Luce Irigaray and Ludwig Wittgenstein are both critics of formal logic. Irigaray speaks of the desire for uniformity, while Wittgenstein refers to the craving for generality—tendencies that hinder our ability to attend to the nuances of life and language. In Irigaray’s case, her critique is intimately connected to the task of revealing and articulating the Feminine. For Wittgenstein, it is closely related to his philosophy of mathematics. Both thinkers direct their critiques not only at the specific details of formal logic but also at its overarching use and influence. In this paper, I will use Marjorie Hass’s essay ‘Fluid Thinking: Irigaray’s Critique of Formal Logic’ (Hass 2002) as a starting point to explore Irigaray’s objections to formal logic alongside Wittgenstein’s. Methodologically, the paper is an interwoven commentary on Hass’s paper, informed by Rush Rhees's understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics and directly by the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics.