.¹¹

It is not only the bipolar organization with machinic enslavement that has characterized the axiomatic, but the war machine installed within it.

The war machine takes on a specific supplementary meaning: industrial, political, judicial, etc. ... (It) no longer had war as its exclusive object but took in charge and its object peace, politics, the world order, in short, the aim. ... It is politics that becomes the continuation of war; it is peace that technologically frees the unlimited material process of total war. ... The war machine reigned over the entire axiomatic like the power of the continuum that surrounded the “world-economy”, and it put all the parts of the universe in contact. ... Wars had become a part of peace.¹²

In their constructivism, Deleuze and Guattari have moved beyond the world in which wars had become a part of peace and that is why they use the tempus of imperfect. But the war machine installed on a global scale, the workings of which we now witness daily, also works in another direction. The other side of the coin (as all people are drawn into this assemblage or axiomatic structure) is that nomadic warriors fight rigid structures and loosen nomadic flows. The war machine on the global scale is the Grand Setting of macro-politics. The nomadic warriors fight that what makes wars possible; they are actors in micro-politics. In this sense the axiomatic, as a world-wide assemblage, holds together heteronymous materials. Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy is nomadology, that is, it is about drives and about the interaction between drives and basic constellations. The nomadic ethics is about the "line of flight". It wages war against strict structuralism: we should not let institutional structures and organizational forms rule over our lives. Nomadic philosophers set their minds free from the over-coding coming from institutional structures. The war machine is a heterogeneous assemblage affecting both macro- and micro-politics. To call it the industrial/technological complex is only partly correct. It was not the industrial/technological complex that made the world wars possible, even if it heavily promoted wars and made large-scale destruction possible; the roots of these disasters lie deeper than that - in that what kind of people or warriors we are. Nomadology is not only associated with Leibniz, but also with Nietzsche, and it might be considered a direct continuation of Nietzsche's cultural analysis.¹³

The plane of consistency makes use of both/and logic. It is not either/or logic that characterizes the relationships between the vital flows and basic structures or assemblages, but both/and logic. The "classical" logic of an excluded middle doesn't give the means to analyze the structures and the organizational forms of today's world. In either/or logic, center-periphery, we-them, North-South are set apart from each other; while in both/and logic they are parts or elements of the same constellations. This is not combining everything or saying that everything goes; it is making a distinction between the analytical, analyzing side of the mind and the synthetic, synthesizing side of the mind. It is the analyzing side of the mind that uses either/or logic, while the synthesizing side makes use of both/and logic. Deleuze and Guattari move within the synthesizing domains, without disregarding the analytic side.

They are against all kinds of one-sidedness in philosophy and in thinking. The synthesizing capacities are on a higher plane than the partial analyzing capacities. The mind gives syntheses in terms of both/and; the mind sees itself, there is the self-seeing eye. Or to put this in another way, there is seeing, hearing, feeling, sensing thought (differential thinking). I continue with an examination of the human predicament in the global world.

Macro politics and micro politics

We can speak about two movements in globalization. There is globalization from above, run by large institutional agents, like the World Trade Organization and other institutions operating on a global scale, and there is globalization from below, initiated by the people, for example, women in India or farmers in Mexico and, as further example, the various forms of local currency. The two levels are apparent in the phenomenon. These two levels, a superstructure and a substructure, can also be found in both Deleuze's and Tillich's analyses.¹⁴

In Deleuze and Guattari the two levels are expressed with terms like "the majoritarian language" and "minority"; "macro politics" and "micro politics"; "macro history" and "micro history"; "molar" and "molecular"; "the striated space" and "the smooth space". Especially the last two concepts are highly interesting and important: the smooth space goes back to Plato's talk of the soft. The food industry, biochemistry, and energy investments today belong to high level macro politics; they are at the top of the striated space. Making use of high levels of abstraction, the food industry also produces and makes use of artificial fibers. The striated space is the world of abstractions, but also the world of mathematics, geometry, and geography. The smooth is the synthetic mind-field. The change in Deleuze's and Guattari's view comes from below, from micro politics:

It is wrongly said [in Marxism in particular] that a society is defined by its contradictions. That is true only on the larger scale of things. From the viewpoint of micro politics, a society is defined by its lines of flight, which are molecular. There is always something that flows or flees, that escapes the binary organizations, the resonance apparatus, and the over coding machine: things that are attributed to a "change of values," the youth, women, the mad, etc.¹⁵

People, people at an individual level, escape the rigid macro political orders, the molar mass, and striated and segmented space, by taking flight into “new creativity”. Lines of flight are molecular, that is, it is the individuals that speed up the processes of creativity. There, however, is no revolutionary nostalgia in Deleuze and Guattari; even fascism is a micro political movement making use of cells, bands and groups, or molecular organizations. “Only microfascism provides an answer to the global question: Why does desire desire its own repression, how can it desire its own repression?”¹⁶ It can do so as the drive is bent back on itself to control itself, and this drive-constellation or assemblage is maintained by social groups (microfascism). This was seen by Tillich as well, in Nazi Germany: “the desire for life, which is natural for every person, is bent back into the desire for death. ... The community, which should bestow life, turns into a community that, in word and song and deed, prepares for death”.¹⁷ Deleuze put this in the following way: “Fascism is construed on an intense line of flight, which it transforms into a line of pure destruction and abolition”.¹⁸ Individuals belong both to the super- and to the substructure; we play a role in both arenas, and organizational constellations or assemblages affect the individual.

In his analyzes of current political situations, Tillich, much in the same way as Deleuze and Guattari, focuses both on macro politics and on micro politics. It might be the case that:

One of the great powers will develop into a world centre, ruling the other nations through liberal methods and in democratic forms! ... The technical union of the world favors centralization. ... For even then disintegration and revolution are not excluded. New centers of power may appear, first underground, then openly, driving towards separation from or towards radical transformation of the whole. They may develop a vocational consciousness of their own.¹⁹

There are many groups with vocational consciousness, but in Tillich’s view vocational consciousness is to be related to *justice*. The name Tillich gave to the process of developing a new vocational consciousness was “transforming justice” and “creative justice”.²⁰ Justice for Tillich is that humans and groups reach meaning and are able to fulfill their potentials as humans and as societies. The just, meaningful, and fair society, the place where individuals in cooperation with each other, with animals, and with things reach their potentials, is the transformative goal of history;

that is, it might be unattainable in history but as the goal of history it exercises its influence *in* history. It is the Spiritual Presence working in the human spirit that, according to Tillich, directs the individual and society towards the goal. This *directing activity* is one of the first expressions of the Spiritual Presence.

The idea of creative justice comes close to Deleuze's and Guattari's "the line of flight" and their "new creativity". The striated space of global technical-mechanical world-order has a counterpart in the smooth space. The question is what we with our thinking and relating promote, what we consent to. This is an ethical issue.

For the stakes here are indeed the negative and the positive in the absolute: the earth girded, encompassed, over coded, conjugated as the object of mortuary and suicidal organization surrounding it on all sides, *or* the earth consolidated, connected with the Cosmos, brought into the Cosmos following lines of creation that cut across it as so many becomings [Nietzsche's expression: Let the earth become lightness ...].²¹

Taking the line of flight is not a No to technology; it is a No to its one-sided domination. Only in either/or logic is the striated space preferred to the smooth space. Tillich held a similar view considering technology. Even technology could be used for creative action, if technology is filled with an artistic-creative import and not with consumerized and utilitarian over-coding. Tillich could state that the Spiritual Presence might come to expression in and through a thing:

For the Spirit, no thing is merely a thing. ... Tools, from the most primitive hammer to the most delicate computer ... can be considered and artistically valued as new embodiments of the power of being itself. This *eros* toward the technical *Gestalt* is a way in which a theonomous relation to technology can be achieved.²²

There is no either/or between *eros* and *agapé*, but *agapé* comes through *eros* even in relation to things, and in things. In creativity, *eros* and *agapé* intertwine.

More could be said about the state of things in the modern world, but the interesting point in the above is the move away from a partial view and *the position* from which organizational forms, factual and possible, are perceived. There is both in Deleuze and in Tillich a realistic analysis

of the present situation, and there are constructive alternatives. There is the move away from enslavement, repression, and subjection, not a flight from life, but an acceptance of the courageous life that does not shut its eyes to the “facts” of life. Deleuze and Guattari talked about “free action”, which is a component of the new creativity, and Tillich talked about the creation of the new in history and about the action in relation to it. All three seem to agree that the response to the prevailing situation should be characterized by creative action. In claiming this they refer to Spinoza. What is action or activity?

Action

In Spinoza there is the move from reaction to action and activity. The opposite of creative action is compulsory reaction. Reaction is always passive: the individual is affected by an inner representation: “thought of an external cause”.

For an ignorant man, besides being agitated in many ways by external causes, never enjoys one true satisfaction of the mind: he lives, moreover, almost unconscious of himself, God, and things, and as soon as he ceases to be passive, ceases to be.²³

Reaction is not free action: the individual is in the hands of his or her representations or inner images and interpretations. But there is also another possibility, another way of living, *Ethics* indicates a way towards that:

If we remove disturbance of the mind or emotion from the thought of an external cause and unite it to other thought, then love and hatred towards the external cause, as well as waverings of the mind which arise from these emotions, are destroyed.²⁴

We should understand that “the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things”.²⁵ In passivity, when we are agitated in many ways, the connection of ideas and the order of things is not the same; the order of ideas is set by the imagination, and imaginary and represented mental objects take over the emotions. We are triggered emotionally; we only react. The individual needs to learn how imagination works within himself or herself: imagination is able

to pick up both the high and the low in the emotional content. If we let imagination rule ourselves, we are not in contact with the order of things; imagination has the upper hand in our interior and we have the emotions we deserve, given our way of living and our way of thinking.²⁶ In the true order of things, love is higher than imagination, or to put it in another way: the essential mind is higher than the accidental mind. In reaction, we let the accidental mind rule over us. Action is the activity of the mind; the mind works on itself and puts things right. What is it to put things right? The order of things is that the essential mind is higher than the accidental mind. The accidental mind follows imagination and reactive passions. The same procedure as was used in imagination is to be used at the level of the essential mind; the mind's activity is one and the same. Instead of the imaginary or represented object, which starts the reaction, the idea of God replaces the imaginary object. Love, instead of anger, fills the mind. "This mental love must be referred to the actions of the mind which therefore is an action with which the mind regards itself accompanied by the idea of God as a cause."²⁷ Imagination is on the subjective side, that is, the mind is able to regard itself as accompanied by the idea of God, in the same way as it is able to regard itself as accompanied by some agitating causes (images and representations of the other). As there is no clarity on this, the waverings of the mind are there. But Spinoza does not consider that this replacement is internal to the mind, that it would only be a mental phenomenon. In addition to the subjective side, there is the objective side. Expressionism in Spinoza is that the mental act contains an expressive dimension, that is, God comes to expression through the action of the mind. On the objective side, we deal with "an action by which God, in so far as he may be expressed through the human mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself".²⁸ In Spinoza, the eternal and essential part of the mind is in God. Even though the mind is in God, this participation does not destroy human activity and action. The mind is active in itself, and this activity is expressed when the mind works on itself by establishing itself in the right order of things. This action replaces the reactive pattern with the "magnanimity of the soul". The result of this work is right self-love and the love of other people: hatred, agitation, and fear are toned down and replaced by love. In Spinoza, reaction gives way to action, or in other words, action makes place for love. We might say that this replacement takes place in the world of

morals: it is a human act in a human world, whereas God is in the trans-moral world. Spinoza seems to think that between humans and God there is mutual immanence. God is not transcendent to the mind, but the essential mind is in God. The replacement or the work is then to bring the accidental mind in conformity with the essential mind, and that is the action as such. To talk about the world of morals and about the trans-moral world, effective in the world of morals, means that we avoid the dualism between the realms. It also helps to express the position of immanent transcendence, and in Kierkegaard's terms: God is in creation, but directly God is not there.

The trans-moral world in the world of morals

In Tillich the Spiritual Presence comes to expression in the human spirit.

Since the finite is potentially or essentially an element in the divine life, everything finite is qualified by this essential relation. ... In the human spirit's essential relation to the divine Spirit, there is no correlation, but rather, mutual immanence.²⁹

This is Spinoza. Essential humanity is not Essentialism in the sense of abstract universalism but

the word "humanity" (is used) in the sense of the fulfillment of human kind's inner aim with respect to himself or herself and his/her personal relations, in co-ordination with justice as the fulfillment of the inner aim of social groups and their mutual relations.³⁰

In existence the individual, however, is in a state of estrangement from his or her essential humanity, and the more she/he tries to bridge the gap, the deeper the estrangement. His or her essential humanity stands now against him or her as the law of "ought to be". We have differentiated between the world of morals and the trans-moral world. We could say that the experience of the "ought to be" is in the world of morals and essential humanity (or to use Spinoza's vocabulary: the essential mind) is in the trans-moral world. The "ought to be" is one of the expressions of the trans-moral world in the world of morals. The "ought to be" is formulated as the law. It is not the law that gives essential humanity back, nor is it possible to know the essential humanity without the law, "for maturity is the result of education by the law", Tillich writes.³¹

Law has its place in the life of the individual, and it has its place even in societal life. In Tillich's view, however, it is only the Spiritual Presence that gives a connection to essential humanity. Given this connection with essential humanity, some marks or expressions follow: increasing awareness, increasing freedom, increasing relatedness, and increasing transcendence.³² These are expressions of the work of the Spiritual Presence in the human spirit. What about society?

Considering possible societal organizational forms, Tillich held a plural view: the Spiritual Presence expresses itself in different kinds of societies and in their power-structures. The Spiritual Presence comes to expression, for example, "in so far as the centering and liberating elements in a structure of political power are balanced".³³ This balance occurs through the power of justice, and it is justice that determines the compulsory elements like punishment and war. There is an affirmation of "compulsory elements in cases where justice is violated" and in cases where the ruling group "transforms the objects of centered control into mere objects".³⁴ Various terrorist attacks violate justice, but even state-ruled terror or torture violates justice, as the victims of torture are already seen as objects; Guantanamo is objectification *par excellence*. Terror today has reached new heights through objectification; human beings are transformed into objects. This objectification is inhuman and it is demonic; it is reaction and revenge, not action. War, violence and compulsion belong to the historical dimension; they are to be found in the world of morals. Justice in the world of morals is regulated or distributive justice (through laws, contracts, agreements etc.), but the ultimate justice, as the meaning-fulfillment of all things, belongs to the trans-moral world. The talk of a trans-moral world implies that the dimension of ultimate justice is not beyond the world we live, the world of morals, but is instead one of its driving dimensions and elements. The trans-moral world expresses itself in the world of morals, not only through the law of ought to be, but through creative justice as well. We do not have to meet violence with violence, even if wars sometimes are justified, but we are able to create situations through creative justice in which violence comes to naught. The trans-moral world is in the world of morals; it is both immanent and transcendent in relation to it, and it comes to expression in it just through creative justice. Considering the relationship between the world of morals and the trans-moral world in democratic society, Tillich wrote the following: "In so far as democratization of political attitudes and institutions serves to resist the destructive

implications of power, it is a manifestation of the Kingdom of God in history. But it would be completely wrong to identify democratic institutions with the Kingdom of God in history.”³⁵ The Spiritual Presence is effective in the individual and in the society in creative justice. Creative justice might become an expression of the presence of God/the being itself in the immanent world. The Spiritual Presence is effective in human relations as far as the estrangement between people is overcome and the compulsory element is toned down. “A war (like nuclear war) which has only the appearance of a war but is in reality universal suicide” is condemned.³⁶ In all cases the compulsory or reactionary element is toned down on behalf of an active element. This active element expresses the trans-moral world in the world of morals. Action in Tillich is “the essentialization”, that is, the *expression* of the essential humanity in society, in history, and in the multidimensional unity of life. Essentialization states that something is to be made by humans; it does not express a given and fixed, static essence. Essentialization is activity, and such an activity is not an individually centered action.

Deleuze wrote considering reaction and action: “Everywhere we see the victory of No over Yes, of reaction over action. Life becomes adaptive and regulative, reduced to its secondary forms; we no longer understand what it means to act.”³⁷ To reduce life to its secondary forms is to presuppose that the institutional structures are all there is. The institutions are for the people; the people are not for the institutions. What does it mean to act according to Deleuze? Life is experimentation, a nomadic experimentation. Instead of a rigid holding to a perhaps hierarchical structure and assemblage, humans constantly create new organizational forms. Desire settles momentarily within these new assemblages, but in the end an assemblage turns on the individual and becomes an apparatus of capture; desire wants more, it wants desire. Life, as lived experience, is an inter-play between flows, drives, desire, and basic structures or the first-forms. What humans are able to reach is the Body without Organs (without rigid organization), and Spinoza’s *Ethics* in Deleuze and Guattari’s view is about creating the Body without Organs: freedom in the middle and in the periphery of a world striated by molar organizations and bent desires.³⁸ Ethics, not only Spinoza’s Ethics, is about life that is not caught in one structure or organization.³⁹ Nomadic people bring new worlds in places where old worlds are about to vanish.

Endnotes

- 1 Deleuze, 2005:327.
- 2 See for example Deleuze & Guattari, 1998:35ff.
- 3 Tillich, 1976:274ff.
- 4 Tillich, 1980:33.
- 5 Mark C. Taylor writes considering Tillich's position: "If God is being or the power of Being, then everything that exists is, in some way, united with the divine. God, in other words, is immanent in self and world." Taylor, 2004:314.
- 6 Tillich, 1976:68f.
- 7 "Though details obviously vary, the binary structure of all such schemes remains the same. ... The opposition between the transcendent and the immanent translates into intraworldly oppositions between good and evil, believers and nonbelievers, redeemed and condemned life." Taylor, 2004:320.
- 8 Deleuze & Guattari, 1998:208.
- 9 Ibid. 259.
- 10 "This is a question of consistency: the "holding together" of heterogeneous elements. At first, they constitute no more than a fuzzy set, a discrete set that later takes on consistency. ... What we term machinic is precisely this synthesis of heterogeneities as such." Ibid. 323, 330.
- 11 Ibid. 469.
- 12 Ibid. 466f.
- 13 See p. 55.
- 14 According to Tillich "there is no real separation between substructure and superstructure." Tillich, 1960:72. Tillich is not referring to societal organization; the citation shows that he thought in terms of heteronymous elements.
- 15 Deleuze & Guattari, 1998:216. "The question of whether individuals or "masses" determine history must be replaced by an exact description of their interplay." Tillich, 1976:313.
- 16 Deleuze & Guattari, 1998:215.
- 17 Tillich, 1998:18f.
- 18 Deleuze & Guattari, 1998:230.
- 19 Tillich, 1960:105f.
- 20 Ibid. 64.
- 21 Deleuze & Guattari, 1998:510.
- 22 Tillich, 1976:258f.

- 23 Spinoza, 1977:224.
- 24 Ibid. 202.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Deleuze interprets Nietzsche: "We always have the beliefs, feelings and thoughts that we deserve given our way of being and our style of life." Deleuze, 2006:1.
- 27 Spinoza, 1977:219.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Tillich, 1976:113f.
- 30 Ibid. 67.
- 31 Ibid. 370.
- 32 Ibid. 231.
- 33 Ibid. 386.
- 34 Ibid. 385f.
- 35 Ibid. 385.
- 36 Ibid. 387.
- 37 Deleuze, 2002:75.
- 38 "After all, is not Spinoza's *Ethics* the great book of the BwO?"
Deleuze & Guattari, 1998:153.
- 39 "Smooth space is filled by events or haecceities, far more than by formed and perceived things. It is a space of affects, more than one of properties. It is *haptic* rather than optical perception. ... Intense *Spatium* instead of *Extensio*. A Body without Organs instead of an organism and organisation." Ibid. 479.

Democracy and the Ethical Self: Nietzsche and Tillich on Citizenship in Modern Society

I like to discuss Nietzsche and Tillich with focus on the movement of thought. Nietzsche's perspectivism is based on movement of thought: things might be seen from different angles, and several points of view are possible, not just one. In Tillich, there is a new start, a search for new positions, immediately after the First World War. His *The System of Sciences* from 1923 is an example of this new orientation. Nietzsche influenced this new start, and he continued to be important for Tillich throughout his life: Nietzsche's influence comes to expression in Tillich's conception of essentialization towards the end of his life. In essentialization, truth and action are congruent with life. There is continuity between the early Tillich of the 1920s and his mature thought; truth and action are combined with each other during both periods. Even in Nietzsche there is a congruence between truth and action. I not only discuss them in general, but focus on social ethics: What did Nietzsche and Tillich say about the recent state of things in modern democratic society? What did they say about the world in making, about the constructive possibilities? Essentialization (truth in making), perhaps one of the most radical moves on the current philosophical scene, has a bearing on ethics (action) and *vice versa*. It is the mutuality between truth and action, discernible both in Nietzsche and in Tillich, that I aim to explicate.

Nietzsche's is heroic Individualism, and there is no doubt the individual is important to him, but the point of gravity in Nietzsche lies in the reciprocity and interaction between the individual and society: even a heroic individual is a member of a culture. I read Nietzsche from the perspective of interaction: there is reciprocity between the mentality structure and the institutional organization, that is, the kind of individual,

the kind of society. Culture provides an overall frame of reference: the network the individual lives in. A society might display different patterns of basic orientation or cultural frames. Nietzsche's philosophy was about the cultural frames and their impact on the individual's self-understanding and self-interpretation. The cultural frames in Tillich's context were called "gestalts". What is the role of the cultural patterns or frames in human self-understanding according to Nietzsche and Tillich? To begin with I bring out some of Nietzsche's and Tillich's philosophical context, highlighting something of the background of their ideas and their respective ways of thinking. After that, I discuss their contribution to today's social ethics.

Reciprocity between the individual and society

Philosophizing changes character with Schelling, Feuerbach and Nietzsche; Nietzsche follows the path opened by Feuerbach and Schelling. Images, representations are mental projections: we insert elements and powers of our human nature into our representations. This is something Nietzsche takes from Feuerbach and from Schelling. Ideas are a sign language to human mentality and to the human ways of structuring and understanding the world. A philosopher talks about Plato, but she/he does not understand that her or his interpretation and judgement of Plato shows only *how* she/he understands Plato; 'Plato' plays this particular role in the interior of the philosopher. Texts are a sign-language of how the writer understands Plato: texts depict the interior of the writer. That images and names are examples is to be found both in Nietzsche and in Feuerbach. Truth is not to be found in the interpretation of philosophical propositions, but truth is related to life. In the light of life-experience so many of our "truths" are foreground evaluations and prejudices.

In Feuerbach we discern the turn and the movement of thought that became decisive to Nietzsche: *the movement back to senses*. The movement back to senses is a necessary condition of Feuerbach's conception of science, not the movement to abstraction:

The task of philosophy, of science in general, does *not* consist of the turn from senses, that is, from the *real* things *away*, but it consists of coming back to them – *not* of turning the *objective* over into *ideas* and *representations*, but of making that what *cannot be seen with common eyes*, i. e., the *objective*, visible.¹

This movement is a basic condition of Nietzsche's science as well: the mind awakens to itself and comes to itself in time and place. Given the movement of thought, it is possible to see life and the world from different perspectives: several positions become accessible.

A kind of *horizontal dualism* has functioned as an interpretative pattern in Western culture, and has given basic orientation in the world: on the one side, the reflecting, abstracting and generalizing individual, the subject, and on the other, the observed world, the object. Given the pattern, the movement of the individual is away from the senses up to abstraction, and the world is interpreted from the position of abstraction. This horizontal dualism, with its positions of abstraction and of observing individuality, has been the interpretative pattern in Western societies. It is this dominant interpretative pattern, or mind and body dualism, that Nietzsche fights in his cultural and political philosophy. Coming back to the real things, which is the purpose of science, implies that one works through the level of representations. If we understood the genealogy of ideas and the genealogy of structures, we would be ready for new ideas and new shapes of the soul. The work of deconstruction and criticism makes the overcoming of the horizontal dualism possible and prepares the ground for new possibilities. In Tillich's *Systematic Theology III*, overcoming horizontal dualism or subject-object structure is a central theme. At the same time as the subject/object structure is pointed out by Tillich as the basic structure of cognition, it also defines the problematic: How to transcend this very structure? Is wholeness possible? Already in the 1920s he was looking for a conception of science that goes "beyond the Cartesian dualism".² In Feuerbach's view, the subject/object structure is a result of an act of self-determination: subjectivity posits itself in relation to the outer world.³ The differentiation between the self and the world, which grounds mind and body dualism, is a human act; the dualism is of human making. The subject/object structure, or in other words, the mind and body dualism, is of human making. All three considered that there is a way beyond this construction: in Nietzsche the way out is through identification and creative work; in Feuerbach through the drive towards wholeness: in Tillich in 1923 through a new shape of the will (gestalt) and later through essentialization. Also in Tillich's *The Courage to Be* the subject/object structure defines the problematic: on the one side the individual and the individuation, on the other side the world and participation in the world. How does one tackle the anxieties threatening from both

sides: the anxiety of losing one's self and the anxiety of losing one's world? In Tillich's view the relation to that what is beyond the subject/object distinction gives means to meet the challenge. It is possible to show that participation and individuation are central categories in Nietzsche, even though he did not explicitly use these concepts.

The position of abstraction is according to Nietzsche only one of the perspectives the individual is able to take: it is a view from the outside. A higher perspective is *the view from life itself*, a view from the inside: "the world seen from within, the world described and defined according to its 'intelligible character'".⁴ It is a higher perspective in the sense that the position is a later product than the position of abstraction:

She/he who has followed the history of an individual science will find in its evolution a clue to the comprehension of the oldest and most common processes of all 'knowledge and understanding': in both cases it is the premature hypotheses, the fictions (representations), the good stupid will to 'believe', the lack of mistrust and patience which are evolved first – it is only late, and then imperfectly, that our senses learn to be subtle, faithful, cautious organs of understanding.⁵

In 1923 Tillich viewed science as giving a view from life itself: the life process itself comes to expression in science.⁶ In Nietzsche, much in the same way as in Feuerbach, the life process shows itself in and through the senses: "All credibility, all good conscience, all evidence of truth comes only from the senses."⁷ This credibility, however, is not that of rude empiricism for Nietzsche, as there is the constructive and creative aspect in the sense-activity: the potential of shaping is inexhaustible. The human mind limits, indeed must limit, the inexhaustible, that is, we constantly choose, interpret, and filter that what comes through the senses.⁸ Nietzsche's is not a philosophy without measures and limits. On the contrary, it is a philosophy in which the human being sets the measures through his or her choices and decisions. Tillich had seen the decision-character of truth in Nietzsche.⁹ In decisions "the deciding ego is not opposite to reality but remains connected with it", he wrote.¹⁰ In Feuerbach and in Nietzsche contact with reality is a later product than the detached position of abstraction, that is, the dualism between the mind and body is worked through in them. The work is done on the axis between the position of abstraction and the spontaneity of will or life; this is the *locus* of 'spirit' in Nietzsche. It is here he is testing things.

This far I have outlined some of the historical influences and presuppositions behind both Nietzsche's and Tillich's thought. I have pointed to the "view from life" in both. Thinking is to be done in relation to life; thinking is an event and through this very event life expresses itself. I do not think that these philosophers disregard the subject/object structure: it grounds the cognitive relation upon which natural sciences are based, it makes the plane of reference possible, and without the objectifying or reifying process there is no representational objectivity. But beyond the representational knowledge, there are other types of knowledge, for example, the participative, intuitive knowledge. Nietzsche refuses to accept Kant's solution, which placed all possible knowledge within the horizontal dualism. Kant thought that there is no awareness of the transcendental field, Feuerbach and Nietzsche disagree: there is the apparatus of production behind our ideas and we are able to become aware of the workings of that very apparatus. Life itself comes to expression in human interior. Philosophy is about life as it comes to expression in human awareness.

Directions of the will

There are two basic movements of life in Nietzsche, given the perspective from within: *the ascending, expanding movement* and *the descending, declining movement*. In the expanding movement the mind and body interact, and the voice of life (the will) is discernable. The individuals are carried on by the tide, by the flow of life. Life and will are congruent in Nietzsche, and the ascending movement gives a heightened feeling of life. There is no feeling of life without awareness of those forces that make up the life-experience; the ascending movement gives the heightened feeling of power, of the will to power. In the other case the individual does not *feel* the touch of life: she/he is cut off from the feeling of life, and the declining movement weakens the feeling of power. In general, Nietzsche sees only two stages of existence: either heightened feeling of power or diminishing feeling of power, both stages being expressions of one and the same life-power. The two movements express the movement of life in the individual, in the organism, in society and in culture: life is a unity. The order of rank in morality is determined by how a particular ethical view is able to depict and to express the ascending movement, the good. The utilitarian view receives a low

ranking as it focuses on secondary phenomena like pleasure and pain and calculates based on them.¹¹ The activity of life itself, the ascending movement, does not recognize calculation. In calculation, humans try to control and to master that which cannot be controlled. In general, calculation expresses a lack. The two movements precede reflection: they are *sensed*. A culture ruled by the declining movement is empty: individuals feel that they are cut off from the stream of life. In a culture influenced by the expanding movement, individuals direct their lives around a common course, and feel that they have a place and role in the scheme of things; they are carried by the tide. What Nietzsche does in his politics of the soul is that he analyzes the prevailing situation in Western society. Western society had, in his eyes, been in decline since the times of Socrates. It was at that time that *two strata* were introduced in human self-understanding: on the one side there is the *light of reason* or rationality, on the other the dark *world of instincts*. That the rational man fights his instincts is a result of the construction of the two strata in human cultural self-understanding. It is not the rude sensualism that is the answer to the call of the senses, but the cultivation of instincts: a living apprehension of sensitivity and sensuality. There is the cultivation of the bond that attaches the individual to all life, when life pulsates through the individual and makes him or her aware of that she/he is in the whole, a part of the universe and a part of humanity. Even if she/he is only a part, the individual has responsibility for the whole: for the outcome of the universe and for that what becomes of us. The individual is responsible for the whole as she/he is in the whole. This, in Tillich's language, is essentialization.

Nietzsche introduced the theme of the internalization of man. The ascending, expanding movement comes to an end and the will turns inward: "All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly *turn inward* – this is what I call the *internalization* of man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his "soul"."¹² On the one side is the inner space, the soul, created by internalization, and on the other the outer space, the world. The horizontal dualism is there. In internalization the will turns upon itself, life cuts into life. "It was precisely here that I saw the beginning of the end, the dead stop, a retrospective weariness, the will turning *against* life."¹³ It is observed that Nietzsche's will to power is two-edged: on the one hand the will to dominate, to control and on the other, the spontaneity of the will.¹⁴ In the "bad" will to power,

the will is turned upon itself: the ascending movement is inhibited and the will tends to control itself. The kind of individual, the kind of society, or in other words: the individuals control themselves, and society shows the signs of control, repression, and a declining feeling for life. The outward directed movement, the desire for more life, is stopped and the will is pushed back into itself through upbringing and education with repression as the result.

Value-differentiation: antipodes belong together

Within the dualistic frame, mind and body are set apart from each other, and the active and the passive elements of the self are set apart from each other as well. The thinking mind is active and the body is passive. This is the “traditional” way of interpreting the relationship between mind and body, an interpretation that more and more people find false and unjust.¹⁶ When this structure is reflected on the societal plane, men are considered to be active and women passive: man is spirit and consciousness, woman is nature, darkness. That the basic elements are *antipodal* is essential to our understanding of Nietzsche. Antipodal means that things belong together, even if they are seemingly opposites. “This world which concerns *us*, in which *we* have to love and fear, this almost invisible, inaudible world of subtle commanding, subtle obeying.”¹⁷ Commanding is being active, obeying is being passive.¹⁸ To be a whole is both to command and to obey in that “almost invisible, inaudible world” of human heart. The antipodal structure of active and passive elements lies at the core of Nietzsche’s understanding of the individual-society relationship: the kind of individual, the kind of society. In a fragmented society, a society in decline, the elements are separated, mirroring dualism in the individual.

In the “herd”, in “the herd instinct of obedience” the passive and reactive element has the upper hand: “there have also been human herds [family groups, communities, tribes, nations, states, churches], and always very many who obey compared with the very small number of those who command.”¹⁹ Nietzsche found himself in the world of active and passive powers. When the declining movement has the upper hand the active powers disappear, and only the passive, reactive elements are left; to obey is to react. Modern ideas, including democracy, belong according to Nietzsche to the declining movement of thought. Passive,

adaptive forces are discernible in modern democracy. “The democratic idiosyncrasy which opposes everything that dominates and wants to dominate (...) places instead “adaptation” in the foreground, that is to say, an activity of the second rank, a mere reactivity.”²⁰ Once democracy was run by the ascending movement and the active powers and elements were discernible even in it, but now it has lost its originality. The democratic, liberal institutions are good when they are life-promoting, life-advancing, life-expanding, when the will behind them is spontaneous: “As long as they (liberal institutions) are still being fought for, these same institutions ... promote freedom mightily.”²¹ But these “institutions immediately cease to be liberal as soon as they are attained ... one knows, indeed, what they bring about: they undermine the will to power.”²² The problem does not lie in the institutions, but in the kind of people that inhabit them:

Our institutions are no longer fit for anything: everyone is unanimous about that. But the fault lies not in them but in us. Having lost all the instincts out of which institutions grow, we are losing the institutions themselves, because we are no longer fit for them. Democracy has always been the declining form of the power to organize.²³

Given the mind and body dualism and the emphasis of the conscious mind, the world of instincts disappears from sight; we, modern people, have lost our instincts and with them the touch of life. Nietzsche’s politics of the soul aims to restore unity between the mind and the body: in the ascending movement there is interaction between the mind and the body, between active and passive forces, between commanding and obeying. In the ascending movement people feel contact with the ascending life-movement.

The constellations of the will are mirrored in institutional structures: the kind of individual, the kind of society, and, we might add: the kind of individual, the kind of thinking. In Foucault’s view the “bad” will to power always establishes itself in institutions like schools, hospitals and prisons; we still live in an inquisitorial culture, a point also made by Tillich.²⁴ Given this realistic view, we perhaps should ask: How to see on institutional structures as *possibility-structures*, as life-promoting and meaning-fulfilling, not only for humans but for all living things? Institutional structures become possibility-structures, when we understand the difference between the active and the reactive/passive affects,

and when we see the interaction between the pattern and the mentality as the binding bond of society. I am not trying to make Nietzsche into a democrat; I only lift up an interpretation of him as a prelude to what perhaps might be called a democratic frame of mind. *Beyond Good and Evil* is a prelude according to Nietzsche, he knew how to place himself.

The cleft between the two strata

Nietzsche is revealing the two strata of the self-world structure. The individual is not only a product of his or her life-history, she/he is also a part of cultural history; both histories are in him or her. Cultural history according to Nietzsche reaches back to nomadic times and to the clash between the high (nomadic aristocracy; people on move) and the low (cattle breeders; people staying in one place) The nomads were, in Nietzsche's view, rulers and active forces, the cattle breeders were the ruled ones. We might translate this example in the following way: those on the move representing active forces and those staying in one place representing passive forces. We meet the clash between the active and the passive elements even here. Another way of explicating and testing is to focus on Rome and Judea. Romans in Nietzsche's view were bearers of higher values, and *they* understood Jews as bearers of contrary values: "The two *opposing* values "good and bad," "good and evil" have been engaged in a fearful struggle on earth for thousands of years. ... The symbol of this struggle, inscribed in letters legible across all human history is "Rome against Judea, Judea against Rome."²⁵ When Rome with its aristocratic values dominates, and this self-understanding has the upper hand (and we see signs of this even today), the people at the other end of the scale become bearers of the contrary values: there is hatred, *resentment*, against the aristocracy. In Nietzsche's view, the two sides or values belong together; they are expressions of the very same evaluation-process. *At the same time as the noble values come into being, the lower values establish themselves, as the very antithesis of the noble values.* To understand this is extremely important. The history of Western culture shows, as the matter of fact, the opposite interpretation: the two sides of the evaluation-process are set apart from each other and they are treated as if they were independent from each other. The value-differentiation leads to cultural dualism. "The pathos of nobility and distance, ... the protracted and domineering fundamental total feeling on

the part of a higher ruling order in relation to a lower order, to a “below” – *that* is the origin of the antithesis “good” and “bad”.²⁶ These antithetical values are created in one and the same process. In cultural dualism the scale is cut in the middle; we get two cultures representing seemingly contrary values, values which as such still belong to the same scale of comparative values. What happens here is that the

instinct for freedom (is) forcibly made latent ... (it is) pushed back and repressed. ... For fundamentally it is the same active force that is at work on a grander scale in those artists of violence and organizers who build states (Romans), and that here, internally, on a smaller and pettier scale, directed backward, in the “labyrinth of the breast,” ... creates for itself a bad conscience and builds negative ideals (Jews, Christians, and democrats) – namely, the *instinct for freedom* [in my language: the will to power].²⁷

On the one hand are the active, dominating powers and on the other hand the passive, reactive powers, with both sides creating their own specific reciprocally determined values: “a development which always runs parallel with that other”.²⁸ *Resentment* is a very negative ideal, which “need(s), physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all – its action is fundamentally reaction”.²⁹ Behind cultural dualism there is a cleft between active and passive forces, a cleft that ultimately is based on mind-body dualism. Nietzsche seemed to have thought that only by traversing both sides of the value-scale is it possible to identify the problem and to indicate a way out. If our interpretation of Nietzsche is correct, then all kinds of partiality in morality would be foreign to Nietzsche’s view. If our interpretation is correct, not much has been changed in the Western culture and in Western cultural self-interpretation, despite the disasters of the 20th century.

The antipodal values are two sides of the same coin. In cultural dualism the antipodal values are separated. What is racism and xenophobia other than reaction? The dominant population sees its antipodal elements in other populations. To see this, to understand it, and to overcome cultural dualism is the very work of the politics of the soul!

Nietzsche saw the beginning of cultural dualism in Athens during Socrates life-time. The aristocracy in Athens representing higher values, and Socrates representing lower values: “With Socrates Greek taste undergoes a change in favour of dialectics: what is really happening when that happens? It is above all the defeat of a *nobler* taste; with dialectics

the rabble gets on top.”³⁰ The antipodal values belong together, like the nobler taste and the lower taste, the rabble. The declining movement starts with Socrates. Socrates

saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasp that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was already no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was coming to an end. ... No one was any longer master of himself ... the instincts were becoming mutually *antagonistic*.³¹

Cultural dualism builds on values that are seemingly exclusive; it builds on the antagonism of the instincts. At the bottom of this lies the mind and body dualism, the widening of the cleft between the mind and the body: “Rationality at any cost, life bright, cold, circumspect, conscious, without instinct, in opposition to instincts. (...) To *have* to combat one’s instincts – that is the formula of *décadence*: as long as life is *ascending*, happiness and instinct are one. —”³² What Nietzsche did was to write a cultural history of Western culture from the perspective of cultural dualism. He believed that the understanding of this phenomenon could set a stop to the accelerated widening of the cleft between the two strata. Democracy, in his view, fights against noble values: it is an expression of the reactive forces.

The active and the passive elements are the antipodes of the self; they are integral parts of human personality. That these elements are integrated (or not integrated) in human self-understanding becomes reflected on the societal and cultural planes. In my view in Nietzsche there is a move away from the dualistic frame to the creation of a manifold whole. There is an identification of differential elements, like the active and passive elements, as well as a move to become an integral whole. Tillich had observed the integral nature of the self in Nietzsche. Further, he had seen that such a self stand in connection with life:

The submissive self is the opposite of the self-affirming self. ... The obedient self, on the contrary, is the self which commands itself according to the law of life, the law of self-transcendence. The will which commands is the creative will. It makes a whole out of fragments and riddles of life. ... The courageous self is united with life itself and its secret.³³

A part in becoming an integrated whole, for Nietzsche, is the identification of the otherness or the passivity of the self:

He who, when trafficking with men, does not occasionally glisten with all the shades of distress, green and grey with disgust, satiety, sympathy, gloom and loneliness, is certainly not a man of an elevated taste; but if he does not voluntarily assume this burden and displeasure, if he continually avoids it and, as aforesaid, remains hidden quietly and proudly away in his citadel, then one thing is sure: he is not made, not predestined for knowledge.³⁴

The active and passive elements are a pair of antipodes or antithetical elements which an individual, in Nietzsche's view, should acknowledge and identify. An acceptance of the antipodes is the port of entry in the philosophy of the future, and it is obvious that Nietzsche thought that his thinking was of that mode. Nietzsche has been interpreted as an individualist and as a representative of the modern individualism; the reciprocity between the individual and the society is many times disregarded as a central theme. "Whole" here does not point to an individualistic whole, but to belonging and to participation.

Perhaps we now understand Nietzsche's politics of the soul and the meaning of his work: the individual is to work on his or her mentality in order to become a more integral whole. If there is a reciprocal bond between the individual and society, as Nietzsche seems to suppose, then such an individual, such a society, and the work on the soul has an immediate effect on society and the societal structures. In Foucault, the work is called "the care of the self". Even in him "the care of the self possesses a positive ethical meaning", and it has relational dimensions.³⁵ Nietzsche wrote: "Concepts are not something arbitrary, something growing up autonomously, but on the contrary grow up connected and related to one another."³⁶ The antipodes and antitheses, the concepts, belong together even if they are set apart from each other in surface interpretations; the concepts are parts of the same integral and differential pattern. High morality and low morality belong to the same set or pattern. Nietzsche wrote: "Today there is perhaps no more decisive mark of a "higher nature," a more spiritual nature, than that of being divided in this sense and a genuine battleground of these opposed values (good and bad; good and evil)."³⁷ To be beyond good and evil is, then, to be beyond mind and body dualism; it is to work in the direction of wholeness. Instead of cultural dualism, a culture with whole human

beings! To be beyond good and evil is not to identify oneself as the bearer of higher morality, but to recognize both the high and the low in one's self. Only this acceptance and affirmation might bring about societal change for a more whole-promoting society, locally and globally.

Even traditional Protestant ethics is sketched using the concept of dualism. Since Luther, the distinction between the inner and the outer has been maintained as a main category. The outer is the political domain and the inner is the spiritual domain. In the outer life the individual is a servant of the societal order, she/he is subordinated to the laws and customs of the society; in his or her inner life she/he is free.³⁸ In this view, there is dualism between the inner and the outer. There is no necessary bond between the inner and the outer in this interpretation; it is enough with inner freedom! Inner freedom or transcendental freedom, as coined by Kant, is something Nietzsche could not accept.³⁹ In such a view, only the interior is the place of freedom. Tillich also states that the distinction between the inner and outer freedom is false; there is no inner freedom without an outer freedom. A part of the problematic in Germany prior to the Second World War was that "philosophers were not capable of changing internal freedom into external freedom and of making free people out of thinkers of freedom".⁴⁰ A necessary condition in making the people free is the following:

Free yourselves from the belief that internal and external freedom, that religious and political freedom can be separated! Cast away this false inheritance that the churches – and with them, the poets and philosophers – have dragged through the centuries: the belief that freedom would not depend on political freedom.⁴¹

One part of freedom is to feel oneself free, but another, more difficult part, is to make oneself free by identifying the differential and antipodal elements both in one's self and in societal structures. Only the identification, acceptance and affirmation, the self-overcoming, to use Nietzsche's language, give the freedom necessary for the political action. This seems to be the case both in Tillich's and Nietzsche's view. Nietzsche's politics of the soul is the ethics of affirmation. Nietzsche had the same view on freedom as Feuerbach had: freedom is the freedom of the whole human nature (*wesen*); freedom is something that stretches itself all over one's being; in morality the whole human being is in action. Feuerbach wrote:

In general whatever an individual makes the essential aim of his or her life, she/he proclaims to be his or her soul; for it is the principle of motion in him or her. But through this aim, through the activity in which she/he realises this aim, the individual is not only something for him- or herself, but also something for others, for the general life, the species. She/he therefore who lives in the consciousness of the species as a reality, regards his or her existence for others, his or her relation to society, his or her utility for the public, as that existence which is one with the existence of his own essence – as his or her immortal existence. She/he lives with his or her whole soul, with his or her whole heart, for humanity.⁴²

To be free is to be beyond one's self-satisfied individuality. The will to power in Nietzsche is to be understood as the life power. For Tillich, the courage to be is congruent and synonymous to the rightly understood will to power:

A life process which shows this balance (between fear and courage) and with it power of being has, in biological terms, vitality, i.e. life power. The right courage therefore must, like the right fear, be understood as the expression of perfect vitality. The courage to be is a function of vitality.⁴³

As is the case in Nietzsche, there are according to Tillich periods of history characterized by the descending movement, by the diminishing life power: "The periods of a diminished courage to be are periods of biological weakness in the individual and in history. ... They are ends of an era and could be overcome only by the rise of vitally powerful groups that replaced the vitally disintegrated groups."⁴⁴ In a collectivistic culture, democracy being such in Nietzsche's view, the passive elements dominate, and the active, whole promoting elements are pushed back, hidden. A will to conformity, a levelling, characterizes such a late culture.⁴⁵ In Tillich's view, the greatest danger to democracy comes from the collectivistic forces of conformity: "Conformism might approximate to collectivism, not so much in an economic respect, and not too much in a political respect, but very much in the pattern of daily life and thought."⁴⁶ In conformism the collective, passive adaptive forces have the upper hand.

What I have tried to do in the above is to show how Nietzsche analyzes the prevailing cultural and societal situation, how he goes beyond mind and body dualism, how he anchors thinking in the life process itself,

and how he indicates the way towards personal and societal wholeness. There is a kind of a structural plane in the reciprocity between the individual and society: the kind of mentality-structure in the individual, the kind of societal structure! Nietzsche digs into the roots of cultural dualism, into the roots of mind and body dualism.

You ask me about the idiosyncrasies of philosophers? ... 'We've got it,' they cry in delight, 'it is the senses! These senses, *which are so immoral as well*, it is they which deceive us about the *real* world. Moral: escape from sense-deception. ... And away, above all, with the *body*, that pitiable *idée fixe* of the senses!'⁴⁷

"They" are the people who philosophize from the position of abstraction. It is not the individual thinkers that are Nietzsche's main target, but what they represent: the mentality-structure coming to expression in them. A new field opens up in morality with Nietzsche, and it is perhaps only Foucault who lately has been able to match that opening. The roots of our moral concepts go thousands of years back in time. By recognizing the differential elements of the "soul" of the self, the individual becomes fit for a new politics of the soul. She/he lessens the role of mere reactive elements; she/he is becoming active, even in the making of truth.

Truth in making

In Tillich's *The System of Science* from 1923 we find the view that thinking issues from life; science issues from life itself. Tillich is critical of those who place reason, and with it science, above life.

The contradiction between life and knowledge ... contains the unfounded assumption that the rational attitude of knowing is necessary and constant. If it were so, the contrast between science and life, in fact, would be insurmountable. The pure rational form would shrivel life and leave on the one side only blank general forms and on the other side lifeless material knowledge. What would be recognized would just be annihilated.⁴⁸

His critical point is expressed in his wartime sermons as well. Germans, and especially the intellectuals, could not resist the Nazi propaganda because “the faith in the intellect had been lost in Germany, because the faith in the strength of the intellect to shape life had been lost. And this faith had been lost because the intellect that was found in one’s self and in others did not issue from life”.⁴⁹ Intellect that does not issue from life issues from a position of abstraction. Science in Tillich’s view should not issue from a position above life, but from life; science should promote the meaning-fulfilment of all things: “Reality comes to fulfillment in the creative act. Cognition is a kind of fulfillment; everything tends towards the real thing. Cognition is co-creation and the promoting of the original creation. It does not dominate things, but brings them to fulfillment”.⁵⁰ Science, working towards the meaning-fulfilment, has a creative and constructive side and it gives room to the particularity and the individuality of things, it does not shy away from the individuality of things as is the case in the position of abstraction: science “is meaning-fulfilment only when it affirms the individuality of things and directs them to the unconditional form”.⁵¹ There is continuity between Tillich’s position in *The System of Sciences* and his later concept of essentialization in *Systematic Theology III*. Essentialization considers the meaning-fulfilment of all things as a result of a constructive and new-creating action. It seems to me that the central part of Nietzsche’s philosophy of science, that science should be in the service of creating the new, is a crucial part of Tillich’s view of science both in 1923 and in 1963, when *Systematic Theology III* was published. In 1923 Tillich wrote: “Truth is the fulfilled meaning of a living process of individual creation, the process in which the object of the spiritual act comes to fulfillment.”⁵² Here, truth and action are related to each other, in a mere representational, static truth this is not the case. How far removed from common mainstream understanding of science Tillich’s view is!

In Tillich during the 1920s we find a movement towards the new: the present is pregnant with the future, and human beings constantly make choices in relation to the future. In decision one “immerses oneself in the creative process which brings the future forth out of the past”.⁵³ He even agrees, as we have seen, with Nietzsche’s analysis of the bourgeois society: the technical gestalt or shape is triumphant in modern capitalist society. The same theme is to be found in *Systematic Theology III*:

A technical product, in contrast to a natural object, is a “thing”. There are no “things” in nature, that is, no objects which are nothing but objects, which have no element of subjectivity. But objects that are produced by the technical act *are* things. ... In transforming objects into things, he destroys their natural structures and relations. But something also happens to man when he does this, as it happens to the objects which he transforms. He himself becomes a thing among things.⁵⁴

In the technical act the inner community between the knower and the known is broken.⁵⁵ However, it is not the technical act with the technical gestalt that is destructive or negative, it becomes such when the individuals become immersed in the gestalt and do not see any other alternative self-interpretations than to interpret themselves as things among things. The technological gestalt, and the opportunities in it, should be considered as a means, but the unlimited technical production of capitalist society has turned means into an end and a goal.

Given both Nietzsche’s and Tillich’s interpretations, we could try to tackle the present situation in which politics are subordinated to economics. The question is whether economics are run by reactive forces or not? Isn’t it so that the pattern of reactive forces now has the upper hand in the economy? The economy is permeated by the technological gestalt and the utilitarian model and it is permeated by reactive forces. If this is the case, a way out is to link the economy with a holistic pattern or model; the economy might be directed to sense-, reality-, and meaning-making. Quantified profiting and calculation would no longer be the driving force of the economy.

If the technological gestalt and the reactive mentality permeate society and human self-understanding, what is the way out? Already during the 1920s Tillich talked about the *original creative source* preceding mind and body dualism.⁵⁶ The original creative source is in life. The community between the knower and the known, he claimed, could be restored, not by method, but by the productive and creative science, which is in contact with the life-process itself. In a productive and determining act there is the shaping of concrete reality. This does not mean that politics are to be ruled by religion, or that the autonomy of democratic organizations is destroyed by some theonomous order. Things and individuals are affirmed in their concreteness, not from the position of abstraction, but from the position of the life-process itself. Given the

order of things, the decision-character of truth is prior to the position of abstraction and its products like representations and the technological gestalt. It is more primordial than representation.

Autonomy and essentialization; making of ethical self

In an autonomous culture, science and morality, including politics and economics are to be based on reason alone (epistemological and moral autonomy); religion and politics are set apart from each other. Tillich wrote: "The autonomous culture is against religion and so with right."⁵⁷ The appearance of the new (as the result of the productive act) does not destroy the products of the autonomous scientific culture nor does it destroy the autonomy of the ethical self. On the contrary, the appearance of the new fulfils and goes beyond the mere product or the mere intended act. The product and the act are there as autonomous as ever, but the creative act is open into the theonomous dimension: creativity becomes Spiritual Creativity. Autonomy and theonomy are not on the same plane. Autonomy, however, has a relationship to the theonomous dimension. Culture in all its products and shapes might become *symbolic* for that what transcends every gestalt and every product, including the individual; culture might become symbolic for the creative abyss of being. "The power of being acts through the power of the individual selves. It does not swallow them as every limited whole, every collectivism, and every conformism does."⁵⁸

It is in Tillich's understanding of Christianity and morality that self-transcendence is expressed. Christianity in Tillich's view is not a new religion: it is the end of religion.⁵⁹ Christianity is above religion, not in the sense that it could be translated into humanism or human-dependent ideology, but in the sense that the zeal of religion is overcome in it. The zeal of religion is the will to fulfil the law: the self is to be moulded by the law of "ought to be". Religious authorities will keep the "ought to be" in place as the law of moral and political conduct. Under the zeal of religion, under the "ought to be", there is no place for any autonomous morality. Nietzsche considered that there is no more effective way to implant a bad conscience than to demand of humans that which they cannot fulfil, and Tillich held the same opinion. In Tillich's view, the individual experiences that she/he is under the "ought to be" while in the state of estrangement. The "ought to be" comes also to expression

in the I and Thou relationship: the individual is to love the Other as oneself. In estrangement this is impossible, as the self is incapable of love. The “ought to be”, experienced in religion and in morality, is in Tillich’s view an expression of essential humanity standing against the individual.⁶⁰ It belongs to the “givens” of human life. This contradiction between estranged humanity and the essential humanity is both *acknowledged* and *overcome* in essentialization:

In the essence of the least actualized individual, the essences of other individuals and, indirectly, of all beings are present. ... She/he who is estranged from his or her own essential being and experiences the despair of total rejection must be told that his or her essence participates in the essences of all those who have reached a high degree of fulfilment and that through this participation his or her being is eternally affirmed. This idea of the essentialization of the individual in unity with all beings makes the concept of vicarious fulfilment understandable. It also gives a new content to the concept of Spiritual Community.⁶¹

The interesting thing in Tillich’s conception of essentialization is the unity of all life: “the individual in unity with all beings”, not only with human beings but with all particular things and beings. There is, in Tillich’s view, a bond that links all living things with each other. The content of essentialization, the new, is the very “result” of the productive act.

In Tillich’s view, it is love that conquers the zeal of religion and the demand of the law: love is prior to the zeal of religion and the law; love comes from the creative source preceding all things and all representation. This is the central point in essentialization:

Eternal Life is the end of morality. ... There is no law where there is essentialization, because what the law demands is nothing but the essence, creatively enriched in existence. We assert the same when we call Eternal life the life universal and perfect love. For love does what love demands before it is demanded. To use another terminology, we can say that in Eternal life the center of the individual person rests in the all-uniting divine center and through it is in communion with all other personal centers.⁶²

The ethical self is not a self that fulfils the law of “ought to be”. The ethical self comes into being in the battle between law and love. As far as human beings live under the predicament of estrangement, the demand of the law is there. We might say that as long there is life, the predicament of estrangement is a fact of life. In self-transcendence, the self participates in “that” which comes from the “before” of the self; the ethical self is the loved, particular self. Only love makes whole. It is at this point that there is continuity between *The System of Sciences* from 1923 and the concept of essentialization. In 1923 Tillich wrote: “In the unity of knowing and love the living meaning of science is brought to its highest peak. – But love is not the negation but the affirmation of the particularity of the Other.”⁶³ In modern epistemology knowledge and love are put apart from each other. When thinking and feeling/sensing are in life, ethics and epistemology are linked with the preceding source: the creative source of life is apprehended in human existence.

The individual is capable of union, reunion Tillich says, with essential humanity (humanity in the universal life). This relationship is a matter of *active participation*; it is not a matter of passive reception. In Tillich’s view, what the individual makes and realizes, creates through his or her existence, adds a new element into essential humanity: humanity is in the making. Essentialization, then, is a truth in the making:

The new which has been actualized in time and space adds something to essential being, uniting it with the positive which is created within existence, thus producing the ultimately new, the “New Being.” ... Participation in the eternal life depends on a creative synthesis of a being’s essential nature with what it has made of it in its temporal existence.⁶⁴

That what the individual makes of himself or herself in existence adds something new to the universal life: it enriches God⁶⁵. Human beings are God’s co-creators and co-labourers.

The eternal act of creation is driven by a love which finds fulfilment only through the other one who has freedom to reject and to accept love. God, so to speak, drives toward the actualization and essentialization of everything that has being. For the eternal dimension of what happens in the universe is the Divine Life itself.⁶⁶

In essentialization the individual does not turn away from the world or society, but the new is instead created in society in interaction with other human beings and with all living things. Coming back from the First World War, after four years at the front, Tillich started to work politically for a new society and a new way of living compared with the ways of living discernible in the capitalist/bourgeoisie society. The aim of action and activity is

the creation of a new meaningful society, in which each group and each individual could find the meaning of life. ... The eternal does not reveal itself in its entirety in time, but it breaks in time and creates something New in it. And for the New, which the eternal demands of our time, works the Religious Socialism.⁶⁷

The aim of socialism: the just and equal society is “only” a step; it is the preliminary, necessary step in the direction of a meaning-fulfilled society. Love and justice, which make up the trans-moral world, direct human society toward the meaning-fulfilment of all things and all individuals. The individual actively participates in the “directing creativity” when in touch with the creative source of life. In creative justice, in art, individuals partake in the creative source preceding everything. The spiritual society is found in the democratic society, but it does not arise from it. It is the trans-moral world that is the driving power in morality, never in its completeness in the political world, but still active in it and “directing” in it. It should be remembered that this position was construed in the aftermath of the First World War, with the next war lurking around the corner. The creation of the new through the creative act was Tillich’s answer to the ethical demands coming from the destruction of European pre-war society; essentialization was his answer in world in which universal suicide through nuclear war became a concrete threat. The positive created in existence is taken to a new level. The overcoming is a No to No; a No to fragmentation and alienation; it is a No to that what inhibits and destroys sense, meaning, and reality.

Endnotes

- 1 Feuerbach, GW 9., 1984:325f.
- 2 Tillich, 1923; 1959:161.
- 3 “But just so subjectivity in general, which distinguishes itself from the world, which takes itself for an essence distinct from the world, posits the world out of itself as a separate existence, indeed, this positing out of the self, and the distinguishing of the self, is one act.” Feuerbach, 1957:108.
- 4 Nietzsche, 1988:49.
- 5 Ibid., 96f.
- 6 “Ist die Wissenschaft ein Akt schöpferischer Sinnerfüllung, so ist sie ein Akt des Lebens selbst.” Tillich, 1923; 1959:290.
- 7 Nietzsche, 1988:82.
- 8 “The transfiguration of human life that here and there come flashing up which we find most difficult and laboursome to evoke in ourselves: those miraculous moments when a great power voluntarily halted before the boundless and immeasurable – when a superfluity of subtle delight in sudden restraint and petrification, in standing firm and fixing oneself, was enjoyed on a ground still trembling. *Measure* is alien to us (to us moderns), let us admit it to ourselves; what we itch for is the infinite, the unmeasured.” Ibid., p. 135.
- 9 See for example Tillich, 1936:140.
- 10 Ibid., 156f.
- 11 See p. 55
- 12 Nietzsche, 1969:84.
- 13 Ibid., 19.
- 14 See Thiele, 1990.
- 15 Tillich, 1998:18.
- 16 There has been “the rigid dualism between human beings and nature. This ancient hierarchical dualism is similar to other such divisions – culture/nature, spirit/flesh, mind/body, male/female – and denies what is obviously a continuum. Like other categories that were imagined absolute, human beings and nature are profoundly linked”. McFague, 2001:46.
- 17 Nietzsche, 1988:137.
- 18 “But now observe the strangest thing of all about the will ... we at the same time command *and* obey ... the side which obeys knows the sensations of constraint, compulsion, pressure, resistance, motion which usually begin immediately after the act of will.” Ibid., 30.

- 19 Ibid., 102.
- 20 Nietzsche, 1969:78f.
- 21 Nietzsche, 1990:102.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Ibid., 103.
- 24 "We belong to an inquisitorial civilization that, for centuries now, practices, according to forms of varying complexity but all derived from the same model, the extraction, displacement, and accumulation of knowledge. The inquisition: a form of power-knowledge essential to our society." Foucault, 1997:19. Tillich wrote that Karl Barth "accused me of "still fighting against the Grand Inquisitor." He is right in asserting that this is a decisive element of my theological thought. ... History has shown that the Grand Inquisitor is always ready to reappear in different disguises, political as well theological." Tillich, 1984:33.
- 25 Nietzsche, 1969:52.
- 26 Ibid., 26
- 27 Ibid., 87. "Then there arise those marvellously incomprehensible and unfathomable men, those enigmatic men predestined for victory and the seduction of men ... they appear in precisely the same ages as those in which that rather weak type with his desire for rest comes to the fore: the two types belong together and originate in the same causes." Nietzsche, 1988:103f.
- 28 Nietzsche, 1969:28.
- 29 Ibid., 37.
- 30 Nietzsche, 1990:41.
- 31 Ibid., 42f.
- 32 Ibid., 44.
- 33 Ibid., 39.
- 34 Nietzsche, 1988:39.
- 35 See Foucault, 1997:288.
- 36 Ibid., 31.
- 37 Nietzsche, 1969:52.
- 38 See Luther, M., *Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen*.
- 39 Nietzsche, 1990:64.
- 40 Tillich, 1923, 1959:22.
- 41 Ibid., 23.
- 42 Feuerbach, 1957:171.
- 43 Tillich, 1980:83.

- 44 Ibid.
- 45 “The *décadence* in the valuating instinct of our politicians, our political parties, goes so deep that *they instinctively prefer* that which leads to dissolution, that which hastens the end.” Nietzsche, 1990:104.
- 46 Tillich, 1980:113.
- 47 Nietzsche, 1990:45.
- 48 Tillich, 1923, 1959:291.
- 49 Tillich, 1998:58.
- 50 Tillich, 1923, 1959:291.
- 51 Ibid.
- 52 Ibid., 289.
- 53 Tillich, 1932:6.
- 54 Tillich, 1976:74.
- 55 Tillich, 1936:117.
- 56 Tillich, 1959:161.
- 57 Tillich, 1965:387.
- 58 Tillich, 1980:181.
- 59 See Tillich, 1949:93ff.
- 60 “The moral imperative is valid because it represents our essential being over against our state of existential estrangement.” Tillich, 1976:44.
- 61 Ibid. 409.
- 62 Ibid. 402. “We have not become more moral or more saintly; we still belong to a world which is subject to evil and self-destruction. But the good of life is in us, uniting us with the good of everything, giving us the blessed experience of the universal love.” Tillich, 1949:100.
- 63 Tillich, 1923, 1959:293.
- 64 Tillich, 1976:400f.
- 65 See Schüssler & Sturm, 2007:197.
- 66 Ibid. 422.
- 67 *Neue Blätter für den Sozialismus. Zeitschrift für Geistige und Politische Gestaltung*. 9. Heft, 1. 1930 p. 403.

Differential Thinking and New Aesthetics; Potentialization, Essentialization, and Art

In *Woman at the window* Caspar David Friedrich was not only reproducing natural scenery but how the outer affects the individual: the shape of the woman tells about her state of mind, she is wondering what is happening on the outside. This is one part of the setting; the other part is that her shape affects the spectator and gives him or her a feeling for an outside world. There is the seen and there is the sensed; the sensed being an opening up in relation to the represented. The sensed gives access to a world: the seen and the sensed make up a differentiated whole.

During Friedrich's lifetime the differential view appeared in Schelling as well:

Activity and receptivity are related to one another as opposed terms [+ and -]. Thus, as the one factor increases, the other falls, and vice versa. ... Activity and receptivity arise simultaneously in one and the same indivisible moment, and precisely this simultaneity of activity and receptivity constitutes life.¹

Friedrich and Schelling were contemporary and Schelling's philosophy influenced Friedrich rather early.² Schelling saw the interaction between activity and receptivity, activity and passivity on all levels of life, the interaction being dependent on two basic forces of expansion and contraction.³ In humans, humans being miniature-beings or organisms,⁴ the activity of conscious apprehension and the passivity of receptivity oscillate in the same moment; activity and passivity play with each other and collide, giving the presuppositions for the synthesis of personality.⁵ Kierkegaard developed the interaction between activity and passivity in his definition of dread. In Schelling there is no binary opposition between

thinking and feeling or sensing, activity and passivity. The kind of thinking that comprises opposite elements and sees these as parts of the same constellation might be called differential thinking. Differential thinking during Schelling's life-time was also present in Kierkegaard.⁶ Differential thinking combines the plus and the minus, but it does not operate within the frames of reflection only, but it opens itself up to the act of sensing. In sensing there are different levels or dimensions to be found: there is the *subjective reflexivity* going on in the subject; there is the *societal reflexivity* going on in groups and society; there is the *being-oriented intuition*. All these levels of sensing are to be found in contemporary philosophy and aesthetics. Differential thinking at its basic levels finds difference in being, and it orients itself out of being, elaborating with expressive meaning: things are to be known out of themselves.⁷ Schelling's is the being-oriented intuition.

Mark C. Taylor brings out societal reflexivity in his work. Economic processes do not necessarily follow the logic of cause and effect; the colliding of active and passive agents is operative in economics as well. Economic processes are explained and understood as self-organizing systems with a logic of their own, and their explanatory elements involve the active and passive agents affecting each other and colliding with each other, creating the global economic system.⁸ In Enlightenment discourse, on the other hand, the autonomous rational part of the self is supposed to control the sensing and feeling part, especially the reactive elements of the self. Enlightenment discourse builds on the binary opposition between mind and body, thinking and receptivity, activity and passivity; one moves within the frames of reflection or subjective reflexivity only. Enlightenment discourse could not break free from the binary opposition between mind and body. Today these binary oppositions and the coding out of these are questioned in philosophy and in new aesthetics. Recent art, like the videos of Tamy Ben-Tor and the "documentary" by Casey Affleck of Joaquin Phoenix, which by now is recognized as a "fake", play on passive-reactive idiosyncrasies. It is as if the new aesthetics and contemporary art ask how much of the passive-reactive elements humans are able to bear, in order to make another way of relating possible: art awakens the mind by letting the passivity of mind collide with the activity of mind. Through its focus on both passive and active elements, the new aesthetics and the new art stick

to Schelling: “But it is necessarily always the case that the higher is at the same time what grasps and recognises the lower.”⁹ By playing out the lower, for example the passive-reactive patterns and idiosyncrasies, the new art opens up for a new way of relating, for a new societal milieu, which gives space for otherness, for the Other and for those societal values that promote human potential. It promotes new synthesis of personality. Aesthetics are combined with ethics today. The new art fights the global trend of excluding, for instance, racism and xenophobia we witness in Europe just now. The new art allows the passive and active actors and elements collide, and through this very colliding it creates space for the new: for the possibility of a new synthesis within the individual, society and the world. What is more, it strives for sense-, meaning-, and reality-making as well. According to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, who build on differential thinking, art is an oppositional force: in a world where everyone is supposed to be orderly, art resides in the darkness, in the becoming of the mass-people and the chaos-people, in those regions where new worlds are about to be formed.¹⁰ Art is about the first-forms in the becoming of a world.¹¹ In Taylor, in Tamy Ben-Tor, in Deleuze and Guattari, and perhaps even in Casey Affleck, differential thinking is present.

Potentialization in Schelling and essentialization in Tillich are also influenced by differential thinking: there is the beheld and there is the sensed, the + and the – playing with and against each other.¹² Schelling in his potentialization and Tillich in his essentialization let the opposites come together: the more one is able to take in of the opposites, the higher the degree of the possibility of potentialization respective essentialization, both ontologically and personally. The more of the minuses one is able to take in and accept, the higher the possibility of synthesis. In essentialization it is the synthesis of personality that creates the change.¹³ In potentialization and in essentialization, the recent discussions of the nature and the role of art in society and in the universe were foreshadowed. It seems to be the case that recent aesthetic theories deal with the same themes as Schelling and Tillich did. Today’s art deals with dimensions of being where the first-forms come into being, and ontological discussions are not left out of the new aesthetics: art reclaims not only the streets today but ontology/being as well.

Potentialization and essentialization; reality-making through art

Life, in Schelling's view, was seen as a play of differential elements and forces: "generally only the positive factor is beheld, and the negative is only felt".¹⁴ Applied to art the seen is the "beheld", the representation, the painting on the wall; the sensed is the felt. Schelling made use of differential thinking: there is the interaction between conscious apprehension or thinking (activity) and feeling or sensing (receptivity). And in addition, in thinking both conscious and unconscious elements are in play; thinking is a matter of the whole person, and both the conscious and the unconscious are comprised in this kind of thinking. Ideas incubate in the unconscious and break out into conscious thinking.¹⁵ Thinking becomes a matter of sensing: of seeing, hearing and feeling, even in a metaphysical sense. Thinking does not only deal with that which one represents in one's mind in the form of mental images, but with that which one is able to sense in interaction with others and one's world. Today's neurophysiology points out that sensing or feeling is an essential part of thinking.¹⁶ Sensing, then, is the other of reflection, the other of abstract thinking. Deleuze has pointed to the differential thinking in Schelling: "The God of love and the God of anger are required in order to have an idea. A, A², A³ form the play of pure depotentialiation and potentiality, testifying to the presence in Schelling's philosophy of a differential calculus adequate to the dialectic."¹⁷ Potentialization in Schelling seems to be that of the synthesis between active and passive forces both in the universal being and in humans; a dynamic coming together of the opposite elements and forces. The synthesis on the human level is something to be felt. Depotentialization is the shattering of the synthesis, and is also a matter of feeling or sensing, for instance, *I am still here* with Joaquin Phoenix sending shockwaves through the global media landscape. New aesthetics shatters civilization. Art is on the spirit-level, as are potentialization-depotentialization and essentialization too.

On Schelling's ontological map or setting there are several instances of potentialization: A: between the being itself and the coming into being of the finite world; A²: in the duplication: there is the infinite in itself and the concrete material being or the universe; A³: between the concrete material being: the Real, and the ultimate goal and meaning of the universe: the Ideal.¹⁸ This is Schelling's ontological map or setting. Schelling's is the world with spiritual impulses. The eruptions of poten-

tialization create the possibility of evolution. There are strong parallels between potentialization and essentialization on different levels.

Schelling moved away from the representational view on art. The most important themes cannot be represented; a painting is not a naturalistic reproduction of images but powers and forces of being might be expressed in and through art: painting is a manifestation or an expression.¹⁹ In art there is expressed the constructive “part” of becoming, and it is here that artist becomes a means of potentialization. The relation between the being itself, or the infinite, and the concrete material being, or the finite, becomes discernible in art, and it is in this context that we also find the work of artists. Art or artists not only represent the concrete world, but they also affect and form the coming into being of a world, and more, the artist in Schelling’s view is a co-creator, she/he is making a new world. An artist makes potentialization possible; an artist is a maker of potentialization. The artist is a co-operator and a co-creator, an active agent, in the coming into being of a concrete world. When Adorno writes that artwork leaves the empirical and creates another world, Schelling takes another route down into the recesses of the empirical.²⁰ The artist is engaged in “real production”; in his or her work “spirit itself which has the power to bring forth or create the material” is manifest.²¹ The artist is active in the very act of spiritual creation, including the creation of matter, the level A of potentialization. This view is far from the position of post-modernity, in which the artist only deals with signs, replicas, and simulacra.

In Friedrich’s *Moonrise over the sea* there is a refined sensitivity and receptivity expressed in the three figures gazing out to the sea; they are caught in the same mood or state of mind. Ships coming to the shore in Friedrich’s art are usually symbolic vessels: they come to take humans from the land of the living to that of the dead; they are symbols of the ultimate limit of organic life. In intuition or in sensing, in “intellectual intuition”, according to Schelling, the humans are able to sense non-being and the presence of death in all living things, the minuses threatening the meaning and sense of life.²² Potentialization accepts death as a part of life; depotentialization is the experience of non-being and the experience of the loss of meaning-orientation. Non-being here is not that of absolute non-being, but instead the relative non-being that denies the plus.²³ We might say that the experience of the minus is necessary but it is not the sufficient condition of potentialization.

In *Moonrise over the sea* both the negative and the positive seemed to have been expressed. There is the limit, death and non-being, to be overcome, and the boundary between the land and the sea, between the living and the dead. And there is more: perhaps the light in the painting, the positive, not only comes from the sun and the moon, perhaps it also comes from the infinite? The higher that makes us recognize the lower is the light of the eternal that holds the scene. Schelling thought that the eternal is present in the concrete universe; Sensibility gives access to the Eternal. In Schelling's view, sensibility is not only an individual capacity, but is participation in universal life. "The cause of *sensibility* is thus the cause of every organism and sensibility itself is the source and origin of life. ... *The cause of sensibility ... must be found in the ultimate conditions of Nature itself.*"²⁴ To know Nature, then, does not only mean to follow the light of reason but follow the enlightened route of senses into the recesses of Being itself.

In his philosophy of nature Schelling pointed out the *actans*. Actans in Schelling's view are not measurable material powers, powers that might be quantified or proved by scientific means. Actans are instead at the ground level of matter, at that level upon which physical matter comes into being, expands and contracts itself into the concrete material world. Physics or natural sciences deal with matter, with the finished concrete being and those laws that make up the mechanics of matter, but philosophy, in Schelling's view, knows about actans, about those potentials that underlie matter and come before matter. Actans are the matter of matter, the potentials which constantly "bomb" the matter and give it its first-forms.²⁵ The matter at its basic level, according to Schelling, is made of the potentials or the actans; actans seem to be in contact with the first-forms of matter. We might say that artists, and philosophers, are in contact with the actans. In *Moonrise over the sea* the matter of matter, the first-forms, and the potentials seem to be expressed in the foreground. It might be said that Friedrich expresses the potentials that make up the first formation of the continuous creation; there are the first-forms of the coming into being of the concrete world. In this painting it is the first-forms that carry the humans: evolution is present, and the light generated by actans comes from matter itself, or the Eternal that "grounds" the matter. Schelling claims that the actans are within existence, and the work of potentials on the concrete material world

might be experienced through intuition: experience gives access to these realms of being. “Higher empiricism” is able to reveal the nature of being:

Empiricism itself, then, allows a higher way of looking at things, or can be grasped from a higher perspective than the received, or, at least since Kant, the usual concept grasps it, which expels everything intelligible not only beyond the concepts of the understanding, but originally and first of all beyond all experience. Hence the now usual explanation that empiricism denies everything supernatural, but this is not the case.²⁶

Caspar David Friedrich seemed to have captured something essential of Schelling’s philosophy of nature, and of actans or natural monads, as Schelling also calls them. An artist, and a philosopher of nature, comes into contact with actans or first potentials, and she/he knows that the world has its potential and constructive dimensions. The philosopher and the artist or the artist-philosopher works with these very potentials of being. The potentials of being play a very central role in Tillich’s *Systematic Theology III*. Further, his theory of art claims that the Eternal or the infinite breaks through in art. Both potentialization and essentialization presuppose the potentials of being or of universal life. The work of an artist both in Schelling and in Tillich is to bring forth reality out of the potential realm.

In essentialization, the individual personality comes to a new synthesis of the opposites elements, and for Tillich the minus is the loss of meaning and the loss of orientation in the multi-dimensional universe. There is

the absolute seriousness of the threat to “lose one’s life” with the relativity of finite existence. The conceptual symbol of “essentialization” is capable of fulfilling this postulate (the restitution of everything), for it emphasizes the despair of having wasted one’s potentialities yet also assures the elevation of the positive within existence [even in the most unfulfilled life] into eternity.²⁷

The + is the new synthesis, that which one has made out of the potentials of one’s life in interaction with the potentials of the universe. It is this + that is brought to divine life or universal life through essentialization.

To sense the non-being, the anxiety of finite existence, the possibility of death and other threats of finite existence might lead to depotentialization, with the meaning of life and orientation in life then lost. Essentialization in Tillich is a radical overcoming of depotentialization (the negation of the negativities of human existence) in the individual, in society, and in the universe: it is the conquest of the opposite possibility. Essentialization links activity, truth, and aesthetics: "There is no truth which is not also "done," ... and there is no aesthetic expression which is not also a reality."²⁸ Here Tillich touches on Schelling's potentialization: the artist brings forth a reality. Human spirit and human cultural creativity is co-operative with and in Spiritual creativity.²⁹ Essentialization deals with sense-, meaning-, and reality-making; reality-making in the ontological sense happens also in art, in Tillich's view. Reality-making in the ontological sense is what an artist in Schelling's view does through potentialization or in artistic creation. Sense-making, both as consciousness of the depth of reason and as the widening of senses, the dynamic/vital standpoint, is also to be found in both of them.

In essentialization the new and the positive, the new synthesis created in existence, brings a new element to the divine life and even changes God: human action enriches God. In Schelling we find the idea that for God to be a living God there must be change in God. There is otherness in God's being; there is the overcoming of the radical otherness in God:

The subject going through nature is also God, only not *as* God – thus God only *outside* His divinity or in his externalization [*Entäußerung*] or in His otherness [*Anderheit*], as an other of Himself, *as* which He only is at the end. ... God is obviously in part involved in a process, and in order precisely to be at least *as* God, is subjected to a Becoming.³⁰

This makes God into a living and *changing God*. Tillich also admits otherness and change in God, and he points out that otherness in God makes God into a living God: "There is no blessedness where there is no conquest of the opposite possibility, and there is no life where there is no "otherness".³¹ The otherness in God implies that God goes out of itself and risks itself in the life-process and in the universe. The notion of God both in Schelling and in Tillich is open-ended; God is inclined to change. Tillich thought that human life and action have an impact on the nature of God. Human action in history loads God and changes God's nature and

being. Humans are not passive “receivers” in relation to God, but active agents in interaction with the universal life. Even Kierkegaard admitted change in God, and he even seemed to admit that human action changes God. He discusses the changing God in relation to human action and in relation to the synthesis of personality. “The religious lies in the dialectic which governs intensification of inwardness, and hence it is sympathetic with the conception of God that God as God is moved, changed.”³²

In Kierkegaard’s view, there are two kinds of synthesis of personality: the one in which one lives more or less at the mercy of one’s surroundings: the individual is determined from the outside. It is with the first synthesis that Tame Ben-Tor deals with in her art, presupposing the second synthesis. In the second synthesis, which is the matter of the inwardly directed action, the individual has reached a new synthesis of personality through his or her choices. This choice is the act or the action in which the individual “puts an end to the mere possibility and identifies him- or herself with the content of his or her thought in order to exist in it”.³³ To exist in the content of one’s thought does not presuppose abstract thought, but it presupposes differential thinking with its dimensions of sensing. Kierkegaard seemed to have thought that this second synthesis of human personality, a reached stage of existence, the spirit-determined existence, enriches and changes God. This is exactly the same view as Tillich had. In Tillich, it is the new synthesis reached in existence that enriches God. The colliding of the + and the -, the play between the positive and the negative elements, makes the new synthesis of personality possible. Human activity and human action, the new reached synthesis, as in Kierkegaard, and as in Tillich, affects and changes God. Human action partakes of the reality-making of universal life. Kierkegaard did not think that aesthetics or art as such had an ontological impact; he discussed art often in relation to the first synthesis or the first immediacy, but he admitted that “the subjective thinker is ... an artist. Existing is an art”.³⁴ He even admitted that the subjective thinker stands in relation to the potential realm: by “the intensification of subjectivity” she/he brings the potentials to materialization and realization.³⁵ Both Schelling and Tillich seemed to be open to art and praxis to deal with reality-making, even in the ontological sense. The ontology of art is also what we find in the new aesthetics.

Synthesis and interaction in new aesthetics: the autopoietic loop

In his discussion of different types of interpretation, Jacques Derrida introduces “performative interpretation”. Interpretation within the frames of the subject-object distinction tries to bring forth the meaning of an objective state of affairs; performative interpretation, on the other hand, changes “the thing” it interprets. Derrida takes his point of departure in the philosopher’s will to change the world.³⁶ The question comes down to the difference between *semiotic* meaning and *expressive* meaning. Semiotic meaning, if it is defined on the axis between the signifier and the signified, presupposing the binary opposition between the two, lends meaning through words and through linguistic means. The semiotic meaning in this sense is a matter of representational order, which presupposes a subject-object distinction and a binary opposition; only objects can be represented. Expressive meaning, when things are allowed to express themselves through themselves, and through their own means, opens up for the manifestation of sense-, meaning-, and reality-making. Expressive meaning comes from below. We find the performative strategy, expressive meaning and the discussion of the relationship between the linguistic meaning and the expressive meaning also in the new aesthetics of Erica Fischer-Lichte.³⁷ Erica Fischer-Lichte discusses the difference between the two types of meaning in her work *The Transformative Power of Performance*. She challenges the hegemony of the semiotic meaning or logo-centrism, and she challenges the binary opposition between mind and body, the signifier and the signified, language and reality/experience. Performances

set in motion oppositional binaries that have been central to occidental culture since antiquity, such as subject vs. object, body vs. mind, and sign vs meaning. ... “Subject” and “object” no longer form an opposition but merely mark different states or positions of the perceiving subject and the object perceived which can occur consecutively or, in some cases, simultaneously.³⁸

The binary opposition is not an option anymore either in philosophy or in aesthetics; the art-experience is no longer about observing or about passive detached attitude. Ethics, aesthetics, and politics melt into each other more and more today.³⁹

Erica Fischer-Lichte talks about performance as sense-, meaning-, and reality-making:

The performance brings forth its materiality exclusively in the present and immediately destroys it again the moment it is created, setting in motion a continuous cycle of generating materiality. ... Meaning cannot be separated from materiality or subsumed under a single concept. Rather, meaning is coterminous with the object's material appearance.⁴⁰

Performance is beyond the framework of the subject-object distinction, and it is beyond the representational mode, but it is not a senseless event, even if that sense cannot be fully put in words. Given the subject-object distinction, it is possible to interpret the “objective” meaning of a play; in performance sense-, meaning-, and reality-making happens among the participants. In performance the “autopoietic self-organisational loop” is in act; the same kind of description of the self-organizational loop is to be found in Mark C. Taylor as well.⁴¹ The autopoietic loop brings together both the passive and the active elements of theatre, the “passive” audience and the “active” actors, at the same time as it creates something new for all the participants.⁴² By doing this the autopoietic loop creates societal reflexivity. “The perceiving subjects begin to perceive themselves self-reflexively, thus opening up a further sphere of meaning and influence on the perceptual dynamics.”⁴³ What characterizes the performance is the new synthesis among the actors; the theatre-event is created in the power of the autopoietic loop; the performance has been allowed to have its (s)way. The passive audience turns into active actors and the active actors become passive; both the audience and the spectators get their activity and passivity on and both have a share in a common thing: they partake of something that cannot be rendered through words. Such a “letting go” makes meaning fleeting, and several interpretations of what the performance is about are possible: it touches the senses, widens the reality of the senses, makes participants conscious of their corporeality, of their being-there in time and place; and it makes reality within time and space, not above or beyond time and space.

The aesthetics of the performative reveals itself as a “new” Enlightenment. It does not call upon all human beings to govern over nature – neither their own nor that surrounding them – but instead encourages them to enter into a new relationship with themselves and the world.⁴⁴

The interpretative setting of theatre during the 19th century started with the observational stance: there is the audience watching the play and there is the scene with its actors. The actors are active and the spectators are passively observing the action on the stage. In the beginning of the 20th century, this state of affairs changed (this happened at the same time as Expressionism came to the fore in painting): the subject-object view gave way to the participating view. The spectators are asked to take part in the performance and to become active actors in the theatre-space. The audience was invited to act and to create the meaning and the reality of the performance. The only activity discernible in some theatres was that the audience left the room! The point, however, was to make the audience aware of their activity and their role in making theatre; to make them aware that the play is a common act between the actors and the audience. Performance is a creation going on between participants and within the participants. The autopoietic loop affects all participants, and each one, by his or her way of acting or not-acting, makes the loop and the “communal” synthesis possible.

The autopoietic loop is a synthetic act; it goes on between and within the participants. It collects the play, gives it sense, meaning, reality, and direction or no direction at all. There is a bodily and emotional affection going on between the participants, an affection that “touches” the conscious and the unconscious, the active and the passive elements of personality. It puts all the participants to the test and brings them to a new level of sensing-, meaning-, and reality-making. The explanation only comes afterwards, if there is any need for any explanation any more. The performance is a social event, gathering and binding people in a common event; it has a political-spiritual impact. It changes human self-understanding and affects the entire group in which it operates and is active; through this change it changes the world. In Erica Fichter-Lichte’s view, the autopoietic loop is a collective feature; it is the “engine” of the group in the state of performance. While the actors play, their performative actions change the play: the play is what participants make out of it. A common thing is manifest among the participants, thanks to the autopoietic loop. The performance for Erica Fischer-Lichte is a societal event, which receives its transformative power from the reflexive autopoietic loop, from the colliding of the passive and the active elements. But she does not only consider that the performance is on the societal level, she opens up for its reality-making as well, that

what happens in the group is not indifferent to society or to the reality and the meaning of life. Performances “have ... been articulating a new image of the artist. One might even go as far as to say that these performances have propagated a new image of human and society”.⁴⁵

In new aesthetics, the binary oppositions between artist and audience, body and mind, art and life are passed by; art, ethics, and truth together make up a new field of action-performance beyond binary categories. The loop is not a vicious circle as the phases of the loop, its energy and elements, are identifiable. The participants, perhaps only standstill, are not in the same participant-position after the event. Their perceptual patterns considering themselves, their world, and their universe are changed. The loop has synthetic power: it creates individual and collective synthesis. The autopoietic loop is a kind of a group synthesis, which takes charge of several individuals: all participants are involved. Such loops are to be found on several levels: in individuals, on societal levels, and perhaps even in humanity at large. It is obvious that Tillich thought that synthesis at one point in the universe affects other points and dimensions of the universe, even non-human life, and it brings about change in universal life, inclusive human life and divine life. This means that community or communion between individuals, society, and universal life not only happens on the conscious plane, but that there are unconscious influences as well, affections in humanity and in all life between all living things.

Endnotes

- 1 Schelling, 2004:65.
- 2 <http://www.the-art-world.com/history/romanticism3.htm> 2010-10-20, 10:03.
- 3 “A second force, one specifically different from the first, must be accepted which acts in the *absolutely* opposite direction in relation to the repulsive force and which makes infinite expansion impossible – attractive force. (...) If, seen from the highest standpoint, all productive activity of Nature was only an infinite evolution from one original involution, it must be this negative factor [no longer a *product*] that inhibits the evolution of Nature, hinders it from reaching the end.” Schelling, 2004:75ff.
- 4 “The organism is only the contracted, miniaturized image of the universal organism.” Ibid., 143.
- 5 “A tendency to restoration must also exist in the organism. But this tendency can only proceed [like *all* activity] from the higher organism, thus the higher organism must be able to be determined to activity by the passivity of the lower. This is not possible unless a plus of activity [i.e., action] in the higher is conditioned by a minus of activity on the lower.” Ibid. 118. “There is developed out of nature a new being whose soul must be all the more perfect the more differentiatedly it contains what was left undifferentiated in the other.” Schelling, 1992:37.
- 6 “But what everyone does not know, so that it counts as differential knowledge, that is a glorious thing to be concerned with.” Kierkegaard, 1974:80.
- 7 Schelling, 2007; Kierkegaard, 1974; Levinas, 2007; Deleuze, 1994; Fischer-Lichte, 2008.
- 8 “Reflexivity (in economics) is a nonlinear relation in which cause and effect are interdependent: the thought and actions of agents influence the operation of the system, which, in turn, influences the thought and actions of agents.” Taylor, 2004:285.
- 9 Schelling, 1994:117.
- 10 “There is extracted from chaos the shadow of the “people to come” in the form that art, but also philosophy and science, summon forth: mass-people, world-people, brain-people, chaos-people—nonthinking thought that lodges in the three, like Klee’s nonconceptual concept or Kandinsky’s internal silence.” Deleuze & Guattari, 1996:218.

- 11 "Can this becoming, this emergence, be called Art? ... The artist: the first person to set out a boundary stone, or to make a mark. ... The expressive is primary in relation to the possessive; expressive qualities, or matters of expression, are necessarily appropriative and constitute a having more profound than being." Deleuze & Guattari, 1998:316.
- 12 "And since there is nothing merely negative [the negative lives from the positive it distorts], nothing that has being can be ultimately annihilated." Tillich, 1976:399.
- 13 "The new which has been actualized in time and space adds something to essential being, uniting it with the positive which is created within existence, ... Participation in the eternal life depends on a creative synthesis of a being's essential nature with what it has made of it in its temporal existence." Ibid., 400f.
- 14 Schelling, 2004:207.
- 15 "Only out of the darkness of unreason [out of feeling, out of longing, the sublime mother of understanding] grow clear thoughts." Schelling, 1992:35.
- 16 Damasio, 1994.
- 17 Deleuze, 1994:191.
- 18 Schelling, 1994:114ff.
- 19 "But as it has already been said that it itself could at no time and via no progression become an object, but remains as ruling over everything, then no further relationship to human consciousness can be thought than that of simple manifestation." Ibid., 127.
- 20 "Artworks detach themselves from the empirical world and bring forth another world, one opposed to the empirical world as if this other world too were an autonomous entity." Adorno, 2004:2.
- 21 "As that which brings forth, it will now manifest itself in a human being by a bringing forth, by real production; it will show itself (1) as that which has the power over material, over matter to overcome it and compel it to be the expression of spirit, indeed of the highest ideas themselves – fine art just as fine art goes this far, but in (2) Poetry [*Poesie*], which is presupposed by fine art and to which the former itself only relates as a tool, in Poetry it will manifest itself as spirit itself which has the power to bring forth or create the material as well. The highest truth and excellence of the plastic work of art does not just consist in the correspondence with the created being or the model of the created being, but rather in the fact that the spirit of nature itself appears to have brought it forth; in it an activity is revealed, therefore, which is itself not of the kind which is created but rather in which one thinks one is seeing the creator." Schelling, 1994:128.

- 22 See Durwood Foster citing Ingeborg Henkel's description of Schelling's "Essentifikation" in Hummel & Lax, 2000:369.
- 23 Considering the relative non-being in Schelling, see Bowie, 1993:96.
- 24 Schelling, 2004:114-6.
- 25 "This matter, which is only the first being-something itself ... is rather itself the matter of this matter, namely of matter which is already formed, is sensuously knowable by us, and is endowed with sensuous attributes, its material, its basis." Schelling, 1994:118.
- 26 Schelling, 1994:190. "An infinite multiplicity of original actans is in existence [how these arise will be precisely the ultimate problem of the philosophy of nature]." Schelling, 2004:28.
- 27 Tillich, 1976:407.
- 28 Ibid., 403.
- 29 "Culture as spiritual creativity becomes, at the same time, Spiritual creativity." Ibid., 403.
- 30 Schelling, 1994:133.
- 31 Tillich, 1976:421.
- 32 Kierkegaard, 1974:387n.
- 33 Ibid., 302.
- 34 Ibid., 314. "The aesthetic corresponds to immediacy." Ibid. 383.
- 35 "The subjective reflection turns its attention inwardly to the subject, and desires in this intensification of inwardness to realize the truth." Kierkegaard. 1974:175 "Within the individual there is a potentiality [the individual is potentially spirit] which is awakened in inwardness to become a God-relationship, and then it becomes possible to see God everywhere." Ibid. 220f.
- 36 Derrida, 1994:51ff.
- 37 See Fischer-Lichte, 2008. "First and foremost, the actions of the actors and spectators signified only what they accomplished. They were self-referential. By being both self-referential and constitutive of reality, they ... can be called "performative" in J. L. Austin's sense." Ibid. 141.
- 38 Ibid., 172.
- 39 Performances "postulate that the aesthetic melts into the social, the political, and the ethical". Fischer-Lichte, 2008:172. Jorge Goia, giving expression for the Brazilian experience of Soma groups, writes: "when we give up imperatives of 'Truth', ethics comes close to aesthetics, and science flirts with the arts. Soma (Freire's experimental pedagogic) can be approached both as a live art form and as activism, envisaging a radical participatory, collaborative practice, where one can live singular experiences. With this experimental format, Soma could be a form

of political engaged live art that aims to challenge the authoritarian or submissive behavior that we discover in our daily lives. It encourages perception and awareness of how this behavior produces authoritarian systems, and aims to extend this awareness to other areas of our lives, to resist and to react against hierarchy and social injustice.” Grindon, 2008:61.

40 Fischer-Lichte, 2008:76. Ibid., 156.

41 “The feedback loop as a self-referential, autopoietic system enabling a fundamentally open, unpredictable process emerged as the defining principle of the theatrical work.” Ibid. 39. Even Mark C. Taylor points out the synthetic act: “Paradoxically, there can be no individuals without the group and no group without individuals. As a result of this interconnection, subjects and groups are bound in loops of mutual influence.” Taylor, 2004:284.

42 Fischer-Lichte, 2008:155.

43 Ibid., 150.

44 Ibid., 207.

45 Ibid., 164.

Differential Relation and the Possibility of Faith-Knowledge; Tillich and Kierkegaard Between Negative and Positive Philosophy

God is a life, not a mere being. All life has a destiny and is subject to suffering and development.¹

The concept of neighbour really means a duplicating of one's own self. ...
And what, then, is it to be a self? It is to be a redoubling [*Fordoblelse*].²

In Schelling's early philosophy of Nature, the + and the – belonged together like activity and receptivity, as the constitutive parts of an organism's duplicity. Schelling termed this duplicity "identity in duplicity and duplicity in identity".³ On the individual, organic level the duplicity is between the activity of the organism, its outward movement, and the receptivity, the inward movement. The + and the –, as antithetical poles of the motion of the organism, mark the actual duplicity. In human beings "intuition and reflection are opposed to each other," Schelling wrote, intuition being the + and reflection the –.⁴ Nature as a whole is the "identity of the product and the productivity"; the being itself in Schelling's view is the always on-going productivity of Nature.⁵ Intuition gives access to the productivity of Nature, into the continuous stream and becoming of Nature. Reflection blocks the intuition; it gives only "mechanics" and "the atoms of time", the products, which are secondary in relation to productivity. Signs of differential thinking were already found in early philosophy of Nature.

The differential relation between the negative and the positive becomes crucial in Schelling's negative and positive philosophy. In humans thinking and sensing or intuition belong together like the + and the -. If thinking is the positive pole, sensing is the negative. By starting from thinking, and by defining thinking as the positive, the negative or the sensed is posited in an excluding relation: the + and the – do not belong together! By allowing the sensed, the two join and build the differential relation. What comes first, when we start from thinking, is the position of negative philosophy, of rationalism, and second that of

positive philosophy, or of higher empiricism.⁶ In Schelling, thinking is not discursive, argumentative thinking only. Thinking is instead a thought-event comprising heteronymous, conscious and unconscious elements leading to ever higher levels of synthesis, differentiation, and potentialization.⁷ The process of thinking is a never-ending event; the more one is able to bear of the opposition, the higher the possibility of synthesis. The interaction between the positive and the negative leads to revolutionary evolution, even in God, as we humans are co-workers of the unfinished evolution. In Tillich's essentialization the negative or non-being, which threatens to undermine the meaning of life, is negated and the positive created through existence is brought up to the level of universal life, enriching the life of God. Tillich finds the overcoming of the negative even in God; God is a living God. In Kierkegaard the differential relation between the positive and the negative is discernible in what he called the "spiritual reduplication", a conception, which can be directly derived from Schelling's "duplicity". Even in Kierkegaard a human being is "God's co-labourer".⁸ There is an immanent transcendence in Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Tillich; Mark C. Taylor finds it in "altarity".⁹ In order to express something of the differential thinking in Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Tillich I try to bring out the differential relation in them. Schelling has influenced both Kierkegaard and Tillich, perhaps more than is obvious at first glance. I start with an interpretation of Schelling's negative and positive philosophy, and after that I discuss the differential relation in Kierkegaard and in Tillich.

The negative and the positive philosophy

The negative and the positive philosophy are not two different philosophies, but parts of one and the same philosophical event: the negative philosophy is the preparatory work that makes the positive philosophy possible. The preparatory work is a critique: the mind tests its possibilities and limits.¹⁰ Metaphysics before Descartes and Kant, according to Schelling, dealt with the "first and general determinations of being", it dealt with the ontological infinite being or the being itself.¹¹ Kant had shown that there is no access to such being or being itself: all experience is finite experience, and the possibility of knowing being or the thing itself falls outside the frameworks and possibilities of human experience. Instead of drawing attention to the ontological being, Kant

analyzed the presuppositions of human experience; inwardness is in the making in him. Descartes, starting with doubt, considered that the world as material substance is run by the mechanical laws; in the material world no being or being itself is to be found as the object of knowledge. Given the philosophies of Descartes and Kant, being is not the object of knowledge; we do not know what being or being itself is; we are left empty handed. In Descartes and in Kant there is an inward leading process, creating the position of inwardness. It is in the situation of inwardness, when the mind awakens to itself and draws itself inward, that the mind tests its limits and possibilities. The position of inwardness, of subjectivity, arrived at through radical doubt becomes Schelling's starting point. Schelling follows Kant and Descartes, but he also tries to go beyond them.

In the situation of inwardness, in Schelling, reflection or reason confronts its own content. What differentiates reason from the mere reflection, and Schelling claims that this is Kant's point as well, is that reason might have its own content as its object; reason is self-relating and self-conscious reason.¹² This far Schelling follows Kant, but he also claims that reason has integral and complementary dimensions beyond the regulative function Kant gave to self-conscious reason; reason is integral and complementary reason.¹³ Initially, then, Schelling equates reason with the self-conscious mind, with an inwardness aware of itself. This inwardness is the pre-reflexive stage of mind. The potential mind is to be found in inwardness: "Reason, however, is the infinite potency of cognition and, as such, has nothing but the infinite potency of being as its content. Precisely because of this it can, from this content, arrive at nothing, but what is possible a priori."¹⁴ The infinite potency of cognition implies that knowledge is a matter of realization; it is an actualization of the potential possibilities. When we try *to think* about that *what* being is, starting from the above, from thinking, we fill the word 'being' with content, saying that being is nature, is the universe, but all we do is fill the word with finite and transient, *represented content*; being is made congruent with the represented content. The finite and transient content, however, does not fill the criterion of being and we erase the represented content. In this situation, we ask: "Why is there anything at all? Why is there not nothing?"¹⁵ The result of the exclusion, of the preparatory work, according to Schelling, is that only the empty concept of being and of being itself is left; there is no real content, no "whatness" to

ascribe to either being or being itself. “Being itself is ... only the result achieved through this process of eliminating that which is not being itself.”¹⁶ Given the process of elimination, only the empty concept of being and of being itself is what remains. Philosophy in the position of reflection turns out to be a negative philosophy. “This science can lead no further than to the ... negative concept; thus, in general, only to the concept of being itself”.¹⁷ If one earlier still thought or dreamed that being has a definite content, the +, the situation of inwardness and the radical doubt shows that there is no such content, there is only the – of the negative philosophy; we do not know what being or being itself is a priori. “Reason has none other than a *negative* concept of that which being itself is.”¹⁸ The + we initially gave to thinking turns out to be the –, as far as the content being is under consideration.

The pre-reflexive stage of mind, grounding reflection, is Schelling’s starting point; within the sphere of reflection logic, mathematics, and grammar are applicable, these are attainable a priori. A rationalist claims that philosophy or thinking proceeds deductively, but this is not the way Schelling takes. Thought or reason cannot arrive at the content of being nor to the being itself *out of thinking*, out of reasoning, according to Schelling. This means that reason comes to its limit, this being the limit of rationalism and of reflection, and reason cannot go beyond this limit. The negative philosophy is rationalism with radical doubt, it is Descartes and Kant; they are negative philosophers in Schelling’s view. “What has once begun in thought can only continue in thought and can never advance any further than the *idea*. What shall reach reality must then also proceed directly from reality”, Schelling wrote.¹⁹ The positive philosophy does not start from thinking; it starts from *existence*. There comes the break or the leap and philosophy can start from reality, or rather, the positive philosophy starts from reality, from existence, from the sensed content, in whatever form that may come.

Thought cannot proceed beyond thought, as Kant’s philosophy clearly demonstrates: God, soul, world are nothing but transcendental ideas in Kant, ideas that do not have any positive content; they have only thought content. In order to reach reality, according Schelling, one must start from reality, from that what exists, and this is done in the positive philosophy. At the culmination of the negative philosophy, “reason can posit being in which there is still nothing of a concept, of a whatness, only as something that is absolutely *outside* itself. ... In this

positing, reason is therefore set outside itself, absolutely ecstatic”.²⁰ The culmination of the negative philosophy is the crisis of self-sufficient thinking which has only itself as object and subject; neither reflection nor self-reflexive processes of thinking give being. “If positive philosophy starts out from that which is external to all thought, it cannot begin with a being that is external to thought in a merely relative sense, but only with a being that is *absolutely* external to thought.”²¹ The positive philosophy starts with the different, it thinks in relation to the different.

Opposite inwardness, there is the concrete world. On the one side there is reflection, the -, on the other side the world, the sensed, the +. The entrance to the positive philosophy is through the senses, through sensing. Reason “must submit to the authority of the senses. ... (As it is) through the sheer authority of our senses, not through reason ... we know that things outside us *exist*”.²² Being or rather the content of being is given through the senses; being is the physical world. In this break or transition “reason possesses nothing *on its own account*, it only watches as its content *dissipates*.”²³ This is what happens in the negative philosophy, but the negative and the positive philosophy are related in the differential relation: “To the extent that the positive philosophy brings to knowledge precisely that which remained in the negative as something incapable of being known, to this extent it is precisely the positive philosophy that straightens out reason *contorted* by the negative.”²⁴ World dawns and in that very dawning the difference between the conceptual being of the negative philosophy (the -) and the encountered being (the +) of the positive philosophy becomes visible. “Empiricism is, therefore, not to be directly opposed to a correctly understood rationalism ... as it is, more properly speaking, a phenomenon parallel to rationalism.”²⁵ The world which dawns is not the ready-made object or finished content, but *the horizon of freedom* opens itself up with and in the world. The world we find in this horizon is “the world as freely created and produced”.²⁶ This free creation and production of the world, in which humans actively participate, is no longer a pure conceptual potentiality or a mere mind-potentiality, but it is the world filled with concrete content, the world of material existence, of deed and action, the world loaded with potential possibilities. The positive philosophy “is oriented towards a future that has not yet occurred”.²⁷

In Schelling, the positive philosophy responds to the quest of reason, but it gives the content of being and being itself only a posterior,

through experience. The positive, then, is to be known only through experience.²⁸ This led Schelling to talk about a higher empiricism: “that what is highest for it (for the positive philosophy) would itself be something experiential in nature”.²⁹ Philosophy “would be a science of experience; I do not mean in the formal sense, but I do mean in the material sense”.³⁰ It is not immediate sense-perception (lower empiricism or the sensible faculty of representation) that gives all content, but the *labour* of a higher empiricism, in which the individuals articulate the basic human experiences, their potential and actual realms. “Only resolve and action can *ground* actual experience”.³¹ The self-world relation is an active correlation; the content is open-ended and thinking is the never-ending process of articulation and discernment. This higher empiricism could also be called “a progressive Empiricism, in that it argues from experience forward, into the future.”³² God or the being itself is to be found in the horizon of freedom, in the world open as its ground and driving agent. Schelling’s world is multi-dimensional; one articulation cannot give the complete picture. The object of this empiricism is not this or that experience, but all experience.³³

In the philosophy proper comprising both the negative and the positive philosophies, there is a moment of transition: there is the going over from the negative to the positive. There is a realization of freedom, of potentiality, and of knowing being. There is the revolutionary groundwork and ground-event of thought and philosophy in Schelling: the abyss or the chasm between the negative and the positive, and there is a going back and forth between the negative and the positive, between reflection and the content, the oscillation, which does justice to basic human experiences.³⁴ The negative philosophy, so to say, creates the conditions of the positive philosophy, and there is now awareness of the pre-reflexive dimensions of the mind: of potentiality, of desire, of passion; desire without an object of desire is nothing.³⁵ From here, from the situation of wanting, longing, wavering, and projection, there comes the leap to the real concrete being, to the +, which cannot be explained by logic or by rational thought. There is the receiving, passive side and there is the constructive, active, willing side in relation to being: the whole human being is active in relation to the sensed world.³⁶ Kierkegaard’s *The Concept of Dread* is his philosophy of freedom, his text is about the realization of freedom: “When then the possibility of freedom manifests itself before (the realization of) freedom, freedom succumbs.”³⁷

The “infinite resignation”, according to Kierkegaard, is the act through which the mind frees itself to its potentiality.³⁸ Infinite resignation belongs to the preparatory work; the situation of inwardness is reached.

Architectonic structure of thought; metaphors and the moment of transition

In *My Search for Absolutes* Tillich expresses a similar structure of argumentation and even a similar *architectonic structure of thought* to that we have found in Schelling. Being or being itself might be understood in two ways according to Tillich: either as an empty abstraction or as “the result of two profound experiences, one of them negative, the other positive”, he wrote.³⁹ Tillich’s is the second way and he keeps the concept of being itself as the starting point. The negative experience is the experience of the abyss of non-being and the positive is that of the conquering of the non-being. Further, Tillich’s method of correlation might have been inspired by Schelling’s philosophy, and not only the method of correlation, but the entire architectonic of his thought seemed to have been inspired by Schelling. A similar architectonic structure is also to be found in Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard discusses the beginning of philosophy, which first comes when reflection comes to a halt.⁴⁰ Kierkegaard’s philosophy starts in existence and there is a moment of transition in him: “He sank absolutely, but then in turn he floated up from the depth of the abyss, lighter now than all that is oppressive and dreadful in life.”⁴¹ In Schelling, reflection reaches its limits through the elimination of the contingent content. There is the experience of the abyss, but there is also the act or the resolution of the will which links with the positive, there is the turning towards the positive. Philosophy proper for Kierkegaard is a matter of inwardness: philosophy does not start with reflection, but with passion and in passion, by decision. More exactly, philosophy deals with infinite passion, and not only with that but also with that which “precedes everything”, even the infinite passion.⁴² I wonder what difference there is between the infinite passion and the infinite potentiality, once in the situation of inwardness! In Tillich’s view, “ultimate concern” is a translation of Kierkegaard’s “infinite passion”.⁴³ Kierkegaard admits that “the heart infinitely bound to God has infinite concern”.⁴⁴ Philosophy in Kierkegaard not only deals with “plain” passions, but with “educated feeling”, with the development of subjectivity.⁴⁵ Both

Schelling and Tillich maintained the rational starting point by clinging to the concept of being or being itself; Kierkegaard's is instead a radical a posteriori philosophy: "Truth exists for the particular individual only as he himself or she herself produces it in action".⁴⁶ Schelling and Tillich might agree. The underlying architectonic structure of thought in all three is very similar, the operational framework is provided by the negative and the positive philosophy. In Kierkegaard and in Tillich this similarity comes to expression, among other things, in their understanding of the metaphorical and the symbolic: the use of metaphors correlates with the moment of transition, in the move from the negative to the positive, in Kierkegaard and in Tillich. In Schelling, metaphors have disclosing power.⁴⁷ Metaphors express the differential finite-infinite relationship; they disclose the human situation in the face of the eternal, both in Tillich and in Kierkegaard.⁴⁸

Tillich wrote that there is only one direct statement about God: God is being itself.⁴⁹ He seemed to share Schelling's starting point: being itself is *prius* in epistemology and in ontology (and in creative act). As it stands it is an empty statement, an abstraction, Tillich admits; it does not say anything about God or the nature of God. That what we say about God, comes from experience and from the situation of revelation: there is "the experience of the holy as transcending ordinary experience without removing it".⁵⁰ But this experience would not be possible if there were not the quest for it: "Although man is actually separated from the infinite, he could not be aware of it if he did not participate in it potentially. This is expressed in the state of being ultimately concerned. ... This is the point at which we must speak non-symbolically about God, but in terms of a quest for God."⁵¹ In Schelling, the quest and the potentiality belonged to the negative philosophy, and they are a given in the human situation; the negative philosophy is non-symbolic. The positive or God, on the other hand, is matter of revelatory experience both for Schelling and for Tillich. Beyond the point of quest and potentiality, says Tillich, all we say about God is symbolic and metaphorical.

Both Tillich and Kierkegaard use metaphors and symbols to express the moment of transition. *It is the moment of transition, with the architectonic structure of thought, which gives metaphors their meaning*, not their literal or linguistic explanation. "Every religious symbol negates itself in its literal meaning, but it affirms itself in its self-transcending

meaning. ... The symbol participates in the reality which is symbolized.”⁵² “Negates itself” is the -, “affirms itself” is the +. Metaphors and symbols are the only way to talk about the positive; true symbols participate in the positive. Metaphors and symbols express the moment of transition. So also in Kierkegaard: “All human language about the spiritual ... is essentially transferred or metaphorical language.”⁵³ The metaphorical or the symbolic explicates, if we only had the eyes, the positive side of the moment of transition:

The spiritual individual and the sensuous-psychic individual say the same thing in a sense, and yet there remains an infinite difference between what they say. ... The one has made a transition or has let him- or herself be led over to the other side; whereas the other has remained on this side.⁵⁴

The ground-event of going over is explicated in Tillich and in Kierkegaard: “let be led over to the other side”, that is, reflection follows this transition. Thinking and being are in interaction with each other. In the following I discuss the ground-event, and its expressions and implications both in Kierkegaard and in Tillich. How did they view the relationship between the negative and the positive? How is the interplay between the + and the – explicated in them? What kind of metaphors do they use? Both Kierkegaard and Tillich draw heavily on Schelling in their philosophies and theologies.

It might be thought that the above is relevant only to Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Tillich, but it has bearing on broader philosophical questions like: What is philosophy? How does philosophy start? How to talk about the philosophical? What is the philosophical? All three discuss Plato and Aristotle in relation to differential or dialectical thinking. For example, Schelling claims that Socratic ignorance was about opinions, representations, and logical knowledge, not about the true, positive philosophy, in which some knowledge is available. As an absolute philosophical statement the claim that one does not know anything is absurd, Schelling claims.⁵⁵ We may agree. Kierkegaard thought that Socrates knew more than he was able or willing to express.⁵⁶ Tillich, in the end of *Systematic Theology III*, claims that considering the God-relationship, or more precisely, considering the understanding of immortality, Plato and Aristotle shared a similar standpoint.⁵⁷ Kierkegaard, in perhaps his finest book *Works of Love*, explicates the – and the +:

poverty and plenty; in true love there is interplay between the - and the +.⁵⁸ Further, the revolution and the transformation of the mind, the preparatory work of the negative philosophy, the critique, is necessary in Kierkegaard's view for there to be any understanding of the relationship with the positive.⁵⁹ The comparison between philosophers and their philosophical standpoints or interpretations is not the main point here. The main question is if there is something to be known about the positive or God in Kierkegaard and in Tillich. If so, how is the positive explicated or expressed in them?

The negative and the positive philosophy in Kierkegaard

Kierkegaard follows Schelling's negative philosophy:

The positive in the sphere of thought comes under the head of certainty in sense-perception, in historical knowledge, and in speculative results. But all this positiveness is sheer falsity. ... Nothing historical can become infinitely certain for me except the fact of my existence. ... Negative thinkers (on the other hand) therefore always have one advantage, in that they have something positive, being aware of the negative element in existence; the positive have nothing at all, since they are deceived.⁶⁰

Kierkegaard talks about the positive in the sphere of thought, that is, in reflection, while we try to secure the "whatness" of things in representation. Representations are insecure: sense-perceptions are changing; historical knowledge changes because of new investigations; and speculative results presuppose the preceding series, which in themselves are not absolute. "All this positiveness is sheer falsity", and this is Schelling's negative philosophy. The radical doubt is active in Kierkegaard as well. Those who propagate the immediate "whatness" are not aware of the radical doubt undermining all immediate positive content; they are not critical enough. The "what" of a thing is only an abstraction that does not give the thing, but gives only a representation, an image of the thing. It is useless to seek the positive in terms of "what", trying for example, to describe God in objective terms as God is not an object and never will become an observable object in Kierkegaard's view. To make God into an object is to make God into a thing. "The god that can be pointed out is an idol", Kierkegaard wrote.⁶¹ The knowledge of God in terms

of “whatness” is not possible in Kierkegaard’s view. All “whatness” is about objects, but God cannot be made into an object of observation. If God is not an object, perhaps there is some other way to talk about God’s relation to the world? If God is in creation, as Kierkegaard claims, how to talk about that? “Negative thinkers therefore always have one advantage, in that they have something positive, being aware of the negative element in existence”, might be read as an expression of the minimum mix between the positive and the negative: awareness of the negative is the impact of the positive, even if one does not know about the positive. The awareness of the – presupposes the +: the higher shows the lower. Schelling and Tillich held a similar view; the differential relation is brought to awareness. The possibility of offense is for Kierkegaard “in the most profound sense the expression for “making aware”. ... Thus the possibility of offense is taken up into faith, is assimilated by faith, is the negative mark of the God-man”.⁶² Facing the possibility of offense “the thoughts of your heart are disclosed as you choose whether you believe or not”.⁶³ In being offended, one turns away from the +, or rather, one turns away from the differential play between the + and the – going on in the spiritual self; the play between the + and the – marks the spiritual self.

In Kierkegaard there is a vision of human existence. The vision might be lifted up as a structural whole; its structural elements might be exposed. In this vision Kierkegaard does not shy away from pointing to the essentially human, and he could speak about the essential structure of existence. Kierkegaard might be read in several ways, but at least two levels are discernible in him: the philosophical level and the level of metaphorical communication. He moves on both levels and combines them in his vision of human existence. The metaphors are means of expressing deep philosophical truths. By using metaphors deliberately, he follows Plato. How, then, does he structurally talk about the finite-infinite relationship? He uses metaphors in order to express the “hidden” structure of existence:

As the quiet lake is fed deep down by the flow of hidden springs, which no eye sees, so a human being’s love is grounded, still more deeply, in God’s love. If there were no spring at the bottom, if God were not love, then there would be neither a little lake nor an individual’s love.⁶⁴

Kierkegaard tells us that this source or ground, the *prius*, one cannot see; if one is turned inward, trying to catch a glimpse of it, one is blinded by the reflection of the surface. The *prius* cannot become an object of observation, as it grounds the subject-object structure. It is on a higher plane than the objectifying approach with its “whatness” or what-truths is able reach. Instead, the source is known by its effects, by “how” it qualifies and determines human existence in the differential relation. One part of the negative philosophy, as we find the negative philosophy also in Kierkegaard, is to work to remove the obstacles: the doubt cleanses the mind and brings the individual in relation to potential being, as seen in Schelling, and even in Kierkegaard. In Schelling we found the standpoint that the mind arrives at the potential being through the preparatory work of the negative philosophy. In Kierkegaard’s vision, as we translate it into philosophical language, the individual’s relation to the infinite or the positive is a potential relation.

To translate this vision into the philosophical language, the love at the bottom is potential love or being. Kierkegaard talks about the “ground-level” and about the “ground-work” and he even talks about “being that love gives”.⁶⁵ Love “is known and recognised by the love in another. Like is known by like”.⁶⁶ It is love in the other that makes love recognizable; the – on this side, the + on the other side, poverty and plenty. Kierkegaard makes a distinction between two kinds of love: immediate, natural, erotic love and spiritual love. The first kind of love is contact with the “other I” or the sensual self.⁶⁷ In erotic love one is in contact with one’s sensual self. The play between the + and the –, between activity and receptivity (enjoyment) is going on *within* the self: no self-transcendence is in sight; one enjoys the receptive self. This first love is “the very height of self-feeling, the I intoxicated in the other I”.⁶⁸ In such a love the individual does not have to stand in an aware relation to the preceding source of love nor to the object of love. Like is known by like: the individual recognises his or her sensual elements in the other human being but this recognition or duplicity is internal to the self. Activity and receptivity are in interaction with each other, an interaction that at this stage is internal to the self. In a moralistic interpretation the first love is natural disregarded, but such an interpretation is not true to Kierkegaard: if there is spiritual love, then there is also friendship and the sensual self, with the difference that the spiritual reduplication comes before, and

is of higher rank than the internal natural duplication.⁶⁹ The natural duplication is internal to the self, but the spiritual reduplication is higher, as the individual relates to what is outside the self. In spiritual reduplication, the individual relates to the preceding source; she/he is in contact with the potential being. Kierkegaard speaks about the right self-love, much in the same way as Tillich did.⁷⁰

In order to deepen love, to enter the sphere of spiritual love, Kierkegaard introduced a key to the potential mind. The key is *the act of presupposing* and this is the act or the action: “The lover does something about him- or herself: she/he presupposes that love is present in the other person”.⁷¹ In *Ethics*, Kierkegaard wrote, concepts are developed by presupposing.⁷² As it stands, the act of presupposing does not say so much, it is like being itself: empty and incomprehensible, but if we read Kierkegaard on the philosophical level, we get another view. “To presuppose” is the key to the potential being, and it is through this act that the potential is made to manifest itself. The potential is not only internal to the mind, as it is encountered at the pre-reflexive stage, it reaches down into that what precedes the individual mind, into the recesses of the being itself; being has potential dimensions. The mind is set by that what we presuppose; the very act gives the basic perspective or the horizon within which we take in the world and other human beings. The individual presupposes that she/he, while hiking, cannot go up to the mountain, the effort becomes overwhelming; a youngster presupposes that one day she/he will be the best hockey player in the world, and one day the dream will come true; a teacher presupposes that kids learn math, she/he creates space for active learning and see, they learn, naturally. “To presuppose”, then, is to stand in contact with the potential mind or the potentiality of the mind; it touches the entire individual, the ground of individuality. *To presuppose is to develop subjectivity*. Further, Kierkegaard seemed to think that this very act is related to what precedes the subject or the self; the act might be internal to the mind or the self but it reaches into a “hidden source”; it reaches into “the spring at the bottom”. Now, the act of presupposing is not only to be read in an inward direction, as if the mind was only turned inward in the act. The outward direction is that one presupposes in relation to the Other. The individual is to presuppose that there is love in the Other, and through this act of presupposing she/he builds up love in the Other; the Other is brought into the realm of the higher love; the Other is build up in love – love

is build up in the Other. In Kierkegaard's view the individual is to presuppose that there is love in the Other, and perhaps she/he touches the love at the bottom and in that sense builds up love in the Other:

Thus we have achieved a clarification of what it means that love builds up and on this we shall dwell: *the lover presupposes that love is present in the other person's heart, and by this very presupposition she/he builds up love in him or her – from the ground up, insofar as in love he/she presupposes it present as the ground.* ... In this way she/he entices forth the good; she/he "loves up" love; she/he builds up. ... The lover works very quietly and earnestly, and yet the powers of the eternal are in motion.⁷³

The only work a lover does is that she/he presupposes love, and all the rest follows from that. Set in motion by the act of presupposing, love is brought into being.

When a fisherman has caught a fish in his net and wishes to keep it alive, what must she/he do? She/he must immediately put it in water; otherwise it becomes exhausted and dies after a time. And why must she/he put it in water? Because water is the fish's element, and *everything which shall be kept alive must be kept in its element.* But love's element is infinitude, inexhaustibility, immeasurability. ... But what can take love out of its element? *As soon as love concentrates upon itself it is out of its element.* What does that mean, to concentrate on itself? It means to become an object for itself. ... Love can never infinitely become its own object. ... For *infinitely* to be an object for itself is to remain in *infinitude* and thus, simply by existing or continuing to exist [since love is a reduplication in itself] is as different from the particularity of natural life as is the reduplication of the spirit.⁷⁴

As love concentrates upon itself or rather, when the individual only enjoys his or her love or love-power, then love is made into an object; natural love is internal to the self. The higher love, on the other hand, builds up the Other. In love there is an outward movement, the activity of presupposing in relation to the Other, and an inward movement of coming to consciousness. In the relationship to the Other, or in the God-relationship the individual gets the self back, this is repetition. "What love does, it is; what it is, it does – at one and the same moment; simultaneously as it goes beyond itself [in an outward direction] it is in itself [in an inward direction]".⁷⁵ Repetition, as an inward movement, takes

place in that very moment the outward movement or moment is established. Repetition is the coming into being of the spiritual self, or rather, it is the spiritual self. The natural duplication is enjoyment internal to the self; in spiritual reduplication God is present. We easily forget “that God is present in the relationship” and we forget the rule of love:

In this world of inwardness the Christian like-for-like is at home. ... What you do unto others you do unto God, and therefore what you do unto others God does unto you. ... For God is ... really the pure like-for-like, the pure rendition of how you yourself are.⁷⁶

Spiritual reduplication is repetition; repetition is the rendition. That what we say about the Other, to the Other, to others, the “echo duplicates it immediately.”⁷⁷ When we forget the Other, then “Christianity does not resound rightly in the inwardness of our being, we never discover the resonance which is the Christian like-for-like.”⁷⁸ And we miss the spiritual self. We read Kierkegaard’s words and think that we only get a dim echo, not being serious enough for the repetition: “The serious individual is serious precisely through the originality with which he or she comes back in repetition. ... Seriousness means the personality itself, and only a serious personality is a real personality.”⁷⁹ This means that the self comes to itself in the God-relationship; the self is get back. Repetition shows that between God and the self there is mutual immanence, even if there is an infinite qualitative difference between God as God and the individual. As a matter of fact, the infinite qualitative difference between God and the individual makes repetition possible: repetition does not take away the essential differences, it confirms, expresses them instead. We have found this mutual immanence between human spirit and the divine Spirit in Tillich as well. This does not mean that we would be able to describe God in objective terms, but are able to express something of the “how” of the differential relation. It is possible to describe the impact of the God-relationship; it is possible to describe the finite-infinite relationship from the human side of the relation. The signs of spiritual reduplication are in Tillich as well: “If the self participates in the power of being-itself it receives itself back.”⁸⁰

Perhaps we by now have some clarification of how Kierkegaard viewed the relationship to the infinite. God is present in creation in an indirect way; all immediate, representing knowledge of God falls away;

there is no objective knowledge of God. This is also what Schelling claimed in his negative philosophy. Still, there is an immanent transcendence in Kierkegaard. There are no objective signs of the positive in Kierkegaard, but there is a developed, educated feeling that makes the individual *aware* of spiritual love in the “how” of human existence. The signs, so to say, are on the human side of the relationship, in human awareness, in reduplication. Self-renunciation and a humbling of oneself are needed in order for love in the spiritual reduplication to take place. Sin is self-centredness, it blocks love. This awareness is brought by love. Given this, the negative is the sign of the positive and the true understanding of the God-relationship is paradoxical and differential.⁸¹ In the God-relationship existence has a negative qualification and determination; the negative is now the sign of the positive.⁸² Still, if the negative and the positive are dialectically or differentially related, then we are not in complete darkness considering the positive. Kierkegaard expresses the differential relation in the essential structure of human existence in the following way:

This, then, is how it is with loftiness and lowliness. The true Christian's abasement is not sheer abasement; it is only a depiction of loftiness, but a depiction in this world, where loftiness must appear inversely as lowliness and abasement. The star truly is high in the sky, is just as high in the sky although, seen in the sea, it seems to lie under the earth. Likewise, to be a Christian is the highest elevation, even though in this world's depiction it must appear as the deepest abasement. Consequently in a certain sense the abasement is loftiness.⁸³

Metaphors give some knowledge of the essential structure of human existence. If we are to talk about faith-knowledge in Kierkegaard, this is all we are able to say. “In a certain sense the abasement is loftiness”, this is to be found both in Schelling and in Tillich in their explication of the finite-infinite relationship: the differential relation. The abasement is loftiness, as the one cannot be known without the other; they are to be discerned relationally and differentially. The + shows the -, as they presuppose each other in the differential relation, even if the immediate awareness of the positive is lacking and the negative is the only content of actual awareness.

The negative and the positive philosophy in Tillich

In today's theology and philosophy, essentialism is condemned. Several forms of essentialism might be considered: from ontological dualism with two independent realms standing side by side (existence and essences; idealism) to epistemological dualism (existence and abstraction; rationalism). Essentialism is usually considered as an abstract doctrine which presupposes the unchanging realm of essences. In such essentialism, nothing new could be created in history or by human action; this world is a shadow, a weak reflection of the true world. From Schelling onwards, however, history is the place of the creation of the new and humans have a role to play in that creation. Neither Schelling nor Kierkegaard nor Tillich could be characterized as essentialists in the above senses: they neither propagate for unchanging God nor for the unchanging human nature nor for the unchanging world. God, human beings, and world are in the process of becoming.⁸⁴ What the three presuppose is potential being and potential human nature and the mix of existential and essential elements in human life, in all life. Kierkegaard, as we have seen, could talk about the essential structure of existence. Tillich claims that there are both essential and existential elements in human existence, in life, in nature at large.⁸⁵ Even the anti-essentialist is able to talk about, must talk about the essential human elements as she/he is a thinking, feeling, and willing, sensing individual; the total personality is in him or her, even if potentially. When Tillich claims that existence is a mix of essential and existential elements, he expresses a truth of human life which might be accepted even by an anti-essentialist. The differential bond between the + and the – expresses the minimum mix: "The finitude of the finite points to the infinity of the infinite", Tillich wrote.⁸⁶ The differential bond in Kierkegaard is congruent with the essential structure of human existence; it is those levels of life we try to express here.

We have pointed that Tillich's structure of argumentation, the architectonic structure of his thought, is very similar to that what Schelling expressed in his negative and positive philosophy. Kierkegaard seems to share this structure as well. In Kierkegaard we have found emphasis on the "how": in the concentration, in the development of subjectivity, the how explicates the way the positive qualifies or determines human life, but we have not found any descriptions of the positive, that God would be such and such in terms of "whatness". In Tillich, we find both the how-truths of human existence and also some metaphorical claims

of the nature of God. These second claims are not what-truths, as the what-truths presuppose an object or the cognitive relation between the subject and the object and Tillich denies that God might become an object of observation.⁸⁷ Schelling is of the same opinion. Kierkegaard might have accepted that God is the foundation and meaning of the subject-object correlation, only if “the ground” is understood in the metaphorical sense. In Kierkegaard we find the free use of symbols and metaphors within a structured vision of existence; in Tillich we find the frustration of having to use metaphors. Tillich starts with words that remind of Schelling’s philosophy of nature:

The conflicts and sufferings of nature under the conditions of existence and its longing for salvation, ... serve the enrichment of essential being after the negation of the negative in everything that has being. Such considerations, of course, are almost poetic-symbolic and should not be treated as if they were descriptions of objects or events in time and space.⁸⁸

Still, these claims considering the nature of the universal life are not peripheral in Tillich, but the differential thinking in his philosophy and theology leads to them. It is said that Tillich, when he had finished his systematic theology, wanted to write a new book, perhaps about the God-nature-human interaction; it is here he halts, seeing the work of essentialization in Plato and in Aristotle.⁸⁹ And more, he saw that the Christian church and Christian theology had chosen the road of dualism, individualism, and conceptualism, entering the road of Platonism, instead of focusing on the immanent transcendence in the life-process itself: “The cognitive situation is totally changed when the conceptual use of the term immortality replaces its symbolic use”.⁹⁰ Immortality, he claims, is participation in the positive, and the only way to talk about “it” is metaphorically and symbolically.

The negative philosophy implies that an immediate positive “whatness” is not possible; there is no objectifying knowledge of God. This was both Schelling’s and Kierkegaard’s position. This same position of the negative philosophy is also seen in Tillich. To secure this, “the negative metaphorical language ... must be used”.⁹¹ God is not an object, no informative knowledge of God is possible, “in relation to God everything is by God”⁹², or shall we say that like is known by like? In the same way as in Kierkegaard, we find a metaphorical communicative level and a

philosophical level in Tillich, and we find that he places an emphasis on the how-truths instead of the what-truths: "The finite is potentially or essentially an element in the divine life, everything finite is qualified by this essential relation".⁹³ In estrangement, the relation is broken and only some weak remnants remain according to Tillich. Still, "the relation to the divine ground of being through the divine Spirit is not agnostic [as it is not amoral]; rather it includes the knowledge of the "depth" of the divine. ... This knowledge is not the fruit of *theoria*, the receiving function of the human spirit, but has an ecstatic character, (it has the character of) *agape*."⁹⁴ If this knowledge has the character of *agape*, then Tillich's position is congruent with that of Kierkegaard's: in Kierkegaard we find the insight into the depth of the divine-human encounter in *agape*, in love. If we only had the eyes of faith, we could see God everywhere, Kierkegaard claimed.⁹⁵ Tillich on his side wrote: "only the "eyes of faith" see what is hidden or spiritual, and the "eyes of faith" are the Spirit's creation: only Spirit discerns Spirit".⁹⁶ "Spirit discerns Spirit", if there is faith-knowledge, it is a participatory knowledge: all knowledge of God is from God; the like is known by like.

In *Mystik und Schuldbewusstsein in Schellings philosophischer Entwicklung* Tillich notes that the negative and the positive build a differential relation in Schelling: the negative and the positive belong together; the bond between them is never totally broken; the relation is paradoxical and differential.⁹⁷ The negative is not to be disregarded, but we are to recognize both the negative and the positive: only through the negative is the positive to be found. The negative is the sign of the positive, Tillich could have written this as well. It seems to be the case that Tillich did not let go of the differential relation, but keeps it as the key of faith throughout his philosophical and theological work. In the outmost estrangement, when all courage to be is gone, the positive is present, if only in the form of the seriousness of the situation. This seriousness or awareness is an expression of the relation between the finite and the infinite. "As non-being is dependent on the being it negates, so the awareness of finitude presupposes a place above finitude from which the finite is seen as finite."⁹⁸ In atheism, as a state of being without God, the seriousness of questioning is the sign of the positive; atheism is a moment of faith. Even if the individual feels that she/he is without God, God has a hidden presence in the lives of all individuals; as far as there is being and life, there is God. If the Spirit is present in the individual,

she/he does not shy away from the negative and the positive, but she/he let them to do the work in him or her; God's strange work destroys what is against love in the individual. Even in a situation of extreme estrangement there is a differential bond between the + and the -, expressing the minimum mix of the existential and the essential elements.

As stated, there is a subjective side of the "how" in Kierkegaard and this "how" is also seen in Tillich. When Tillich explicates the presence of the New Being, he does so by listing how human awareness changes under the impact of the Spiritual Presence.⁹⁹ We have found that metaphors and symbols in Kierkegaard express the moment of transition: they express the going over from the negative to the positive, making the relation with the positive explicable. For Tillich, metaphors and symbols express participatory knowledge. In Tillich's view there is "the symbolic expression of the relation of the temporal to the eternal. More specifically, it (the *eschaton*) symbolizes the "transition" from the temporal to the eternal".¹⁰⁰ Beyond this, Tillich also emphasizes the objective side, going beyond the how of human subjectivity. The religious symbols, even if they are metaphorical, "have a *fundamentum in re*, a foundation in reality, however much the subjective side of man's experience may contribute".¹⁰¹ God for Schelling is a living God that goes out of divine ground and, as all living things, there is otherness in God. Tillich wrote:

Non-being is not foreign to being, but ... it is that quality of being by which everything that participates in being is negated. Non-being is the negation of being within being itself. Each of these words is, of course, used metaphorically. But metaphorical language can be true language, pointing to something that is both revealed and hidden in this language.¹⁰²

Expressive metaphors might open up hidden dimensions of life and being; metaphors might function as explications of the participatory life. In Kierkegaard we found the standpoint that love makes individuality visible; love touches the total personality of the Other. Tillich draws attention "to the multidimensional love which affirms the other one in the act of reunion".¹⁰³ In Tillich, love makes its work through the multidimensional unity of life; it is in all life's dimensions, conquering the negative or non-being. Love confirms and affirms the individuality of the Other even in Tillich:

The self-conscious self cannot be excluded from Eternal Life. Since Eternal Life is life and not undifferentiated identity and since the Kingdom of God is the universal actualization of love, the element of individualization cannot be eliminated or the element of participation would also disappear. There is no participation if there are no individual centers to participate; the two poles condition each other.¹⁰⁴

The terms 'individualization' and participation' are concepts with determined content only within the subject-object structure. In relation to the infinite, they are metaphors which should not be understood literally. Kierkegaard wrote: "For one who has individuality another person's individuality is no refutation but rather a confirmation."¹⁰⁵

As indicated, Tillich goes beyond Kierkegaard's position, which deals with the qualification or determination of existence by the positive. The differential play between the + and the - is in all beings, on all levels of life in Tillich. All things, including humans, resist non-being. Given the finite nature of life, all things are threatened by non-being; perhaps only humans are able to be aware of this threat. There is psychological resistance, when we react on the threat of anxiety and annihilation; there is physiological resistance as we die daily and conquer death in every moment in our bodies. Without anything outside this struggle, the opposition between the + and the - would be unbearable. Tillich's point is that all things, life as such, contain both being and non-being, that in life or in the divine ground of being, the process of conquering non-being goes on continuously: being is good but it is constantly threatened by non-being, only the being itself is the constant ever on-going conquering of the non-being. Life itself is the differential play; the differential play is life. Tillich claims that the overcoming of the non-being in life is God's continuous directing creation. As far as we become aware of this, the possibility of faith-knowledge is there. There is not only a No to nothing; there is also the source, the ground, the secret source at the bottom of the living, loving heart conquering non-being.

Endnotes

- 1 Schelling, 1992:84.
- 2 Kierkegaard, 2009:37, 159.
- 3 “In the transition from homogeneity to duplicity a world dawns, and with the restoration of duplicity the world itself opens up. And if Nature is only visible spirit, then the spirit must become visible in it generally, as soon as the identity of matter (its absolute rest), by which it is suppressed in itself, is canceled. ... The general expression of Nature is therefore “identity in duplicity and duplicity in identity.” Schelling, 2004:132, 180.
- 4 Ibid., 203.
- 5 Ibid., 202.
- 6 Schelling, 1994:190.
- 7 In his definition of the nature of thinking, Deleuze takes a similar position to Schelling: “The conditions of a true critique and a true creation are the same: the destruction of an image of thought which presupposes itself and the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself. Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental *encounter*. ... Its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is opposed to recognition. In recognition, the sensible is not at all that which can only be sensed, but that which bears directly upon the senses in an object which can be recalled, imagined or conceived.” Deleuze, 1994:139.
- 8 Kierkegaard, 2009:259.
- 9 Taylor, 2009:127.
- 10 In Gilles Deleuze’s view, differential thinking can be found in Nietzsche as well: “The differential element is both a critique of the value of values and the positive element of a creation.” Deleuze, 2006:2.
- 11 Schelling, 2007:120.
- 12 “According to Kant, reason is nothing other than the faculty of knowledge as such, so that what is posited within us becomes, from the standpoint of philosophy, an object for us.” Ibid., 132.
- 13 In Schelling “our exclusive dependence on a negative and instrumental reason is supplanted by an integrative reason capable of realizing our nature in its wholeness and, therewith, of reconciling our fractured self with nature”. Bruno Matthews in Schelling, 2007:80.
- 14 Schelling, 2007:142.
- 15 Ibid., 94.

- 16 Ibid., 138. "The science that accomplishes this elimination of what is contingent in the first concepts of being – and with this frees being itself – is critical, is of the negative type." Ibid., 144.
- 17 Ibid., 137.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Ibid., 203.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Ibid., 179.
- 22 Ibid., 210.
- 23 Ibid., 197.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Ibid., 166.
- 26 Schelling, 1994:190.
- 27 Bruce Matthews in Translator's Introduction in Schelling, 2007:79.
- 28 "With what is capable of being comprehended a priori, the negative philosophy busies itself while the positive deals with what is not capable of being comprehended a priori. But the positive philosophy concerns itself with this only in order to transform precisely that which is incomprehensible a priori into what is a posteriori comprehensible: what is incomprehensible a priori becomes comprehensible in God." Schelling, 2007:205.
- 29 Schelling, 1994:190.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Schelling, 2007:169.
- 32 Bruce Matthews in Schelling 2007:71. Citation is from the German edition of *Grounding of Positive Philosophy*.
- 33 "The experience towards which positive philosophy proceeds is not just of a *particular kind*, but it is the entirety of all experience from beginning to end." Schelling, 2007:181.
- 34 "In the unruly hues of embodied existence it is not logic, but rather "(w)anting itself" that is the purest example" of "the transition a *potentia ad actum*." This example captures the living dynamic beginning that does justice to our actual experience of "being capable of freely deciding" to become "originator(s) of a course of action"." Bruce Matthews in Schelling, 2007:34.
- 35 "If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality. ... Desire and its object are one and the same thing." Deleuze & Guattari, 1994:26.

- 36 “We are ... “co-poets” of our history, working in collaboration with the forces of creation. Not only can we read the book of nature, but we can also edit and rewrite it. For the author of this book and writer of our drama does not “exist independently of us, but reveals and discloses himself successively only, through the very play of our own freedom, so that without this freedom even he himself *would not be*.” Bruce Matthews in Schelling, 2007:81. Citation is from Schelling’s *System of Transcendental Idealism*.
- 37 Kierkegaard, 1973:81.
- 38 ”The infinite resignation is the last stage prior to faith, so that one who has not made this movement has not faith; for only in the infinite resignation do I become clear to myself with respect to my eternal validity, and only then can there be any question of grasping existence by virtue of faith.” Kierkegaard, 1941:65f.
- 39 Tillich, 1984:81.
- 40 “Only when reflection comes to a halt can a beginning be made, and reflection can be halted only by something else, and this something must be quite different from the logical, being a resolution of the will.” Kierkegaard, 1974:103.
- 41 Kierkegaard, 1973:142.
- 42 Kierkegaard, 1974.
- 43 Tillich, ST I 1978:12.
- 44 Kierkegaard, 2009:149.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 Kierkegaard, 1973:123.
- 47 Bowie, 2006:8.
- 48 ”Thinking metaphorically means spotting a thread of similarity between two dissimilar objects, events, or whatever, one of which is better known than the other, and using the better-known one as a way of speaking about the lesser known. (...) Metaphor is ordinary language.” McFague, 1983:15f.
- 49 Tillich, ST I 1978:235ff.
- 50 Tillich, ST II 1978:8.
- 51 Ibid., 9.
- 52 Ibid. “Thus it follows that everything religion has to say about God, including qualities, actions, and manifestations, has a symbolic character and that the meaning of “God” is completely missed if one takes the symbolic language literally.” Ibid.
- 53 Kierkegaard, 2009:199.

- 54 Ibid.
- 55 "Socrates does not deny all knowledge, but rather only that knowledge of which the others boasted. ... Socrates presupposes a knowledge in this explanation of ignorance. ... Socrates presupposes a knowledge to which the mere science of reason relates as ignorant. ... He sought instead of this (a doctrine) a *higher* historical context, as if only in *this* context there was real knowledge. ... Socrates and Plato both relate to this positive as something of the future: they relate to it prophetically. In Aristotle, philosophy for the first time cleansed itself of all that is prophetic and mythical, and yet in doing this, Aristotle appears as the pupil of both, in that he turned away completely from the *merely* logical toward the positive that was accessible to him – to the empirical in the widest sense of the word, in which the *thatness* [that it exists] is first, and the *whatness* [what something is] then becomes second and, thus, subsidiary." Schelling 2007:157ff.
- 56 "Here the way swings off; Socrates concentrates essentially upon accentuating existence, while Plato forgets this and loses himself in speculation." Kierkegaard, 1974:184.
- 57 "Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic idea of immortality could be understood as an attempt to resist its inescapable primitivization and to take Plato's thought into his own symbol of highest fulfillment, which is the individual's participation in the eternal self-intuition of the divine *nous*." Tillich, 1976:411.
- 58 "The lover always wants that which she/he nevertheless possesses. ... That simple wise man of old has said, "Love is a son of riches and poverty." ... Yet love is perhaps best described as an infinite debt: when an individual is gripped by love, he or she feels that this is like being in infinite debt." Kierkegaard, 2009:171f.
- 59 "A certain prior transformation of mind and thought is necessary in order to become aware of what the discussion is about." Ibid., 173.
- 60 Kierkegaard, 1974:75.
- 61 Ibid., 424.
- 62 Kierkegaard, 1991:140ff,
- 63 Ibid., 136.
- 64 Kierkegaard 2009:27.
- 65 Ibid., 208ff.
- 66 Ibid., 33.
- 67 "The beloved and the friend are therefore called, remarkably and significantly enough, the *other-self*, the *other I*." Ibid., 66.
- 68 Kierkegaard, 1991:68.

- 69 True love "will teach erotic love and friendship what genuine love is: in love towards yourself preserve love to your neighbour, in erotic love preserve love to your neighbor". Kierkegaard, 2009:74.
- 70 "To love oneself in the right way and to love one's neighbour correspond perfectly to one another; fundamentally they are one and the same thing." Ibid., 39.
- 71 Ibid., 208
- 72 Kierkegaard, 1973:32.
- 73 Kierkegaard, 2009:206.
- 74 Ibid., 175ff.
- 75 Ibid., 261.
- 76 Ibid., 351f.
- 77 Kierkegaard, 2007:352.
- 78 Kierkegaard, 2009:352.
- 79 Kierkegaard, 1973:132.
- 80 Tillich, 1980:181.
- 81 ""But if the essentially Christian is something so terrifying and appalling, how in the world can anyone think of accepting Christianity?" Very simply and, if you wish that also, very Lutherany: only the consciousness of sin can force one, if I dare to put it that way [from the other side grace is the force], into this horror." Kierkegaard, 1991:67.
- 82 "For here again the negative is the mark by which the God-relationship is recognized." Kierkegaard, 1974:412. "Between God and human being, however, there is an absolute difference. (...) But since there is this absolute difference between God and man, how does the principle of equality in love express itself? By means of the absolute difference. And what is the form of this absolute difference? Humility. What sort of humility? The humility that frankly admits its human lowliness with humble cheerfulness before God." Ibid., 441. "All ironical observations depend upon paying attention to the "how," whereas the gentleman with whom the ironist has the honour to converse is attentive only of the "what"." Ibid., 543.
- 83 Kierkegaard, 2009:198.
- 84 Tillich dismisses essentialism, see Tillich, ST II, 1978:23ff.
- 85 Tillich, 1976:12.
- 86 Tillich, ST II 1978:8.
- 87 "God can never become an object for individuals' knowledge or action. ... The holiness of God makes it impossible to draw God into the context of the ego-world and the subject-object correlation. God is the ground and meaning of this correlation, not an element within it." Tillich, ST I 1978:271f.

- 88 Tillich, 1976:405f.
- 89 In Aristotle "the soul is the form of the life process, its immortality includes all elements which constitutes this process, though it includes them as essences. The meaning of the "immortality of the soul" then would involve the power of essentialization. And in Plato's late doctrine of the world-soul, the idea of immortality in the sense of universal essentialization seems to be implied". Ibid., 410.
- 90 Tillich, 1976:411.
- 91 Ibid., 401.
- 92 Ibid., 133.
- 93 Ibid.
- 94 Ibid., 117.
- 95 Kierkegaard, 1974.
- 96 Tillich, 1976:150.
- 97 "Auch in Sünder ist das Band des Geistes wirksam, obwohl die sein-sollende Einheit aufgelöst ist; die Kraft der Sünde beruht auf ihm, und dieses Band ist es, was den Menschen zum Menschen macht, seine "Substanz". "Wird die Einheit ganz aufgehoben, so wird eben damit der Widerstreit aufgehoben". [VII, 371] Das Nicht-sein-Sollende kann nur am Sein-Sollenden offenbar werden. Das Schuldbewusstsein selbst schliesst das Bewusstsein um die wahre Einheit in sich. Je tiefer und absoluter das Schuldbewusstsein, desto höher die Erfassung der wahren Identität- Ja und Nein stehen auch hier in voller Absolutenheit nebeneinander und ineinander. Es ist das Wesen aller Flachheit des Geistes, diese Identität der Widerspruchs abschwächen zu wollen. In die Tiefe des Geistes aber blickt, wer sie als die Form der lebendigen Wahrheit lebendig erfasst." Tillich, 1959:93.
- 98 Tillich, 1960:39.
- 99 Tillich, 1976.
- 100 Ibid., 395.
- 101 Ibid., 283.
- 102 Tillich, 1960:38.
- 103 Tillich, 1976:160.
- 104 Ibid., 413f.
- 105 Kierkegaard, 2007:254.

Tillichian Pedagogy and New Learning Situation: Informative Learning, Participative Learning, and Self-Determination

In pedagogy and in didactics we find three main questions: *What* is the subject or content of teaching and learning? *How* is it to be mediated in the pedagogical situation? *Why* is the teaching done in the given way or, rather, what are the goals of teaching and learning? What, how, and why making up the key-questions of learning and education. In Scandinavian context the emphasis has moved from pedagogy to didactics: religious education is didactics of religion. Didactics is the design of learning situation, including classroom design, ethical dimensions, curriculum, and the objectives of the course; didactics, in American context, is curriculum studies. Recent pedagogy studies emotions in the classroom, the impact of cultural patterns in the learning situation, and the life-politics of pedagogy.¹ Usually the relationship between the two is interpreted in the sense that didactics is subordinated to pedagogy: pedagogical philosophy contains a didactic dimension. Tillichian pedagogy I use in the widest sense of the word, including philosophical, political, pedagogical and didactic aspects. With Tillichian pedagogy I refer to Tillich's philosophy of education. It is said, that Tillich did not have a philosophy of education and pedagogical issues were explicit during the German period only.² This is true: he did not have an explicit philosophy of education, but pedagogical interests follow him all the time: they were integrated with his thought in profound way. Questions concerning teaching and learning were a part of Tillich's thinking both during the German period and during his time in the United States. I think that there is a *latent* philosophy of education in Tillich; the leading motives of that philosophy are discernible already under the 1920's. If it is so that pedagogy is integrated with various aspects of Tillich thought, a whole-emphasizing approach is needed in order to catch sight of it.

Recent critical education asks for “a holistic engagement with the world that is existentially challenging in cognitive, affective and practical terms”.³ Such an engagement is to be found in Tillich.

Today’s learning situation is different from the learning situation just few years back in time. Technical tools of communication from learning platforms to twitter have pervaded the learning situation. Students are not met in real time, but they are spread all over the world and the communication is through email and learning platform. Internationally there is an outspoken concurrence between private and public universities considering the financial resources, that is, the students. Multi-national corporations have their own universities, educating their own high-skilled staff and fostering international elite, which has the whole globe as its working-place.⁴ The society, locally and globally is split in two: one the one hand the educated privileged class and on the other hand those who are outside the educational system, due to their lack of relevant education. Even if the divide is getting wider and wider between the two classes, and will probably do so in the nearest future, sustainable strategies in education are seen as a way of reducing the cleft.⁵ Tillich fought the dividing tendencies already during the 1920’s; the cultural trends are backed up by thousands of years of mental history. Education is an active force in the society, “conditioning” the society and its future in one way or another; education is, and always has been future-oriented.⁶ Today it is necessary to think through the role of education locally, globally, culturally and religiously. It is necessary to discuss the educational tradition and what education does to us individually, socially, and globally, and not least, it is necessary to discuss the constructive potentials of education. I discuss Tillich’s philosophy of education in relation to the recent learning situation; I try to lift up his constructive educational alternatives. Traditional teaching, if we are to talk in those terms, has emphasized the what-side of pedagogy: teaching is to communicate formulated knowledge or information; education is informative learning. The how-side: how we relate to knowledge, how we construe knowledge, how we are in relation to each other, how we orientate in the light of meaning, has been the “hidden” side of education. In Tillich’s thought, and in his pedagogy, the last-mentioned questions have a central place. To tackle the recent political, economical, and cultural/educational situation it is necessary to integrate the what-side with the how-side! The how-side emphasizes connectedness,

identity, meaning and ethical/political issues; the “how” is essential to participative learning.

Religion is the subject matter in religious education, in scientific studies of religion and in theology, but do we learn *about* religion or *from* religion? This last question is widely discussed in the Anglo-Saxon religious education, influencing the Scandinavian context.⁷ Scientific study of religion, since Schleiermacher, has studied the outer, historical forms and functions of religion. It studies those forms of expression to which an objective attitude is appropriate: we learn about religion, what it is and how it functions. In confessional schools we learn from religion, and the only way to understand religion, it is said, is through participation in a particular religion. In non-confessional schools, in the state-funded schools, the emphasis is on learning about religion. The secular state gives room for both ways, as it admits the right to religion; it admits the confessional schools. Today it is asked if the “old” ideal of scientific study of religion: religion as the object of scientific studies, is possible at all.⁸ Post-modernity is adhering to relativism in epistemology, morality, and religion, and in the study of religion. Essentialism is denied and with it both the essential human nature and the essential, substantial definition of religion. Is all, then, relative? On the other hand, we have fundamentalists in Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Christendom who claim that the only way to understand religion is to study and to live from religion. There is a considerable pressure coming both from relativists and from fundamentalists against the scientific study of religion! The questions considering the possibility of religious studies and of studying theology in schools and universities are important questions, touching the very foundations of the modern state and the way democratic institutions are construed in democratic states. If we cannot study religion with scientific means, why should it be a subject in schools and universities at all? The scientific study of religion is not possible, why should we then study theology, as theology is a superstructure to religion? Many things are wrong in this logic of exclusion, but the argumentation catches a trend in the recent debate. How would Tillich have tackled these issues? His is not an extremist position: he gives room for the autonomous culture (it is possible to study religion with scientific means) and he gives room for religion in its various, non-extremist forms. Tillich had an integrated view of the relationship between the modern autonomous culture and religion.

I make a difference between two levels of learning: the *informative level* and the *level of participative learning*. The two build up an integral or integrative model; both kinds of learning are needed, if we like to have a holistic view on education and learning. We are able to lift up Tillich's philosophy of education with this model. The model helps us to discuss Tillich's pedagogical views, deeply embedded in his philosophy and in his cultural theology, and it helps us to discuss these in relation to recent discussions in pedagogy, didactics, and philosophy. Further, the model proposes a view on religion and theology, which builds on integration between religion as a lived reality, religion as a studied object, and theology as a faith-perspective in life. Life, thinking, and faith are integrated with each other, even in the learning situation. In an integrative model it is possible to point out the different levels or dimensions as such, at the same time as certain wholeness is presupposed. We do not only orientate ourselves through bits, fragments, and atomistic claims (clear statements), but we orientate in terms of constellations, patterns, "wholes" including values, which are mostly rooted in the unconscious. There are conscious and non-conscious learning-processes, as Damasio puts it: the conscious mind gives only a window-view to things and much of learning happens outside that window-view.⁹ The interesting question: How to educate the unconscious comes in view.¹⁰ Perhaps learning is about value-differentiation at the meta-narrative level: that we learn about that what is truly important and valuable in life, despite the dominating evaluations of our commercialized times? When it comes to religion, we might make a difference between that what is truly valuable and that what is only an expression of the "ultimate value". It seems to be the case that both relativists and fundamentalists place an absolute value-judgment on that what is not the valuable as such, but only a representation or a report of the absolute. Derek R. Nelson has observed, while using *Dynamics of Faith* in education that the book "functions primarily as a *relativizing antidote to absolutizing tendencies*".¹¹ I would like to add that Tillich's philosophical theology and its pedagogical application functions as a relativizing antidote to absolutizing tendencies even in understanding culture, politics, morality, and science, not only in understanding religion. It relativizes things on the informative level, but it also points to something absolute on the relational level. In Tillich's view, the different levels of reality "demand different approaches and different languages".¹²

Informative learning

When Tillich came to the United States he saw that students knew historical facts but no emotional, identity-bearing connection with the past was discernible. Considering his first meetings with American students, Tillich wrote:

I found that an immediate emotional identification with the reality of the past was lacking. Many of the students here had an excellent knowledge of historical facts, but these facts did not seem to concern them profoundly. They remained objects of their intellect and almost never became elements of their existence.¹³

Perhaps the schools had emphasized the informative learning rather than the personal dimension of identity and orientation in history and in one's contextual space. If so, the teaching was more or less determined by the objectifying approach: the fact- or what-orientation, and not with the how- and why-orientation. The objectifying approach had laid the ground of teaching and learning in Scandinavia, perhaps even in the United States. Herbert M. Kliebard points to "the yoke of college domination" burdening the high school preparatory courses for college studies.¹⁴ The yoke is still there because of the one-sided emphases of traditional school subjects. If this is true, universities and schools are still in the hands of the informative learning, even though there are significant changes happening in recent years according to Kliebard. We might say that the informative learning has been a dominating trend during the 20th century in Scandinavia and perhaps in the United States as well.

One of the strongest arguments against the hegemony of informative learning, coming from neurophysiologists, is that the informative learning emphasizes the higher cognitive capacities at the cost of other mind-capacities.¹⁵ If the emphasis is solely on the cognitive/informative learning, the emotional capacities get impoverished: the capacity for empathetic identification with others is lessening, because of the one-sided emphasis of the cognitive rationality. In 1920's Tillich pointed to a trend in modern education, leading to an unbalanced development of personality. He talked about "the one-sided intellectual emphasis in modern education".¹⁶ Education was linked with the knowledge-needs of the capitalistic industrial society and not with the development of the whole personality. The purpose of education was to supply the labor-

market of the industrial society with qualified workers; education gave the means to manage the system. Education marked class and the intellectual/economic needs of the privileged groups: “cultural education becomes the hall mark of a class and an instrument of economic power.”¹⁷ In the prevailing education:

Nature and tradition were regarded not from the point of view of their meaning, as referring to the eternal, but from the point of view of their finite, phenomenal form. Consequently the materials of education were to be received intellectually, through knowledge of the finite and phenomenal form.¹⁸

In Tillich’s view, education had become a part of the process of dehumanization and depersonalization:

The loss of personality is interdependent with the loss of community. Only personalities can have community. Depersonalized beings have social interrelations. (...) The monopolistic direction of public communication, of leisure, pleasure, learning, sex relations, sport, etc., does not provide a basis for a real community.¹⁹

The informative learning seems to have dominated the educational system of the capitalist industrial society in the 19th and the 20th century. Since Freire, the informative learning is called “banking-education”: the purpose of teaching is to deliver well-formulated facts; students collect the facts and store them; the capability to store facts is checked in controlling tests.²⁰ In banking-education it is the teacher, as the authoritative representative of the educational system, who has the right knowledge and s/he transports it to pupils and students. The informative learning is teacher-centered learning. The informative learning is still with us, but now in a more sophisticated form. Today we witness “a gradual yet relentless replacement of the orthodox teacher-student relationship with the supplier-client, or shopping mall-shopper pattern”.²¹ In the supplier-client model it is supposed that learning is a matter of buying and selling, but still it is only information that is being sold. One part of learning is informative learning, but learning should not be reduced to transporting information. Informative learning is partial: it does not touch the whole human person; the unconscious, symbol-creating dimension of personality, the body, is excluded in the informative learning. “All movements against the spirit of capitalist society in education

are united in their opposition to the intellectualism of purely formal training”, Tillich wrote while still in Germany.²²

In America, after 1933, Tillich continues to articulate the alternative to the informative learning: it is symbols that give the sense of identity and meaning; a depersonalized individual is to restore her or his core or centre of personality in interaction with other people; both personality and community are to be restored; that what happens in one individual, affects all others. What is demanded is ”a convincing restatement of the meaning of life, ... the discovery of symbols expressing it, and ... the re-establishment of personality and community. But such a demand includes the demand for an equally radical and inseparable social and political construction”.²³ Given the relation of interdependence, which in Tillich’s view “links” all dimensions and realms of life with each other, there is no restoration of humanity without the corresponding restoration of society and community and *vice versa*. The alternative should “include the principle of humanist education, ... the opening up of human possibilities and the providing of opportunities where the pupil may develop in freedom”.²⁴ The alternative includes self-determination.

Informative learning is supposed to build on abstract universalism. It makes use of the universals of language and of representation (words, images and signs); universals or common concepts being the results of the process of abstraction. It is presupposed that words stand for that what they say, that there is a one-to-one fit between the representation and the represented, the map and the terrain. It is supposed that words do nothing more but inform about the states of affairs in humans, nature, and society. Words, in informative learning, are not supposed to have constructive capacities, they tell about the world as it is in itself. Realism and informative learning are supposed to be congruent with each other. The one-to-one fit between the representation and the represented is questioned today.²⁵ If there is no one-to-one fit between the representation and the represented, the word and the object, if all things are internal to representation, then relativism is the inevitable outcome. Relativism, as a philosophical position, is self-contradictory. The claim that all stories and all truth-claims are equally true, as a relativist claims, is not a relativistic claim: it aims to say something true about the stories and about the relation of the stories to each other. Tillich does not accept the relativist position, but he claims that *there is relativity at the informative level*. In Tillich’s view all representations, as propositions, statements,

and assertions are relative. Tillich thought that the cognitive relation between the representation and the represented, the I-It relation, gives some knowledge of things and of the universe *under certain conditions*. The condition-dependence gives the relativity of representation. Empirical truths, for instance, are congruent in Tillich's view with "controlling knowledge" or controlled knowledge. This knowledge "is verified by the success of controlling actions. The technical use of scientific knowledge is its greatest and most impressive verification".²⁶ Still, empirical truth-claims, built on the controlling knowledge, are relative. The controlling knowledge is there under certain conditions: the subject/object structure between the individual and the world has come to pass; the thing-universe is construed; the object of knowledge is targeted; the experimenting, and controlling procedures are used in testing the hypotheses. If these conditions are fulfilled, the knowledge is there. The informative truth-claims, as we find them in science, in ethics, in religion are in Tillich's view *probabilities*, in this sense they are relative. "Every particular assertion is preliminary," he wrote.²⁷ Given the above, absolute literal faith in science, that only scientific truth-claims were true or that only science gives us truth is impossible. In religion, and in religious education, the relativity of assertions leads to the breakdown of logo-centrism: "*Verbum* is more than *oratio*. Protestantism has forgotten that to a great degree. *Verbum*, word of revelation can be in everything in which the spirit expresses itself, even in the silent symbols of art."²⁸ Religious education, then, might use all the means through which the spirit is able to express itself: rites, rituals, images, natural things, art, architecture etc, and not only words. Rites and symbols affect the unconscious of children (and adults), Tillich wrote, and educators should be aware of that affection. "The conquest of literalism without the loss of the symbols is the great task for religious education," he wrote.²⁹

The relativity of assertions is not the last word of truth-claims. All truth-claims must meet the absolutes of knowledge: those absolute cognitive conditions that make the truth-claims possible, like the *categories of mind* as formal structures of the mind and *being*, as we presuppose that natural things, even as objects of science, have being. The absolutes are there, but we cannot say *what* they are; they cannot become objects of knowledge, as knowledge itself presupposes them. Given the underlying absolutes of the cognitive relation, Tillich's position is not

the relativist philosophical position. Tillich formulated this in the following way: "Each of our statements about the absolutes in knowledge is relative. ... But the absolutes themselves are not relative."³⁰ In sense impressions there is something prevailing and absolute, even if we cannot formulate it in clear and definite terms, something that "stands there" despite the changing flux of perception. In human encounters there is something absolute: the demand to admit the Other as a person on her/his own right, despite the relativity of moral prescriptions and laws.³¹ There is, further, "the logical and semantic structure of the mind", which is absolute and which must be presupposed in all truth-claims. There is the fundamental and "the basic absolute": being, as we presuppose that all things have being.³² None of the absolutes is an object, but all empirical and controlling knowledge needs objects. There is no possibility to say what these absolutes are: they must be presupposed as belonging to the mind/world encounter. We should have an open and critical mind while making use of informative learning. Experimental verification must be combined with "experiential verification", Tillich wrote.³³

Humans and higher animals are products of evolution, evolution is there as part of the life-process, when we start to claim that humans and animals are nothing but material products of evolution, we make a metaphysical claim. Given the scientific perspective, it is highly probable that humans are products of evolution and that we have a this-worldly life-history, but to claim that we are *nothing but* products of evolution shuts out the other possibilities and other interpretations. Science gives us means of understanding nature and of natural processes in terms of cause and effect, but it is not only science that gives us knowledge, it gives us only one kind of knowledge. When we start to claim that through scientific understanding of nature we control nature and the future direction of life-process, we make a metaphysical claim and place ourselves above life. We become victims of a modern myth: that only the scientific perspective with its controlling knowledge gives true knowledge of the universe and of its future direction. "The world as a universal machine is the myth of the modern man, and his *ethos* is the elevation of the personality to the mastery of this machine," Tillich wrote.³⁴ The elevated personality is still a depersonalized individual, if the elevation is in the power of the machine only. The determination is from the outside.

The question of self-determination actualizes itself. In a depersonalized society education is not able to reach its goal which is “to give a personal center which can radiate into all sectors of contemporary life”.³⁵ Still the individual has “the capacity of becoming personality. ... Personality is that being which has the power of self-determination, or which is free; for to be free means to have power over one’s self, not to be bound to one’s given nature”.³⁶ In a depersonalized situation, the personal center is not reached and the power of self-determination is broken; the bond to one’s humanity is lost. Tillich thought that genuine self-determination is possible only in the power of the humanity of humans, that is, in relation to the essential human nature: “the determining subject can determine only in the power of what it essentially is. But under the conditions of existential estrangement, it is separated from what it essentially is”.³⁷ What this means is that the bond to common humanity is to be re-established. One goal of Tillichian pedagogy is to create space for the restoration of the humanity of humans. This does not mean that there are not any other forms of self-determination than the restoring act.

Participative learning and self-determination

In the orthodox teacher-student relationship it is the teacher who stands for knowledge and transports this knowledge in a one way communication to the students. Tillich saw the alternative to the informative learning in encouraging creativity, participation, and originality on the part of students and pupils. In 1920’s, while referring to the new pedagogy, he wrote:

The authoritative communication of the subject matter is opposed; originality and creative activity on the part of the pupil are encouraged. Vital participation of the pupil in perceptual reality is to take place of the intellectual communication of the rational and abstract forms of things. Fellowship between the pupils and between them and the teacher is proclaimed as the ideal form of the educational relationship. This is all of great importance for the religious situation of the present and particularly of the future. Love of community and love of things are beginning to prevail.³⁸

What this means is that the learning situation is to be constructed in such a way that pupils, students, and teachers participate in that activity or act in which truth, community, meaning, and society are in making. Recently Victoria Rue has written: "Classrooms can be arenas for building communities too. When classroom become communities of learning, students and teachers are "rehearsing" the society they would like to see".³⁹ This new community-building, at the same time as the processes of community-destruction are accelerating locally and globally, is one of the possibilities of the new pedagogy today. The emphasis is turned from the informative to the *participative learning*.

In the participative learning situation pupils, students, and teachers share the common relationship in collecting information, in construing/creating new knowledge, and in orientating in the light of that what is the goal and meaning of life. To orientate in the light of meaning is not to give consent to a represented world or an informed world, it is not to move on the informative level only, it is both to ask the question of meaning and to act for meaning in the prevailing situation, "from the below". To orientate in the light of meaning does not mean that schools and universities are turned into religious congregations, as participative learning gives room for autonomy and autonomous culture (informative learning). It means that there is room for human questioning, human search for meaning, and for human self-determination. "The humanistic question is radical; it goes to the roots and does not accept anything whatsoever as being beyond questioning. (...) Christianity includes humanism and the radical question of truth which is the first principle of humanism."⁴⁰ Further, participative or integral learning gives room for drama and art, as these are bearers of stories, narratives, rites, and symbols. It is narratives, rites, and symbols that give the sense of identity and meaning, in Tillich's terminology: they give the reunion with the center of personality, creating the very core of personality; personality comes into being. If there is the loss of identity, meaning, and community (depersonalized individuals and depersonalized communities fostering non-personal social interrelations), then drama and art: the opening up of the symbolic dimension of things, might be a way to counteract that loss. The symbolic dimension is not only in the individual, it links the individual with being. The participative or integral learning makes use of art, metaphors and symbols; it points to and participates in the creative dimension of being; it deals with ontological

issues. Tillich pointed to the creativity of being: “Reality itself creates structural possibilities within itself. Life, as well as mind, is creative.”⁴¹ Today there is hardly any professional educator who does not admit the indispensability of art in learning, and with it the creative interaction between mind, being and society:

“Then we really may believe that mountains are living?” asks one of the young girls in *The Ethics of the Dust*. “Things are not either wholly alive, or wholly dead. They are more or less alive,” responds Ruskin’s Lecturer, and he has the girls – not unlike Millais’s angels fifteen years before – walk around and grasp each other’s hands, as in a dance, creating “*crystals of life*,” to empirically teach them the configurational nature of things. ... The Gothic is an architecture of relationality, of entanglement, an architecture that constantly forges new relationships and expresses them in every possible form and shape.⁴²

Map-making

The participative learning is structural and relational: it studies the human ways of relating and map-making. In Keri Facer’s view “building the map is the basis for all learning and for the mutual encounter”.⁴³ The informative learning presupposes the subject/object relation between the individual and the world, that is, it presupposes a certain map. The grounding coordinate of that map is the subject/object relation between the individual and the world. The subject/object relation between the self and the world is a product of self-determination: the position of observer is construed in relation to the world. The modern autonomous self is born in this act of self-determination: the self posits itself as an autonomous thinking subject in relation to the world. This act grounds the modern autonomous culture. Tillich named the self/world structure: “the basic ontological structure”.⁴⁴ The autonomous self is individualistic, punctual, and independent.⁴⁵ In Tillich we, however, discover a second phase of self-determination surplus to the initial phase of self-determination. The coming into being of the modern autonomous subjective self is an initial phase of self-determination. It is a necessary step, laying the ground of the autonomous culture and the basic ontological structure of the self/world relation, but human beings do not only relate objectively with the world, they also relate to each other, affect each other, and realize their selves in interdependence and in interaction with each other. The marks of the second phase of self-determination are

discernible in Tillich. Religion, culture, morality, and education might be understood in the light of the second phase of self-determination: Western education builds on the humanistic ideal: the individual is to development her/his intellectual, emotional, moral and volitional capacities and potentials. The humanistic educational ideal has its root in Renaissance, even if the modern education has disregarded the affective levels of interdependence and interaction, which were still a part of the Renaissance humanism. Education, humanistic education, helps us to go from darkness and ignorance to the clarity of rational reason. Only the individual with reason is free and autonomous. Freedom is the freedom of speech, of opinion, of religion, freedom is to choose one's way as a reflecting person. The humanistic educational ideal builds on strong self-determination: the individual as such is capable of reaching the goal of learning, which is the balanced development of personality. According to humanism the individual as such is in touch with the essential human nature and the human nature comes to expression in the activity of thinking, feeling, and willing, in the *species activity*. The goal is to think independently, to differentiate between the self-feeling and mere reactions, and to act independently in the power of the reflecting reason. A humanist works for the benefit of others; s/he serves humanity; s/he is a *uomo universale*. In Tillich's view the opportunity of the development of personality is given only for a few privileged individuals, large groups of people are left outside of the humanistic educational ideal:

Because of human finitude, no one can fulfill the humanist ideal, since decisive human potentialities will always remain unrealized. But even worse, the human condition always excludes ... the vast majority of human beings from the higher grades of cultural form and educational depth. ... Therefore, the question "Educating into what?" must be answered in a way which includes everyone who is a person. But culture cannot do that by itself – just because of the ambiguities of humanism. Only a self-transcending humanism can answer the question of the meaning of culture and the aim of education.⁴⁶

In Tillich's view, the humanistic educational ideal is correct, but given the conditions of existence it is unattainable in its entirety: an individual is not capable of realizing the whole human potential. Tillichian pedagogy admits of the humanistic educational ideal: the ideal is partly reachable for certain individuals under certain conditions, but given the factual

conditions of human life this ideal is not reachable for all. Because of the factual conditions, the goal of educational ideal should be such that it includes all persons and not only those who have the privilege of education. Tillich wrote: "Humanity is attained by self-determination and other-determination in mutual dependence. The individual strives for her/his own humanity and tries to help others reach humanity, an attempt which expresses her/his humanity".⁴⁷ Under the condition of existence the relationship to the human essential nature is broken and fragmented, it is ambiguous, and "therefore, self-determination into fulfilled humanity is impossible; nevertheless, it is necessary".⁴⁸ Human life, at the stage of autonomous culture, is a mixture of existential and essential elements. If humans lived in the best of the worlds, the ideal of fulfilled humanity would be reached by all. In the real life this is not the case because of the social, economical, and political conditions, and not least, because of the estrangement cutting through all life and all levels of encounter and understanding, leaving large groups of people outside the humanistic educational ideal. Therefore, the complete self-determination into fulfilled humanity (the uninhibited species activity) is practically impossible. Still humans are to strive for development on their own and the humanistic ideal should be a part of education; partly it is reachable for individuals as individuals.

This far the autonomous culture and humanistic education: the informative learning gives some knowledge of the world; autonomous cultural forms in education, science, and morality are there on their own; an individual is a mixture of existential and essential elements; the moments of the species activity are there, but the species activity is mixed with self-seeking and inhibited by estrangement; there is the cleft between the individual and the essential human nature. An individual cannot elevate her or him to a constant uninhibited species activity, only momentarily it is there. The species activity is in the individual, at the same time as it is above the individual, determining her or him in the activity of thinking, feeling, and willing. If the species activity is there, the center of personality is restored in relation to the human essential nature. False forms of self-elevation and self-sufficiency break down as the species activity is for all individuals as individuals. The species activity is expressing the human nature or the humanity of humans. One central goal of Tillichian pedagogy is, then, the restoration of the humanity of humans, the question "Education into what?" might

be answered in terms of the humanity of humans: the society is to be construed in such a way that the humanity of humans is reached by all. Education or learning is to create the space in which the center of personality is restored.

The givenness of being and of human nature

In Tillich's view, education or learning should go "deeper into reality" than the humanistic ideal seems to allow for: the goal of learning is *initiation* into the basic structures and relations of being, not only into those possibilities and potentials that are included in human nature in the autonomous culture. Being and human nature are congruent with each other according to Tillich: both are "givens" and they, so to say, "come together". Tillich links the question of the goal of human development with being, much in the same way as Heidegger did in his *Letter on Humanism*. In Tillich's view, the essential human nature is congruent with being; the species activity and being are congruent with each other. In this view "the idea of humanism is transcended without being denied".⁴⁹ The idea of humanism is that each and every individual as such, through self-determination, is capable of the uninhibited activity of thinking, feeling, and willing; that the essential human nature is expressed in and through the individual. In Tillich's view, education is "initiation", pointing "to the *terminus ad quem*, the "where to." Secular culture has lost an ultimate and commanding *terminus ad quem*, because it has lost an ultimate and unconditional concern".⁵⁰ In 1946 Tillich thought that the content of religious education, the where-to, is the sacred void.⁵¹ Later he seemed to have thought that the *seriousness* in questioning the direction, goal, and meaning of life, disregarding culture or particular religion, *points* to the presence of the holy in *all* life. This gives a non-religious interpretation of religion. The holy or the eternal, or as Tillich preferred to call it: the Spiritual Presence is in all life, not only in the religious life. There is the spiritual dimension in life itself, the spiritual dimension comes to expression in religion, in morality, but it also comes to expression outside religion. It is at this point that map-making becomes crucial as it helps us to point out the presence of the holy in the human life-encounter. The experience of the holy comes from the dimension *preceding* the subject/object split. The question of education and initiation, the question of "where to", might be answered in terms of the givenness of the preceding dimension. Self-determination is in relation to the preceding dimension:

The moral act, the act of personal self-constitution in the encounter with other persons, is based on participation in the transcendent union. This participation makes the moral act possible. By its Spiritual impact, the preceding transcendent union creates the actual union of the centered person with itself, the encountered world, and the ground of self and world.⁵²

It is not only the development of personality that is the goal of education, but a creative relationship with the creative source of all life *prior* to the subject/object split. In morality and in religion “the preceding absolute” comes to expression. The Other, through her/his very existence demands to be accepted as a person. In Tillich’s view there is:

The permanent resistance of every personality against any attempt to make it into a thing, to appropriate it and deprive it of its self-determination, is the presupposition for the rise of personality as such. Without this resistance of the “thou” to the “ego,” without the unconditional demand embodied in every person to be acknowledged as a person in theory and in practice, no personal life would be possible. A person becomes aware of her/his own character as a person only when s/he is confronted by another person. Only in the community of the I and the thou can personality arise.⁵³

The unconditional demand is the absolute in the human-to-human encounter. It is only in relation to the Other that we learn about ourselves. In meeting the Other we also become aware of that what in that very meeting transcends both the self and the Other: that we have a common humanity and that we are connected with the universe; we partake into something bigger than our selves. Being and the humanity of humans are interconnected. The absolute at the relational level is the demand to accept the Other as a person on her or his own (the moral act). This acceptance we cannot do, if we have not *felt* and *experienced* the acceptance for our own part. If the acceptance is there, the core of personality is there and the Other is allowed to stand her/his own ground and to develop in freedom. Our self-determination happens only in relation to the Other; self-determination is mutual enterprise at the relational level. As we learn to see beyond ourselves, we see that the Other comes with a world to us, that s/he is a bearer of a world, a true mask of God, God in disguise, whatever culture or religion s/he represents. S/he is a gift.

The relationship to the preceding dimension is in all life. Religious education, then, is not to teach a religious way of living, but it is to learn both

about religion and from religion about that what in religion *transcends religion*: the infinite is in religion, but it is not from religion. The Spiritual Presence or God is in the givenness of the encountered life. Religious education in ethics is not only to learn about the moral prescriptions throughout human history and in different cultures, it is also to learn about that which in moral life *transcends morality*: the demand coming from each and every person to be accepted as person, whatever culture or whatever nation, whatever religion this particular person belongs to. The acceptance is there in the power of that what transcends the individual selves and particular cultures. The Other is accepted as such: s/he is allowed to stand his or her own ground; s/he is allowed to express her/his meaning and identity through symbols suitable for her or him; the species activity is encouraged. Learning is about the restoration of the humanity of humans.

Endnotes

- 1 Megan Boler, 1999. *Feeling Power: Emotions and Education*. New York: Routledge.
- 2 Bjarne Lantz. 1994. *Paul Tillich. Filosofi, teologi, kultur*. Haslev: Gyldendal, pp. 288ff.
- 3 Andrew Wright, 2004. *Religion, Education and Post-modernity*. London: RoutledgeFalmer, p. 174.
- 4 “Many of the major multinational corporations already have corporate ‘universities’ with Deans, faculties and programmes of courses and training ranging from personal development to recognized qualifications critical for career progression, with some granting degrees in their own right. ... Corporate universities numbered over 2400 in 2002, and were forecast to overtake the number of private universities in the US by 2010.” Kerri Facer, 2011. *Learning Futures. Education, Technology, and Social Change*. London: Routledge, p. 26.
- 5 Sustainable strategies in education in counteracting “the highly polarized future” are discussed in Facer, 2011.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Wright, 2004.
- 8 See for example Luther M. Martin & Donald Wiebe, ‘Religious Studies as a Scientific Discipline: The Persistence of a Delusion’. *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*. Volume 80, number 3, September 2012, pp. 587-597.
- 9 “Our cognitive unconscious is capable of reasoning and has a larger “space” for operations than the conscious counterpart. (...) In all likelihood, there is an important reasoning process going on unconsciously, in the subterranean mind, and the reasoning produces results without the intervening steps ever being known.” Antonio Damasio, 2012. *Self Come to Mind. Constructing the Conscious Brain*. London: Vintage Books, 275f.
- 10 See Ibid., pp. 280ff.
- 11 Derek R. Nelson, ‘Absolutes, Relativism, and Teaching Dynamics of Faith’. *Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society*, vol. 38, no 4, 2012, p. 7.
- 12 Paul Tillich, 1964. *Theology of Culture*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 54.
- 13 Paul Tillich, 1984. *My Search for Absolutes*. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 27.
- 14 “Colleges have served to perpetuate a curriculum organized around traditional disciplines of knowledge, and thereby the colleges have had fatally inhibiting effect on curriculum experimentation. ... Over the course of roughly a century, many high school reformers have exhibited an only half-concealed tendency to demean the kind of academic knowledge that colleges have come to represent.” Herbert M. Kliebard, 2002. *Changing Course. American Curriculum Reform in the 20th Century*. New York: Teachers College Press, 50.

- 15 Matti Bergström, 1984. *The Green Theory*. Helsinki: WSOY. "Increased cognitive demands have made the interplay between the cortex (where consciousness is born) and brain stem a bit rough and brutal, or, to put it in kinder words, they have made access to the wellspring of feeling more difficult. (...) In the wars of consciousness the cerebral cortex tends to get the upper hand". Damasio, 2012:251.
- 16 Paul Tillich, 1932. *The Religious Situation*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, p. 108.
- 17 Ibid, p. 16.
- 18 Ibid, p. 111.
- 19 Paul Tillich, 1948. *The Protestant Era*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 264.
- 20 See Collins, Janet, Insley, Kim & Soler, Janet, 2001. *Developing Pedagogy. Researching Practice*. London: Paul Chapman Publishing.
- 21 Facer, 2011:37f. Facer is referring to Zygmunt Bauman.
- 22 Tillich, 1932:112.
- 23 Tillich, 1948:266.
- 24 Tillich, 1964:155.
- 25 Thomas S. Kuhn, 1970. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; Mark C. Taylor, 2004. *Confidence Games. Money and Markets in a World without Redemption*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- 26 Tillich, 1978:102.
- 27 Tillich, 1984:71.
- 28 Tillich, 1936:238. "But if everything is based on the Word, then the consciousness is overburdened. Therefore today we have a reaction against intellectualization of the Word in Protestantism." Paul Tillich, 'The New Community', in *Faith and Thought*. Vol. II, nr 1, 1984. New jersey: First Baptist Church of Montclair, p. 34
- 29 Tillich, 1964:156."Nobody can say exactly how much or how little a young child takes from a ritual act into her/his unconsciousness, even if s/he understands almost nothing of it." Ibid.
- 30 Tillich, 1984:80.
- 31 "The truth of ethical relativism lies in the moral law's inability to give commandments which are unambiguous, both in their general form and in their concrete application. Every moral law is abstract in relation to the unique and totally concrete situation." Paul Tillich, 1976. *Systematic Theology III*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 47.
- 32 Ibid, pp. 64ff.

- 33 "Receiving knowledge is verified by the creative union of two natures, that of knowing and that of the known. (...) Experiential verification must go on continually." Tillich, 1978:103.
- 34 Tillich, 1948:122.
- 35 Tillich, 1964:153.
- 36 Tillich, 1948:115.
- 37 Tillich, 1976:75.
- 38 Tillich, 1932:115f.
- 39 Victoria Rue, 2005. *Acting Religious. Theatre as Pedagogy in Religious Studies*. Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, pp. 3f.
- 40 Tillich, 1964:154f.
- 41 Paul Tillich, 1978. *Systematic Theology I*. London: SCM Press, p. 78.
- 42 Lars Spuybroek, 2011. *The Sympathy of Things. Ruskin and the Ecology of Design*. Rotterdam: V2_Publishing, pp. 62, 71.
- 43 Facer, 2011:112.
- 44 "The self without a world is empty; the world without a self is dead." Tillich, 1978:171, ST I.
- 45 Charles Taylor. 1992. *Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 46 Tillich, 1976:86.
- 47 Ibid., p. 75.
- 48 Ibid., p. 75.
- 49 Ibid., p. 249.
- 50 Tillich, 1948:65.
- 51 Ibid.
- 52 Tillich, 1976:159.
- 53 Tillich, 1948:125.

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Ethics, Interaction, and Differential Thinking

In abstract thinking based on body/soul dualism, thinking and sensing are placed apart from each other: thinking is defined as activity and sensing as passivity. In differential thinking, however, the two interact, and the self/world relationship becomes an active relationship. Once thinking becomes aware thinking, it encounters the differential elements of the soul and the different as such. The relationship to the different is expressed through differential thinking. One part of that relationship involves overcoming prior evaluations and prejudices.

The author traces the beginnings of differential thinking back to Schelling and to Hegel, locates its articulation in Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, and demonstrates how it reaches full expression within Paul Tillich, especially in his Social Ethics.

Differential thinking is occurring in time and place: it coordinates the past, the present, and the future, allowing for an orientation towards the future. Differential thinking links the individual with species activity, turning individuals into co-laborers in the evolutionary process of being. The cultural, religious, social, political, and educational implications of differential thinking are all examined in this text.

Jari Ristiniemi's previous works include *Experiential Dialectics* and *Wholeness and the Integral Mind*; towards *Self-Transcending Humanity*. He works at the University of Gävle, Sweden.